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In this time of extreme fragility in the world economy, when the needs of the 
world’s poor are as pressing as ever, all who work or study in the field of 
economic development must constantly reconsider what’s working, what’s 
not working, and what can work better. Economists, scientists, activists, poli-
ticians, investors, workers: all have a responsibility to carefully consider how 
best to contribute to the development agenda. Lawyers are no exception. Law-
yers and legal specialists who work in the development sphere must engage 
in unending self-examination if they are to continue to make a useful, indeed 
essential, contribution to fighting poverty. 
The role of law, or rather the role of the “rule of law,” in achieving devel-
opment outcomes has been acknowledged and studied extensively in recent 
decades. More analysis and debate are required, however, to understand the 
complicated and multifaceted nature of this role. That is a task that requires 
the input of practitioners, legal experts, and many others who encounter or 
work with legal systems. The World Bank Legal Review gathers this input from 
around the world and compiles it into a useful resource for all development 
practitioners and scholars. The subtitle of this volume, Legal Innovation and 
Empowerment for Development, highlights how the law can respond to the chal-
lenges posed to development objectives in a world slowly emerging from an 
economic crisis. The focus on innovation is a call for new, imaginative strate-
gies and ways of thinking about what the law can do in the development 
realm. The focus on empowerment is a deliberate attempt to place the law into 
the hands of the poor; to give them another tool with which to resist poverty. 
The two themes are linked by their shared importance in the face of economic 
uncertainty. There is an urgent need for new, innovative thinking, and a great 
need to empower the poor to defend themselves. 
This volume shows some of the ways that the law can make an innovative 
and empowering difference in development scenarios. Development prob-
lems are complex and varied, and the theme of innovation and empowerment 
naturally has a broad scope. Consequently, this volume reaches far and wide. 
It considers the nature, promise, and limitations of legal innovation and legal 
empowerment. It looks at concrete examples in places such as Africa, the Asia-
Pacific region, and Latin America. It considers developments in issues with 
universal application, such as the rights of the disabled and the effectiveness 
of asset recovery measures.
xi
Forewordxii
The World Bank Legal Review contains many valuable lessons and creative 
responses. I hope that the exciting ideas in this volume will inspire lawyers 
and non-lawyers alike to consider what new contribution they can make to 




The effects of the global financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession are 
still being felt throughout the world and continue to be a preoccupation of 
the World Bank and other development institutions. Meanwhile, the Bank’s 
member countries face a range of other economic challenges and crises. As a 
result, demand for the Bank’s assistance remains elevated. In addition to re-
sponding to debilitating crises, both real and potential, the Bank ensures that 
its resources are focused on the long, hard road to economic development. 
The Bank’s team of lawyers and legal specialists has a crucial role to play 
in proactively supporting the Bank in the achievement of its development 
objectives. It is our responsibility to provide a sound legal response to these 
many challenges. It is also our responsibility to ensure that that response rep-
resents world’s best practice and is at the cutting edge of contemporary think-
ing about what the law can and should do to support development goals. 
With these responsibilities in mind, we have compiled the fourth volume of 
The World Bank Legal Review, subtitled Legal Innovation and Empowerment for 
Development. In a time of difficulty and change, innovative ideas and strate-
gies to empower the poor are more important than ever. 
Many (although not all) of the contributions to this volume of The World 
Bank Legal Review emerged from the second annual World Bank Law, Justice 
and Development Week, held in Washington, D.C., in November 2011. Jointly 
hosted by the General Counsels of all the World Bank Group organizations, 
the Law, Justice and Development Week brought together leading scholars, 
legal practitioners, development experts, policy institutes, universities, and 
other concerned parties to share lessons and inspiration. A sense of the great 
range of legal innovations and empowerment strategies that were discussed 
and debated is captured in this book. All of the diverse issues under discussion 
were linked by the understanding that the law must respond with solutions 
that are innovative and empowering. New problems call for new answers.
I thank the contributors to this volume. The diverse topics they discuss 
and the varied perspectives they represent have been organized by four dis-
tinguished editors: Chenguang Wang of Tsinghua University, Sam Muller of 
the Hague Institute for the Internationalization of Law (HiiL), Chantal Thomas 
of Cornell University, and our Deputy General Counsel for Knowledge and 
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Research, Hassane Cissé. Dr. Nigel Quinney provided invaluable editorial as-
sistance. This volume deals with important and intriguing topics in law and 
development, and the contributors’ analyses will assist anyone who is inter-
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The concept of the rule of law has now garnered near-universal recognition 
both as a means and as an end of socioeconomic improvement in poor coun-
tries. Yet, the very universality of the concept has generated next-level prob-
lems. The rule of law as an abstract goal offers little guidance about the practi-
cal aspects of such a goal in specific contexts. As Hassane Cissé notes in this 
volume, “[d]evelopment policymakers have learnt through bitter experience 
that a uniform, one-size-fits-all approach to policy interventions in poor coun-
tries can have unfortunate, indeed disastrous, consequences.”1 The challenge 
for rule of law reformers, then, is to overcome the pitfalls of a one-size-fits-all 
approach and instead to devise regulatory strategies suitable and responsive 
to the local environment. 
An additional challenge for rule of law and related “good governance” 
reforms is that the economic liberalization programs accompanying such 
policies often have failed to address social inequities and hierarchies. Some 
contemporary development policy analysts have focused on how to incor-
porate these social goals. For example, Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom 
provides a template for understanding how the fulfillment of civil, political, 
and social rights could be factored into development policy.2 The challenge 
is to ensure that opportunities for, and benefits of, prosperity are equitably 
enjoyed, and that the least advantaged are able to share them.
Both of these challenges—transposing policies to particular contexts and 
ensuring more equitable processes and outcomes of policy reform—inspire 
the theme of this volume: Legal Innovation and Empowerment for Development. 
The fourth installment of a research effort under way at the World Bank, this 
volume highlights both the necessity of innovating law and policy to address 
specific development contexts and the importance of doing so in a way that 
will contribute to socioeconomic empowerment. In this way, the volume 
makes the case that legal innovation can drive, rather than simply reflect, em-
powerment and development. 
The theme of legal innovation and empowerment for development com-
plements substantive and institutional sensibilities in current development 
policy. Substantively, development policy discourse seems to have moved 
away from tacking hard toward statist policy or neoliberal policy. Rather, 
1  See, in this volume, Hassane Cissé, Legal Empowerment of the Poor: Past, Present, Future.
2  Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford U. Press 1999).
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something of a more self-consciously moderate approach is emerging in which 
the basic commitment to market-oriented regulation is affirmed, but the im-
portance of meeting social needs as a concurrent rather than a long-term goal 
is simultaneously recognized.3
Institutionally, this self-styled pragmatism is reflected through the en-
dorsement of “new governance” techniques that blend public sector and pri-
vate sector approaches. Public-private partnerships constitute one important 
example, but there are many variations, such as a bottom-line approach to 
measuring policy effects that resembles market metrics.
There is cause for hope that these new approaches may help balance out 
some of the excesses of prior eras. They may be reflected in a greater focus 
on locality, as well as a greater focus on inclusiveness in processes of gover-
nance. Equally welcome is the greater awareness of the importance of self-
assessment by the range of actors who participate in the development policy 
cosmos: developed-country governments, international organizations, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 
Still, one might ask how much of this apparent change remains only sur-
face deep. Can these reforms transform deeply entrenched policy orientations 
on the ground? Is the turn to social innovation and empowerment merely cos-
metic, leaving underlying structural dynamics and biases intact? How pos-
sible is genuine interdisciplinary exchange among the various categories of 
experts in law, economics, and public policy? There is much evidence that 
deep institutional “inefficiencies” remain. Key among these are imperfect in-
formation, powerful interests, and subjective models.4
Despite these persistent questions, many new developments in the field 
are promising and interesting, and some of these are presented in this volume. 
In exploring contemporary examples of legal innovation and empowerment, 
the volume offers a variety of focal points. Some chapters focus on elaborating 
the broad concepts of innovation and empowerment. Others focus on govern-
mental innovations in particular country contexts. Still others discuss the role 
of NGOs and civil society. Finally, some chapters describe emerging trends in 
international laws and organizations. Although this brief introduction cannot 
do justice to the richness and complexity of these contributions, it does con-
sider each focal point in turn.
The Conceptual State of Play
What precisely is meant by “legal innovation” and “legal empowerment”? 
The general issue of legal, judicial, and constitutional innovation is addressed 
3  See, in this volume, David M. Trubek, Diogo R. Coutinho, & Mario G. Schapiro, Toward a New 
Law and Development: New State Activism in Brazil and the Challenge for Legal Institutions.
4  Chantal Thomas, Law and Neoclassical Economic Development: Toward an Institutionalist Critique 
of Institutionalism, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 968, 1018–1023 (2011).
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by Sam Muller and Maurits Barendrecht in “The Justice Innovation Approach: 
How Justice Sector Leaders in Development Contexts Can Promote Innova-
tion.” The authors stress competition among potential providers (alternative 
dispute resolution is envisioned as a potential competitor to traditional judi-
cial processes) as well as a redefinition of members of society as stakeholders. 
Within this framework, Muller and Barendrecht emphasize a few key as-
pects of desirable “justice innovation.” First, it is low cost and bottom up. Sec-
ond, it emphasizes that even though policy goals should be clear, the factors 
leading to their realization will inevitably be complex, reflecting the environ-
ment on the ground. Third, this version of justice innovation favors public-
private partnerships in the delivery of access to justice, including something 
like a “Build-Operate-Transfer” model (in which investors are permitted to 
build and operate a firm for a period of time in exchange for, among other 
things, an agreement to transfer possession eventually to the owner). Finally, 
this version emphasizes the importance of protecting and rewarding innova-
tion and experimentation. 
The authors offer a pragmatic approach to the question of how to deliver 
a public good, such as justice, through a model based on the ideal of private 
sector competition. Such an approach may have the virtue of encouraging 
clearer quantification and greater accountability through a “marketized” fo-
cus on systemic “profits,” in the form of increased satisfaction with access to 
justice, which might permit more precise measurement of the “deliverables” 
of reform. At the same time, some implications of competition in the justice 
sector remain unclear. For example, if competition leads to the proliferation of 
dispute resolution fora, will the “forum shopping” that likely ensues improve 
the justice sector through regulatory competition, or encourage negative ex-
ternalities (i.e., gaming the system)? More profoundly, what danger might 
privatizing justice pose to public policy goals?
As for legal empowerment, this concept is taken up in Hassane Cissé in 
“Legal Empowerment of the Poor: Past, Present, Future.” Now that the “idea 
that law has an important role to play in promoting economic development 
has become well established,” Cissé notes that the “traditional focus on in-
stitutions and government machinery has been widened to bring the people 
themselves into view.”
Legal empowerment of the poor (LEP) is in part a reaction to classical 
rule of law approaches, which focus too much on “institutions and state struc-
tures,” perhaps with the unstated premise that these automatically benefit the 
poor, rather than on whether such benefits are quantifiably delivered. Cissé 
emphasizes the point made by Muller and Barendrecht that earlier approach-
es have been overly top down and therefore likely to misapprehend the con-
text of those on the lower rungs of society.
Despite these improvements, Cissé notes some difficulties with LEP. First, 
there is the problem of “causality versus correlation” that characterizes the 
entire field of good governance policy—does economic empowerment result 
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from, or lead to, better institutions? Second, there is the delicate matter of 
compliance of LEP reforms with the World Bank Articles of Agreement, which 
prohibit interference in political matters. Third, in the form it has taken up 
to now, most visibly in the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 
(CLEP), LEP has come under criticism for overestimating the impact of legal 
exclusion as opposed to other factors on poverty and adopting neoliberal eco-
nomic assumptions. Among the latter, property rights enforcement is “pos-
sibly the most contested” on the CLEP agenda.
Beyond these conceptual difficulties, there are some applied challenges in 
implementing LEP policy. Cissé writes of the need to see LEP as not merely a 
technocratic strategy, but also as one that entails confronting the reality of en-
trenched power elites and interests. Additionally, vigilance against one-size-
fits-all policies must continue. Examples of local LEP solutions include greater 
incorporation of informal justice systems.
If the perils of one-size-fits-all are to be taken seriously, then general ideas 
about legal empowerment and innovation must take into context more spe-
cific social hierarchies. A useful intervention in thinking through one kind of 
particularity—gender equality—is offered by Jeni Klugman and Sarah Twigg 
in “The Role of Laws and Institutions in Expanding Women’s Voice, Agency, 
and Empowerment.” As these authors point out, gender equality has now 
been mainstreamed as a focus of development policy, one example of which 
is the 2012 World Development Report, whose title is Gender Equality and 
Development. 
A focus on gender equality encourages analytically productive atten-
tion to the effects of law. The authors focus in part on formally unequal rules, 
pointing out that although more and more countries have incorporated non-
discrimination principles into their basic laws, many “still have legal provi-
sions that overtly discriminate against women in both formal statutory and 
customary law.” These formal inequalities affect, among other things, access 
by women to entrepreneurial opportunity through restriction of their ability 
to sign contracts, open bank accounts, and undertake other business activities. 
A gender equality analysis requires looking at whether the laws apply for-
mally unequal rules as well as at whether they enforce a regulatory structure 
that is conducive to the kind of economic growth that would increase the well-
being of women (and, by extension, children and households more generally). 
For example, family law can enforce differential treatment, as in the case of 
many inheritance laws. It can also enforce seemingly neutral provisions that 
nevertheless generate a disparate adverse impact on women. The authors give 
an example of the latter when discussing the failure of some legal systems to 
provide for joint ownership in marriage.
The potentially disparate effects of titling practices point to the impor-
tance of understanding context before adopting prescribed LEP reforms such 
as property registration. Without understanding the existing legal and eco-
nomic distribution of resources, such registration might have the effect of dis-
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owning less powerful members of a community. The authors describe one 
project, the Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System, which ad-
dressed this issue by introducing land registration and creating joint titling at 
the same time—a significant social intervention. Such examples suggest the 
importance of context within the more specific category of gender.
Country Contexts
Further to the centrality of context in shaping development policy, the volume 
considers a variety of country studies. Among the most innovative in the field 
have been the emerging developing country economies. Brazil and China are 
leaders within these ranks, and this volume offers multiple perspectives on 
each country.
China
In “Legal Transplantation and Legal Development in Transitional China,” 
Chenguang Wang takes on the debate about the benefits of legal transplants 
in the specific context of China. Wang notes that transplantation should not 
be viewed as exceptional: every legal system has evolved through reference to 
others. Yet, transplants are vulnerable to several critiques. Synthesizing these 
two sides of the debate, he offers a view of transplants that seeks to capture 
their benefits while minimizing their potential harms.
As Wang demonstrates, China in the past several years has boldly ad-
opted numerous legal transplants, but with two innovative characteristics that 
have increased the chances for success. First, policy makers have integrated 
transplanted laws with “aboriginal” laws. Second, transplants have involved 
selective, as opposed to wholesale, adoption.
In “Achieving Development through Innovative Constitutionalism: 
A China Story,” Zhenmin Wang and Yuan Tao tell a story that bears out 
Chenguang Wang’s narrative of incremental transplantation. Wang and Tao de-
scribe the gradual and piecemeal reform of China’s constitution from socialist 
legal and political commitments to the constitutionalism of liberal capitalist 
economies. They argue that this style of reform has contributed significantly 
to China’s economic rise. Regardless of actual causality, these reforms form an 
important part of the larger legal picture.
In “Rule of Law as a Watermark: China’s Legal and Judicial Challenges,” 
Stéphanie Balme, looks beyond China’s constitution to its massive adoption, 
from the late 1970s onward, of new legislation and administrative regula-
tions—an exertion she dubs “quantitative legislative reforms.” 
These reforms coincided with the adoption of the 1982 constitution, and, 
in many cases, provided processes for redressing grievances that were admin-
istrative rather than judicial, such as the proliferation of xinfang offices. Balme 
suggests that China’s process of legalization is incomplete and ongoing. This 
process is evidenced by, among other things, a gradual increase in both formal 
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legal and nonlegal mediation disputes over xinfang complaints; improvement 
of the legal system’s “hardware” through better education and regulation of 
the legal profession and judicial system; and increased incorporation of hu-
man rights discourse.
Among the remaining challenges are the legal guarantee of ownership 
rights, which suffers because the current system is complex and the judicial 
system does not have clear authority to regulate. Underlying all this is the fact 
that, even though the adoption of the new constitution precipitated much of 
this reform, there continues to be a 
lack of respect for the constitution . . . explained by the de facto 
absence of a hierarchy of norms (despite a clear definition of the 
“sources of the law,” [fa yuan]), resulting in confusion both in the or-
ganization and in the legal texts, administrative regulations, and de-
crees. It can also be explained by the lack of a clear conception of the 
position of the constitution in the hierarchy of the normative system.
The chapters by Balme and Wang and Tao support Chenguang Wang’s 
general analysis of the piecemeal and partial nature of legal transplantation 
and reform in China. This process leaves much to be desired. At the same 
time, one might see the disorganized quality of legal reform in China as an 
acceptable price for a greater legitimacy borne of incremental change as op-
posed to radical transplantation.
Brazil 
As with China and its adoption of a new constitution in 1982, the adoption of 
a new constitution in 1988 marked a watershed moment in the transforma-
tion of the structure of economic law and regulation for Brazil. In “Toward 
a New Law and Development: New State Activism in Brazil and the Chal-
lenge for Legal Institutions,” David M. Trubek, Diogo R. Coutinho, and Mario 
G. Schapiro identify a resulting new wave of governance that seeks to avoid 
perceived extremes of prior eras in development policy in Brazil—both the 
unrelenting statism of the early decolonization period and the adamantly 
deregulatory orientation of the Washington Consensus.
Although Brazil’s government adopted characteristic policies in both 
eras, by the late 1980s, the country was beginning to move toward the ap-
proach that Trubek et al. deem “new state activism.” Beginning with the 1988 
constitution, building through the Cardoso administration of the mid-1990s, 
and maturing after the 2002 election of Lula da Silva, new state activism em-
braces innovation in governance in two respects. First, innovation as an end is 
encouraged, particularly in industrial policy. Specialized measures designed 
to boost select market sectors have been adopted successfully over objections 
that “governments were not able to strategically identify targets.” Second, in-
novation characterizes the means by which policies are implemented. In par-
ticular, new state activism features partnerships between the government and 
the private sector that improve capacity on both sides.
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The authors describe a series of structural conditioning factors that have 
driven innovation in these various manifestations. Legal protections for prop-
erty rights and against expropriation, arising from domestic constitutional law 
and from international treaty commitments, arguably forced the Lula admin-
istration to pursue social policy goals through new techniques that ultimately 
were friendlier to both domestic and foreign investors. 
The innovative approach to governance that Trubek et al. describe is fur-
ther detailed in the context of environmental and water law by Luciano Badini 
and Luciano Alvarenga in “The Role of the Public Ministry in the Defense of 
the Environment: Hydrogeographical Regions and Attitudes for Coping with 
Socioenvironmental Conflicts.” Badini and Alvarenga focus on the techniques 
that the Brazilian Public Ministry has used to achieve environmental protec-
tion and conservation objectives related to freshwater. 
The authors begin by noting that the Public Ministry is a product of the 
1988 constitution, and as such exemplifies that document’s combination of 
ambitious social goals and institutional prudentialism, as described in Tru-
bek et al. Badini and Alvarenga then discuss the particular strategies adopted 
in relation to freshwater regulation: first, the reorganization of the territorial 
objects of regulation from a fragmented scheme to one based on the drainage 
basin as the basic unit of analysis; and second, the pursuit of nonjudicial and 
therefore presumably less costly approaches to conflict resolution.
In the cases of both Brazil and China, we see the operation of the prag-
matic and synthetic approaches that are also invoked in more general form 
in the discussions of Muller and Barendrecht and of Cissé. In both countries, 
successful reform policies arose out of careful attention to context and a com-
paratively gradual pace. Concessions were made to external and internal con-
straints of legal and economic liberalism, but socially transformative goals 
were no less vigorously pursued. A comparative reading of these chapters 
highlights a notable difference between the two countries: whereas in Brazil 
the overarching focus of socially transformative policies appears to have been 
direct poverty-reduction measures, in the Chinese context, more traditional 
economic growth has remained a priority; and although these measures are 
also achieving poverty reduction, they may do so at the immediate (though 
increasingly contested) expense of the environment and the displacement of 
socially marginal populations. 
The Global North
Within good governance policy, anticorruption efforts play a major role in 
supporting rule of law reform. The legal innovations discussed by Rita Adam 
in “Innovation in Asset Recovery: The Swiss Perspective” and Karyn Kenny in 
“International Asset Sharing: A Multipurpose Tool for Development” point to 
the beginnings of an important trend in anticorruption policy—one in which 
developed countries interrogate their own legal systems to identify and cor-
rect connections to theft of public assets in poor countries. The complicity of 
financial institutions and legal systems in the global north contributes to these 
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broader enabling conditions. The temptation of financial corruption in poor 
countries is magnified by the ability to secure ill-gotten gains in legal jurisdic-
tions out of the reach of local actors. 
Adam describes legal reforms in Switzerland that allow the Swiss Federal 
Council to freeze assets reasonably suspected to be the product of public theft 
and to repatriate those assets to the home country without the cooperation 
of either the home country government (which, Adam argues, may be too 
weak and ineffective to mount an effective request) or local prosecutorial au-
thorities. Kenny describes multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral arrangements 
to share assets among countries when those assets constitute the proceeds of 
crime that implicates multiple jurisdictions, such as drug trafficking or money 
laundering.
Much of the contemporary global anticorruption campaign has been ham-
pered by a failure to realize that corruption in poor countries arises not only 
from local malfeasance, but also from enabling conditions across borders and 
within a globalized political economy. Both Adam and Kenny describe inno-
vations that have disrupted and minimized the perverse incentives that for-
eign jurisdictions offer to commit corruption.
NGOs and Civil Society
Whereas the chapters described above focus on governmental reforms, others 
in this volume take on the role of NGOs and civil society in pursuing legal in-
novation and legal empowerment. 
In “The Political Economy of Improving Traditional Justice Systems: A 
Case Study of NGO Engagement with Shalish in Bangladesh,” Stephen Golub 
examines the advantages and disadvantages of employing traditional and 
customary forms of dispute resolution such as shalish. The advantages, ac-
cording to Golub, include increased effectiveness due to greater legitimacy 
and lower user and operational costs. The disadvantages include unwieldi-
ness and unpredictability, as well as reinforcement of traditional hierarchies 
such as gender inequality.
Golub describes how NGOs have worked to modify traditional shalish so 
as to address some of the disadvantages. In so doing, these NGOs are taking 
an innovative approach to the goal of increasing access to justice. Rather than 
replacing traditional justice with a legal transplant, they are seeking to adapt 
tradition to contemporary concerns while retaining institutional advantages. 
At the same time, extensive NGO involvement can raise questions of account-
ability or neutrality in influencing the outcomes of disputes. Moreover, efforts 
to correct ingrained social prejudices may fail, resulting in their inadvertent 
retrenchment. Golub concludes by recommending a cautious optimism with 
respect to shalish but also emphasizes the need for further study, not only of 
shalish, but also of other fora for alternative dispute resolution.
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In “‘We Want What the OK Tedi Women Have!’ Guidance from Papua 
New Guinea on Women’s Engagement in Mining Deals,” Nicholas Menzies 
and Georgia Harley tell the story of a mining agreement negotiation in Papua 
New Guinea in which some participants in the negotiations represented wom-
en as a community group. These interests were not represented by a formally 
constituted NGO, but rather more informally in the sense of women repre-
senting a significant group in civil society.
The participation of women in the OK Tedi negotiations is a promising ex-
ample of bringing civil society to the table and more generally of recognizing 
the interests of noncorporate stakeholders in investment. Menzies and Harley 
identify specific characteristics that allowed the women representatives to ne-
gotiate successfully—most important, the experience and skills of the negotia-
tors themselves.
Yet, the various benefits that were negotiated have suffered from spotty 
implementation. Once the agreement was concluded, the national govern-
ment of Papua New Guinea failed to take an interest in implementing the 
measures it called for, and the negotiators left the scene, leaving the communi-
ty ill-equipped to attend to implementation. This points to some of the struc-
tural disadvantages of bringing civil society or the community in as a separate 
group in the formation of large foreign investment agreements. Although the 
“community development” aspects of the agreement represented a laudable 
innovation on the standard foreign direct investment model inspired by the 
goal of empowerment, further innovation in implementation will be required 
to realize this goal more fully.
Multilateral Contexts
Particularly in this age of globalization, the regulatory environment in most 
countries is significantly shaped by the values and practices of international 
legal regimes and organizations. These domains of international law extend 
across a range of subject matters, from human rights to finance. 
Innovations in this area involve creating stronger connections between the 
goals of particular specialized regimes. In “Human Rights and Development: 
Regime Interaction and the Fragmentation of International Law,” Siobhán 
McInerney-Lankford speaks to this question. Her chapter begins with a gen-
eral observation of the phenomenon of fragmentation in international law and 
a demonstration of fragmentation in regards to human rights law and devel-
opment law. Institutionally, these fields remain largely separate. 
McInerney-Lankford argues, however, that there is also an increasing 
convergence between human rights and development. Substantively, this con-
vergence arises in “shared principles such as equality, participation, account-
ability, transparency, and voice, as well as in attention to vulnerable groups.” 
These policies are acknowledged by international organizations from the 
United Nations to the International Finance Corporation. 
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However, “not all such provisions translate into a reliance on human 
rights in a direct operational sense.” McInerney-Lankford points to region-
al systems, particularly those in Europe, that intertwine human rights and 
development more extensively. For example, the European Union formally 
incorporates human rights principles in its economic partnerships with non-
European countries.
Such integration, McInerney-Lankford believes, should be more broadly 
adopted. In this way, she calls for regime interaction as both an innovation 
and an empowerment strategy. Ideally, international law will eventually 
consist of “human rights as a shared legal framework, highlighting both 
partner and donor obligations under international human rights law and of-
fering concrete operational entry points for their application in development 
activities.”
In “Beyond the Orthodoxy of Rule of Law and Justice Sector Reform: 
A Framework for Legal Empowerment and Innovation through the Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,” Janet E. Lord, Deepti Samant 
Raja, and Peter Blanck show how this convention—one of the newer ad- 
ditions to the United Nations’ “core” human rights treaties—innovates by 
establishing extensive guidelines for domestic implementation of the trea-
ty’s principles.
In “Transforming through Transparency: Opening Up the World Bank’s 
Sanctions Regime,” Conrad C. Daly and Frank A. Fariello, Jr., describe the 
Bank’s sanctions regime, which was established in 1996 to combat corruption 
and fraud in the disbursement of funds. The regime forms part of a greater ef-
fort by the Bank to increase accountability and transparency in its operations, 
and stands alongside better-known innovations of the Bank such as its Inspec-
tion Panel, which examines compliance with Bank protocols more broadly.
Such reforms represent commendable efforts to bring good governance 
policy home; that is, to prioritize good governance principles not only in bor-
rower countries but also in the Bank’s own institutional practices. One ques-
tion that emerges in considering these reforms is why the Inspection Panel 
and the sanctions regime are separate institutions. It seems debatable whether 
the reasons for such separation extend beyond mere historical contingency. As 
these kinds of internal reforms develop, perhaps the Bank will integrate and 
consolidate its various monitoring functions.
In “Intellectual Property: Facilitating Technology Transfer for Develop-
ment,” Roy F. Waldron discusses the innovative arrangements that phar-
maceutical companies are entering into with public sector actors in order to 
increase access to medicines, framed by the author as the transfer and applica-
tion of medical technology to national public health. 
Such innovations are directly linked to empowerment in that they may 
allow developing countries to increase levels of public health in vulnerable 
populations and in society more generally. Although many of the specific de-
tails of these agreements are not discussed for reasons of confidentiality, they 
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appear to be highly promising responses to the problem of access to medi-
cines, in which the research and development prowess of pharmaceutical 
companies can be harnessed by nonprofit organizations with public health as 
their main priority.
These arrangements involve a number of different types of international 
organizations, including the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and the World 
Health Organization (WHO). These organizations often take leading roles in 
these arrangements, as do other nonprofit and research organizations such 
as the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation in Brazil and the Geneva-based Drugs for 
Neglected Diseases Initiative. 
Furthermore, these initiatives take place against the backdrop of inter-
national economic law established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Since the 
adoption of TRIPS, the WTO membership has taken several strides to clarify 
that the more stringent patent-protection rules in TRIPS should not apply to 
many developing country access-to-medicine issues.5
These developments in international intellectual property rules have re-
arranged the leverage of the parties Waldron describes in his chapter. These 
parties are “bargaining in the shadow of the law”6—in this case, TRIPS law. 
Thus, although it is true that, as Waldron points out, pharmaceutical compa-
nies are willing to engage in these technology transfer agreements only be-
cause patent-protection rules are in place, willingness is likely enhanced by 
the emergence of legally valid exceptions to those rules. In other words, these 
companies have an incentive to reach voluntary agreements rather than be 
subjected to the compulsory licensing permitted by the TRIPS exceptions.
In “OHADA Nears the Twenty-Year Mark: An Assessment,” Renaud 
Beauchard looks at the regional context of the Organization for the Harmoni-
zation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). An ambitious integration scheme, 
OHADA represents a step forward for the region in terms of the recognition 
of the benefits of intraregional trade. At the same time, OHADA bears signs 
of adverse side effects of legal transplantation. Considering the chapters on 
China presented in this volume, a comparison between modes of transplan-
tation is perhaps instructive. Whereas China’s transplants were relatively 
piecemeal, OHADA constituted a major and sudden overhaul involving 
some elements that were not particularly useful in the local context, such as 
a bankruptcy act. Whereas China’s reforms integrated aboriginal practices, 
OHADA’s seemed to ignore local practices and instead emphasized uniformity 
and conformity with national and international standards. 
5  WTO Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), which 
was followed by the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sep. 2, 2003).
6  Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 88 Yale L. J. 950 
(1979).
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For example, the author discusses the difficulty in convincing local actors 
to settle transactional matters according to OHADA law: they observe that 
the complex structure of local markets in the central location of Cotonou “op-
erates almost entirely outside the realm of formal law and ignores OHADA.” 
Although some efficiencies are probably be gained by coming into compli-
ance with OHADA, the possibility of competing efficiencies of local practices 
and “private ordering”7 appear to have been wholly dismissed, creating the 
danger that OHADA will cause greater disruption than improvement of re-
gional markets.
Given these difficulties, the history recounted in Marc Frilet’s “Legal In-
novation for Development: The OHADA Experience” is instructive. Frilet 
explains that OHADA drafters sought to correct deficiencies in business law 
practices in the newly independent francophone African countries. Because 
of difficulty in ascertaining applicable principles of local law, and other in-
formation and capacity asymmetries, Frilet states, French law firms servicing 
local clients tended to provide “authoritative interpretations” based on the 
company law of their home country. Although this practice may have served 
as a useful stopgap measure in the early days of independence, the need for 
a clearer and more locally accessible legal framework inspired the efforts that 
culminated in OHADA.
Thus, the reasoning behind OHADA was largely sound. The member 
countries stood to capture efficiency gains through legal harmonization that 
could spur much-needed regional growth. Moreover, the initiative and par-
ticipation of distinguished experts and regional authorities to achieve this 
objective was commendable. As Frilet notes, however, both the substantive 
and the institutional realization of OHADA’s objectives remain incomplete. 
Substantively, the framework does not address topics that Frilet asserts are 
crucially important to current development strategies, such as public contract 
law. Institutionally, OHADA continues to struggle with implementation, both 
for reasons of capacity and because the framework is not yet widely under-
stood by or familiar to local actors. 
Consequently, the “OHADA experience” offers insights into what kinds 
of innovative approaches are likely to be successful. Perhaps a more wide-
ly consultative and participatory process could have yielded a more readily 
adaptive legal framework. In addition, OHADA reinforces the critical need 
for institutional and administrative capacity to implement legal innovations 
once adopted. At the same time, such recommendations come with a num-
ber of challenges. OHADA drafters may have avoided wider consultation for 
fear that it would slow or stop momentum. And the devotion of scarce insti-
tutional resources to the ambitious goals of OHADA requires costly choices 
both economically and politically. OHADA exemplifies both the appeal and 
the pitfalls of legal innovation strategies.
7  Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 
89 Harv. L. Rev. 637 (1976).




This volume reflects the interconnected roles that actors in development 
policy—governments, donors, lenders, investors, and civil society—play in 
shaping the substance and the effect of legal reforms. Legal innovation and 
empowerment for development recognizes and responds to this interdepen-
dence. The analytics of attentiveness to context, participatory decision mak-
ing, and systemic institutional assessment that emerge from these studies 
offer valuable contributions to the ongoing effort to revitalize contemporary 
approaches to law, equity, and global justice.
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The Justice Innovation Approach 
How Justice Sector Leaders in Development  
Contexts Can Promote Innovation 
Sam muller and mauritS Barendrecht
In September 2012, the UN General Assembly devoted its opening debate to 
the rule of law.1 A clearer signal that the community of states attaches great 
importance to the development of the rule of law is hardly imaginable. In De-
livering Justice: Programme of Action to Strengthen the Rule of Law at the National 
and International Levels, the secretary-general of the United Nations proposed 
a program called “delivering justice.” According to this report, the rule of law 
involves more than the state and its institutions: it “is at the heart of the social 
contract between the State and individuals under its jurisdiction, and ensures 
that justice permeates at every level.” The report continues: “responsibility for 
ensuring rule of law . . . lies with member States and their citizens.”2 Clearly, the 
rule of law is about more than simply setting rules; it also involves mecha-
nisms to ensure that rules and dispute-resolution processes actually work. De-
livering Justice contains sections about budgeting and planning, accountable 
and transparent delivery at the national level, monitoring, the role of civil 
society, and informal and traditional justice systems. Rather than encourag-
ing states to enact more laws or ensuring that new rights are protected, the 
secretary-general proposes that states set goals for ensuring the rule of law, 
assume a monitoring role, measure effectiveness, perform benchmarking ex-
ercises, and report progress against indicators. In sum, the report encourages 
state actors to rethink their role in delivering justice. 
This chapter develops this idea further. It shows how justice sector lead-
ers—ministers of justice, secretaries-general of ministries, strategy depart-
ments of ministries, chief justices, and directors of public prosecution agen-
cies—can help society deliver justice rather than simply providing justice 
themselves. The chapter assumes that the process of delivering justice can be 
improved in a way similar to the delivery of health care, education, or electricity: 
through continuous innovation. It addresses the issue of how justice sector 
leaders can enable effective justice innovation.
1  See UN General Assembly Resolution A/Res/66/102 (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://
www.unrol.org/files/GA%20Resolution%202012.pdf, paragraph 15 et seq. 
2  See Delivering Justice: Programme of Action to Strengthen the Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels, Report of the Secretary-General 2, 6–8 (Mar. 16, 2012). 
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The analysis is written with the development context in mind. However, 
the suggested approach is relevant for all countries, albeit with different pri-
orities and areas of emphasis. 
This chapter first explains the meaning of justice innovation. Then it sets 
out what a strategic justice leader can do to stimulate and consolidate rule 
of law. The chapter ends by explaining exactly why the justice innovation 
approach is worth pursuing and how it can help deal with a number of 
challenges. 
What Is Justice Innovation? 
Building on the Wikipedia definition, we say that justice innovation is the effort 
to create better or more effective justice products, processes, services, technol-
ogies, or ideas that are accepted by markets, governments, and society. Two 
concepts stand out in this definition: the emphasis on better or more effective 
justice products and the need to ensure that these products are actually used 
and liked by all stakeholders. 
Rule of law assistance and justice sector budgets tend to fund the build-
ing or strengthening of existing state institutions. The image of basic rule of 
law institutions has not changed much in the past 200 years. Courts, bar as-
sociations, law-making procedures, and parliaments are all founded on ideas 
developed during a period in Western history when empires and kings were 
being replaced by states and democracies. Until recently, justice sector leaders 
and the organizations that supply development funds felt responsible for train-
ing and resourcing judges, prosecutors, and police officers; building bar asso-
ciations and national councils for the judiciary; developing constitutions and 
other laws modeled on Western standards; and setting up national gazettes 
in which to publish the laws.
However, most rule of law mechanisms emerged independent of state in-
stitutions. Informal justice systems—with communication, negotiation, me-
diation, and adjudication—tend to develop whenever groups of people live or 
work together and conflicts must be managed.3 Protection of property rights is 
triggered by demand when people start investing in assets of a certain value 
that become scarce.4 Often, the state incorporates successful innovations that 
were developed privately. 
In line with this reality, and taking criminal justice as an example, the 
question at the core of the justice innovation approach should be not “how do 
3  Deborah Isser ed., Customary Justice and Rule of Law in War Torn Societies (United States Insti-
tute of Peace Press 2011). 
4  See Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, from Prehuman Times to the French Revo-
lution 247 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011) (“Of all the components of contemporary states, 
effective legal institutions are perhaps the most difficult to construct”); Lee J. Alston & Ber-
nardo Mueller, Property Rights and the State, in Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley, Handbook 
of New Institutional Economics 573 (Springer Verlag 2008).
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we build a good prosecution service?” but rather “how do we empower and 
stimulate the stakeholders in the criminal justice system—judges, prosecu-
tors, police officers, victim support services, civil servants, legal aid lawyers, 
psychologists working with drug offenders, academics, correction services, 
and social entrepreneurs—to continuously improve criminal justice mecha-
nisms?” In other words, how can strategic justice leaders contribute to the 
innovation process so that more justice is delivered? 
What Can Justice Sector Leaders Do to Foster Innovation? 
The literature on innovation shows that successful innovation processes can-
not be forced by following a simple set of prescriptions. Innovation is a matter 
of doing many things well and involves many factors.5 One survey found no 
less than 40 factors associated with successful innovation.6 Many are related 
to what happens on the ground, as justice sector professionals improve their 
processes step by step and through trial and error. But there are quite a few 
things that justice sector leaders can do to help justice innovation thrive.7 
Generate Possibilities
In the innovation initiation phase, the literature lists nine factors associated 
with innovation. Innovation is stimulated by creating a setting with diverse 
views, people, and backgrounds. Practitioners should focus on users of rule of 
law mechanisms and the people directly serving them. They know best what 
is needed and what might work. Time and space are required for innovation, 
as are clear goals for the innovation process. A justice sector leader can take 
several actions in this phase. 
Articulate a Clear Vision
Innovation can be inspired by a clear vision that shows political commitment 
and a desire to redirect resources in a particular area. This is a critical factor 
because innovation—for instance, when dealing with employment conflicts—
will require efforts from a wide variety of actors—for instance, employers, 
lawyers, trade unions, lawmakers, and courts. Typically, the organizations in 
the justice supply chain are independent and cannot be managed in one com-
mon direction. They must be inspired, and they must see that others in the 
supply chain are adapting to change. 
5  See The Best Story in Development, The Economist (May 19, 2012), available at http://www 
.economist.com/node/21555571, which cites a study of the many things that contribute to a 
significant drop in child mortality. 
6  Nizar Becheikh, Réjéan Landry & Nabil Amara, Lessons from Innovation Empirical Studies in 
the Manufacturing Sector: A Systematic Review of the Literature from 1993–2003, 26 Technovation 
644–64 (2006).
7  See the Innovation Model, available at http://www.innovatingjustice.com/innovationlab 
/innovation-assistance/innovation-model/?subcategoryID=15535, developed on the basis 
of factors that have been found to support innovation in the public sector. 
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Politicians are subject to many pressures and can unknowingly sow con-
fusion. A minister may make a speech one day in which he (or she) states that 
access to justice should be improved. The next day he might argue before a 
different audience that courts are overburdened and that people should do 
more to resolve their own conflicts. The visions of justice sector leaders should 
be realistic: in many postconflict contexts, donors demand the articulation of 
a national rule of law plan. (Interestingly, the donor states that demand such 
national rule of law plans rarely have one themselves.) Those plans are often 
very wide in scope (they are, after all, “national”), they rarely clearly priori-
tize, and they often contain unrealistic timelines,8 making it hard for potential 
innovators to coalesce around a common agenda. 
To be realized, a vision must be as specific as possible, couched in plain 
language, ambitious but doable, and consistent, not changing with every new 
administration. The Millennium Development Goals are an excellent example 
of a clear, concrete, ambitious, doable, and consistent vision. Other examples 
of justice innovation visions are “to increase the number of people living on 
land and in houses with tenure security by 20 percent in the next year,” “to 
make a judge available to every village of more than 500 people within the 
next two years,” and “to ensure that employers and employees get a solu-
tion within two months after filing a claim.” It would not be difficult to list a 
number of priorities for justice sector innovation based on an assessment of 
the most frequent and urgent justiciable problems the population experiences; 
such surveys have been done before.9
Break the Rules
Innovation means doing things in new ways. The innovation literature urges 
innovators to challenge every rule of the game. For justice sector profession-
als, this directive creates a dilemma, because their legitimacy is built on fol-
lowing the rules, not breaking them. Changing procedures in a relevant way 
almost always requires a change in the rules or at least in the way rules are 
applied. So everywhere in the world, professional judges, lawyers, and oth-
ers are more likely waiting for the rules to change than taking initiatives to 
improve procedures. 
Justice sector leaders can address this dilemma by allowing experiments, 
provided that the experiments are clearly motivated by goals such as decreas-
ing costs, preventing error, increasing procedural justice, or speeding up 
8  One of the more extreme examples is the Afghanistan Compact, agreed to between Afghani-
stan and the international community, in London in 2006, which provides as benchmarks: 
“By end-2010, the legal framework required under the constitution, including civil, criminal 
and commercial law, will be put in place, distributed to all judicial and legislative institu-
tions and made available to the public” and “By end-2010, functioning institutions of justice 
will be fully operational in each province of Afghanistan, and the average time to resolve 
contract disputes will be reduced as much as possible.”
9  See Basic Justice Care, available at http://www.hiil.org/publication/strategies-towards 
-basic-justice-care, which lists some basic justice needs.
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trials. Instead of stressing formal barriers to new solutions, justice sector lead-
ers can urge stakeholders to develop, try, and test new procedures and to ask 
for changes in the rules if necessary. Procedures for experimental treatments 
in the health care sector may be a source of inspiration.
Foster Competition
Innovation is hardly conceivable without competition. Innovation in an envi-
ronment like Silicon Valley is not based on monopolies and rigid agreements 
between players as to who will deliver what to the exclusion of others. Such 
incubators are messy, chaotic places where smart ideas compete with other 
smart ideas for funding, duplication is not frowned upon, and the shared as-
sumption is that the best idea will win out in the end. What is “best” is mea-
sured by sales figures, demand by clients, and the willingness of venture capi-
talists to invest. Organization is limited: it is aimed at creating a place where 
innovators can meet other innovators and where people who are interested in 
funding start-ups can find the best ones. What happens next is thanks to the 
magic of the marketplace and innovation. 
Can this concept be transposed to the world of order, norms, and justice? 
Not if one perceives the delivery of justice as the application of a master pro-
gram emanating from a state’s constitution. In the real world, delivering justice 
is a messy process, as every practicing lawyer will testify. There are many ways 
to solve conflicts, and many rule makers (national, international, local, formal, 
informal, public, private) work on the same problems. Justice sector innova-
tors should be able to develop the best approaches in an attractive, competitive 
environment in which there are a few generally accepted ways to measure 
potential success of innovations (such as satisfaction of all types of users).10 
Fostering competition in the justice sector can be part of a ministerial in-
novation policy. This policy would put the minister less in the position of the 
holder of power who acts, and more in the role of creating a level playing field 
to make sure that the fairest, most effective, fastest, and lowest-cost solutions 
survive. 
For example, take the provision of fair and efficient dispute settlement 
processes for employment conflicts or coping with the aftermath of large-
scale violence. Various civil and criminal public courts might offer different 
procedures (national, international), industry tribunals, truth and reconcilia-
tion commissions (local or national), commissions establishing adequate com-
pensation, semibinding mediation services based on existing informal justice 
mechanisms, or online dispute-resolution platforms.11
10  See Non State Security and Justice in Fragile States, Overseas Development Institute Briefing 
Paper 73 (Apr. 2012), which also lists some useful rules of engagement in respect to nonstate 
actors, available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7640.pdf. 
11  See, for example, David Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform without Cultural Imperialism? Reinforcing 
Customary Justice through Collateral Review in Southern Sudan, 2 Hague J. on the Rule of L. 1–28 
(2010).
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In the Netherlands, E-Court promises its clients quick and cheap awards 
by arbitrators for money claims. Its initiators tell a story of many obstacles 
based on resistance from bailiffs, state courts, and the ministry of justice, who 
all saw the existing way of doing things threatened by the concept of E-Court 
rather than welcoming a new supplier of fair and speedy solutions.12 Yet, this 
innovation forced the courts to rethink their ways of dealing with similar 
claims, seeing that the income for the state justice sector from money claims 
was no longer guaranteed. Did fostering competition enhance the perfor-
mance and effectiveness of state courts and private sector dispute resolution? 
Competition requires a level playing field based on transparency of quality 
and costs so that clients seeking access to justice can make informed choices 
and defendants are protected against unfair procedures. In theory, it should be 
possible, for example, to send all users of a justice process a brief e-mail or text 
message on their mobile phones asking them to assess a court process they 
have just gone through based on a number of criteria.13 Their responses could 
be aggregated and fed into a website for all to see. And based on that, justice 
clients, justice providers, and ministry officials could see what works best. 
Justice sector leaders can foster competition by making the performance 
of justice services more measurable and transparent, by avoiding general 
monopolies, and by allowing differentiation and specialization. 
Develop Innovations
Once the innovators are at work, the most fruitful ideas must be selected for 
the actual innovation process. This requires a situation where people with a 
positive attitude and sufficient resources can nurture the innovative concept. 
Partnerships between public services providers and private sector organiza-
tions can be very fruitful: legal expenses insurance companies can help ensure 
access to legal aid; online dispute-resolution platforms can be integrated into 
court procedures. In today’s world, these are no longer rich-country options. 
Building a prototype early on is recommended, as well as involving end us-
ers in the development process. Again, a justice sector leader can take specific 
actions. 
Manage Risk
Once the developing process starts, a safe environment in which to develop a 
new concept, allowing for trial and error, is important. In an environment that 
is not “safe,” where failure is immediately linked to blame and consequences, 
innovation tends to be difficult. The appetite of the public for trial and er-
ror in the justice sector may not be big, however. A minister of justice may 
be genuinely committed to creating more room for such an approach, but he 
too is subject to cabinet, parliamentary, and media scrutiny. So creating safe 
12  See http://www.innovatingjustice.com/innovations/e-court-the-first-online-private-court. 
13  See, for example, the measuring access to justice tool at http://www.innovatingjustice.com 
/innovations/measuring-the-costs-and-quality-of-access-to-justice. 
The Justice Innovation Approach 23
spaces for experiments requires risk management. The minister must build it 
upward within the cabinet, vis-à-vis the prime minister or president and with 
respect for parliament. The minister of justice must also have a smart media 
strategy. The minister of justice must project a strong commitment to gradual 
innovation processes, allowing for trial and error at the ground level, where 
the innovations need to come from. Quick wins are likely to be important 
here—specific improvements that show that the innovation climate is produc-
ing results, such as savings in the budget, a higher level of satisfaction from 
victims, more efficient court hearings, less recidivism, or decreasing juvenile 
delinquency. 
Reward Innovation Champions
People are important. Almost all successful innovations are linked to a key 
person who devoted years of hard work to making a dream come true. The 
justice sector is not very good at rewarding such innovation champions. Mak-
ing substantial money from innovation is hard, and one of the strengths (and 
weaknesses) of the justice sector is stressing the professional roles of judges 
and civil servants rather than personal qualities and strong personalities. A 
minister of justice is in a unique position to reward people who have worked 
for many years on improving procedures or systems of rules. Attaching peo-
ple’s names to innovations can be done easily; one should never underesti-
mate the effect of simple and consistent praise for good achievements.14  
Fund Early Development
Many innovations in the justice sector—good as they are—trip over two wires: 
funding for early development and funding for a sustained period of time. 
The justice sector tends to be funded in a rigid way. The budget and plan-
ning cycle is generally quite short. Budgets are structured around fixed de-
liverables, which rarely if ever include money for systematic research and 
development. Courts cannot invest money now that they can recoup in the 
next years by cost savings or by an increase in court fees for better services 
or more plaintiffs bringing cases. Justice sector donors may be interested in 
trying new procedures, but they tend to want specific deliverables: so many 
judges trained, so many courts and prisons built, a bar association set up. The 
situation is slightly different in the legal services industry, where research and 
development budgets from suppliers to law firms have created innovations in 
specific areas, such as software to help with e-discovery. 
A minister of justice can make sure that research and development bud-
gets exist and that there are ways to recoup initial investments. He can do that 
within his own ministry, and he can initiate public-private partnerships with 
14  An excellent example is the relationship between the International Criminal Court and the 
partners of the Legal Tools database and Case Matrix Network. The partners carry the costs 
of their contribution to the network but are also part of the innovation team. Signs of appre-
ciation and commitment by the court stimulate the partners in this innovative network. See 
http://www.legal-tools.org/en/what-are-the-icc-legal-tools/. 
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donors that provide investments in justice innovation with a commitment, for 
example, that the ministry will take over responsibility for funding the ser-
vices once an innovation has been successfully developed. Developing states 
can lead the way here.
Replicate and Scale Up
Once an innovation is up and running, its potential for replication and scaling 
up should be exploited. Models for interactive court hearings developed for 
civil justice courts can be adapted to administrative law or criminal justice. 
What has been developed in one court may be useful for similar courts in 
other countries, but standardizing new practices too early may stifle innova-
tion. Change management is necessary as well.
Create Incentives 
A minister of justice can create incentives for justice leaders to try out well-
tested innovations that have been developed elsewhere. Allocating extra bud-
gets to those who are willing to adopt an innovation is one method. One factor 
inhibiting justice sector innovation is that each court in each country tends to 
develop its own working methods, without relying on external suppliers of 
procedures, supporting software, or protocols for dealing with certain types 
of crime. A minister of justice can urge justice sector organizations to consider 
buying tools that are readily available, either those developed by specialized 
private sector companies or those developed by colleagues in the public sec-
tor. If a worldwide market for justice sector technologies were to evolve, the 
rule of law could be enhanced substantially and many cost savings would 
be possible. Ministers of justice from developing countries have more choice 
than ever. Tanzania need not look only at things that worked in Germany, the 
United Kingdom, or France; it can also look at innovations from, for example, 
Brazil, India, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Rwanda.
Be Aware of Disruptive Innovations
Justice sector leaders should be aware of the possibilities of disruptive inno-
vations. Online services, such as those offered by Legal Zoom,15 disrupt the 
market for lawyers and notaries in civil law countries, who are likely to pro-
tect their markets by favoring legislation that has been designed without new 
possibilities in mind, such as the prohibition of legal advice by nonlawyers or 
the monopolies of notaries public. Because innovations can make basic justice 
care available to groups that were unable to get any legal assistance in the 
past, there is every reason to create a level playing field for such new technolo-
gies. The paralegal program Timap for Justice has had a disruptive effect on 
the legal services market in Sierra Leone.16
 
15  See http://www.legalzoom.com/.
16  See http://www.timapforjustice.org/. 
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Consider Long-Term Business Models
Assuring longer-term funding for successful justice innovations after the re-
search and development phase is often challenging. One of the reasons for this 
is that consideration of such funding tends to start only once an innovation 
has been developed. Justice sector leaders should be thinking about the man-
agement and budgeting of research and development processes right from the 
start of any justice innovation initiative.17
Analyze and Learn
Innovation cannot exist without critical reflection. Justice sector leaders should 
ensure that monitoring mechanisms are in place and that new insights can be 
implemented in improved versions immediately (real-time learning). 
One reason why the health care sector is so innovative is that benchmarks 
for new treatments are easy to establish: symptoms disappear and the patient 
feels better and does not return with the same complaints. Similar metrics for 
the justice sector would greatly enhance innovation processes, for example, 
through lower costs, timelier decisions, and higher satisfaction of users (pro-
cedural justice, outcome justice). 
A minister of justice can ensure that a segment of the core budget is re-
served for developing such measurement tools and for applying them to 
the processes and procedures of the system. This is an area par excellence 
where the minister can enlist civil society organizations, academic networks, 
and external donors. Civil society organizations can be stimulated to play a 
role in assessing elements of the justice system and showing where improve-
ments are needed. Outcomes measurement could interest donors; and more 
and more academic institutions are developing rule of law measuring tools.18 
What the minister cannot outsource is working with senior civil servants to 
build a culture in which the challenges that measuring makes visible are har-
nessed toward justice innovation. 
Challenges and Benefits of a Justice Innovation Approach
The best way to make the case for a new role for justice sector leaders is to 
provide an example. Tunisia will go down in history as the spark that set off 
a forest fire in the Arab world. After President Ben Ali fled, a transitional gov-
ernment organized rather effective and open elections, on the basis of which 
a constitutional assembly worked on a new constitution; as of July 2012, a 
provisional government was running the country. Ambitions and expecta-
tions are high, also relating to the rule of law. There is a general yearning for a 
better justice system. However, the challenges are tremendous, and there are 
17  A very useful tool for this is http://www.businessmodelgeneration.com. 
18  For a good overview, see Special Issue on Measuring Rule of Law, 3(2) Hague J. on the Rule 
of L. (Sep. 2011).
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no easy answers.19 Stimulating gradual innovation processes around practical 
problems and showing quick wins may be the most promising way forward. 
However, justice sectors leaders in Tunisia and other countries in transi-
tion face the following challenges.
Lack of Trust
In Tunisia, a new social contract is being put in place in the midst of a difficult 
economic and social context. Trust in the state is low.20 For many citizens, state 
institutions are linked to capricious behavior by people in positions with au-
thority. So most people avoid getting in touch with the state institutions; the 
idea that law protects and can work for people needs to be sold. State institu-
tions are not automatically viewed as legitimate. 
Trust must be regained. The World Development Report 2011 (WDR) con-
vincingly argues that legitimate institutions are the best immunizer against 
internal and external stresses such as the ones Tunisia faces.21 The WDR shows 
that legitimacy comes with the responsiveness of institutions and that “capac-
ity, inclusion, and accountability” are needed.22 In many developing countries, 
state institutions have limited capacity, are not seen as fully inclusive, and face 
little accountability. To build legitimate institutions, the WDR argues, justice 
sector leaders must work from the bottom up, with “good enough coalitions” 
to create quick and visible wins that show that rule of law is essential. 
Any minister of justice can build on processes that work in a country. By 
examining at informal justice systems for medium-level crime, rule-making 
processes in specific industries, or court procedures giving effective protec-
tion against eviction, the minister of justice can stimulate the people involved 
to innovate and extend these services to the more urgent justice problems the 
state faces. Coalitions can be built to nurture these processes and to shield 
them against attempts to corrupt them. 
Lack of Funds
Unemployment, especially in youth, is very high in Tunisia, making invest-
ments in labor-intensive industries a priority among the many other economic 
19  To name a few: budgets are limited, ideas of justice differ, trust in public officials in the 
justice sector is limited, and expectations are high. In May 2012, a dispute arose between 
the government and the association of judges after eighty-one judges were fired for alleged 
corruption; see http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/05/31/judges-strike-lifted-following 
-agreement-with-ministry-of-justice/.
20  See, for example, a survey by the World Justice Project according to which 51 percent of 
Tunisians believe that the police forces are the most corrupt institution in Tunisian society, 
available at http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/05/29/according-to-poll-80-of-tunisians 
-feel-free-to-express-themselves/. See also remarks by the head of the national anticorrup-
tion agency during a HiiL seminar held in Tunis (Apr. 2011), on record with the authors.
21	 	World	 Development	 Report	 2011:	 Conflict,	 Security	 and	Development 74 et seq. (World Bank 
2011).
22  Id., at 84.
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challenges. In 2009, the Tunisian GDP stood at around US$40 billion, or US$8 
per person.23 This is three to five times less than the GDP in Euro Area coun-
tries, making it inconceivable that Tunisia will be able to invest heavily in 
court infrastructure and expensive professionals to deliver justice sector ser-
vices. But Tunisian citizens do not want less “justice” than European ones, nor 
should they be asked to accept less. So a country like Tunisia has every inter-
est in stimulating innovation in the justice sector so that it can deliver better 
justice for its money.
Innovative ways to deliver justice at low cost can be found throughout 
the world; a transitioning country such as Tunisia presents a window of op-
portunity to adopt and adapt these innovations to a local setting. Can court 
processes be organized in such a way that more solutions are delivered per 
judge? In Nicaragua, the Facilitadores Judiciales program equipped a judge 
with a team of facilitadores, who live in villages far away from the courthouse. 
They mediate under the judge’s supervision and assist with bringing the cases 
that do not settle to court. Sierra Leone and South Africa pioneered the use 
of paralegals at a fraction of the cost of training judges and lawyers. In large-
scale litigation, which will also occur in Tunisia, expert evidence is often key. 
Increasing the reliability of the fact-finding process and decreasing the costs 
of dealing with expertise were the goal of a procedure for a dialogue between 
experts at a court hearing developed in Australia.24 Online dispute resolution 
now resolves 60 million disputes between buyers and sellers on eBay, holding 
promise for dealing with large numbers of disputes anywhere in the world.25
Power Relations
Influence on justice sector institutions is always part of a broader struggle for 
power, especially in situations of transition. Military versus civilian power 
brokers. Landowners versus landless. Employers versus employees. Domi-
nant ethnic groups versus groups that feel oppressed. Secular versus religious 
norms. Rule of law gets politicized quickly.
The stimulation of justice innovation can be a road to reform without po-
litical turmoil. It is less about big principles (which is not to say they do not 
count) and more about little steps that deal with specific problems. Gradual 
but deliberate improvement of employment complaint procedures can be 
organized from the bottom up: targets can include more voice for parties at 
hearings, speedier resolution, more settlement, lower costs, clearer criteria 
for remedies, and clearer reasons in judgments. This approach is likely to be 
more effective than a heated discussion about the independence of courts or 
whether employees should have protection against dismissal. Innovation in-
cludes developing transparent monitoring mechanisms that show the extent 
23  The Economist, World in Figures, 2012, at The Economist website. 
24  See http://www.innovatingjustice.com/innovations/concurrent-expert-evidence.
25  See http://pages.ebay.com/coverage/index.html. 
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to which the clients of the courts experienced a neutral procedure with equal 
opportunities for both parties. 
Indonesia has found interesting ways to cope with the sharia versus secu-
lar dilemma. The area of family relationships is perhaps the foremost area 
where sharia law has impact (corporal punishment in criminal law is seldom 
applied in practice in most countries that have sharia law). Facing a choice 
between formal courts and religious courts, Indonesian couples wanting a di-
vorce overwhelmingly choose religious ones. Religious courts are more open 
to innovation, working in close cooperation with Australian courts to improve 
their services.
Transitional Justice
Tunisia is a place where the concept of transition permeates. The judicial or-
ganization needs fundamental reorganizing: some judges too closely linked 
to the former regime may have to go, a role for council for the judiciary must 
be found, performance mechanisms to hold judges accountable and effective 
ways to distribute budgets must be developed, and the question of special-
ization versus generalization is on the table, as is the question of how it can 
support courts. Law making represents a huge challenge. The country is em-
barking on a fundamental redesign, facing the task of ensuring the quality and 
coherence of laws. Both the judges and the clients of the justice system need 
better access to legal information. Key elements of the “hard” justice infra-
structure—courthouses and published and available laws—are in bad shape. 
For a minister of justice, these issues are fraught with choices for which it will 
be difficult to build support within the courts and the institutions involved in 
law making.
A strategy based on creating a level playing field for justice innovation 
assumes that justice sector innovators take initiatives to start improving ser-
vices. And those improved services should be the point of departure, not the 
organization itself: ways to create needs for higher quality, more trustworthy 
services, and lower-cost delivery. For example, if a group of judges decides 
that disputes over land is an urgent priority and they propose terms of refer-
ence for a new procedure, such as transparency of criteria for allocating land 
and compensation, the more organizational problems of specialization and 
court independence may be solved on the way. The goal is for the government 
to be less the structure that is supposed to solve a problem and more a place 
where leaders work to empower those closest to the problem to creatively 
resolve concrete, close-to-the-ground issues. 
Conclusion
Justice sector leaders can improve the rule of law by incorporating the justice 
innovation approach. Because this approach enlists the whole of society (jus-
tice users and providers), benefits from best practices and technologies devel-
oped in other countries, and harnesses the knowledge of those working on 
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problems already, it can deliver more value and justice with less money than 
other approaches. However, organizing the necessary space for justice innova-
tion is not easy in any context, and is even more challenging in the context of 
a developing state. 
Good justice sector leadership is a key component of the effort. Legal sys-
tems have their own dynamics and tend to move slowly. The WDR estimates 
that it takes 17 to 41 years to establish basic trust in the rule of law.26 The at-
titude of expecting central, top-down coordination is very strong in the justice 
sector, and many very good ideas now wait until a new constitution is en-
acted, the law of procedure is changed, or a budget is cleared. However, there 
are many opportunities for a justice sector leader to create and manage justice 
innovation in the meantime. There is certainly risk involved in doing so, but 
the potential benefits are huge.
26  World Development Report, supra note 21, at 11.
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Legal Empowerment of the Poor:  
Past, Present, Future
Hassane Cissé
The concept that law plays a significant role in promoting economic devel-
opment is well established. The nature of that significance, in the context of 
development narratives, traditionally has been rooted in law’s connection to 
strong institutions and good governance: the presence of law can be consid-
ered a prerequisite for effective government. Effective government has come 
to be treated as an essential ingredient in the development recipe, and law or, 
more specifically, the “rule of law,” is the condition for that ingredient. 
In an effort to reimagine how law can fit into development strategies, 
scholars and practitioners have widened the traditional focus on institutions 
and government machinery to bring the people themselves into view: the poor 
have become a subject in law and development discourse, rather than simply 
the indirect, long-term beneficiaries of institutional reform. Many scholars 
and practitioners now argue that law can be used as a tool in the hands of 
the poor, a tool that they can use to improve their own lives. This process has 
become known as legal empowerment.
This chapter maps the emergence and progress of the legal empowerment 
movement, if it can be called that. This field is still young, and disagreements 
over its direction are unresolved. Basic questions of priorities and strategies 
remain contested; assumptions must be tested further; more data need to be 
collected. Nevertheless, the movement has much promise and is gaining ac-
ceptance. It should be taken seriously by everyone concerned with using the 
law to end poverty.
The Emergence of Legal Empowerment and Its Place  
in the Rule of Law Agenda
Legal empowerment of the poor (LEP) is a relatively new frontier in thinking 
about how the law can affect the lives of the poor and what can and should 
be done to empower the poor to use the law for their betterment. By evoking 
law and power together, LEP directly challenges traditional ideas about the 
role of law in the lives of the poor. At the same time, the LEP paradigm is not 
a complete rejection of other ways of theorizing about the purpose of rule of 
law in development. LEP both reaffirms and reacts against the older develop-
ment agenda of advancing the rule of law, and remains closely connected to 
  The author thanks Matthew Moorhead for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this 
article. Stephen Golub and Sam Muller also provided constructive comments. Responsibility 
for errors or omissions remains with the author.
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it. To understand the origins and evolution of LEP, and possibly its future, one 
must also understand the nature of this connection with traditional rule of law 
approaches.
The importance of the rule of law in human development is generally 
acknowledged, despite enduring disagreements about the degree of that im-
portance. Lawyers, economists, and development specialists must continue 
to explore new ways in which the law can alleviate poverty. As practitioners 
endeavor to improve the imperfect understanding of the role of law in human 
welfare, advances continue to be made in rule of law scholarship.1 As new 
insights are uncovered, many traditional ways of thinking about how law can 
lift people out of poverty become ripe for reevaluation. As the scholarship 
grows and this process of reevaluation unfolds, elements of what might be 
termed the “classical rule of law approach” receive more critical attention. In 
particular, an excessive focus on institutions and state structures, a supposed 
hallmark of the classic rule of law approach, has been criticized for overlook-
ing the needs of the poor. A growing awareness of this risk has caused scholars 
and development practitioners to conceive of a new way of thinking about 
how the law can contribute to development: LEP. A central claim of the LEP 
approach is that poverty endures because, in part, people are forced to live 
their lives without legal protection. 
The focus on legal empowerment is intended to strengthen existing and 
ongoing efforts to further the rule of law agenda. It is also, to some extent, a 
reprimand of those efforts. Legal empowerment as a strategy for development 
has gained prominence, in part, on the back of criticism of, or frustration with, 
the outcomes of the more established rule of law agenda. That agenda can 
mean many things to different people, and some sense of its meaning is set 
out here. 
“Rule of law” is a concept with a broad scope that was established as a 
development objective and method decades before LEP emerged. Generally, 
the rule of law is defined in one of two ways. The first emphasizes elements of 
substantive justice; the second emphasizes the procedural aspects of a system 
in which the rule of law prevails.2 The conditions of both definitions must be 
met if the rule of law can be said to exist in any given system. A functional 
rule of law system that provides both procedural effectiveness and substan-
tive justice is obviously important to human welfare and the satisfaction of 
justice claims. What is less clear is exactly how much the rule of law matters, 
and how effective rule of law interventions have been in improving develop-
ment outcomes for the poor. 
1  See, for example, Thomas Carothers ed., Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowl-
edge (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2006); James J. Heckman, Robert L. 
Nelson, & Lee Cabatingan ed., Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law (Routledge 2010); and 
Michael J. Trebilcock & Ronald J. Daniels ed., Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting 
the Fragile Path of Progress (Edward Elgar 2008).
2  Paul P. Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework, 
467 Public Law (1997).
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The impact of improvements in the rule of law environment on develop-
ment outcomes is notoriously hard to quantify. A number of attempts have 
been made. Daniel Kaufmann and his colleagues measured several aspects 
of governance, including the rule of law, over time and across more than two 
hundred countries.3 They suggest that a nation’s GDP increases noticeably 
by moving ahead when improvements are made in an index of rule of law 
indicators. Despite efforts such as these, however, it may never be possible to 
measure the impact of the rule of law in neat percentages. Kaufmann’s study 
acknowledges that the difficulties inherent in proving a link between the rule 
of law and economic growth may preclude such measurement. Nevertheless, 
the study supports a general consensus that there is a positive correlation be-
tween economic development and strong legal systems. 
The way in which the rule of law has evolved en route to becoming part 
of mainstream development orthodoxy is perhaps best exemplified by the ap-
proach of the World Bank, one of the world’s foremost development institu-
tions, to the issue. When the Bank realized that the rule of law and judicial 
reform were related to economic development, the Bank became involved in 
LEP efforts. The connection to economic development is a critical factor that 
enables the Bank to engage in legal reform, because its Articles of Agreement 
prohibit it from taking into account anything other than “economic consid-
erations” in its lending operations.4 Before the Bank could be comfortable in-
volving itself in LEP work, it needed to accept that the quality of governance 
affects economic development. This was a delicate task for an institution that 
is prohibited from “interfering in the political affairs” of its members, yet as 
evidence of the importance of governance and the rule of law in economic per-
formance grew, the Bank responded. In 1990, the general counsel of the Bank 
issued a legal opinion concluding that the Bank “may favorably respond to a 
country’s request for assistance in the field of legal reform, if it finds it relevant 
to the country’s economic development and to the success of the Bank’s lend-
ing strategy for the country.”5 
Although hard to quantify, the correlation between rule of law indicators 
and economic development is real. Beyond this assumption, what matters to 
people is identifying precisely what kind of rule of law initiatives serve them 
best. As the field matures and the evidence of what works and what does not 
starts to mount, the “second generation” of rule of law scholarship is challeng-
ing many assumptions about how to conduct legal reform and what to expect 
from the results. In the past decade, some scholars and commentators have 
3  Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VI: Governance In-
dicators for 1996–2006, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280 (2007). See also, 
for example, Juan Carlos Botero, Robert L. Nelson, & Christine Pratt, Indices and Indicators of 
Justice, Governance and the Rule of Law: An Overview, 3 Hague J. on the Rule of L. 153 (2011). 
4  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, article IV, section 10.
5  Ibrahim Shihata, Issues of “Governance” in the Borrowing Members—The Extent of Their Rel-
evance under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement 25 (Dec. 21, 1990).
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come to question the dominant ways of thinking about the rule of law. LEP 
has emerged from this persistent questioning. 
As Stephen Golub posits, LEP is partly an alternative to the perceived fail-
ings of rule of law orthodoxy.6 Golub classifies many of the law-reform efforts 
of the major international development actors as top-down efforts that pay 
insufficient attention to the actual needs of the poor. According to Golub, rule 
of law orthodoxy has been said to focus “too much on law, lawyers, and state 
institutions, and too little on development, the poor, and civil society.”7 
LEP is intended to address these particular deficiencies. In the words of 
critics such as Thomas Carothers, typical efforts to promote the rule of law 
cannot convincingly demonstrate “how the rule of law develops in societies 
and how such development can be stimulated beyond simplistic efforts to 
copy institutional forms.”8 LEP, however, is more focused on the real needs 
of the poor. As a development strategy, it has been said to both advance and 
transcend the rule of law. LEP advances the rule of law in the sense that em-
powered people will be in a position to demand good governance, and it tran-
scends the rule of law by lifting the focus from governance to more general 
poverty alleviation.9
A number of definitions of LEP are used in the literature. The UN Com-
mission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP) defines LEP as “a pro-
cess of systemic change through which the poor and excluded become able to 
use the law, the legal system, and legal services to protect and advance their 
rights and interests as citizens and economic actors.”10 Golub expands on the 
basic definition of LEP by differentiating it from rule of law orthodoxy on 
four issues. First, LEP requires lawyers to view the poor as partners instead of 
simply providing advice. Second, the poor should aspire to influence public 
policy directly in order to avoid falling into a top-down approach. Third, LEP 
should employ nonjudicial strategies alongside strictly legal ones. Fourth, law 
should be integrated into a broader range of development-related activities.11 
These features enable LEP to serve as a “useful organizing framework to navi-
gate through the complex landscape which has resulted from the fusion of 
6  The term “rule of law orthodoxy” is used by Frank Upham in Mythmaking in the Rule of Law 
Orthodoxy, Carnegie Endowment Working Paper No. 30, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and 
Rule of Law Project (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2002).
7  Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative, Carnegie 
Endowment Working Paper No. 41, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project 
3 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2003).
8  Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge, Carnegie 
Endowment Working Paper No. 34, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project 
3 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2003).
9  Golub, supra note 7, at 7.
10  Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Making the Law Work for Everyone: Volume 
One, Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 3 (2008).
11  Golub, supra note 7, at 4. 
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the two tectonic plates driving development today: governance and poverty 
reduction.”12
Cementing the Place of Legal Empowerment:  
The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor
Scholars such as Banik13 and Golub have been working in the area of LEP for 
years, but the idea that LEP can be a force for development gained international 
recognition when it became the subject of a landmark UN commission in 2008. 
The CLEP report brought international attention and credibility to LEP and 
provides a road map for mainstreaming LEP into development work.14 The 
report does not understate the view of the commissioners that legal empower-
ment is of the utmost importance. Central to the report is the bold claim that 
“four billion people around the world are robbed of the chance to better their 
lives and climb out of poverty, because they are excluded from the rule of 
law.”15 Influential names lend their authority to this statement. The commis-
sion was cochaired by former US secretary of state Madeline Albright and re-
nowned Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, and comprised 23 members, 
of whom 19 were current or former presidents, prime ministers, senior jurists, 
or other government officials of the highest rank. 
For the commissioners, poverty partly stems from “legal exclusion,” or 
exclusion from the protections of the rule of law. The report concluded that 
“by expanding and deepening legal protection, poor people will be better able 
to free themselves from poverty.”16 Four areas, or “pillars,” are critical to the 
task of extending legal protection to the 4 billion excluded people, accord-
ing to the CLEP report. The first pillar, access to justice and the rule of law, is 
essential to the others. Legal empowerment is impossible if poor people do 
not have access to a functional judicial system of some kind. Efforts in this 
regard include a range of measures to make judicial systems more accessible 
to the poor and oriented to their needs. The three other pillars are legal rights: 
property rights, labor rights, and so-called business rights. The CLEP report 
emphasizes the foundation of LEP in international human rights law, particu-
larly in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but it does not 
elaborate on the nature of this connection to human rights discourse.17 
The CLEP report is a welcome contribution to the broader international 
development agenda. It moves from the traditional focus on strengthening 
laws and institutions to a focus on the needs of the poor. The prestige and 
12  Ana Palacio, Legal Empowerment of the Poor: An Action Agenda for the World Bank 14 (2006). 
13  Dan Banik ed., Rights and Legal Empowerment in Eradicating Poverty (Ashgate 2008).
14  Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 10.
15  Id., at 1.
16  Gordon Brown, Foreword to Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 10.
17  Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 10, at 29.
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scale of the commission have permanently elevated the status of LEP as a 
development strategy and have similarly increased the general awareness of 
its purpose and benefits. The response to the CLEP report has included a UN 
General Assembly resolution endorsing the findings, as well as discussions 
about possible funding initiatives among key donors. 
Rather than assuming that the poor will automatically benefit by increas-
ing the resources available to courts, the report argues that poverty is best 
addressed by moving resources and power directly into the hands of the poor. 
It provides a map to redirect the poverty-fighting rule of law agenda toward 
a more constructive path. 
Nonetheless, the report has been the subject of criticism. Golub, for ex-
ample, criticizes it for unquestioningly adopting certain neoliberal economic 
assumptions, for attaching excessive importance to the role of legal exclusion 
in perpetuating poverty, for taking insufficient notice of preexisting research 
on LEP, for proposing a top-down approach to what is claimed to be a bottom-
up development strategy, and for assuming that rational persuasion will suf-
fice to convince elites to surrender political power to the poor.18 
The CLEP report arguably overreaches in claiming that 4 billion people 
are impoverished as a result of their exclusion from the protection of the law. 
Many scholars, such as Banik, have noted that this claim is not properly sub-
stantiated.19 In addition to legal exclusion, many important factors interact in 
complex and opaque ways to produce poverty, including cultural exclusion, 
economic failure, high population growth, and political instability. To over-
emphasize the poverty-fighting effect of LEP is to risk undermining the entire 
LEP project. 
If the CLEP report risks overreaching in its 4-billion-people claim, the 
focus on four pillars is equally limiting. Property, labor, and business rights 
are not the only areas in which empowerment can make a difference in poor 
people’s lives. The poor must be empowered to gain access to education, 
to benefit from criminal justice, and to combat violence against women, for 
example.20 
Certain policy prescriptions proposed by the CLEP report are vulnerable 
to the charge that they are unworkable in practice and do not acknowledge the 
entrenched political obstacles that stand in the way of LEP.21 The CLEP report 
says that political leadership is necessary for change and assumes that elites 
can be persuaded by rational arguments to empower the poor. In the words of 
18  Stephen Golub, The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: One Big Step Forward and a 
Few Steps Back for Development Policy and Practice, 1 Hague J. on the Rule of L. 101, 105 (2009).
19  Dan Banik, Legal Empowerment as a Conceptual and Operational Tool in Poverty Eradication, 
1 Hague J. on the Rule of L. 117, 118 (2009).
20  Banik, supra note 19, at 125.
21  Sam Muller & Maurits Barendrecht consider how justice sector leadership can overcome 
these obstacles in their chapter in this volume.
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CLEP, LEP “does not require its political champions to be saints (although that 
could be useful) but only to recognize an enlightened self-interest . . . what 
better political legacy than to have made a lasting contribution to the develop-
ment of one’s country.”22
The unavoidable truth is that power is a relative concept. When one per-
son is empowered, the power that another person has over him or her is di-
minished. In the relationships between people, power is both won and lost. In 
other words, the process of empowering people creates winners and losers. 
It is not realistic to assume that elites, when confronted by rational economic 
arguments, will surrender their relative advantage over the poor to further 
a greater good. Shifting power to the poor is a difficult and highly political 
task that requires a political strategy to accompany economic theorizing. A 
technocratic approach that fails to directly address local political exigencies 
will not succeed. In many developing countries, networks of elites connecting 
the government and private sector will staunchly resist LEP because LEP pre-
sents a direct challenge to the existing power structure. As Matthew Stephens 
notes, the CLEP report does not adequately address this formidable challenge. 
The report contains “no strategy for political change, little evidence produced 
to justify the suggested reforms and an absence of implementable responses 
to turn theory into practice. These deficiencies diminish [the CLEP report’s] 
value to practitioners and will curtail its policy impact.”23
No commission, no matter how distinguished or experienced its member-
ship, can reveal a magic recipe to make political obstacles to good develop-
ment policy disappear. It would be unfair and unrealistic to demand such a 
recipe from CLEP. However, CLEP does not offer much guidance on this issue 
beyond stating that “politics cannot be wished away. Powerful actors must 
be co-opted, won over.”24 Many entrenched elites will not be amenable to co-
option under any circumstances and will never be partners in LEP. If elites are 
uncooperative, the only approach that remains is a bottom-up strategy that 
empowers the poor and the disenfranchised to protect their own interests. 
This is, fundamentally, what LEP is about: empowering the poor to improve 
their own situation.
Contemporary Issues in Legal Empowerment of the Poor
As the responses to the CLEP report make clear, there are limits to what LEP 
can achieve and substantial barriers in the way of success. Although law has a 
significant role to play in defeating poverty, the poor themselves often see the 
law as a barrier to prosperity and security, rather than as a tool for overcoming 
22  Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 10, at 45–46.
23  Matthew Stephens, The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: An Opportunity Missed, 
1 Hague J. on the Rule of L. 132, 147 (2009).
24  Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 10, at 43.
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poverty.25 LEP is about transforming the way the poor experience the law, 
shifting from a constraining to an empowering experience. Efforts to move in 
this direction can be grouped by themes, or perhaps by challenges. This sec-
tion explores a few of the more prominent issues faced by the LEP movement.
Access to Justice
The CLEP report’s focus on access to justice is appropriate. LEP has significant 
potential as a development strategy, particularly through the promotion of ac-
cess to justice for the poor. Making justice available to the poor can unlock the 
greatest development benefits of LEP. Accessing justice means seeing wrongs 
righted and having the confidence that remedies are available to correct such 
wrongs that may occur. These are important outcomes to people everywhere. 
Confidence in the capacity to access justice gives the poor the green light to in-
vest in their own future and that of their families, secure in the knowledge that 
their entitlements will be protected. More formally, “access to justice” means 
“the ability of people to seek and obtain a remedy through formal or informal 
institutions of justice, and in conformity with human rights standards.”26
This definition acknowledges that access to justice is about more than sim-
ply the formal, or official, justice system of courts and judges. Informal justice 
systems, often in the form of precolonial conflict resolution systems, have an 
essential role to play. Poor people in developing countries tend to seek justice 
from informal systems rather than from the formal court system.27 There is a 
long list of well-known obstacles between the poor and a just outcome in the 
formal justice system: procedural deficiencies, prohibitive costs, mistrust of 
the law, fear of the authorities, corruption, language barriers, excessive delays 
in decision making, and perceived institutional illegitimacy.28 These are just a 
few examples of the many reasons that formal justice systems are usually out 
of reach of the poor and why the poor turn to informal systems. Of course, 
formal systems are extremely important and must be strengthened. Informal 
justice systems alone are not a long-term solution to the problem of provid-
ing justice to the general population. Informal justice systems can perpetu-
ate discrimination against women or be problematic from other human rights 
perspectives. Nevertheless, allowing for these limitations, the role of informal 
systems in delivering justice to poor people must be acknowledged and sup-
ported as part of any comprehensive LEP strategy. 
It must be noted that access to justice has been a concern of legal prac-
titioners and legal policymakers for centuries and was a central objective of 
legal reform long before the emergence of LEP. The World Bank, for example, 
targeted access to justice in several of its earliest legal reform projects. Ac-
25  Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 10, at 3.
26  UNDP, Access to Justice Is the Ability of People to Seek and Obtain a Remedy through Formal or 
Informal Institutions of Justice, and in Conformity with Human Rights Standards (2005).
27  Banik, supra note 13, at 14. 
28  Banik, supra note 13, at 15.
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cess to justice first appeared as a World Bank objective in 1996 in the Ecuador 
Judicial Reform Project.29 Since then, access to justice has been an objective in 
legal reform projects in countries such as Armenia, Bangladesh, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Peru, and 
the Philippines.30 Thus, although much that LEP offers is new, its concern with 
access to justice is not. What the proponents of LEP promise, however, is that 
LEP, with its focus on empowering those most in need of improved access to 
justice, can provide better ways of doing just that.
A recent World Bank project in Sierra Leone is an example of a project 
designed to empower the poor to access justice. The World Bank’s Justice for 
the Poor program worked with Namati, an organization devoted to legal em-
powerment, to train community-based paralegals to overcome obstacles in 
the delivery of health services.31 Inadequate or nonexistent health care is one 
of the gravest disadvantages endured by Sierra Leone’s poor. The delivery of 
health care services is impeded by corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of 
resources. The failure to provide health care on such a scale is a grave injustice, 
and the paralegal program is an attempt to use the law to empower Sierra 
Leoneans to demand justice from health care providers. 
Health care is a good candidate for a LEP strategy because the delivery 
of health services encompasses much more than medical staff and medicines. 
To be effective, the delivery of any public service must be accountable. Much 
of Sierra Leone’s underperformance in health care can be attributed to the 
failures of the state institutions that are nominally responsible for health care 
delivery. The paralegal program grew from the view that addressing these 
failures requires an understanding of the policy and regulations governing 
health care, which in turn means an understanding of what the state is sup-
posed to provide and to whom, and where pressure should be applied when 
the state fails to deliver. 
Sierra Leone does not have enough lawyers for this task. In many of Si-
erra Leone’s districts, community paralegals—that is, nonlawyers with some 
training in law and government administration—help citizens navigate gov-
ernment services. Until now, however, paralegals have not been used to im-
prove accountability in the delivery of health services. The Justice for the Poor 
program assesses whether paralegals help improve service outcomes by, for 
example, making regular, unannounced visits to the health clinic to help en-
sure that maternal and child health services are truly provided free of charge. 
Ultimately, the goal is for paralegals to help empower their communities. 
A general increase in the level of “social accountability” in Sierra Leonean 
villages will help people access the services to which they are entitled. Once 
29  Roberto Laver, The World Bank and Judicial Reform: Overcoming “Blind Spots” in the Approach to 
Judicial Independence, 22 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 183, 196 (2012).
30  Id. 
31  Justice for the Poor.
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taught how to pursue redress in the health system, people will gain experi-
ence and confidence in engaging with state institutions and will learn how to 
hold them accountable. 
Gender Inequality
In practice, empowering the poor largely means empowering women. The 
World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development examines 
and details the many ways poor women are disempowered.32 Despite prog-
ress in recent decades, the likelihood of women dying in childbirth in Sub- 
Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia remains comparable to that in Northern 
Europe in the nineteenth century.33 In many countries, women enjoy fewer 
legal protections and property rights than do men. Women are far more likely 
than men to work in low-paying, low-status “pink collar” occupations, to face 
life-threatening violence in the home, and to be unrepresented in senior lev-
els of politics and management.34 In its extent, severity, and ubiquity, gender 
inequality is perhaps the most pressing area calling for LEP strategies. As 
the World Development Report concludes, gender inequality matters for two 
reasons:
First, gender equality matters intrinsically, because the ability to live 
the life of one’s own choosing and be spared from absolute privation 
is a basic human right and should be equal for everyone, indepen-
dent of whether one is male or female. Second, gender equality mat-
ters instrumentally, because greater gender equality contributes to 
economic efficiency and the achievement of other key development 
outcomes.35
An example of the way in which targeting women can empower large num-
bers of the poor and how grassroots legal empowerment can instigate change 
at a national level is a project conducted by the World Bank and its partners 
in Indonesia. The Bank’s Justice for the Poor program, together with the Aus-
tralian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Family Court of 
Australia, and PEKKA (an Indonesian civil society organization supporting 
women-headed households), developed a number of innovative programs to 
empower women to use their legal identity to exercise their rights and access 
benefits. 
A few statistics demonstrate the importance to poor people of establishing 
legal identity in Indonesia. According to the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, 
women head almost 10 million Indonesian households.36 In order to access 
32  World Bank, World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development (World Bank 
2011). 
33  Id., at 2.
34  Id.
35  Id., at 3. 
36  Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik), Statistik Gender 2009 18 (Bureau of 
Statistics 2010).
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government services such as health insurance, rice subsidies, and cash trans-
fer payments, female heads of household must prove to local government au-
thorities that they are, in fact, the head of the household. To obtain an identity 
card giving her head-of-household status, a woman must prove that, if she 
has been married or divorced, her marriage or divorce was legally registered. 
This presents a serious obstacle for many women. Research by PEKKA shows 
that more than 50 percent of the marriages and 86 percent of the divorces of 
its members are not legally registered because they were not brought before 
a court.37 In Indonesia, the relevant court is usually a religious court. The reli-
gious courts handle 98 percent of divorce cases, which themselves account for 
50 percent of all court cases in Indonesia.38
To access poverty alleviation programs, health services, and education 
programs for herself and her family, a woman must have a legal identity and a 
status as the head of her household. Legal marriage and divorce also matter to 
her children. Unregistered or illegal marriages and divorces, and the resulting 
lack of birth certificates for the children of such unions, feed an intergenera-
tional cycle of poverty and social exclusion. When women are disempowered, 
their children and other family members often join them in poverty. 
The Women’s Legal Empowerment (WLE) program was designed to help 
women in West Java formalize their legal identity by building on PEKKA’s 
existing empowerment programs. The WLE program had both demand- and 
supply-side empowerment objectives. On the demand side, the program 
aimed to inform communities of their rights and encourage them to insist that 
those rights be respected; on the supply side, it aimed to improve the capacity 
of the government administration and legal system to recognize and protect 
the rights of poor women. The WLE program used various tools to work to-
ward these objectives. In the villages, trained paralegals disseminated legal 
information about family law and domestic violence, provided assistance to 
local women, and supported grassroots advocacy efforts. A forum, compris-
ing judges, public prosecutors, police, local government officials, NGO repre-
sentatives, and academics, was established at the district level to conduct legal 
awareness and outreach activities. Women used the services of the paralegals 
and the forum members to obtain hundreds of birth certificates for their chil-
dren and to organize circuit courts to visit villages to formalize marriages and 
divorces. 
The outcome was the empowerment to a transformative degree of the in-
dividual women concerned. On a larger scale, the research and results gener-
ated by the WLE and its associated projects contributed to policy develop-
ments across Indonesia. After becoming aware of the problems of accessing 
justice in the religious courts, the government increased the religious courts’ 
37  Justice for the Poor, Increasing Access to Justice for Women, the Poor, and Those Living in Remote 
Areas: An Indonesian Case Study, Briefing Note 6, No. 2 (Mar. 2011).
38  Id. Data taken from Supreme Court annual report for 2009.
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budget 18-fold in two years.39 New laws have been passed requiring Indone-
sian courts to provide legal aid services to the poor, an encouraging example 
of the impact that LEP can have on policy making by elites. 
Property Rights 
LEP is a work in progress. Even as the concept has gained currency as a de-
velopment strategy in government and international institutions, the contours 
and nuances of what LEP means in practice, or what a good LEP policy looks 
like, remain unresolved. To a frustrated observer, LEP may appear to suffer 
“from a lack of clarity at many levels of definition, operation, and evaluation.”40 
The connection between theory and public policy has not been clearly iden-
tified, despite the work of CLEP. Much research remains to be done about 
what policies and interventions are the most effective at empowering the poor. 
In the meantime, certain theories about the best kind of LEP policies remain 
hotly debated. The most important, and possibly the most contested, issue in 
the brief history of LEP concerns the protection of property rights.
Hernando de Soto, the cochair of the CLEP report, has long argued that de-
veloping countries are constrained by the dominance of informal economies.41 
According to this view, without an effective legal system that recognizes and 
enforces property rights, a country cannot develop a functioning market and 
consequently cannot produce or allocate capital. If poor people in developing 
countries are to escape poverty, their property rights must be formalized and 
protected so that they can exploit the capital value of that property. 
This view forms a central pillar of the CLEP report, which urges develop-
ing countries to extend property rights to more people by accommodating 
access to housing, protecting the supply of credit, enacting land reform, and 
standardizing and uniformly applying property law in the court system. 
This focus on the importance of formal property rights is influential, and 
variations of it are widely shared,42 but it has been criticized by some schol-
ars. Alan Gilbert has said that de Soto is guilty of “fanning the delusion that 
anyone, anywhere, can become a fully fledged capitalist,” whereas in fact 
focusing on securing property rights tends to “persuade policy makers that 
they need do little more than offer title deeds and then leave the market to do 
everything else.”43 Others have argued that a Western-inspired vision of indi-
vidual property rights is ill suited to economies that have long operated under 
a system of collective or community ownership of land.
39  Justice for the Poor, supra note 37.
40  Palacio, supra note 12, at 6.
41  Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Every-
where Else (Random House 2000).
42  See, for example, Robert D. Cooter & Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Solomon’s Knot: How Law Can End 
the Poverty of Nations (Princeton U. Press 2012).
43  Alan Gilbert, On the Mystery of Capital and the Myths of Hernando de Soto: What Difference Does 
Legal Title Make? International Development Planning Review 15 (Liverpool U. Press 2002).
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Development policy makers have learned through bitter experience that 
a uniform, one-size-fits-all approach to policy interventions in poor countries 
can have unfortunate, and sometimes disastrous, consequences. The same 
principle certainly applies to legal reform and to property law reform. If a 
legal reform is to take hold and be effective, it must be perceived as legitimate, 
not as an alien custom imposed by external forces. Property law reform will 
have a better chance of taking root if it strengthens rights that individuals 
already believe they possess or should possess. The reforms must support ex-
isting aspirations, not completely reorder society. That is, reforms to systems 
of property law must incorporate local understandings of the relationship be-
tween people and the land they inhabit. This is particularly important where 
a collective or spiritual attachment to land prevails: land is not always con-
ceptualized as “property,” something that can be bought and sold.44 If policy 
makers bear these sensitivities in mind, much can be done to empower the 
poor in the area of property rights. 
Networks
LEP is not solely, or perhaps even primarily, a “legal” strategy to reduce pov-
erty. As Golub notes, “legal empowerment is about power more than about 
law.”45 An aim of LEP is to avoid the fixation on formal legal institutions (and 
lawyers) that some say is a mark of the traditional rule of law agenda and to 
focus on more community-based methods. Supporting strong and effective 
judicial institutions is an important part of strengthening the rule of law in a 
country, but without complementary efforts to empower poor people to use 
the law, this cannot be considered a LEP strategy. LEP activities can be catego-
rized in a number of different ways. Golub’s list is a good example: investing 
in civil society, engaging NGOs at a country-specific level, integrating with 
socioeconomic development projects, taking a long-term approach, support-
ing impact-oriented research, incentivizing government personnel to support 
legal empowerment, and making LEP a policy priority for donor countries as 
well as for developing countries.46
The emergence of organizations that are dedicated to these community-
based activities is an indication of the status of LEP within the broader de-
velopment agenda. Consider Namati, with which, as noted above, the World 
Bank is working on a project in Sierra Leone. Namati describes itself as an 
organization that is focused on “innovations in legal empowerment” and that 
supports grassroots programs that move away from the familiar model that 
involves many lawyers.47 Typically, according to Namati, a legal empower-
ment program will contain a small group of lawyers and a larger front-line 
44  For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Edward Robbins, Formalisation of Land and 
Housing Tenure to Empower the Poor: Simple Nostrum or Complex Challenge? in Rights and Legal 
Empowerment in Eradicating Poverty 175 (Dan Banik ed., Ashgate 2008). 
45  Golub, supra note 18, at 108.
46  Golub, supra note 18, at 113–16. 
47  See http://www.namati.org.
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group of community paralegals. Paralegals work closely with communities, 
deploy a flexible range of tools, and connect to lawyers for high-level advo-
cacy if their front-line efforts prove to be insufficient or inappropriate. In ad-
dition to these community-level programs, Namati believes that LEP requires 
reforms to state institutions to encourage the participation and ownership of 
individuals and communities. Examples of such institutional reforms include 
simplifying land registration procedures, strengthening grievance mecha-
nisms to respond to failures in public service delivery, and improving access 
to government information.
As more organizations and development agencies adopt LEP approaches, 
evidence of a global LEP discourse is emerging. The Global Legal Empower-
ment Network is an interesting example. The network, the result of a collabo-
ration between the World Bank and the Open Society Justice Initiative and 
hosted by Namati, provides a forum for those involved in LEP, including de-
velopment agencies, community paralegals, concerned citizens, NGOs, pub-
lic interest lawyers, journalists, and government officials, to share knowledge 
and experience. The network aims to connect practitioners to each other and to 
build a strong foundation and momentum for LEP. As of this writing, the net-
work consists of an online database for exchanging practical resources, such 
as a paralegal training manual. Practitioners are invited to form subgroups 
based on geographical regions or themes and to participate in face-to-face 
regional meetings. 
The future of the LEP movement lies in networks that connect develop-
ment practitioners with the poor, development practitioners with develop-
ment practitioners, and the poor with the poor. If poor people are to realize the 
benefits of empowerment, such connections must be made. Solidarity and the 
strengthening of community ties are essential if the power of the poor is to be 
expressed; that is, if it is to be any kind of power worth having. 
Conclusion
LEP is a new movement in a much older tradition, and it shares with that tra-
dition a commitment to bring the law to bear on development challenges. By 
focusing on those who are directly affected by a lack of economic opportunity 
and by prioritizing their needs, LEP has the potential to make the development 
agenda work better for the poor. That is, after all, the purpose of development 
efforts. Prominently inscribed in the foyer of the World Bank headquarters in 
Washington, DC, are the words “Our dream is a world free of poverty.”
LEP can contribute to turning that dream into a reality, but substantial 
challenges exist. The priorities for LEP should be to launch pilot projects based 
on solid LEP principles, to examine the results of those projects for insights, 
and, above all, to collect more data: data about what the poor want, what 
the poor think the law can do for them, and how the poor want to empower 
themselves. As the data grow and the principles and basic strategies of LEP 
are refined, LEP will assume an important place in the antipoverty agenda. 
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Beyond the Orthodoxy of Rule of Law 
and Justice Sector Reform
A Framework for Legal Empowerment  
and Innovation through the Convention  
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Janet e. Lord, deepti Samant raJa, and peter BLanck
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),1 the first 
legally binding international human rights treaty to address the rights and 
fundamental freedoms of one billion persons, provides a framework for legal 
empowerment and innovation that challenges traditional conceptualizations 
of justice-oriented development intervention. The CRPD implicitly renounces 
the orthodox view that top-down justice sector and rule of law initiatives 
should be the primary target of law and development efforts. Although the 
CRPD does not discount—in fact, it explicitly requires—the reform of legal 
systems, justice sectors, and institutions in meeting its obligations, it goes well 
beyond the traditional focus on development donors to embrace an empower-
ment model that implicates nonformal and decentralized justice and admin-
istrative systems and processes, local communities in development, and the 
duties of private as well as public actors in fostering inclusion. The legal em-
powerment framework set forth in the CRPD has significant implications not 
only for bridging rights and development in the context of disability but also 
more broadly for other marginalized groups living in poverty.
The UN General Assembly adopted the CRPD, along with its Optional 
Protocol,2 by general consensus and the instruments were opened for 
signature by states parties on March 30, 2007.3 It attained the requisite 20 
  This research was funded in part by grants to Blanck from the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion, the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research (NIDRR), and Syracuse 
University; for details see http://bbi.syr.edu. This chapter is adapted from presentations 
made at the session “Persons with Disabilities: Innovation and Empowerment through the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,” World Bank Law, Justice and Devel-
opment Week, Washington, D.C., 2011. The authors wish to thank participants in the panel 
session for their inputs. The authors wish to acknowledge and thank Jesse Feitel, Max Smith, 
and Josh Tumen for assisting with background research for this chapter. 
1  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, GA Res. 61/106, UN Doc. A/
RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006) (hereinafter, CRPD).
2  Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, GA Res. 
61/106, Annex II, UN Doc. A/RES/61/106 ( Jan. 24, 2007) (hereinafter, Optional Protocol).
3  Updated information on signatures and ratifications is available at http://www.un.org 
/esa/socdev/enable/rights/humanrights.htm (accessed Jul. 25, 2012).
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ratifications in short order, triggering its entry into force on May 3, 2008.4 The 
impetus for drafting the treaty was the exclusion of an estimated 1 billion 
persons with disabilities from their communities, where they are routinely de-
nied access to education, employment, health care services, and basic needs.5 
More often than not, persons with disabilities live in poverty and experience 
lower levels of education and income compared to the general population.6 
Research indicates that in all countries, disability prevalence rates are signifi-
cantly higher among groups with lower economic status, underscoring the 
reinforcing relationship between poverty and disability.7 
Prior to the adoption of the CRPD, no international instrument compre-
hensively addressed the multitude of barriers experienced by persons with 
disabilities, and only a handful of states had well-developed disability rights 
law and policy frameworks.8 Where states did have disability-related leg-
islation, often such laws explicitly introduced disability discrimination, for 
example, denying persons with disabilities the right to vote, to obtain an 
education, to serve as a juror, to open a bank account, to own property, or 
to work in certain sectors. In other instances, provisions relating to disability 
evoked welfare-oriented as opposed to comprehensive human rights protec-
tion. Although the human rights of persons with disabilities were implicitly 
addressed within the framework of general human rights law, and were to 
some extent reflected in several disability-specific nonbinding initiatives, this 
framework was insufficient to advance disability human rights and provide 
an impetus for change at the state level.9 
4  For more on the rights of persons with disabilities generally, see Human Rights and 
Persons with Disabilities, www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/humanrights.htm (ac-
cessed Jul. 24, 2012). For a comprehensive overview of the CRPD, see Rosemary Kayess & 
Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, 8(1) Human Rights L. Rev. 1–34 (2008); M. A. Stein & J. E. Lord, Future Pros-
pects for the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in The UN 
Convention on the Rights of Person with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives 
(O. M. Arnardóttir & G. Quinn ed., Martinus Nijhoff 2008). 
5  See World Health Organization and World Bank, World Report on Disability 29 (2011), available 
at http://www.who.int/disabilities/world_report/2011/report/en/ (accessed Jul. 25, 2012).
6  Id., at 39.
7  Daniel Mont, Measuring Disability Prevalence, SP Discussion Paper No. 0706 (Disability & 
Development Team, HDNSP, World Bank, Mar. 2007), available at http://siteresources 
.worldbank.org/DISABILITY/Resources/Data/MontPrevalence.pdf. See also Sophie Mitra, 
Aleksandra Posarac, Brandon Vick, Disability and Poverty in Developing Countries: A Multidi-
mensional Study World Development (Jul. 27, 2012).
8  See Gerard Quinn, Resisting the “Temptation of Elegance”: Can the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities Socialise States in Rights Behaviour? in The UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives 215, 224–29 (1st ed., O. M. 
Arnardóttir & G. Quinn ed., Martinus Nijhoff 2009).
9  For a review of the need for further development of domestic disability law frameworks, 
see Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative and Regional 
Disability Law Reform, Disability Rights Law and Policy: International and National Perspectives 
3, 25-45 (Mary Lou Breslin & Sylvia Yee ed., Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund 
2002), available at http://www.dredf.org/international/degener_quinn.html (accessed 
Jul. 24, 2012).
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The CRPD fills this gap insofar as it provides a road map for the develop-
ment and reform of domestic disability law and policy in alignment with in-
ternational human rights principles, but also in its creation of mechanisms and 
duties to foster the empowerment of disability advocates and their representa-
tive organizations. In obligating states parties to pursue specific national-level 
implementation measures to give full effect to its provisions, the CRPD ad-
vances the kind of broad-based approach to human rights advocacy contem-
plated in the legal empowerment literature.10 Moreover, recognition of the link 
between poverty and disability in the CRPD provides added support for legal 
empowerment approaches in the context of disability.11 In sum, the CRPD calls 
for innovation to advance domestic disability advocacy to support the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of the globe’s “largest minority.”12
CRPD: Structure and Overall Content
The CRPD comprises 25 preambular paragraphs and 50 operative articles that 
set out the historical progression of international disability rights and high-
light issues of particular import.13 It has an introductory set of provisions out-
lining its purpose (Article 1), key definitions (Article 2), and several general 
(cross-cutting) articles that are to be interpreted and applied across all articles 
of the treaty text (Articles 3–9).14 The CRPD is the first international human 
rights treaty to prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability and, signifi-
cantly, to require the provision of reasonable accommodation in order to meet 
its nondiscrimination and equality requirement. It has a novel provision (Ar-
ticle 9, Accessibility) detailing state obligations in the area of accessibility that 
is broadly defined and is driving innovation in numerous spheres and affects 
not only states but private actors as well. The CRPD enumerates specific sub-
stantive civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights (Articles 10–30). It 
establishes a system of monitoring and implementation (Articles 31–40), and 
it includes provisions that govern the operation of the CRPD (Articles 41–50). 
The general requirements set forth in Article 4 make clear the need to 
ground CRPD obligations in national law, policy, and programming in con-
sultation with persons with disabilities. Thus, Article 4 requires states parties 
to consult with and involve persons with disabilities in developing and im-
plementing legislation and policies and in decision-making processes, includ-
ing development planning. In this sense, the CRPD underscores the need to 
engage with stakeholders and their representative organizations, reflecting a 
10  See Stephen Golub & Kim McQuay, Legal Empowerment: Advancing Good Governance and Pov-
erty Reduction, in Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2001); Anna Pala-
cio, Legal Empowerment of the Poor: An Action Agenda for the World Bank (ARD 2006).
11  World Report on Disability, supra note 5, at 39.
12  Id., at 29.
13  CRPD, supra note 1.
14  The CRPD articles are available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=259 (ac-
cessed Jul. 25, 2012). 
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shift toward legal empowerment approaches, as opposed to only stand-alone, 
top-down rule of law interventions. Top-down initiatives are needed and are 
required by the CRPD—including training of lawyers and judiciaries—but 
these interventions rest within the context of a legal empowerment, access to 
justice approach.
The CRPD lays out a framework for national-level monitoring that in-
cludes cross-governmental coordination, independent monitoring (inferred to 
be performed by a national human rights institution, or NHRI), and stake-
holder participation (Article 33). A Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities—the CRPD’s treaty-monitoring body—is tasked with monitor-
ing implementation by states parties through its oversight of the mandatory 
reporting requirement and the issuance of general recommendations for the 
state party concerned.15 The Optional Protocol to the CRPD,16 consisting of 
18 articles, gives the committee competence to examine individual complaints 
with regard to alleged CRPD violations by parties to the protocol. It allows 
states parties to opt into participation in individual and group communica-
tions procedures, as well as an inquiry procedure, all of which are overseen by 
the committee.17 These mechanisms are important vehicles for empowering 
local disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) to bring individual violations 
and systemic abuses to the attention of the committee for its review. 
An innovative mechanism that can facilitate disability advocacy is the es-
tablishment of a periodic meeting of a Conference of States Parties (COSP), 
as set forth under Article 40 of the CRPD. Disability advocates and their rep-
resentative organizations are using the COSP in ways that reflect creative ap-
proaches to legal empowerment.18 
The CRPD stands out among the core human rights conventions in affirm-
ing the role and impact of international cooperation in promoting the imple-
mentation of progressive disability reforms and in establishing a framework 
to foster international cooperation and inclusive development programming. 
Through Article 32, the CRPD is the first human rights convention to detail 
the kinds of measures states parties can take to facilitate the implementation 
of the convention.19 Article 32 promotes the need to ensure that international 
15  For an overview of the development, mandate, and future potential of the CRPD committee, 
see M. A. Stein & J. E. Lord, Monitoring the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
Innovations, Lost Opportunities, and Future Potential, 31 Hum. Rights Q. 689 (2010).
16  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Optional Protocol, United Nations, 
available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=311 (accessed Jul. 25, 2012).
17  The committee undertook consideration of an individual communication in which it found 
a violation of CRPD rights. See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, HM 
v. Sweden, Communication No. 3/2011, Views adopted by the committee at its seventh session 
(Apr. 16–27, 2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Juris 
prudence.aspx.
18  See UN Enable, Conference of States Parties, available at http://www.un.org/disabilities 
/default.asp?id=1535 (accessed Jul. 25, 2012).
19  Katherine Guernsey, Marco Nicoli, & Alberto Ninio, Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
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cooperation initiatives, including development programs, are accessible and 
inclusive of people with disabilities.20 Thus, it gives credence to the impor-
tance of mainstreaming disability in development to achieve not only the 
goals and objectives of this convention but also goals for poverty reduction 
and empowerment within the development community as a whole.21 States 
are encouraged to support capacity building and the exchange of knowledge 
and best practices, strengthen research collaborations and access to scientific 
knowledge, and offer technical and economic assistance to help meet a state’s 
obligations under the convention.22 This provision may extend CRPD stan-
dards, via development programming, to effect change in discrete contexts 
such as electoral law reform and practice, community-based rehabilitation, 
and DPO capacity building.
The convention sets forth general obligations familiar to human rights 
treaties—prompting national law reform and domestic incorporation of its 
provisions. It provides a framework for national-level disability rights advo-
cacy and action. Significantly, the convention draws together a diverse set of 
obligations that, when surveyed, constitute a map of advocacy and empower-
ment opportunities at the local, national, and international level. In so doing, 
the CRPD plots a course for a human rights practice that goes beyond tradi-
tional justice sector and rule of law interventions and includes legal empow-
erment and innovation that is locally driven, community focused, and civil 
society oriented.23
The CRPD as a Framework for Empowerment and Innovation:  
Beyond Rule of Law and Justice Sector Orthodoxy 
The CRPD evokes a model of disability rights realization reflective of the lit-
erature on legal empowerment. This is specifically reflected in the following 
articles: 
•	 	Articles 4 and 8 specify that raising disability rights awareness is a gen-
eral obligation requiring strategies aimed at dismantling barriers posed 
by stigma and discrimination, making the justice system more accessible. 
•	 	Article 4 proposes that law is a tool for strengthening legal rights through 
disability legal reform and legal framework development in terms of both 
substance and process.
Disabilities: Its Implementation and Relevance for the World Bank, SP Discussion Paper No. 0712 
(World Bank 2007).
20  CRPD, supra note 1.
21  UN Enable, The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Disability, available at http://
www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=1470 (accessed Jul. 25, 2012).
22  CRPD, supra note 1.
23  For a discussion of the limitations of orthodox justice sector and rule of law interventions, see 
Golub & McQuay, supra note 10. 
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•	 	Articles 13, 28, and 32 facilitate disability rights implementation through 
strategies of inclusion, including in justice sector institutional capacity 
building.
•	 	Articles 16, 33, and 34–40 provide strategies for strengthening the moni-
toring and enforcement of disability rights.
Although countries have enthusiastically supported, ratified, and signed 
the CRPD,24 many face challenges in implementing the convention due to 
disempowering social contexts for persons with disabilities and underdevel-
oped legal systems. This reality raises a variety of issues, among them the 
differentiation between developed and developing countries in capacities for 
implementation and the varied perspectives on the nature and definition of 
disability.
The CRPD does not provide a concrete definition of disability but states 
that “persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, 
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various 
barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal 
basis with others.”25 This conceptualization demands a shift in how policy-
makers think about disability. For example, disability laws in some countries 
define disability with a finite list of observable impairments, ignoring hidden 
disabilities that arise from chronic or mental illness, learning and cognitive 
difficulty, and accident, and disregarding environmental and interactional is-
sues completely.26
Prior to the adoption of the CRPD, many disability laws and policies op-
erated mainly from the perspective of medical and welfare perspectives on 
disability, in which a person with a disability is presumed to be incapable of 
equal participation in society.27 This conception leads to a dependence on wel-
fare policies and charity programs to address the “needs” of persons with dis-
abilities and their families.28 Many of the concepts set forth in the CRPD may 
seem foreign to policymakers and at times may be at odds with the legislative 
approaches used in some countries. Thus, states parties need to bring about 
significant law and policy reform and development to align with the shift re-
quired by the CRPD29—presenting challenges, but also creating opportunities 
for significant innovation. 
24  For an updated list of ratifications and signatories, see http://www.un.org/disabilities 
/countries.asp?id=166 (accessed Jul. 25, 2012).
25  CRDP, Article 1, supra note 1.
26  See, for example, the case of India in Andrew Byrnes, Disability Discrimination Law and the 
Asian and Pacific Region (Paper 3), in Resources on Harmonization of National Legislation with the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Asia and the Pacific, available at http://
www.unescap.org/sdd/issues/disability/crpd/files/Paper-III-Andrew-20110121.pdf.
27  Kayess & French, supra note 4.
28  Id.
29  Arlene Kanter, The Promise and Challenge of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities, 34 Syracuse J. Intl. L. & Com. 287 (2007).
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The provisions and motivations under Article 32, which covers interna-
tional cooperation, offer the potential to assist states parties struggling with 
challenges in crafting required innovations and facilitating access to resources 
to aid in implementation. Promoting the exchange of technical knowledge 
and best practices while providing resources for capacity building will aid 
government workers and practitioners at all levels to usher in improvements 
and reforms to policies, programs, and practices. Addressing disability in 
international aid and development funding and support will help low- and 
middle-income states parties to provide far-reaching and inclusive programs 
that meet their goals and obligations under the CRPD.
The following sections discuss the general schema of legal empowerment 
and innovation set forth in the CRPD and provide illustrations of how CRPD 
obligations are pursued in different ways to effect change. These include rais-
ing awareness of disability rights; strengthening disability rights; facilitating 
disability rights; and improving monitoring and enforcement of disability 
rights.
Raising Awareness of Disability Rights
The various barriers faced by persons with disabilities in developing countries 
combine to restrict their access to information and awareness of their rights, 
a situation also faced by persons living in poverty and other disadvantaged 
groups. As emphasized in the World Report on Disability, persons with disabili-
ties are likely to live in poverty and are very often restricted in their access to 
education, employment, transportation, and health care and often live in iso-
lation from the wider community.30 The social determinants of legal empower-
ment, therefore, are severely restricted for persons with disabilities. The need 
for awareness-building initiatives, including legal literacy programs, partici-
patory human rights education tied to action at the local level, legal aid bu-
reaus, and inclusive development programming aiming to integrate persons 
with disabilities into mainstream programming (such as health, economic de-
velopment, democracy and governance, and education), are important and 
implicit in the CRPD framework. 
The CRPD recognizes in Article 8 (awareness raising) that a precondition 
to legal empowerment is combating the stigma that seeds discrimination. In so 
doing, the CRPD signals the central role that legal empowerment plays in ad-
dressing the situation of persons with disabilities (and indeed any historically 
marginalized group). Consistent with legal empowerment models, awareness 
raising is a fundamental precondition of disability rights realization and com-
prises both understanding of legal rights and an appreciation of how to claim 
those rights through action.31 CRPD provisions that require public consulta-
tion as well as accessibility measures in the contexts of law and policy making, 
30  World Report on Disability, supra note 5, at 39.
31  Golub & McQuay, supra note 10, at 7.
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training health professionals in disability rights awareness, and the general 
obligation to promote the training of professionals and staff working with per-
sons with disabilities in the CRPD rights framework are important facilitators 
of rights awareness and are central to legal empowerment.32 
There are numerous examples of innovative disability rights awareness-
raising initiatives, many of which are integrated into development program-
ming, as opposed to implementation limited to one-off training events. In Li-
beria, during the historic 2004 elections in which the first woman African head 
of state was elected, DPOs used the electoral process to raise the voice and 
visibility of Liberians with disabilities. At the time, Liberian DPOs were aware 
of the CRPD drafting process and requested, as part of their election work, 
information about international standards on disability to help them draft a 
national disability law. Facilitated through the international election adminis-
tration organization, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems and 
BlueLaw International LLP, the project’s goal was to foster DPO cooperation 
through the creation of a coalition that affected all phases of the electoral pro-
cess—voter education and registration, polling, electoral observation and 
monitoring, and postelection assessment.33 
The methodology was to position members of the Liberian disability 
community as leaders and experts and to conduct participatory human rights 
education in raising awareness and understanding about election access on 
the part of election commissioners.34 A poignant illustration of successful ad-
vocacy occurred during a training of 50 election officials from the Liberian 
National Election Commission. During the workshop, disability advocates, 
including persons with various types of disabilities, simulated vote casting 
at a polling station to illustrate the numerous barriers that they had experi-
enced in previous elections.35 This method used humor that was effective, and 
it imparted serious messages of discrimination and exclusion based on stereo-
typing and generalized lack of knowledge. Drawing on their individual ex-
periences, members of the group demonstrated the barriers that can stand in 
the way of access and participation for a voter with disabilities, ranging from 
physical and communication barriers experienced by persons with physical 
and sensory disabilities to barriers rooted in ignorance and stigma.
 
32  CRPD, supra note 1, at Article 4.
33  Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, Participation in International Agreements as Transformative 
Social Change: The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in Making Rights 
Real ( Jody Heymann ed., Cambridge U. Press 2012).
34  Id. 
35  For more on using participatory human rights education to forward disability rights, see 
Janet E. Lord and Nancy Flowers, Human Rights Education and Grassroots Peace Building, in 
Human Rights and Conflict: New Actors, Strategies and Ethical Dilemmas ( Julie A. Mertus & Jeff 
Helsing ed., United States Institute of Peace 2006).
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Strengthening Disability Rights
To strengthen disability law frameworks so they are more in line with inter-
national standards on disability rights, the substance as well as the process 
of the law must be reformed. Substantive and procedural reforms can cre-
ate accessible and consumer-oriented dispute-settlement procedures. These 
range from legal claims brought before courts and human rights tribunals to 
electoral complaints mechanisms to complaints procedures of national human 
rights institutions. Procedural reforms are a core part of enhancing access to 
justice for marginalized groups, including enhancing the accessibility of no-
tice requirements, the right to be heard, access to information rights, and the 
provision of reasonable accommodations.
Legislative Reform to Modify Legal Frameworks  
and Stimulate Legal Empowerment
Although legislation and policies by themselves do not assure full implemen-
tation of the CRPD, they are a necessary pillar of the effort to facilitate change. 
Similar to states parties to other core human rights conventions, states parties 
to the CRPD are required to adopt specific legislation that prohibits discrimi-
nation in all spheres.36 Such laws should aim at eliminating barriers to access 
that constitute both formal and substantive discrimination, attribute obliga-
tions to public and private actors, and introduce measures to bring about 
equitable access to all rights. Although the CRPD is relatively new, it has 
already promoted significant law and policy shifts. This work is being under-
taken at various levels, including in constitutional development and reform, 
national-level law reform and development, and targeted law reforms in dis-
crete contexts.
For some countries, antidiscrimination legislation will require a change in 
the overall approach toward tackling inequities. For example, Japan does not 
have comprehensive antidiscrimination laws and policies, and the concept 
of nondiscrimination in regard to disability is not considered a part of the 
broader civil and human rights initiative.37 With its ratification of the CRPD, 
Japan is developing disability discrimination law and policy for the first time.38 
States parties should consider using incentives to encourage public and pri-
vate actors to change their attitudes and behavior in relation to individuals and 
groups facing systemic discrimination, or penalize them in case of noncom-
pliance. The identification and elimination of barriers will frequently require 
devoting greater resources to issues of access. Particular attention must be 
given to ensuring that laws and policies are implemented in practice. 
In Nepal, DPOs worked to ensure that the voices of persons with disabili-
ties were heard during the drafting of a new constitution. The Kathmandu 
36  CRPD, supra note 1, at Article 4.
37  J. Nakagawa & P. Blanck, Future of Disability Law in Japan: Employment and Accommodation, 
33(1) Loy. L.A. Intl. & Comp. L. Rev. 173 (2010). 
38  Id.
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Center for Independent Living in Nepal held workshops that were strategi-
cally designed by the organizers to build linkages among DPOs, civil society 
organizations, and international actors—such as the United Nations—in 
the constitution-drafting process. Although few DPOs in the country had pre-
viously focused on law and policy advocacy, one objective of the constitu-
tion-drafting participation was to help build the capacity of DPOs to engage 
actively in law and policy reform and development and to engage with in-
ternational civil society partners to increase understanding of international 
standards on disability.39 
In other countries, notably South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, and Thailand,40 
DPOs have likewise used constitution-building processes to leverage disabil-
ity rights. Ecuador issued a presidential executive decree in 2007 to promote 
the development of disability programs across all sectors and introduced a 
chapter on disability in its 2008 constitution.41 Article 54 of Kenya’s 2010 con-
stitution “seeks to minimize barriers to equalization of opportunities in all as-
pects of social-cultural, economic and political life” for persons with disabili-
ties.42 In Egypt, efforts are under way to adopt a national disability law, situate 
disability within the new constitutional framework, and revise the election 
law in conformity with the CRPD. Enhancing political participation is critical 
in postconflict and transitioning countries.
Legal Empowerment to Support the Reform of Policies,  
Plans, and Strategies 
Since the adoption of the CRPD, countries have started developing disability 
action plans where none existed previously, as well as incorporating disabil-
ity into their broader national action plans. Thailand developed the National 
Plan for Persons with Disabilities’ Quality of Life Development Plan 2007–11 
to issue guidelines for an integrated approach to disability and development 
programs in the country.43 States parties should ensure that strategies, policies, 
and plans of action are in place and implemented in order to address barri-
ers to access. Economic policies, such as budgetary allocations and measures 
to stimulate economic growth, should take into account the need to guaran-
tee the effective enjoyment of all CRPD rights. Public and private institutions 
should be required to develop plans of action to address nondiscrimination, 
39  Lord & Stein, supra note 33.
40  The Thai constitution of 2007 includes “anti-discrimination provisions and guarantees acces-
sibility to social welfare and services for persons with disabilities.” For legislative develop-
ments as reported to the CRPD committee, see United Nations, Compilation of Legislative Mea-
sures Undertaken in the Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
2011 Update (CRPD/CSP/2011/CRP.5), available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/docu 
ments/COP/crpd_csp_2011_crp.5.doc (accessed May 24, 2012).
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. For a more extensive discussion of law and policy within the context of HIV and disabil-
ity, see Janet E. Lord, HIV/AIDS, Disability and Discrimination:  A Thematic Guide on Inclusive 
Law, Policy and Programming (One Billion Strong, Washington, D.C. 2012).
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and states should conduct human rights education and training programs for 
public officials and make such training available to judges and candidates for 
judicial appointments. 
Projects aimed at building human rights knowledge and advocacy tech-
niques are often pursued in a vacuum, effectively disconnected from follow-
up action plans. For instance, some efforts to train local DPOs regarding the 
CRPD have been provided without enabling those groups to exercise their 
newly acquired capabilities. Consequently, although DPOs have gained 
knowledge, they remain unsure how to appropriately utilize it. The Harvard 
Law School Project on Disability, in cooperation with BlueLaw International 
and American Institutes for Research, worked with a coalition of DPOs in 
Zambia. The objectives were to learn more about the CRPD with a specific aim 
to make public health services, including HIV/AIDS education, be disability 
inclusive.44 One of the strategies was the placement of a disability advocate on 
the team implementing a large-scale HIV program involving a large interna-
tional organization and a number of local organizations. The provision of dis-
ability expertise in the form of a dedicated staff member and the provision of 
training to a network of disability advocates engaged in both disability policy 
and HIV education at the community level increased the capacity of DPOs 
and enabled them to achieve better access to health care, the CRPD goal they 
identified as a priority. 
Facilitating Disability Rights 
Measures in the CRPD aim to ensure the facilitation of the rights set forth in 
the treaty. The CRPD is a framework in which disability rights may be ex-
ercised through a variety of measures that identify and then dismantle the 
barriers that stand in the way of the legal empowerment of persons with dis-
abilities. Such facilitation efforts include the accessibility measures identified 
in Article 9, the measures of reasonable accommodation and positive mea-
sures in Article 5, institutional and individual capacity building, and means to 
facilitate access to the mechanisms of justice.
Accessibility in Virtual Spaces
The CRPD has helped to bridge another major frontier in disability em-
powerment and inclusion in the mainstream—ensuring that accessibility is 
not limited to the physical realm alone but extends to virtual spaces as well. 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are a major driver in 
social and professional interchange in today’s world and permeate almost 
all transactions and interactions in society. Today, ICT-enabled services and 
resources are central features of many socioeconomic development initia-
tives, including promoting access to banking, health care, education, income 
44  For a brief discussion of this project, see http://www.bluelawinternational.com (accessed 
Jul. 24, 2012).
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generation, disaster response and management, and social networking and 
civic participation.45 This raises the stakes in ensuring that ICTs are accessible 
to people with disabilities for two reasons: one, ICT-enabled development can 
significantly help to level the playing field for people with disabilities;46 and 
two, the lack of accessibility will add to their exclusion from major develop-
ment programs, leading to further marginalization.47 
The CRPD addresses accessible ICTs and assistive technologies (AT) 
throughout, most specifically in Articles 9, 21, and 26, emphasizing the criti-
cal role these technologies play in realizing all rights, such as access to justice, 
freedom of expression, and rights to political participation, education, health 
rehabilitation, and employment.48 However, Web accessibility and the avail-
ability of accessible ICTs remain low despite the wide ratification of the CRPD. 
The Global Initiative for Inclusive ICTs (G3ict) issued the CRPD Progress Re-
port on ICT Accessibility 2010 based on a survey of 33 countries. This report 
found that
•	 	Only 58 percent of the countries studied included ICT in accessibility defi-
nitions in laws or regulations.
•	 	Only 36 percent had laws, policies, or programs to define public procure-
ment rules for accessible ICTs.
•	 	Sixty one percent enabled persons with disabilities to input information in 
accessible and usable formats to access services offered online.
•	 	Sixty seven percent had laws, policies, or programs that ensure that gov-
ernment communications using ICTs are provided in accessible and alter-
native formats (for example, sign language or Braille).
The pervasiveness of ICTs in most socioeconomic domains requires states 
parties to develop laws and policies to support a comprehensive, coordi-
nated, and successful approach to promoting ICT accessibility for all. Peter 
Blanck and colleagues at the Burton Blatt Institute at Syracuse University have 
worked closely with the European Union (EU) to assess the adequacy of laws 
and policies to ensure broad ICT accessibility. The lessons learned through 
this work resonate across countries. 
45  Deepti Samant, Rebecca Matter, & Mark Harniss, Realizing the Potential of Accessible ICTs in 
Developing Countries, in Disability & Rehabilitation: Assistive Technology (Informa Healthcare 
2012, doi:10.3109/17483107.2012.669022, available at http://informahealthcare.com/doi 
/pdfplus/10.3109/17483107.2012.669022) also forthcoming in print.
46  Id.
47  Peter Blanck, Towards a Right under the ADA to Web Access for People with Cognitive Dis-
abilities (Coleman Institute for Cognitive Disabilities 2012), available at http://www.cole 
maninstitute.org/images/documents/research_development/2012CTowardsARightUnder
TheADA.pdf; M. V. Vicente & A. J. Lopez, A Multidimensional Analysis of the Disability Digital 
Divide: Some Evidence for Internet Use, 26(1) The Information Society 48 –64 (2010).
48  CRPD (2006), available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=13&pid=150 
(accessed Jul. 24, 2012).
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Laws, policies, and regulations must address accessibility in the entire 
accessibility supply chain, including “content production, content transmis-
sion, and content rendering.”49 Thus, policies must cover the producers and 
developers as well as the deployers of technology (that is, service providers 
such as banks).50 Different countries have different approaches for such an 
undertaking. For example, in the United States different pieces of legislation 
covering different products, agencies, and sectors that utilize ICT-based ser-
vices—a piecemeal approach—coexist with broad-sweeping legislation such 
as the Americans with Disabilities Act.51 Depending on the political climate 
and national interest, both approaches may need to be used. Additionally, 
states parties should promote collaboration and agreement among the differ-
ent stakeholders such as consumers, service providers, manufacturers, and 
law enforcement to create broad support for institutional drive due to the dif-
fering interests of and impacts on each stakeholder group.52 Issues such as ICT 
accessibility encompass the need for top-down (impose direct obligations on 
the supply side) as well as bottom-up (rights for users/consumers) types of 
legislation.53 Some states will need to support public and private mechanisms 
for harmonization toward uniformity of law.
Another issue that is increasingly a challenge for law and policymakers 
is that of convergence—the “erosion of boundaries” between different types 
of previously separate ICT products and services such as the transmission of 
television content delivered over the Internet.54 The expansion of such services 
may fall in the gray areas not clearly covered by accessibility legislation or 
regulation. As discussed by Cullen et al.:
Telephony over the Internet often falls outside the scope of legisla-
tion dealing with accessibility of voice telephony and there is a lack 
of clarity as to whether interactive TV is a broadcast or a telecommu-
nications service, or neither of these but a new class of service from 
an e-Accessibility regulatory point of view.55 
Finally, it is important to address the issue of the existence and trans-
ferability of standards and regulations for ICT products and services across 
49  Kevin Cullen et al., Accessibility of ICT Products and Services to Disabled and Older People: To-
wards a Framework for Further Development of EU Legislation or Other Co-ordination Measures on 
eAccessibility (European Commission 2008).
50  Id.
51  William N. Myhill, Law & Policy Challenges for Achieving an Accessible eSociety: Lessons from the 
United States, in European Yearbook on Disability Law vol. 2 (L. Waddington & G. Quinn ed., 
Intersentia 2010).
52  Samant, Matter, & Harniss supra note 45.
53  Cullen et al., supra note 49.
54  Rajendra Singh & Siddhartha Raja, Convergence in Information and Communication Technol-
ogy: Strategic and Regulatory Considerations (World Bank 2010), available at http://publi 
cations.worldbank.org/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=0&products_id=23785 
(accessed Jul. 25, 2012).
55  Cullen et al., supra note 49, at 65.
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national boundaries. The lack of accessibility standards and policies across 
regions can create significant challenges for individuals with disabilities in 
an increasingly global society and impede progress toward the fulfillment of 
the CRPD. The challenge of CRPD implementation in the context of virtual 
spaces raises numerous issues pertaining to developing-country needs and 
underdeveloped capacity.
Common but Differentiated Obligations between Developed  
and Developing States?
The notion that international obligations may introduce flexibility and differ-
ential treatment for rich and poor countries is a pragmatic response to real 
disparities in technical and economic capacities to comply fully with treaty 
standards. Bodansky’s typology of treaty design features that affect obliga-
tory stringency in the international environmental realm is instructive in this 
regard; it includes flexible or contextual commitments; differential standards; 
and reservations.56 Although it may be anathema to suggest that human rights 
obligations are somehow contingent or differential on the basis of resources, 
there are indeed concepts that do, in essence, render obligations either less 
stringent in the sense of temporality (that is, progressive realization in rela-
tion to economic, social, and cultural rights)57 or more flexible in the sense of 
providing states with a margin of appreciation for the operationalization of a 
requirement to suit country contexts or in allowing reservations, declarations, 
and understandings.58 
Thus, it is possible to speak in terms of “common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities” in the CRPD.59 However, legal, institutional, and economic un-
derdevelopment is not an escape hatch for avoiding compliance. The CRPD 
goes further than any other human rights convention in establishing a frame-
work for international cooperation that accommodates divergent levels of 
economic development and unequal capacities to address disability rights in a 
comprehensive manner.60 Article 32 represents one model for making interna-
tional human rights law responsive to such challenges and to foster substan-
tive disability rights equality among states.61
 
56  D. Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (President and Fellows of 
Harvard College 2010).
57  CRPD, supra note 1, at Article 4(2).
58  Id., at Article 46.
59  C. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 Am. J. Intl. L. 276–
301 (2004).
60  Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-
state Relations, 10 European J. Intl. L. 549–82 (1999). For a helpful discussion of implementa-
tion challenges in another context, see G. Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for 
Developing Country Adaptation, 5(2) World Trade Rev. 177–98 (2006).
61  CRPD, supra note 1, at Article 32.
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Reasonable Accommodation as a Primary Means  
of Rights Facilitation
One of the most important facilitators of the rights recognized in the CRPD 
is the concept of required reasonable accommodation. The failure to provide 
reasonable accommodation to an individual with a disability, whether to facil-
itate access to education, work, health care, cultural activities, or other spheres 
of life, constitutes discrimination. 
Reasonable accommodation is being implemented at the domestic level 
in numerous ways. One example of using the tools of legal empowerment 
to equip persons with disabilities and employers to better understand how 
to operationalize reasonable accommodation is the Job Accommodation Net-
work, an initiative of the Office of Disability Employment Policy in the US 
Department of Labor. The Job Accommodation Network is a model for the 
provision of free, expert, and confidential guidance on workplace accom-
modations and disability employment issues.62 The service helps to identify 
practical solutions that benefit employers in meeting their reasonable accom-
modations duties and employees in negotiating job accommodations. The ini-
tiative focuses on workable solutions according to which legal requirements 
are satisfied within a framework that assists the employer and the employee 
in understanding legal requirements and measures that may be undertaken 
to meet them. This approach and similar initiatives are being operationalized 
as countries implement the obligations set forth in the CRPD. Other applica-
tions of reasonable accommodation under development pertain to the obli-
gations set forth in Article 12 to facilitate empowered decision making. Law 
reform initiatives in Ireland and South Africa, for example, are putting into 
place models that will reasonably accommodate individuals with disabilities 
in decision making about all aspects of life, including medical and rehabilita-
tion issues, financial and property matters, and political participation.63
Improving Monitoring and Enforcement of Disability Rights
National legislation, strategies, policies, and plans should provide for mecha-
nisms and institutions that effectively address the individual and the struc-
tural nature of the harm caused by disability discrimination and inequality 
of access to rights in all fields covered by the CRPD. Institutions dealing with 
allegations of disability discrimination customarily include courts and tribu-
nals, administrative authorities, national human rights institutions, and om-
budspersons. These institutions should be accessible to all persons with dis-
abilities without discrimination and consistent with principles of accessibility. 
62  See Job Accommodation Network, http://askjan.org/ (accessed Jul. 24, 2012).
63  For a discussion of the Irish initiative, see Amnesty International Ireland, Mental Health 
Act 2001: A Review, Summary Paper (undated). For a review of the South African effort to 
draft legislation on supported decision making, see South African Law Reform Commis-
sion, Current Investigations, Progress Report, available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc 
/progress.htm.
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Institutions should be empowered to provide effective remedies, such as com-
pensation, reparation, restitution, rehabilitation, guarantees of nonrepetition, 
and public apologies, and states parties should ensure that these measures are 
effectively implemented.
Improving Access to Dispute-Settlement Mechanisms 
The drafters of the CRPD understood the barriers that exist for persons with 
disabilities in seeking access to justice for the vindication of their rights. Some 
of these barriers parallel those that all marginalized groups experience and 
that contribute toward disempowerment, while others are more specific to 
disability. There is an overall lack of awareness or unintended insensitivity to 
disability-related concerns and needs among court personnel, including in-
flexible court policies, practices, and procedures and inaccessible public infor-
mation about courts and court services.
Given recognition that access to justice programs for marginalized groups 
is essential and must be pursued in conjunction with top-down justice sector 
reform strategies, there are numerous possibilities for the use of existing plat-
forms to enhance disability inclusion. In Afghanistan, Global Rights partnered 
with local women’s organizations and several universities to establish legal 
assistance bureaus in order to enhance women’s access to family courts and 
justice.64 Improving the accessibility of these courts to women, persons with 
disabilities, and other marginalized groups is essential to create well-trodden 
pathways for the enforcement of legal rights. DPOs are working to ensure 
that such community-based legal services are accessible to persons with dis-
abilities. This is consistent with measures set forth in Article 13 of the CRPD. 
Eliminating Barriers through Litigation 
Legal empowerment approaches stress not only top-down training of judges 
and lawyers but also how to work within civil society to build capacity to en-
gage in a range of activities that enhance and facilitate access to justice. Strate-
gic litigation at the local level and through regional as well as international hu-
man rights mechanisms is an effective tool for change provided it is designed 
and implemented by local organizations and not driven by ill-informed out-
siders. Experience with existing domestic disability laws and existing regional 
systems discloses the possibilities for change.
Antidiscrimination legislation with remedial measures is a tool that can 
help ensure equality and fair treatment in the face of continuing stigma and 
negative attitudes toward people with disabilities. In the United States, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)65 has significantly affected the ability 
of persons with disabilities to combat stigma and discrimination in the work-
64  See Global Rights, Afghanistan, http://www.globalrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename 
=www_asia_afghanistan (accessed Jul. 25, 2012).
65  See, generally, P. Blanck et al., Disability Rights Law and Policy: Casebook (Thomson/West 
2009).
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place. Consider the case of Don Perkl, an individual with intellectual disability, 
who was fired from Chuck E. Cheese, a pizza restaurant, because of his disabil-
ity.66 Despite support from his supervisor and his coworkers, he was fired by 
a regional manager who believed that Perkl was threatening to the restaurant 
patrons due to his disability and unfit for the job. A jury disagreed, awarding 
Perkl back pay, legal fees, and compensatory damages under the ADA, as well 
as US$13 million in punitive damages, to deliver a strong message.67 Without 
the ADA for recourse, Perkl would have faced severe difficulty in challenging 
the regional manager for blatant disability-based discrimination. 
Across the globe, lawyers are undertaking similar cases in areas of disabil-
ity rights. This work, including development projects that aim to strengthen 
the ability of civil society and legal aid clinics to undertake legal empower-
ment work, must target the elimination of systemic disability discrimination 
and segregation that inhibit equitable access to all rights for persons with 
disabilities. The Harvard Law School Project on Disability, for example, has 
served as amici in a number of cases before the European Court of Human 
Rights, as well as the European Committee of Social Rights.68 
Innovations in Monitoring: Disability Rights Budget Analysis
Standard rule of law approaches overemphasize legal interventions that not 
only are top-down and disconnected from the marginalized groups that legal 
frameworks are intended to serve but also privilege practices that emphasize 
court-focused action over other equally valid and in some instances more ef-
fective forms of interventions for marginalized groups. Legal empowerment 
approaches increasingly point to the efficacy of budgetary analysis as an im-
portant tool in bringing legal obligations to bear on government action.69 In 
this regard, the CRPD sets up a framework that brings such approaches with-
in its aperture. 
The CRPD conceptualizes nondiscrimination and equality and encom-
passes a cross-cutting obligation that may be realized only through its appli-
cation to specific substantive human rights, whether civil, political, economic, 
social, or cultural. It asserts a substantive equality approach that goes beyond 
formal equality and advances socially, economically, and historically margin-
alized groups.70 Moreover, the CRPD is an affront to the discredited notion 
66  See P. Blanck, Americans with Disabilities and Their Civil Rights: Past, Present, and Future, 66 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 687–719 (2006), for a discussion of this and other ADA cases in which Blanck was 
involved as an expert witness and legal counsel.
67  Id.
68  See Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No. 38832/06 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, May 20, 2010), para-
graph 4.
69  See Gillian MacNaughton & Paul Hunt, A Human Rights–Based Approach to Social Impact As-
sessment, in New Directions in Social Impact Assessment: Conceptual and Methodological Advances 
355, 360 (Frank Vanclay & Ana Maria Esteves ed., Edward Elgar 2012) (Budget analysis “re-
veals human rights problems and affords means to tackle them”).
70  Janet E. Lord & Rebecca Brown, The Role of Reasonable Accommodation in Securing Substantive 
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that civil and political rights require little in the way of positive action and in-
vestment of resources by states in order to effect implementation.71 The CRPD 
brings the human rights framework together in requiring reasonable accom-
modation through positive measures in all areas of life.72 
The implications of this model for legal empowerment underscore the so-
phistication of the CRPD framework. In projecting the need for a multifaceted 
approach to implementation, the CRPD embraces the need for budget analy-
sis to track the extent to which states parties undertake the measures required 
to realize all rights under the CRPD, even those subject to progressive realiza-
tion. Disability rights budget analysis encompasses an approach according 
to which a state party’s allocation of resources in a given area (for example, 
education, employment, or community living) is scrutinized and assessed.73 
Budget analysis can be used to identify the sufficiency of resource allocation in 
an attempt to secure the rights of a particularly disadvantaged group.74 In this 
regard, the Limberg Principles on the Implementation of Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights75 stress that statistical information and information on 
budgetary allocations and expenditures should be presented in such a way as 




Equality for Persons with Disabilities: The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties, in Critical Perspectives on Human Rights and Disability Law 273 (Marcia Rioux, Lee Ann 
Basser, & Melinda Jones ed., Martinus Nijhoff 2011).
71  See Anna Lawson, Disability and Equality Law in Britain: The Role of Reasonable Adjustment 
(Hart 2008).
72  See Lord & Brown, supra note 70.
73  See Gillian MacNaughton, Human Rights Frameworks, Strategies, and Tools for the Poverty Law-
yer’s Toolbox, J. Hum. Rights Prac. 83, 95. See also Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, The 
Domestic Incorporation of Human Rights Law and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, 83 Wash. L. Rev. 449, 459 (2008) (asserting that budget analysis in the 
disability rights context is an “essential component” of disability rights advocacy work).
74  S. Farrior, Human Rights Advocacy on Gender Issues: Challenges and Opportunities, 1 J. Hum. 
Rights Prac. 83– 100 (2009). See I. Diokno and M. Socorro, A Rights-Based Approach towards Budget 
Analysis 8 (International Human Rights Internship Program 1999), available at http://www 
.crin.org/docs/resources/publications/hrbap/RBABudgetAnalysis.pdf (accessed Feb. 22, 
2012); Helena Hofbauer et al., Dignity Counts: A Guide to Using Budget Analysis to Advance 
Human Rights (International Budget Partnership 2004), available at http://www.iie.org 
/en/Programs/IHRIP/~/media/Files/Programs/IHRIP/Dignity_Counts.ashx (accessed 
Feb. 22, 2012). Budget analysis can also serve an important role in the realm of women’s rights. 
See, for example, Debbie Budlender & Rhonda Sharp, How to Do a Gender-Sensitive Budget 
Analysis: Contemporary Research and Practice (Commonwealth Secretariat 1998), available at 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7B1171EF87-2C5C 
-4624-9D76-B03CF35F4E65%7D_AusAIDTr.pdf (accessed Feb. 22, 2012).
75  United Nations, Economic & Social Council, Limburg Principles on the Implementation of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, paragraph 79, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17 ( Jan. 8, 
1987).
76  Id.
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Inclusive Development Monitoring, Indicators, and Benchmarks 
States parties are obliged to monitor the implementation of measures to com-
ply with CRPD obligations. Monitoring should assess both the steps taken and 
the results achieved in the elimination of barriers to effective access. National 
strategies, policies, and plans should use appropriate indicators and bench-
marks in operationalizing the CRPD. Monitoring and evaluation practitioners 
have made significant advances in developing performance indicators to sim-
plify the task of monitoring and evaluating human rights implementation and 
development interventions. Although most countries have a long way to go 
before they have effective monitoring and evaluation in the realm of disability 
and other areas, many are establishing monitoring and evaluation working 
groups comprising representatives from government, donor agencies, civil so-
ciety, the UN system, and academic institutions. These groups seek to identify 
and adapt the indicators appropriate for their countries and to harmonize the 
collection, analysis, and reporting of data.
As the first human rights convention to explicitly call upon states parties 
to reform their development assistance programs to include people with dis-
abilities, the CRPD provides an important impetus for international coopera-
tion and assistance. Considerable effort must be taken to ensure that donor 
governments and recipient developing countries adhere to the inclusive de-
velopment mandate. This is unlikely to be achieved through the vehicle of na-
tional disability legislative reform, but instead must be implemented through 
the adoption and monitoring of development policies. Participation in devel-
opment decision making is a major focus of many DPO capacity-building en-
deavors, and is reflected in the Australian Agency for International Develop-
ment Disability Strategy, along with other donor initiatives. Groups such as 
Handicap International have worked to ensure that development tools, such 
as the processes to develop poverty reduction strategy papers in developing 
countries, are inclusive and conducted in collaboration and consultation with 
local DPOs.
Looking Forward
The CRPD provides a conceptual model for the legal empowerment of per-
sons with disabilities through innovative and broad-based interventions. Its 
obligations are to be implemented through actions required by the mecha-
nisms familiar to the rule of law orthodoxy. Moreover, beyond law and policy 
change, CRPD obligations are to be applied through culture building, partici-
patory and empowering engagement in decision making, inclusive develop-
ment practices, disability rights education, rights-based budget analysis, and 
other activities. The CRPD calls upon states, as well as development actors 
and DPOs, to engage in a variety of human rights actions in order to realize 
its implementation—from scoping exercises that examine accessibility obliga-
tions in law and policy to law reform, law development, and human rights 
education that raises awareness among a wide array of stakeholders.
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The CRPD embodies the potential for a significant transformation in dis-
ability legislation, policies, and programs around the world to empower per-
sons with disabilities through full and equal enjoyment of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. Many governments and development practi-
tioners realize this necessity, but do not have adequate knowledge of effec-
tive practices and solutions. The CRPD addresses this concern prominently 
through Article 32, which highlights the role that capacity building, technical 
assistance, and the exchange of evidence-based knowledge and best practices 
can play in facilitating the changes that may be required after ratification. In-
tellectual assistance plays a role, as does monetary assistance to support ac-
tions by low- and middle-income countries to put the convention into practice. 
Article 32 encourages financial assistance to aid in CRPD implementation 
through inclusive and accessible aid programming. When international devel-
opment addresses disability only as a separate issue distinct from mainstream 
programs, the result is a vicious circle where individuals with disabilities are 
further excluded and marginalized from the benefits of most economic and 
social development reforms and actions.77 Hence, Article 32 is critical to as-
sist states parties in meeting their obligations under the CRPD and requires 
strong international cooperation. The international development community, 
together with the international disability rights community, can play a signifi-
cant role in assisting states parties to reform their laws, policies, and programs 
to implement the CRPD by strengthening technical assistance, providing fi-
nancial support to implement the articles of the convention, and exchanging 
knowledge on best practices. Article 32 requires states parties to work with 
each other and with relevant organizations to support capacity building 
“through the exchange and sharing of information, experiences, training pro-
grammes and best practices” and to “facilitate cooperation in research and 
access to scientific and technical knowledge.” 
Knowledge and practices can be exchanged via networks that encour-
age dialogue and collaboration through multiple communication strategies 
among researchers in academic institutions, think tanks, and governments 
across geographic regions. Participants in such networks can share findings 
from their activities that increase awareness and understanding about people 
with disabilities in areas such as deinstitutionalization and community living, 
employment and economic empowerment, legal capacity, human rights, and 
access to health care, education, and technology. 
One example of such a network is the Global Forum on Law, Justice and 
Development (GFLJD), initiated by the World Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency 
together with a number of academic and institutional partners from around 
the world. The GFLJD aims to bring together stakeholders in the fields of law, 
justice, and development, combining the economic, legal, and technical as-
pects of a range of targeted issues beyond disability. By introducing disability 
into this network, practitioners can work toward mainstreaming the needs of 
77  Samant, Matter, & Harniss, supra note 45.
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persons with disabilities across the spectrum of law, justice, and development 
programs around the world.
The approaches to legal empowerment and innovation called for in the 
implementation of the CRPD can be built upon to advance an emerging dis-
ability rights narrative with roots at the community as well as national level. 
Empowerment and innovation will be achieved in these reform efforts only 
with the full participation of and meaningful consultation with persons with 
disabilities and their representative organizations.

The Political Economy of Improving  
Traditional Justice Systems
A Case Study of NGO Engagement  
with Shalish in Bangladesh
Stephen Golub
In the past decade, the role that traditional justice systems (TJSs) play in the 
lives of the rural poor has received increasing attention.1 Sometimes referred 
to as customary justice systems, nonstate justice systems (because they have 
not originated as legal systems devised and administered by the state), or al-
ternative dispute resolution (when viewed as alternatives to the courts), TJSs 
handle most disputes and other justice processes in many societies, particu-
larly in rural areas. 
Across the globe, institutions such as development agencies, national gov-
ernments, and civil society groups are exploring whether and how to work 
with TJSs. TJSs merit this focus because they are so central to the lives of so 
many. Yet, they often are blatantly unfair to women and other populations 
who suffer from power imbalances in their disputes and in their lives. The 
powerful can use TJSs as a mechanism to control the relatively powerless. 
They are often instruments, then, for the administration not just of justice but 
also, informally, of local governance. With these considerations in mind, what 
can and should development, government, and civil society institutions do to 
help make TJSs more equitable in their operations?
This chapter aims to address this question by examining how NGOs in 
Bangladesh attempt to employ, modify, or monitor the country’s main TJS, 
known as shalish, so as to retain its meritorious features and ameliorate its 
drawbacks.2 Most Bangladeshi NGOs seek to make shalish less gender 
biased, corrupt, and punitive, as well as fairer and more accountable. As with 
any customary system, the way shalish functions varies among communities 
1  The World Bank, the UK Department for International Development (DfID), the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the International Development Law Or-
ganization are but a few of the major international agencies conducting relevant research, 
programs, or other initiatives.
2  This chapter draws on the author’s numerous visits to Bangladesh between 1993 and 2012 
in the course of consulting for DfID, the Asia Foundation, the Asian Development Bank, 
the Ford Foundation, and other internationally oriented organizations, as well as additional 
research conducted by the author.
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and regions. However, the picture painted with broad strokes in this chapter 
applies to much of the country. 
The TJS operations of Bangladeshi NGOs take on additional salience for 
the international community in view of the recently launched the Community 
Legal Services Programme, which will support such work (as well as related, 
justice-oriented activities). Funded by the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DfID), this five-year (2012–17), 17 million GBP 
initiative will provide a substantial base of experience and research that other 
development institutions and countries can draw on.3
This chapter first delves into the importance of TJSs. It then discusses the 
nature of shalish in its conventional, unmodified form, unaffected by NGO in-
fluence. It moves on to address NGO efforts to improve shalish operations or 
to act as substitutes for the process. Finally, the chapter offers some reflections 
on the implications of this analysis for international development, including 
for NGOs and governments concerned with customary justice. 
The political economy approach taken in this discussion mirrors the strat-
egies of many NGOs seeking to improve shalish. Traditional justice is not just 
about dispute resolution. It is also about power, politics, governance, gender, 
community dynamics, and resource allocation. 
Any approach to justice and development that relies mainly on technical 
analyses and solutions is bound to fall far short of the mark in its attempts 
to formulate, promote, and implement reforms. This kind of approach is es-
pecially misguided in the case of customary justice. For instance, an NGO 
or government program that trains traditional leaders how to mediate intra-
community conflicts addresses a minor or nonexistent need. That organiza-
tion or program should instead focus on the economic, political, and cultural 
influences and incentives that shape the behaviors of community leaders 
and members alike. To their considerable credit, many Bangladeshi NGOs 
do exactly that in grappling with the considerable challenge of improving 
shalish. 
In taking this tack, these NGOs take a legal empowerment approach to 
working with traditional justice. That is, the NGOs use the law (in this case, 
customary law) and rights (involving gender equity, for example) specifically 
to help the disadvantaged gain greater control over their lives.
The Global Context: The Main Way the Poor Seek Justice
DfID has estimated that “in many developing countries, traditional or cus-
tomary legal systems account for 80 percent of total cases.”4 The Development 
Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
3  See http://www.communitylegalservice.org/index.php (accessed Sep. 28, 2012).
4  DfID, Safety, Security and Accessible Justice: Putting Policy into Practice 58 (undated).
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Development (OECD) similarly points to research suggesting that “non-state 
systems are the main providers of justice and security for up to 80 –90 percent 
of the population” in fragile states.5 These calculations reflect the fact that, by 
virtue of choice or necessity, the poor in many societies use customary forums 
to seek justice more than they do formal governmental institutions, especially 
in rural areas.
Why is this the case? Due to cost, inconvenience, incomprehensibility, or 
corruption, justice through judiciaries (and other state institutions) can be dif-
ficult or impossible for poor people to access. Even where access to justice 
through state institutions is feasible, it is not necessarily the preferred option. 
In the relatively rare instances where free legal aid is available and effec-
tive, the act of going to court can be an expensive one. It can involve court fees 
and other expenses, and repeated court visits can drain a great deal of time 
away from earning a living. Going to court also can be inconvenient, due to 
those repeated visits and the great distances that the rural poor must travel for 
trials and other legal proceedings. Once a plaintiff is in court, the proceedings 
may be incomprehensible, often conducted in languages (such as those of the 
nations’ former colonial rulers) that may be foreign to him or her. In addition, 
legal discourse is highly technical and beyond the grasp of even educated 
nonlawyers, not to mention the illiterate or impoverished. Finally, there is no 
guarantee that judicial proceedings are free from corruption, political control, 
gender biases, or other undue influences that undercut their fairness, particu-
larly for the poor.
None of this is to deny the value of well-functioning courts for many pur-
poses, not least addressing serious crimes, human rights abuses, and public 
policy issues. Nor is it to claim that TJSs always operate fairly; as already em-
phasized here, that is far from the case. But the fact that a well-functioning 
judiciary is desirable does not mean it is achievable. Efforts to address judi-
cial inadequacies have proven problematic in many nations, including Ban-
gladesh. Notwithstanding the presence of some fine Bangladeshi jurists, the 
country’s court system has been resistant to change. A 2011 World Bank re-
port, Disputes, Crimes and Pathways of Redress: A Household Survey on Citizens’ 
Perceptions and Experiences of the Justice System in Bangladesh, indicates wide-
spread lack of public confidence in the courts, police, and other formal justice 
sector institutions.6
In terms of cost, convenience, and comprehensibility, TJSs do have distinct 
advantages over the courts. The poor do not have to pay to use them. TJSs usu-
ally take far less time than court cases do, even if they do not always offer in-
stant justice. Their dispute-resolution sessions typically take place much closer 
5  OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, Enhancing the De-
livery of Justice and Security in Fragile States 4 (Aug. 2006).
6  Saku Akmeemana, Disputes, Crimes and Pathways of Redress: A Household Survey on Citizens’ 
Perceptions and Experiences of the Justice System in Bangladesh (World Bank 2011).
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to where the poor reside. TJS proceedings are conducted in languages that the 
poor understand and are often conducted by fellow community members. 
Being more comprehensible and rooted in their communities can make 
some TJSs more transparent and accountable to the poor—at least compared 
with incomprehensible judicial systems that leave the poor open to manipula-
tion by judges, court personnel, or even their own attorneys. Nevertheless, 
although TJSs may be preferable to the courts for many purposes, that fact 
constitutes faint praise.
Conventional Shalish: An Overview
The term shalish (or salish) refers to a traditional, community-based, largely 
informal Bangladeshi process through which small, loosely constituted panels 
of influential local figures help resolve community members’ disputes and/
or impose sanctions on them. The term is applied in at least four ways: to the 
process in general, to an individual hearing, to a series of hearings about a 
specific dispute, and to the panel conducting a hearing. The panel members 
are called shalishdars. 
Although practiced across most of the country, shalish is not the only lo-
cal, informal method of dispute resolution in Bangladesh. Cultural minorities 
employ their own, varied methods. As in many societies, Bangladeshi dis-
putants may seek out influential individuals for advice or decisions without 
turning to a panel of such persons. But the widespread use and diverse forms 
of shalish make it potentially fertile ground for international efforts to under-
stand analogous processes and external efforts to improve them.
Shalish may involve voluntary submission to arbitration (which, in this 
context, involves the parties agreeing to submit to the judgment of the shalish 
panel) or mediation (in which the panel helps the disputants devise a settle-
ment themselves). Frequently, shalish blends the two, such that the two par-
ties are nominally free to accept or reject shalishdars’ recommendations, but 
pressure from the shalishdars or other community members may undermine 
the voluntariness of such decisions. 
A harsh (though relatively rare) version of shalish can take a punitive 
form. In such instances, the forum constitutes a de facto criminal court that 
inflicts trial and punishment on individuals who have not consented to its 
jurisdiction.
With the exception of the summary judgment imposed under that harsh 
version, a shalish can result in a quick resolution or may extend over numer-
ous sessions and months. Negotiations between disputants, often including 
or represented by family members, sometimes also take place outside these 
sessions, complementing the discussions that take place within them. 
The term “dispute-resolution process” suggests calm deliberation, with 
the parties patiently putting forth their perspectives and impartial facilitators 
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soberly sorting through the issues. Although not the product of a scientific 
survey, this author’s impressions of more than a dozen (NGO-organized) sha-
lish sessions during the 1990s were rather different:
The actual shalish is often a loud and passionate event in which 
disputants, relatives, [shalish panel] members and even uninvited 
community members congregate to express their thoughts and feel-
ings. Additional observers—adults and children alike—gather in the 
room’s doorway and outside. More than one exchange of opinions 
may occur simultaneously. Calm discussions explode into bursts of 
shouting and even laughter or tears. All of this typically takes place 
in a crowded school room or other public space, sweltering most of 
the year, often with the noise of other community activities filter-
ing in from outside. The number of participants and observers may 
range from a few dozen to well over one hundred.7 
Even more significant, it can be misleading to characterize shalish as con-
stituting alternative dispute resolution. As Siddiqi explains:
The shalish should not be thought of as an alternative [emphasis in 
original] dispute resolution mechanism in Bangladesh. The concept 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) was developed in relation 
to a specific set of needs within various “western” legal systems. 
While many features of ADR are similar to those that characterize 
the shalish, the latter does not by any means constitute an alterna-
tive for the vast majority of the rural population. Indeed, despite its 
visibility and prominence, available statistics would argue for view-
ing the formal justice system as the “alternative” form of dispute 
resolution.8
Siddiqi’s insight applies to most disputes involving most rural Bangla-
deshis and many urban ones. Even if the country’s problematic courts oper-
ated more efficiently and equitably, they still would represent an alternative to 
shalish, rather than vice versa. 
The Main Types of Disputes Addressed via Shalish
Shalish most commonly addresses two types of disputes: one category in-
volves family and gender issues; the other involves property, including land 
and petty theft. 
Gender/family disputes can pertain to dowry (the price, in cash or kind, 
that the bride’s family typically pays that of the groom), dower/denmohor (a 
payment that the groom may promise the bride but that she usually forgoes 
7  Stephen Golub, From the Village to the University: Legal Activism in Bangladesh, in Many Roads 
to Justice: The Law-Related Work of Ford Foundation Grantees around the World 137 –38 (Mary 
McClymont & Stephen Golub ed., Ford Foundation 2000).
8  D. M. Siddiqi, Shalish and the Quest for Gender Justice: An Assessment of Strategic Interventions 
in Bangladesh, report prepared for Research Initiatives, Bangladesh, 11 (Mar. 17, 2004).
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unless he divorces her), maintenance payments (for a wife’s and children’s ex-
penses in the event of separation or divorce), polygamy, “torture” (a term that 
usually refers to physical or psychological abuse, such as by the husband’s 
family against the wife, rather than to protracted infliction of pain for pur-
poses of sadism or interrogation), and divorce. 
Given the nature of Bangladeshi households and family structures, many 
such disputes are not confined to two individuals. Entire families often become 
involved and may even instigate conflict. In such instances, not all mistreat-
ment is by men against women. A husband’s mother may be the lead actor in 
abuses against his wife. And gender-related power imbalances notwithstand-
ing, there certainly are instances in which women treat men unfairly.
That being said, abusive treatment of women cuts across many gender-
related disputes. This can involve both physical and psychological mistreat-
ment (the latter sometimes called “mental torture”). Young women who are 
taken into the homes of in-laws after marriage may be especially victimized 
in this way. The new wives are often just girls.9 Such abuse often is linked to 
ongoing dowry demands by the husband’s family. 
Dowry does not appear deeply rooted in the history of the lands that be-
came Bangladesh. White10 and Rozario11 both suggest that dowry dates back 
only several decades at most, and that previously it was common for the hus-
band’s family to pay that of the wife in connection with a wedding. Why dowry 
has become dominant is a matter of conjecture. Geirbo and Imam discuss an 
array of possible economic, social, and historical causes—including supply 
and demand for husbands versus wives—but do not draw firm conclusions.12
In any case, dowry triggers or is otherwise related to gender disputes be-
cause it involves demands by the husband or his parents for payments by 
the wife’s parents. The convention must be seen in the context of a society in 
which poorly educated girls are viewed as economic liabilities; families may 
be anxious to see daughters wed because (if the families are impoverished) 
they represent extra mouths to feed and/or marriages may represent a road to 
the families’ social advancement; and girls and their families may be socially 
ostracized if they remain single. 
As with gender-related disputes, land conflicts blend with other societal 
issues. They are embedded in the nature of the society’s poverty, structure, 
9  In one area studied by the Bangladeshi Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the 
Population Council, 80 percent of brides were under 18 years old. BRAC and Population 
Council, Bangladesh Adolescent Survey 2004 (Dhaka 2004).
10  S. White, Arguing with the Crocodile: Class and Gender Hierarchies in a Bangladeshi Village 102 (U. 
Press Limited 1992).
11  S. Rozario, Purity and Communal Boundaries: Women and Social Change in a Bangladeshi Village 
131–35 (U. Press Limited 2001).
12  H. C. Geirbo & N. Imam, The Motivations behind Giving and Taking Dowry, Research Mono-
graph Series No. 28, 2 –3 (BRAC Research and Evaluation Division Jul. 2006).
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and agrarian constraints.13 Problems involving land are not always distinct 
from gender matters, and they may be intrafamily in nature.
Conventional Shalish as Both Dispute Resolution  
and Social Control
Before considering efforts to modify shalish, it is important to consider what 
shalish constitutes in its conventional, traditional form. As summarized by 
Khair, traditional shalish
is basically a practice of gathering village elders and concerned par-
ties, exclusively male, for the resolution of local disputes. Sometimes 
Chairmen and elite members of the Union Parishad [a local govern-
ment unit] are invited to sit through the proceedings. Shalish has no 
fixed dimension and its size and structure depend entirely on the 
nature and gravity of the problem at hand.14
A shalish may be completed in one day, but it may extend over a number 
of sessions and involve private negotiations between disputants, often encom-
passing their families. Traditional shalish may inappropriately and illegally 
handle even the most serious criminal actions, including rape.
Whether a specific shalish constitutes mediation or arbitration, or a blend 
of the two, hinges on the dynamics at play. Community mores and the opin-
ions of powerful leaders often exert such strong influences that outcomes are 
imposed on a disputant contrary to his or her wishes. In the alternative, the 
disputant may have a nominal choice, but pressure to act in accord with mores 
and opinions effectively forces acquiescence. Thus, a woman victimized by 
domestic violence may be forced to return to her husband because the shalish-
dars tolerate such treatment and because they chastise the husband only in a 
pro forma manner.
Khair and her colleagues highlight some of the problems afflicting con-
ventional shalish:
Sometimes solutions are arbitrary and imposed on reluctant dispu-
tants by powerful village or community members. Such “solutions” 
are based less on civil or other law than on subjective judgments 
designed to ensure the continuity of their leadership, to strengthen 
their relational alliances, or to uphold the perceived cultural norms 
and biases. The shalish also is susceptible to manipulation by corrupt 
touts [persons who exploit some nominal knowledge of the law] and 
local musclemen who may be hired to guide the pace and direction 
of the process by intimidation. Furthermore, because the traditional 
13  See, for example, E. G. Jansen, Rural Bangladesh: Competition for Scarce Resources (Norwegian 
U. Press 1987).
14  S. Khair, Alternative Approaches to Justice: A Review of ADR Initiatives under the Democracy Part-
nership, report prepared for the Asia Foundation, 5 (May 2001).
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shalish is composed exclusively of male members, women are par-
ticularly vulnerable to extreme judgments and harsh penalties.15
One additional, crucial dimension of traditional shalish that must be 
emphasized is its role as an institution for perpetuating the social control 
of women and the poor. Hashmi explicates this point when describing the 
“member-matbar-mulla” triumvirate that controls village affairs, including 
shalish:
The members of the Union Parishad (the lowest electoral unit) are 
elected officials, in charge of the disbursement of public goods and 
relief materials among the poor villagers, and are the most powerful 
in the triumvirate. They are often connected with the ruling political 
party of other influential power-brokers in the neighboring towns 
or groups of villages. The matbars (matabbars) or village elders, who 
also sit on the salish (village court), are next in the hierarchy, hav-
ing vested interests in the village economy as rentiers and money-
lenders. They often get shares in misappropriated relief goods along 
with government officials and members-chairmen of the Union Pari-
shads. The mulla, associated with the local mosques and maktabs (el-
ementary religious schools), are sometimes quite influential as they 
endorse the activities of village elders albeit in the name of Islamic 
or Sharia law. They often sit on the salish and issue fatwas in support 
of their patrons, the village elders. The rural poor, often women, are 
victims of these fatwas.16
 The increasing involvement of women and younger political figures in 
village affairs may run counter to the bleak picture painted here. However, 
with the increased politicization of society involving armed thugs, these 
influences are further tainting traditional shalish, according to a number 
of sources.17
Why, then, do Bangladeshis still turn to traditional shalish to address their 
disputes? The reasons echo the reality that customary justice systems are often 
favored by the poor across the globe. Thus, although otherwise highly critical 
of the institution, Siddiqi notes:
For poor villagers, especially women, the shalish offers many advan-
tages. First, a shalish hearing does not require any serious expendi-
ture. Second, it takes place locally, at a time that is convenient for all 
of the parties involved. Proceedings occur in a language and frame-
15  S. Khair et al., Access to Justice: Best Practices under the Democracy Partnership 8–9 (Asia Foun-
dation, Apr. 2002).
16  T. Hashmi, Women and Islam in Bangladesh: Beyond Subjection and Tyranny 137 (Macmillan 
2000).
17  For a summary of recent scholarship concerning these trends, see Harry Blair, Civil Society, 
Dispute Resolution and Local Governance in Bangladesh: Ideas for Pro-Poor Programme Support, 
report prepared for the Department for International Development, UK High Commission 
(May 2003).
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work of justice that is comprehensible to the litigants. Third, disputes 
are resolved relatively quickly, usually in one to three sittings.18 
The bottom line is that shalish is often the first and only choice available 
to impoverished Bangladeshis. It is affordable, comprehensible, convenient, 
and efficient, even in contrast with a well-functioning judicial system—not to 
mention the country’s courts. 
Efforts to modify conventional shalish, then, should not be seen simply 
in terms of improving dispute resolution or access to justice. To the consider-
able degree that traditional shalish perpetuates poverty and the poor’s lack of 
control over their lives, efforts to reform it can contribute to the fundamental 
development goals of poverty alleviation and good governance.
The Punitive Approach: Shalish as Trial
From time to time, harshly punitive versions of traditional shalish have been 
reported. These reports describe incidents of people being lashed or even 
stoned to death for violation of local norms. The reports, which received at-
tention from Amnesty International in the 1990s,19 have attracted significant 
attention in the Bangladeshi press over the years. 
The kind of shalish documented in these reports goes far beyond media-
tion or even arbitration and amounts to de facto trials. These trials result in 
fatwas decreed by mullas who belong to the shalish panels or otherwise influ-
ence them. The mullas interpret or misinterpret sharia to subject the “defen-
dants” to horrible punishment that exceeds the more mundane (though still 
unfair) edicts described by Hashmi. 
While egregious, these punitive shalish processes appear to be relatively 
rare. According to a 2006–07 study conducted by the Asia Foundation for DfID: 
Only a few NGOs consulted in the study had even heard of such 
abuses taking place anywhere close to their areas of operation. Even 
then, their responses to questions about the practice suggest that the 
few dozen newspaper reports of the abuses may represent the sum 
total of the problem rather than a window on a problem that is more 
prevalent than reports would suggest. This is also the opinion of 
ASK [Ain O Salish Kendra, a women’s rights NGO discussed in fur-
ther detail below], which tracks violations of this kind. Local and na-
tional NGOs are sometimes able to mobilize police to prevent such 
actions before they occur.20
18  D. M. Siddiqi, Paving the Way to Justice: The Experience of Nagorik Uddyog, Bangladesh 10 (One 
World Action 2005).
19  See, for example, Amnesty International, Bangladesh: Taking the Law in Their Own Hands: The 
Village Salish (ASA Dec. 13, 1993).
20  Asia Foundation, Promoting Improved Access to Justice: Community Legal Service Delivery in 
Bangladesh 22 (Asia Foundation, Mar. 2007).
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This is not to minimize the threat that punitive shalish could become if 
it were to grow in rural areas, particularly given the increasing influence of 
ultraconservative religious elements in some parts of the country in recent 
years. At this point, however, the problem seems to be severe in nature but 
limited in scope.
Four Prominent Approaches to Modifying Shalish
There appear to be four main approaches that NGOs take to modify shalish.21
NGOs Organize Shalish
Possibly the most common form of NGO interaction with shalish occurs when 
an NGO organizes shalish panels and sessions, sometimes building on other 
rights-oriented or development-oriented activities it has undertaken in the 
community. NGOs are able to take such initiatives for varying reasons, includ-
ing their long-standing presence and credibility in a community, the influence 
they derive from their other operations, and in some cases their success at co-
opting traditional shalishdars. 
Much of this approach is derived from the pioneering efforts of the 
Madaripur Legal Aid Association (MLAA, named for the district in which it 
mainly works). MLAA’s work reaches back nearly 30 years. In addition to its 
own direct engagement with shalish, MLAA provides lawyers to assist clients 
when necessary (such as when they are victims of violent crimes) and trains 
NGOs from across the country in its approach. 
The nature and degree of NGO engagement with shalish varies consid-
erably. NGOs such as MLAA and Nagorik Uddyog (NU) may include tra-
ditional shalishdars in the new panels in order to maintain the presence of 
influential persons. But they supplement them with educated persons (such 
as teachers) who may have broader and less-traditional perspectives, women 
from various backgrounds, and men who may be relatively uneducated or 
impoverished. Once the NGO convenes a shalish, its own personnel may play 
passive roles at the session, with the shalishdars managing the mediation.
There are distinct differences among organizations taking this approach. 
MLAA is distinguished by a fairly extensive network of personnel covering a 
district (and nearby areas) of more than 1 million people and close, longstand-
ing connections with the local bar associations. The community-based organi-
zations it forms are mainly shalish panels.
In contrast, the Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association 
(BNWLA) works with partner NGOs that in turn train community members 
21  Although the author has been able to update the information upon which he bases this sec-
tion via correspondence and three 2012 visits to Bangladesh, much of the analysis in this 
section draws on research conducted five or more years ago. It is possible that the nature of 
the engagement of certain NGOs with shalish changed during the intervening period.
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to conduct shalish. Unlike with MLAA, BNWLA personnel do not attend sha-
lish sessions, but representatives from partner NGOs do.
NU organizes and trains shalish panels on a local (ward) level, requiring 
that at least one-third of the shalishdars be women. NU then draws on these 
panels to form higher-level (Union Parishad) legal aid committees that both 
review shalish outcomes and monitor the more general human rights situa-
tion in their areas. Unlike BNWLA and MLAA, NU does not include attorneys 
on its staff. 
Like NU, the women’s development NGO Banchte Shekha, which in 
many respects is also a membership organization, often plays active and di-
verse roles with respect to its partner populations. It is active, for instance, in 
the areas of livelihood, credit, health, education, and other gender-oriented 
work. Many years of efforts to improve women’s perspectives, knowledge, 
financial well-being, and status bolster the NGO’s local credibility and influ-
ence in its approach to shalish. Its shalish panels are accordingly more heavily 
weighted with untraditional shalishdars, especially women, drawn from its 
partner populations. Its personnel play active roles in suggesting and even 
directing shalish deliberations. 
Although there is no typical model for NGO-organized shalish, Hasle pro-
vides a useful summary of a process employed by NU. She bears quoting at 
some length, for she illustrates the many stages of the organization’s engage-
ment with the process:
NU seeks out members of the traditional shalish that are open to a 
more democratic and just form of dispute resolution—as identified 
through participatory local level workshops—and invites them to 
become members of a local NU shalish committee, along with other 
individuals representing a cross-section of the community. One third 
of the members are women, and a particular effort is made to in-
clude women Union members [i.e., women who have been elected 
to the local Union Parishad, or governing council].
As a matter of strategy, NU seek[s] to transform rather than replace 
the existing power structure through a method of cooptation, and 
in particular by bringing together “influential” and ordinary (“non-
influential”) members of the community in training and mediation, 
thereby fostering new allegiances. . . . 
Once established, NU aims to provide the committee members with 
necessary tools for promoting greater justice in the shalish process. 
Emphasis is given to education and training, combining human 
rights education with information about the law, including civil and 
criminal laws, as well as religious and customary laws. Committee 
members are also introduced to local lawyers who stand ready to 
assist them on a case-by-case basis. Role-plays and other forms of 
participatory exercises are used to enhance the members’ sensitivity 
to prevailing attitudes and norms that discriminate against women, 
and develop legal and moral arguments for how these can be coun-
The World Bank Legal Review78
teracted through the shalish. Members of the shalish committee are 
not, however, on NU’s payroll, and are free to take part in the tradi-
tional shalish in their own capacity.
One of NU’s main activities is to organise shalish hearings (NU-
shalish hereafter). These are convened on the basis of an applica-
tion from an aggrieved member of the community, which is filed 
with one of NU’s Community Organisers (CO). COs are volunteers 
from the respective communities where NU operates, and each CO 
cover[s] one Union. All COs have received human rights and legal 
training from NU, and have access to local lawyers.
When NU has accepted an application . . . the CO undertakes a fact-
finding exercise, to verify the applicant’s claims and to collect other 
relevant information. Provided the application is considered valid 
(i.e. that the fact-finding confirms that there is a grievance), a formal 
notice inviting the respondent to a NU-shalish is sent. . . . It should 
be noted that NU would not convene a shalish in criminal cases, as 
a part of their strategy to promote greater respect for the rule of law; 
and would take action to ensure that these cases are adjudicated by 
formal courts, with assistance from NU as relevant.
Assuming the respondent is willing to meet in a NU-shalish, a me-
diation session is convened. While NU facilitates the mediation by 
organising the venue, NU staff plays a passive role in the discussion, 
which is led by members of the NU-shalish committee, representa-
tives from NU’s women leadership programme and representatives 
from each of the parties (which may include non-NU shalishdars and 
other influential people). According to NU policy, a resolution should 
be reached through mediation and not arbitration. As discussed with 
project staff, this is understood to imply willingness to compromise 
on both sides, and while law is a relevant factor in the negotiation, it 
is not the only—or even the dominant—consideration. . . .
Provided an agreement is reached, which is overwhelmingly the 
case, this is recorded in the minutes of the hearing, which is signed 
by both parties. . . . If the opposing party is unwilling to reach a 
settlement, or the applicant considers the settlement unreasonable, 
NU stands ready to provide legal aid to the applicant so as to facili-
tate a formal court hearing. This is also an option in cases where the 
respondent does not abide by the decisions made. 
Following the mediation, NU undertakes to visit the applicant on a 
monthly basis for three months, so as to monitor the implementation 
of the shalish decision.22
A 2011 study of NU’s program to build up women’s leadership roles (in-
cluding in shalish) provides a similarly positive assessment of the organiza-
tion’s work:
22  Lena Hasle, Too Poor for Rights? Access to Justice for Poor Women in Bangladesh: A Case Study 
10 –12 (unpublished MSC dissertation for the London School of Economics 2004).
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[I]t seems that this programme is . . . a potentially useful model of 
a women’s leadership building strategy. . . . The efforts of Nagorik  
Uddyog appear to have resulted in perceptible expansion of wom-
en’s political space (manifest in greater substantive participation 
in shalish) and in conjunction with other women’s empowerment 
strategies currently taking place in rural Bangladesh, such efforts 
could have a real, positive long-term impact on the status of women 
in Bangladeshi society.23
NGO-Assisted Community-Based  
Organizations (CBOs) Modify Shalish 
Some NGOs concentrate on strengthening partner community-based orga-
nizations (CBOs) so that they can affect shalish.24 Part of the rationale is to 
strengthen access to justice while minimizing NGO engagement and com-
munity dependence on NGOs. Under this approach, NGO personnel avoid 
involvement in creating panels and initiating sessions. They instead concen-
trate on strengthening citizen capacities to join, pressure, persuade, educate, 
and otherwise influence traditional shalish bodies. The community mem-
bers who are trained and supported by NGOs seek to influence preexisting 
shalish panels.
To varying extents, NGOs engage in monitoring traditional shalish panels 
even as they seek to co-opt those panels or set up parallel structures. Ain O 
Salish Kendra (ASK), a women’s rights NGO, takes this approach. ASK trains 
and supports a number of other NGOs to help affiliated CBOs exert influence 
on shalish and on other local institutions and issues. One such partner orga-
nization is the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), a very 
large national NGO that promotes livelihood development, microfinance, and 
numerous other socioeconomic initiatives in many parts of the country.25
Siddiqi summarizes key aspects of this approach, in terms of how ASK 
aids partner NGOs:
The organization does not have any offices in the field but works 
through six [at the time of Siddiqi’s summary] partner NGOs. GSJP 
[ASK Gender and Social Justice Program] staff spend considerable 
time in the field but their mandate is strictly limited. They do not 
form alternative shalish committees, nor are they allowed to partici-
pate in local shalish. Their role is to observe, to monitor and to per-
suade. The GSJP seeks to monitor local shalish, track human rights 
violations in its working areas and increase the legal literacy of the 
23  Ryan Higgitt, Women’s Leadership Building as a Poverty Reduction Strategy, 6(1) J. S. Asian Dev. 
114 (2011).
24  To make a crude distinction between the two, NGOs are nonprofits that at least partly com-
prise paid staff, whereas CBOs comprise members of the very populations they serve, repre-
sent, or otherwise benefit.
25  In recent years, BRAC has branched out beyond Bangladesh to launch operations in other 
countries.
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local population. The strategy is to empower through knowledge. 
ASK focuses on legal education and empowerment in a general 
sense, working on the assumption that the desired effect on the sha-
lish can be achieved only with an overall shift in ideology. 
With the help of its partner NGOs, ASK staff members in the field 
help to organize a Manobodhikar Songrokkhon Parishad (MSP) 
[Human Rights Protection Committee], previously known as Ain 
Shohayota Committees (ASC) [legal assistance committees]. [ASK 
and its partner NGOs also organize human rights committees exclu-
sively comprising women.] As the name suggests, the responsibili-
ties of MSP members are primarily to monitor the local situation, to 
intervene in cases where the law has been broken and to facilitate the 
spread of human rights information. Committee members basically 
have a watchdog capacity. Members are not necessary [sic] drawn 
from the dominant social groups, at least not exclusively. 
Through its Gender and Social Justice program, ASK seeks to chal-
lenge and transform local knowledge and moral codes of conduct. 
The organization’s approach is quite distinct—unlike other NGOs 
involved in remaking the shalish, ASK does not intervene directly in 
shalish proceedings. Its objective is more long-term—it seeks to per-
suade the inhabitants in its working areas of the need to transform 
the existing gendered and unequal structures of power.26 
As Siddiqi further explains, “ASK proceeds on the assumption that an 
equitable and representative shalish structure can be created and sustained 
only when there is an overall shift in community norms and practices of 
power.”27 
This point does not discount other organizations’ efforts to alter commu-
nity dynamics so that women and other disadvantaged populations achieve 
greater power and more equitable treatment. The ASK approach aims for a 
lesser degree of NGO engagement so as to facilitate a greater degree of CBO 
empowerment.
The ways in which such an approach plays out in practice vary among 
partner NGOs, but usually involve a degree of community organizing by the 
partner. Alim describes how one partner, BRAC, increased the power of its 
members by pulling them together into not just small-scale community orga-
nizations but also larger-scale (but still local) federations that have a greater 
likelihood of exercising influence.28 
Alim analyzes two examples of such operations. In one instance the fed-
eration (with a woman leading the way) influenced the deliberations of a 
26  Siddiqi, supra note 8.
27  D. M. Siddiqi, Ain O Salish Kendra: Twenty Years on the Frontline 34 (ASK Dec. 2006).
28  A. Alim, Shalish and the Role of BRAC’s Federation: Improving the Poor’s Access to Justice, Social 
Science Research Network Paper 905745 (2004), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=905745.
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shalish regarding an alleged petty theft. In the other, a case of a husband 
who had illegally taken a second wife, the federation sought police assistance 
when the shalish failed to reach a resolution. Specifically, this intervention 
prevented the husband from selling land and leaving his first wife and five 
children destitute.29
NGO Staff Members Conduct Shalish
A number of NGOs utilize individual staff members to settle conflicts between 
disputants without the involvement of shalish panels. Such efforts—often also 
called shalish by such groups because of their mediation-oriented nature—
can take a number of forms. In some instances, a field or office worker initially 
interviews one or more disputants and explores the other options of NGO-fa-
cilitated shalish or litigation. In others, this kind of shalish is the main mecha-
nism by which the NGO seeks to help resolve a dispute; the NGO retains the 
option of utilizing its own staff or outside counsel to pursue legal redress.
Thus, at the same time that ASK aids partner NGOs and CBOs in modify-
ing traditional shalish, its Dhaka-based personnel conduct shalish between 
disputants. Similarly, even as BRAC (sometimes with the assistance of ASK) 
seeks to strengthen the roles of its partner populations and CBOs in modifying 
traditional shalish and human rights in their communities, its staff members 
individually conduct shalish sessions.
Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST), a national NGO that 
undertakes both individual legal aid and more policy-oriented litigation and 
advocacy, employs this approach exclusively. Staff members engage in shalish 
but do not become involved in organizing shalish panels or CBOs the way 
other NGOs’ staff members do. The BLAST approach also differs in that, un-
like some other NGOs (that rely on outside counsel), BLAST can threaten a 
recalcitrant party with litigation on behalf of BLAST’s client if an agreement 
is not reached. Thus, BLAST is often closer to arbitration than mediation on 
the spectrum of what shalish effectively means. This is not to say that BLAST 
always takes the opposing party to court if shalish fails. But the threat is more 
immediate than for many other NGOs.
NGOs Aid the Government’s Village Court System
Bangladesh has made an effort to build on the advantages of shalish by insti-
tuting a formal, officially recognized mediation system. First implemented de-
cades ago, village courts are dispute-resolution bodies that have official status 
under the laws of Bangladesh30 but have been moribund in large parts of the 
country. In connection with the adoption of the Village Courts Act in 2006, 
there has been renewed donor and government interest in reviving these insti-
29  Id., at 42–43.
30  The 1961 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance is a precursor to the village courts. The 1976 Vil-
lage Courts Ordinance put in place the legal structure that, except for raising the jurisdiction 
limit from 5,000 to 25,000 taka, largely stayed unchanged in the 2006 Village Courts Act. 
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tutions. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, 
is conducting a project aiming to “activate” village courts.31
Union Parishad chairpersons head village courts. Other Union Parishad 
members may substitute for them, however. In addition, with the permission 
of the chairperson, a nonmember may chair the five-person village court panel. 
The opposing sides of a dispute each select two of the other four members, in-
cluding one Union Parishad member each. If two parties agree to the jurisdic-
tion of a village court, they are bound by its decision if four out of the five pan-
elists (or if one panelist is absent, three out of four members) agree on a ruling.
In recent years, MLAA has played a role in trying to revive the institu-
tion through training and advice. Certainly, Union Parishad chairpersons 
command a great deal of authority in their communities. Disputes, Crimes and 
Pathways of Redress indicates that community members often seek their help in 
resolving disputes even in the absence of village courts.32
Other NGOs are more skeptical about the village courts’ prospects for 
success. They base this skepticism on the long history of largely fruitless ef-
forts to fortify institutions. They also are concerned about the village courts’ 
potentially politicized or corrupt nature. Other sources lend weight to these 
doubts by raising questions about local political dynamics, Union Parishad 
members’ biases, and the village courts themselves.33 
Additional Research Findings
As with so much in the field of law and development, there is a shortage of 
research that documents the impact of efforts to improve shalish. The studies 
cited in this chapter provide some preliminary evidence that NGO engage-
ment with shalish can enhance equity in resolving disputes and improve the 
situations of disadvantaged individuals. One could even, very tentatively, in-
fer that the gender-equitable effects could contribute to poverty alleviation 
and improved governance. But much more research needs to be done, and not 
all findings to date have been favorable. 
Although the aforementioned 2006-07 Asia Foundation study does not 
reach firm conclusions, the findings are generally positive. Both beneficiaries 
and opinion leaders indicate that NGOs that were the foci of the research 
were generally effective in conducting shalish and otherwise benefit their 
communities.
31  See http://www.villagecourts.org/index.php (accessed Sep. 29, 2012).
32  Akmeemana, supra note 6.
33  See, for example, Bangladesh Ministry of Women’s and Children’s Affairs (MOWCA), Back-
ground Paper on Good Practices and Priorities to Combat Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Children 
in Bangladesh (MOWCA 2001); T. Haque et al., In Search of Justice: Women’s Encounters with 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (Asia Foundation Apr. 2002); and United Nations Development 
Programme, Human Security in Bangladesh: In Search of Justice and Dignity (UNDP Sep. 2002).
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Yet, not all research on this matter has yielded positive results. Geirbo 
and Imam find that even though community members served by BRAC have 
become aware of dowry being illegal, they continue to pay it. Their research 
further indicates that deeply ingrained social practices and attitudes tend to 
persist—to some extent, even among some BRAC NGO workers, which has 
potentially powerful implications for their shalish-oriented work.34 A number 
of the Asia Foundation study’s focus groups report that illegal dowry and 
related problems continue despite the efforts of organizations to provide vari-
ous kinds of community legal services, including shalish.35
Disputes, Crimes and Pathways of Redress provides provocative insights 
about how widespread Bangladeshis’ use of NGO justice services such as 
modified shalish is. Its findings indicate, inter alia, that far more people iden-
tify Union Parishad chairpersons (operating informally, rather than in con-
nection with formally convened village councils) as a first choice in seeking 
resolution of legal problems, compared to NGO shalish.36
As scrupulous as this study was, however, it raises as many questions 
as it answers about dispute resolution and redress. For example, due to the 
methodology employed by its survey research, the study identified relatively 
low rates of gender-specific problems (in a society in which dowry, under-
age and multiple marriages, physical and psychological abuse of women, and 
women being cheated out of inheritances and other property are widespread). 
In addition, especially in view of the aforementioned research regarding the 
member-matbar-mulla triumvirate and related findings, there remains the is-
sue of whether and to what extent people receive fair treatment from chair-
persons (or to what extent that treatment is tainted by gender biases, graft, 
patronage, and other undue influences on their conduct). There also is the 
matter of whether the study’s design and peer review adequately involved 
NGO experts. 
Still, the study provides a useful basis for further research regarding not 
only NGOs’ and Union Parishad chairpersons’ services but also the public’s 
widespread lack of confidence in formal justice sector institutions.37 The Bank 
and the personnel involved in initiating and implementing this research 
should be commended for providing a model for digging deep into how people 
seek access to justice.
 Other Bangladesh-specific studies document NGO efficacy in other re-
gards. One example is Hasle’s field research, which includes interviews with 
NU clients whose shalish agreements were arranged by NU-affiliated panels 
in 2002. NU’s follow-up records indicate that, of a sample of 37 selected by 
Hasle, 31 agreements were honored. In subsequently interviewing the clients, 
34  Geirbo & Imam, supra note 12.
35  Asia Foundation, supra note 20.
36  Akmeemana, supra note 6. 
37  Id.
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Hasle found that in all but one case the agreements were “more or less” hon-
ored.38 Siddiqi’s research on both NU and ASK similarly document their strat-
egies and efficacy.39
The findings of Hasle and Siddiqi are not inconsistent with that of Geirbo 
and Imam. Many of the disputes that Hasle scrutinized, for example, involved 
domestic violence that was reportedly halted through shalish interventions. In 
contrast, Geirbo and Imam researched dowry and related phenomena.
The impact of modifying shalish might best be considered in the context of 
researching integrated legal services and/or development efforts that include 
but are not limited to improving how shalish operates. The Asia Foundation’s 
quantitative inquiries into legal services efficacy in Bangladesh, conducted un-
der the auspices of a seven-country study of legal empowerment for the Asian 
Development Bank in 2000 –2001, found indications of poverty-alleviating 
and good-governance-promoting impact. More specifically, it compared 
control (that is, nonbeneficiary) populations with those belonging to either 
Banchte Shekha or Samata, an NGO that focuses on land advocacy, livelihood 
development, and access to government agricultural services.40 
The findings indicate that the NGOs’ impact included restraining dowry; 
increasing successful citizen participation in joint actions and in influencing 
local government decisions; fostering positive community attitudes toward 
women’s rights and participation in governance; increasing use by the poor of 
government-managed lands that local elites otherwise seize; and dramatically 
reducing reliance on those elites for dispute resolution. The survey research 
found similar though more modest impact by MLAA in a number of these 
regards.41
The Foundation findings regarding dowry and other kinds of impact 
may not be totally consistent with the more qualitative inquiries of Geirbo 
and Imam. However, these two limited studies looked at different NGOs and 
communities. Expanded, rigorous research is called for. 
Implications for International Development
Efforts to improve TJSs can be as much about social justice and governance as 
about dispute resolution. There is a tendency to view TJSs in terms of whether 
and how they settle disputes. The realities of shalish in Bangladesh contradict 
this view. Shalish in its traditional form often is a means of social control—of 
38  Hasle, supra note 22. 
39  D. M. Siddiqi, Paving the Way to Justice, supra note 18; Shalish and the Quest for Gender Justice, 
supra note 8; and Ain O Salish Kendra, supra note 27.
40  Stephen Golub & Kim McQuay, Legal Empowerment: Advancing Good Governance and Poverty 
Reduction, in Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank 135–49 (Asian Development 
Bank 2001).
41  Id.
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men over women, of the relatively wealthy over the impoverished, and of 
religious and political leaders over their communities. Whether and to what 
extent these realities apply to traditional systems elsewhere is beyond the pur-
view of this chapter. But the possibility that such systems manifest social con-
trol—and the potential to advance social justice by modifying them—should 
not be overlooked.
NGO engagement—and donor support for it—represents a potentially pro-
ductive middle ground for efforts to improve TJSs. The experience of NGOs 
and their CBO partners in Bangladesh suggests that such organizations can 
productively work to keep the many advantages of TJSs while seeking to im-
prove such systems. This effort represents a programmatic middle ground 
between simply leaving customary systems to their own devices and seek-
ing to integrate them into the official state justice system. Pursuing this path 
does not preclude efforts to initiate or strengthen such integration. But given 
the fact that even after decades of existence, the state’s village court system 
remains largely moribund and in need of “activation” by a UNDP project, and 
given the degree to which that system likely lends itself to political influence 
and traditional attitudes, NGO engagement with shalish arguably compares 
favorably with reliance on that system. This is particularly salient in terms 
of improving dispute resolution and for the aforementioned considerations 
regarding social justice. It most likely makes sense to support similar civil 
society efforts elsewhere.
However, the reality remains that many beneficiaries of NGO modifica-
tion of TJSs may go from “worse to bad.” For example, a farmer may recoup 
only a portion of the crop proceeds rightly due him, but this is better than 
nothing. An impoverished woman who in a society that offers more economic 
opportunities might be able to escape a dysfunctional marriage may opt to re-
turn to it by dint of NGO efforts. But this may be preferable to her alternatives 
outside the marriage: destitution, ostracization, homelessness, or malnourish-
ment for herself or her children. 
On a more hopeful note, it should be borne in mind that community dy-
namics in Bangladesh and elsewhere are not stagnant. The 2011 study on NU 
reached encouraging conclusions about the progress that the NGO and other 
women’s empowerment strategies are making.42 This author’s observation of 
NGO-modified shalish in the 1990s found a markedly higher level of engage-
ment by women over the years.
The possibility of litigation can be a powerful incentive for reaching and hon-
oring a TJS agreement. The threat or fear of being taken to court by lawyers 
associated with an NGO can make an otherwise recalcitrant party cooperate 
with shalish. Especially when the judiciary is backlogged, corrupt, and oth-
erwise dysfunctional, the expense of litigation and uncertainty of result can 
persuade a party to avoid becoming enmeshed in the formal wheels of justice. 
42  Higgitt, supra note 23.
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Ironically, then, some NGO engagement with shalish implicitly weaves 
together the country’s nonstate and state legal systems. NGOs sometimes take 
cases straight to court if criminal or otherwise severe violations of a client’s 
rights are at play. More commonly, though, NGO engagement integrates the 
two systems by holding out the possibility of turning to the judiciary should 
shalish fail. 
On the other hand, under some circumstances, the possibility of going to 
court may not appeal to the NGO client or may not intimidate his or her op-
ponent. Power imbalances are salient in this regard. An influential person may 
have resources to afford representation or significant sway in the community, 
making the client reluctant to go the judicial route. 
Are NGOs’ potential dual roles in shalish inappropriate? In many instances 
of shalish, NGOs do not take sides—their influence is on the process as a 
whole, rather than individual disputes. They convene and moderate in a neu-
tral manner, rather than advocating and litigating in a partisan one. Still, the 
very fact that some convene sessions in response to one party’s request can 
make her/him a kind of client. And, as discussed above, when they raise the 
possibility of taking recalcitrant parties to court (and occasionally actually do 
so), they take a clear stand in their clients’ favor. Are these dual roles—neu-
tral convener and partisan advocate—inappropriate? This raises issues of un-
checked, unaccountable NGO influence.
The issue may be less problematic than it seems, however. There certainly 
is a tension between the two roles. And there is room for abuse by NGO per-
sonnel. But the balance in many disputes is typically tipped against women 
and other disadvantaged persons to begin with. There is no assurance that the 
police or courts redress power imbalances any better than NGOs do; in fact, 
there are indications to the contrary. Even if NGOs do not always act with ab-
solute integrity or clarity in deciding whom they will support, their net impact 
is to make for fairer processes that can sometimes advance social justice. 
One mechanism for advancing NGO accountability could be the intro-
duction or strengthening of systems by which the organization’s management 
obtains community feedback on whether and how its local personnel are act-
ing responsibly. Although there are examples of such mechanisms in other 
countries—the dispute-resolution NGO Timap in Sierra Leone, for example—
it is beyond the purview of this chapter to explore whether and to what extent 
similar approaches exist in Bangladesh.
NGO authority lends weight to shalish. The credibility and influence of an 
NGO can encourage the parties to participate in shalish and to abide by the 
results. This influence can flow, for example, from an NGO generating donor 
resources or otherwise bringing benefits to a community that grants the or-
ganization a measure of power. Or the NGO may be based in Dhaka or have 
influential government, donor, or civil society connections there, which sug-
gests to many on a local level that it is a sophisticated, well-connected outfit. 
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The NGO can act as a countervailing influence to the corruption or politiciza-
tion that may otherwise affect dispute resolution. 
Yet, the degree of this influence is limited in many areas. Local officials’ 
and party activists’ political power also generates resources, sometimes far 
beyond those of an NGO. In addition, they may have criminal or police links 
that allow them to bring force to bear or otherwise act with impunity. And 
certainly, not all influential persons in a community necessarily view NGO 
generation of resources or contacts as unmitigated goods.
To the extent that NGOs do have considerable local influence, this has 
implications for the trade-off between approaches that prioritize their direct 
engagement with organizing shalish and those that concentrate on building 
up CBOs that can act independently. An argument for the former is that such 
engagement is necessary in most of Bangladesh for the foreseeable future, be-
cause change is a slow process and countervailing, conservative social dynam-
ics are too strong for CBOs to counter. The case for the latter approach is that it 
is ultimately more sustainable and that the NGO remains in the picture to pro-
vide advice, training, legal assistance, and other support on an ongoing basis.
The involvement of influential persons can be crucial for shalish. Influential 
persons on the NGO-modified shalish panels may combine with community 
mores to create pressure for both parties to reach and honor an agreement. 
In some cases, long-term NGO engagement in a community on a number of 
fronts may make such persons’ involvement less important. With its years of 
involvement with literacy, livelihoods, organizing, and other activities ben-
efiting women, Banchte Shekha is a case in point. In some instances, however, 
NGOs may need to compromise with and try to co-opt influential figures, 
even if they tend to be conservative in their outlooks, rather than attempt to 
exclude them from shalish.
Nevertheless, there is a line to walk in such efforts. NGOs are effective to 
the extent that they mitigate traditional shalishdars’ gender biases and other 
undue influences. The NGOs do this by helping women join the shalish panels 
and otherwise participate in the process. They also seek to involve commu-
nity leaders and educated persons—teachers, for example—who may have 
broader perspectives. 
The integration of TJS modification with broader socioeconomic development 
work holds promise for affecting underlying community dynamics. Shalish is 
a product of underlying community dynamics. To the extent that improving 
shalish hinges on affecting those dynamics, it is important to see NGO engage-
ment with shalish as part of an integrated approach to poverty alleviation, 
improved governance, and social change. This is not to discount the value 
of straightforward income generation, microfinance, and other operations. 
But attacking problems such as government corruption and gender inequity 
requires a long-term, multipronged approach.
This view might seem to weigh in favor of simply supporting socioeco-
nomic development NGOs for service delivery, with legal services NGOs 
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playing supportive (though still crucial) back-up roles. But there are a few 
reasons to avoid drawing such a stark conclusion. First, insufficient data are 
available to support it. It would take years of rigorous research to make that 
judgment. Second, because legal-services NGOs are sophisticated in their le-
gal knowledge and activities, they bring countervailing strengths to the table. 
Finally, and perhaps most significant, in many situations in Bangladesh the 
two kinds of NGOs are already cooperating in ways (such as training and 
other support by the legal services groups to the socioeconomic development 
ones) that produce integrated approaches. 
A cautious approach to strengthening village courts and other government 
dispute resolution mechanisms is advisable. MLAA’s interest in fortifying the 
village court system deserves respect, given its trailblazing role in community 
legal services in Bangladesh. UNDP’s initiative to work with these bodies also 
could bear fruit. Nevertheless, it is best to proceed cautiously with govern-
ment-centered work in Bangladesh and other countries. NGO-assisted shalish 
merits a greater investment of donor resources.
There are several reasons for such caution regarding village courts. First, 
the often corrupt and increasingly politicized nature of even the most basic 
local government functions, together with criminal links to politics, means 
that the village courts could be similarly infected. Conversely, there is also 
the more mundane constraint that Union Parishad chairpersons are often too 
busy to invest time and effort in participating in the process. Third, the prob-
lematic history of efforts to energize the system should be taken into account. 
In addition, MLAA aside, not all NGOs see the village courts as a vehicle for 
sound dispute resolution.
NGO-assisted shalish merits a greater investment of resources because, 
when integrated with socioeconomic development efforts, it has the poten-
tial to modify underlying community dynamics in ways that reach beyond 
dispute resolution. The village courts could perpetuate such underlying 
dynamics to the disadvantage of women and the poor. In a related vein, al-
though Disputes, Crimes and Pathways of Redress indicates that Union Parishad 
chairpersons play important dispute-resolution roles even outside the village 
courts structure, they may also perpetuate unjust community dynamics.
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Intellectual Property
Facilitating Technology Transfer  
for Development
Roy F. WaldRon
In 1994, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) established minimum standards for the regulation of many 
forms of intellectual property (IP), including the right of patent owners to pre-
vent unauthorized persons from using a patented process and making, us-
ing, offering for sale, selling, or importing a patented product or a product 
obtained directly by the patented process.1 All members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) were required to adopt TRIPS-compliant IP laws, with 
the exception of least-developed countries (LDCs), which have until 2016 to 
apply TRIPS provisions for pharmaceutical patents.2 The most comprehensive 
and influential international treaty on intellectual property rights, TRIPS is the 
global baseline for IP protection.
To successfully attract imported technology and to build the necessary 
preconditions for adapting the imported technology, developing countries 
needed a supportive environment that would facilitate such transfers, which 
included strong intellectual property protection and enforcement. To a large 
extent, this was the rationale behind the negotiation of TRIPS: technology 
would flow to those developing countries that adopted strong intellectual 
property protection and enforcement.
Developing countries view technology transfer as part of the bargain in 
which they agreed to protect intellectual property rights. TRIPS was crafted 
to create a common understanding of intellectual property rights globally and 
to provide its signatories (trading partners) with protections and certainties 
to ensure fair competition through a regime of IP rights. Articles 7 and 66.2 
promote the practice of technology transfer, with the goal of ensuring that 
  The author wishes to thank Sharon Reiche and Angela Wasunna, both of Pfizer, for their 
contributions in the preparation of this chapter. The views expressed are those of the author 
and do not reflect the policy or position of Pfizer Inc.
1  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Apr. 15, 1994), Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, The Legal Texts: The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 
I.L.M. 1197 (1994), article 28 (hereinafter, TRIPS).
2  See World Trade Organization. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001). 
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technology holders are assured a favorable environment for investing in de-
veloping countries—and transferring their technology.3 
The objectives section of Article 7 states that the “protection and enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technol-
ogy, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and 
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of 
rights and obligations.”4 The obligation for developed countries to provide 
incentives to enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage technol-
ogy transfer to LDC members is found in Article 66.2.5 To ensure compliance, 
developed countries are required to submit reports on actions they have taken 
or plan to take in order to fulfill their commitments under this article.6
Despite the reference to technology transfer in Articles 7 and 66.2, TRIPS 
does not set out a universally recognized definition of technology transfer—
leaving it open to legal and policy interpretation. There are many ways to 
transfer technology. Foreign direct investment, trade, and mobility of human 
resources are important sources of technology transfer and knowledge spill-
overs. Imports and exports, scientific collaborations, knowledge-sharing ven-
tures, and capacity building help disseminate technology information from 
one source to another.7 Proprietary knowledge may be revealed during licens-
ing agreements and joint ventures with local partners, thus giving rise to the 
transfer of technology.8 Additionally, foreign direct investment, a significant 
indicator of economic development and attractiveness of an economy, leads 
to technology transfer when multinational enterprises transfer information to 
their subsidiaries, some of which has the potential to “leak” into the host econ-
omy. The host country benefits via the experts, skills, and financial resources 
that are required to develop and make use of technology, as well as the de-
velopment of human resources, higher wages, and improvement in corporate 
governance standards.9 
3  TRIPS, supra note 1, Articles 7 and 66.2.
4  Id., at Article 7 (emphasis added).
5  Id., at Article 66.2 (“Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and 
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology 
transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and 
viable technological base”).
6  See World Trade Organization, Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement 
IP/C/28 (Feb. 20, 2003).
7  See Bernard Hoekman, Keith Maskus, & Kamal Saggi, Transfer of Technology to Developing 
Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options, Institute of Behavioral Science, Research 
Program on Political and Economic Change, University of Colorado at Boulder Working 
Paper PEC2004-0003 (May 2004).
8  See Thomas Müller & Monika Schnitzer, Technology Transfer and Spillovers in International Joint 
Ventures, 68 J. Intl. Eco. 456–68 (2006). 
9  See Maria Maher, Hans Christiansen, & Fabienne Fortanier, Growth, Technology Transfer and 
Foreign Direct Investment (OECD 2011) (prepared for the OECD Global Forum on Interna-
tional Investment: New Horizons and Policy Challenges for Foreign Direct Investment in the 
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During the 37th Session of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of 
Technology (WGTTT),10 Francis Gurry, the director general of the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO), discussed his organization’s work on 
innovation and technology transfer. During his presentation, Gurry quoted 
Sir Francis Bacon’s dictum that “knowledge is power,” extrapolating to pro-
pose that the sharing of “technological superiority” is a transfer of power.11 
He considered what is required to entice companies to “do away with their 
competitive power” through technology transfer; in his view, the existence 
of suitable market conditions and market possibilities in the host country are 
vital for the transfer of technology to occur.12 
The Role of Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property and Technology 
Transfer in Developing Countries 
Protection of Intellectual Property Is Critical 
As Gurry implied, the private sector considers a variety of factors when decid-
ing whether to engage in technology transfer. To create the necessary condi-
tions to foster confidence to invest in and export new technologies, as well as 
to develop new technologies in collaboration with developing countries, there 
must be strong IP protection and effective enforcement in those countries. As 
an intellectual property–dependent industry, the pharmaceutical industry did 
not initially engage in technology transfer in developing countries where IP 
protection was lacking. With TRIPS, a framework was created that encour-
ages the rapid dissemination of ideas and efficient technology transfer, both of 
which are critical for technology-intensive, high-risk sectors. 
The pharmaceutical industry’s willingness to invest in critical value-added 
production and research and development (R&D) facilities in developing 
countries is directly linked to the strength and effectiveness of their IP systems. 
By safeguarding property against unauthorized commercial exploitation, 
effective IP protection provides predictability and, more important, the ability 
for a company to enter into license agreements and contracts. Because patents 
provide a legal basis for revealing proprietary information to subsidiaries and 
licensees, companies are less inclined to engage in technology transactions 
21st Century, Mexico City, Nov. 26–27, 2001). 
10  In 2001, during the WTO’s Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, a number of developing 
countries proposed the establishment of a working group under the umbrella of the WTO 
General Council to study the relationship between international trade and technology trans-
fer and to make recommendations on ways to increase the flow of technology to developing 
countries. The proposal was accepted, and the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of 
Technology (WGTTT) was established. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declara-
tion WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001), article 37.
11  World Trade Organization, Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology. 37th Ses-
sion, Notes on the Meeting of Nov. 3, 2011, WT/WGTTT/M/37 ( Jan. 13, 2012).
12  Id.
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without effective IP protection.13 IP protection helps pharmaceutical compa-
nies justify investments in the inherently risky, costly, complex, and lengthy 
R&D and regulatory process, and ensure long-term foreign investor commit-
ment to the local market. 
Technology transfers that follow in the wake of strong IP protection also 
help curtail “brain drain” by generating a more qualified and technically ad-
vanced labor force that will be motivated to remain in their home countries. 
Brain drain is “the departure of educated or professional people from one 
country, economic sector, or field for another usually for better pay or living 
conditions.”14 When these skilled workers leave their home country in search 
of better opportunities in wealthier countries, the developing country fails to 
benefit from its considerable investment of public funds to educate the person 
who now brings his or her skills to the developed world.15 The loss of these 
workers negatively affects the developing country’s ability to absorb tech-
nology transfer, because knowledge of scientific and technical information is 
necessary to accomplish technology transfer and advance development.16 By 
providing companies with increased incentives—such as a supportive IP en-
vironment—to establish R&D facilities in developing countries, countries may 
entice local individuals to return or remain in country to capitalize on these 
opportunities. 
IP plays an essential role in technological development and dissemination 
and provides incentives for innovation in developing countries. Developing 
countries have the potential to attract not only the transfer of existing technol-
ogy but also the transfer of new technologies through stronger patent rights.17 
Although the degree to which a country benefits from IP depends on the coun-
try’s relative strengths and socioeconomic characteristics, in countries with 
strong and effective IP regimes in place, there is a significant link between 
increased incentives for local innovation and the transfer of technologies that 
encourage local innovation and economic growth.18 By providing the right in-
centives and removing barriers to the timely launch of innovative medicines, 
the patients and the private sector benefit.
13  See Hoekman, Maskus, & Saggi, supra note 7. 
14  Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary. 
15  See John Barton, New Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for National and International 
Policy, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development Issue Paper No. 18 (Feb. 
2007).
16  See Keith Maskus & Jerome Reichman ed., International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology 
under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime 57 (Cambridge U. Press 2005).
17  See Walter G. Park & Douglas C. Lippoldt, Technology Transfer and the Economic Implications 
of the Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries, OECD Trade Policy 
Working Paper No. 62, 25 (2008). 
18  Id., at 28.
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Other Factors Conducive to Technology Transfer 
Strong and effective IP protection and enforcement, generally a prerequisite 
for any out-licensing or joint-venture decision, is only one of many factors in-
fluencing a company’s decision to engage in technology transfer. Factors such 
as predictable regulatory standards, government commitment to education, a 
stable business environment, and alignment with the government’s economic 
development priorities play an essential role. 
A reliable and predictable registration process for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts is important in providing motivations and incentives to engage in tech-
nology transfer.19 A heavily regulated sector, the pharmaceutical industry 
must meet rigorous standards involving safety, quality, and efficacy in order 
to ensure the welfare of patients. Therefore, when relying on local production, 
companies frequently transfer their technology to entities based in part on 
their capacity to meet international quality standards. This in turn contributes 
to the development of the local pharmaceutical industry. 
The presence of a highly skilled workforce is vital to the development, 
application, utilization, and integration of new technology20 and makes the 
investment climate more attractive for foreign investors. Due to their depth 
of knowledge, these highly trained and educated workers are essential for 
technology transfer to occur. Through improvements in education and in the 
operating environment, developing countries are encouraged to promote the 
knowledge, experience, and skills necessary to enable workers to bring eco-
nomic value and a competitive advantage to technical companies. These com-
panies, in turn, provide education and training and may bring new informa-
tion, skills, and technology to host nations. 
A country’s relative political, economic, and social stability will influence 
a company’s decision whether to transfer technology and is often considered 
a precondition for technology transfer to occur.21 Long periods of stability lead 
to stronger and more successful partnerships because stability lowers the risk 
of doing business in an unfamiliar environment and provides companies with 
increased confidence to implement long-term business strategies and assur-
ance that their goals will be sustainable. Economic reforms and other efforts 
that promote trade, investment, nondiscriminatory policies, legal frameworks, 
and national infrastructure add to the attractiveness of a country with regard 
to technology transfer.22 As governments begin to understand the interrela-
tionship between health care and economic outcomes, investment in health 
care systems and infrastructures will become a high priority.23
19  See Technology Transfer: A Collaborative Approach to Improve Global Health (IFPMA 2011). 
20  See Barton, supra note 15.
21  See Technology Transfer, supra note 19. 
22  See Maher, Christiansen, & Fortanier, supra note 9.
23  See Technology Transfer, supra note 19. 
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By aligning themselves with a system that promotes technology trans-
fer, developing countries are more likely to create medicines and technolo-
gies that address their public health needs and enable local and regional 
solutions.24 Technology transfer arrangements can create strong alliances and 
collaborations that can be leveraged for long-term commercial and economic 
advantage. A supportive environment that encourages these transactions is 
a win-win situation for both the private sector and the developing country. 
The R&D activities of companies can enhance economic and social progress in 
developing countries. In turn, the development of a robust and dynamic inno-
vation system in a developing country will expand commercial opportunities 
for companies.
Examples of Technology Transfer in the Pharmaceutical Industry
A goal of technology transfer, in the context of pharmaceuticals, is to promote 
access to new medicines and technologies for diseases that affect a local popu-
lation. Access to medicines in developing countries is a high-priority issue in 
the global health sector, including for multinational pharmaceutical compa-
nies.25 Technology transfer can directly affect research for neglected tropical 
diseases (NTDs) that primarily occur in developing countries. Many forms 
of collaboration and alliances have been developed to promote research and 
treatment of these diseases, and many include a technology transfer element.26 
These types of arrangements, which are becoming more frequent, demon-
strate that solutions to societal issues can be found through partnerships and 
the sharing of knowledge without undermining IP rights. 
Pfizer’s Research Partnership with Drugs  
for Neglected Diseases Initiative
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), NTDs affect more than 
1 billion people each year and are endemic in 149 countries.27 For NTDs such 
as leishmaniasis and human African trypanosomiasis (HAT), infections oc-
cur among the poorest people in rural areas. To accelerate the elimination or 
24  See Luis A. Salicrup & Lenka Fedorková, Challenges and Opportunities for Enhancing Biotech-
nology and Technology Transfer in Developing Countries, 24 Biotech. Advances 69–79 (2006). 
25  See Sofia Gruskin & Zyde Raad, Are Drug Companies Living Up to Their Human Rights Respon-
sibilities? Moving toward Assessment (Harvard School of Public Health 2010); Carsten Fink, 
Intellectual Property and Public Health: An Overview of the Debate with a Focus on US Policy 
(World Bank Development Research Group 2008); Joyce Meng, Expanding Global Access: A 
Comparative Analysis of Pharmaceutical Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative (unpub-
lished paper 2007); and Greg Martin et al., Balancing Intellectual Monopoly Privileges and the 
Need for Essential Medicines, 3(4) Globalization and Health (2007).
26  James T. Gathii, Approaches to Accessing Essential Medicines and the TRIPS Agreement, 15(2) 
Harv. J. L. & Tech. (2002).
27  See the WHO-sponsored Global Health Observatory website’s section Neglected Tropical 
Diseases, http://www.who.int.gho/ (accessed Apr. 2012); and World Health Organization, 
Accelerating Work to Overcome the Global Impact of Neglected Tropical Diseases: A Roadmap for 
Implementation (WHO 2012).
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control of these diseases, Pfizer entered into an agreement with Drugs for Ne-
glected Diseases initiative (DNDi) in 2009, in which Pfizer agreed to provide 
DNDi with access to a Pfizer library of proprietary compounds to screen for 
new potential targets against leishmaniasis, Chagas disease, and HAT.28 This 
arrangement, which partners Pfizer’s research infrastructure with DNDi’s 
neglected disease expertise, maximizes the chances of identifying promis-
ing starting points for drug discovery programs. Although Pfizer owns the 
IP on these compounds, any novel leads are a candidate for licensing agree-
ments with regard to NTDs. The Pfizer-DNDi partnership demonstrates that 
the burden of finding solutions to diseases endemic to developing countries 
does not rest with a single entity. Through the transfer of technology, dupli-
cation of research and repetitiveness of efforts are minimized, resulting in a 
more streamlined and focused approach that draws on the complementary 
strengths of each organization. The collaboration has identified promising 
leads, and DNDi will continue research, development, and commercialization 
based on these leads.
GlaxoSmithKline’s Vaccine Development Initiative  
with the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation 
In 2009, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) announced a partnership with the Oswaldo 
Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) to develop and manufacture vaccines for public 
health needs in Brazil.29 The agreement created an R&D collaboration pro-
gram at Fiocruz to develop a vaccine for dengue fever, a mosquito-borne 
viral infection that is the leading cause of serious illness and death among 
children in Asian and Latin American countries and for which no specific 
treatment is available.30 With approximately half of the world’s population at 
risk of contracting dengue fever,31 this joint R&D initiative will enhance Bra-
zilian capacity to improve the health of patients by protecting them against 
this disease. 
GSK also partnered with Fiocruz in 2009 to provide access to the tech-
nology behind GSK’s 10-valent conjugate vaccine for pediatric pneumococ-
cal disease, or Synflorix.32 Under the agreement, GSK supplied Fiocruz with 
Synflorix until the technology transfer was complete; the vaccine has since 
been incorporated into Brazil’s national immunization program.33 In shar-
ing knowledge and technology between the two organizations, scientists 
from GSK and Fiocruz work across facilities in Brazil and Belgium to protect 
28	 	See	Pfizer	and	DNDi	Advancing	International	Research	Efforts	in	the	Fight	against	Neglected	Tropi-
cal Diseases, DNDi Press Release (Nov. 18, 2009). 
29  See GSK and Brazil’s Fiocruz Form Partnership for New R&D Effort and Increased Vaccine Access, 
GSK Press Release (Aug. 17, 2009). 
30  Id.; World Health Organization, Dengue and Severe Dengue, Fact Sheet No. 117 ( Jan. 2012). 
31  Id. 
32  See GSK and Brazil’s Fiocruz, supra note 29. 
33  Id.
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children from diseases such as pneumonia, meningitis, and bacteremia.34 The 
two organizations extended their partnership in 2010, enabling scientists at 
Fiocruz and GSK’s Tres Cantos facility in Spain to share new ideas, know-how, 
and research on diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, Chagas disease, and 
leishmaniasis.35
In collaborations such as these, the transfer of technology and expertise 
drives discovery and development efforts to produce new and innovative 
medicines to treat diseases that affect people in developing countries. Antonio 
de Pádua Risolia Barbosa, deputy director of production at the Immunobio-
logical Technology Institute, or Bio-Manguinhos unit, of Fiocruz, states, “Be-
sides our own innovation and development, we have partnerships with local 
and global organizations, and we use technology transfer to accelerate the 
viability of the products for the population.”36 
WIPO Re:Search—Sharing Innovation in the Fight against NTDs
Recognizing the need for progress in neglected disease research and under-
standing that such research is the collective responsibility of the entire global 
health community, WIPO Re:Search was formed in 2011 through the efforts 
of several of the world’s leading pharmaceutical companies, WIPO, and BIO 
Ventures for Global Health (BVGH).37 
WIPO Re:Search provides three services:
•	 	A comprehensive platform/database, hosted by WIPO, of patent and oth-
er proprietary information (for example, clinical trial results, regulatory 
status) on compounds and technologies available for licensing for NTD 
research 
•	 	A partnership hub, managed by BVGH, providing a forum where inter-
ested parties can learn about available licensing opportunities, available 
funding for research, and networking opportunities in their research fields
•	 	A range of specific supporting activities, such as facilitating licensing 
agreements and dispute resolution38
WIPO Re:Search aims to promote the transfer of knowledge through 
the facilitation of nontraditional partnerships and by encouraging organiza-
tions to share proprietary information publicly. WIPO Re:Search also offers 
researchers in developing countries access to research facilities and scientists 
34  Id.
35  See GlaxoSmithKline and Fiocruz Extend Innovative Collaboration to Research and Develop New 
Medicines for Neglected Tropical Diseases, GSK Press Release (Nov. 12, 2010). 
36  Patricia Van Arnum, Technology Transfer in Global Health Initiatives, 7(4) Pharmaceutical Tech-
nology Sourcing and Management (Apr. 6, 2011). 
37  See Leading Pharmaceutical Companies & Research Institutions Offer IP and Expertise for Use in 
Treating Neglected Tropical Diseases as Part of WIPO Re:Search, WIPO Press Release (Oct. 26, 
2011). 
38  See WIPO Re:Search website, www.wiporesearch.org (accessed Mar. 2012).
Intellectual Property 97
working in leading pharmaceutical companies and laboratories, an important 
step in the technology transfer process. The structure of the consortium dem-
onstrates that solutions to societal issues can be solved through partnerships 
without undermining IP. 
Users of WIPO Re:Search are granted royalty-free licenses to IP for re-
search and development, anywhere in the world, of products and technolo-
gies or services for the sole purpose of addressing public health needs for 
NTDs in LDCs. Users are also granted royalty-free licenses to make or have 
made such products, technologies, or services. These licenses also allow users 
to sell these products in LDCs royalty-free. Users are allowed to retain owner-
ship of and apply for registration of IP as they deem fit, but are encouraged to 
license through WIPO Re:Search new IP rights generated under an agreement 
made pursuant to membership in the consortium.39
WIPO Re:Search leverages expertise to develop new products and tech-
nologies, improves research productivity, allows the monetization of technol-
ogies and IP assets that would otherwise go unused in the organization’s own 
business, and makes more efficient use of research investments by enhanc-
ing the exchange of mutually beneficial knowledge. Through information- 
sharing consortiums such as WIPO Re:Search, products and technologies can 
be brought to market faster and more efficiently.
The consortium has received the commitment of more than 50 private and 
public organizations dedicated to accelerating R&D for NTDs, malaria, and 
tuberculosis, including Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca, DNDi, Fiocruz, 
Medicines for Malaria Ventures (MMV), PATH, and the Walter Reed Army 
Institute of Research (WRAIR).40 Although the commitment and willingness 
of these partners to transfer technology through WIPO Re:Search is a step 
toward addressing the R&D challenges that affect the developing world, sus-
tained elimination of these diseases is possible only with a commitment by 
individual countries to ensure access to safe water, proper waste disposal and 
treatment, basic sanitation, and improved living conditions.41
ViiV Healthcare—Joint Venture between Pfizer and GSK 
According to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 
the growth of the global AIDS epidemic appears to have stabilized, and the 
annual number of new HIV infections has been steadily declining.42 However, 
approximately 34 million people worldwide continue to live with HIV,43 and 
39  See WIPO Re:Search: Sharing Innovation in the Fight against Neglected Tropical Diseases, Guiding 
Principles (May 2011), available at http://www.wiporesearch.org.
40  Id.
41  See World Health Organization, Accelerating Work to Overcome the Global Impact of Neglected 
Tropical Diseases, supra note 27.
42  See UNAIDS, Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 16 (UNAIDS 2010).
43  See UNAIDS website, http://www.unaids.org (accessed Mar. 2012).
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more than 7,000 people are newly infected every day.44 Discrimination and 
stigmatization remain, and many people continue to lack access to the antiret-
roviral (ARV) medicines and health care support they require; only one-third 
of the 15 million people living with HIV in low- and middle-income countries 
who need treatment are receiving it.45
To further efforts to deliver advances in treatment and care for people liv-
ing with HIV, Pfizer and GSK created a joint venture and established a new 
specialist HIV company, ViiV Healthcare, in 2009.46 ViiV Healthcare is focused 
solely on the research, development, and commercialization of HIV medicines 
and has a single, sustainable, not-for-profit price for each ARV that it makes 
available to a wide range of patients in LDCs and sub-Saharan Africa—a total 
of 69 countries, representing 80% of all people living with HIV/AIDS world-
wide.47 ViiV Healthcare extends royalty-free voluntary licensing of its innova-
tive drugs to generic manufacturers producing and distributing therapies to 
people living with HIV in LDCs, low-income countries, and all of sub-Saharan 
Africa. As of 2012, ViiV Healthcare had granted 11 voluntary licenses for its 
ARVs.48
By combining the research efforts and knowledge of Pfizer and GSK, ViiV 
Healthcare will achieve more for those whose lives are affected by HIV than ei-
ther company could have achieved alone. Various ViiV initiatives, such as the 
ViiV Healthcare Effect, strive to strengthen education, support services, local 
health care capacity, and capabilities through education and collaboration.49 
Pfizer’s Global Health Fellows
Since 2003, more than 300 Pfizer colleagues have participated in the Global 
Health Fellows Program, an international corporate volunteer program that 
places Pfizer colleagues in short-term assignments with international devel-
opment organizations in emerging markets.50 The objective of the program is 
to strengthen the ability of health care providers in these countries to care for 
their patients. Through Pfizer’s partnership with more than 40 organizations, 
colleagues are provided the opportunity to transfer their professional medical 
and business expertise to optimize local supply chains and business functions 
44  See UNAIDS, 2011–2015 Strategy: Getting to Zero (UNAIDS 2010). 
45  See UNAIDS, supra note 42, at 7.
46  See ViiV Healthcare Launches: A New Specialist HIV Company Dedicated to Delivering Advances in 
HIV Treatment and Care, ViiV press release (Nov. 3, 2009). 
47  See ViiV Healthcare website, www.viivhealthcare.com (accessed Mar. 2012).
48  Id.
49  The ViiV Healthcare Effect is a portal that introduces the company’s approach to partner-
ships and showcases best practices throughout the world. It provides users the opportunity 
to hear directly from people creating new solutions on the ground and to learn what has 
worked and how those efforts can be applied or expanded to support more communities. See 
ViiV Healthcare Effect website, www.viivhealthcareeffect.com (accessed Mar. 2012).
50  See Pfizer website, Global Health Fellows, available at http://www.pfizer.com/ghf (ac-
cessed Mar. 2012).
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and improve health prevention approaches. This program demonstrates that 
technology transfer encompasses expertise and technical skills.
WHO’s TDR Career Development Fellowship Program
In 1975, the Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases 
(TDR), sponsored by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and WHO, was 
established as a scientific collaboration to coordinate, support, and influence 
global efforts to combat diseases affecting disadvantaged populations.51 
TDR founded the Career Development Fellowship on Clinical Research & 
Development in 2009 with the support of the Bill & Melinda Gates Founda-
tion. Researchers and public health professionals from disease-endemic coun-
tries are awarded a 12-month training opportunity with pharmaceutical com-
panies in order to receive specialized in-house training to acquire experience 
in clinical trial management, R&D project management, regulatory compli-
ance, and good practices.52 By focusing on human resources development and 
capacity building, individual fellows are able to maintain their existing capa-
bilities, strengthen their potential, and obtain new skills that are not normally 
taught in academic centers. Once the fellowship has been completed and the 
fellows return to their home countries, they have the opportunity to assume 
a leading role in the global effort on R&D, thereby enhancing the develop-
ing country’s capacity for product development. In 2009, Pfizer hosted two 
developing-world clinical researchers as part of the TDR program.53 In 2011, 
Eisai, a major Japan-based pharmaceutical company, welcomed a TDR clinical 
research fellow whose goal is to build the health care capacity of developing 
countries; Eisai provides the fellow with the opportunity to learn about drug 
development from the US and Japanese perspective.54 Upon completion of the 
fellowship, the fellow returned to his home country, Colombia, to develop and 
arrange local and regional academic meetings to educate his counterparts in 
the study of tropical and neglected diseases.55 
Looking toward the Future: Navigating an Evolving Landscape
The world today is quite different than it was a few decades ago; trade, as 
well as scientific and education research systems, is highly globalized, and an 
51  See World Health Organization website, TDR, available at http://www.who.int/tdr (ac-
cessed Mar. 2012).
52  See International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA) web-
site, Capacity Building, http://www.ifpma.org/global-health/access/capacity-building 
.html (accessed Mar. 2012).
53  See Pfizer	Corporate	Responsibility	Report (2009), available at http://www.pfizer.com/respon 
sibility (accessed Mar. 2012).
54  See Eisai Takes Second Clinical Research Fellow from Developing World, available at http://www 
.eisai.com (accessed Mar. 2012).
55  Id.
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increasing number of developing countries are becoming more technologi-
cally sophisticated. According to the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects 
report, however, “the world economy has entered a very difficult phase 
characterized by significant downside risks and fragility,” with developing-
country growth expected to decline to 5.4 percent and 6.0 percent versus 6.2 
percent and 6.3 percent in June 2011 projections.56 
Developing countries should be encouraged to identify new drivers of 
growth, one of which is technology transfer. Although technology transfer can 
be a time-consuming and complex process, given the right incentives and strong 
interest by developing countries in increasing their access to international 
technologies, companies from developed countries can assist LDCs in achiev-
ing sustained economic change and growth in domestic productivity. Intel-
lectual property, in particular, helps realize the model necessary to transfer 
technology and should be viewed as a vital tool that can aid in social and eco-
nomic progress. As countries develop their own assets, they will have greater 
incentives to respect the IP framework and implement and enforce strong IP 
regimes that will aid in the facilitation of new types of positive partnerships.
Although not all countries are equally prepared to integrate complex tech-
nology into their production chains, the level of complexity on the technology 
transfer spectrum varies, beginning with knowledge and skills training as the 
most basic form. Therefore, the transfer of technology should be encouraged 
in all regions of the developing world, because building local capacity can 
play a major role in moving LDCs to the next stage of development and sig-
nificantly affect the pace of innovation within these countries.
56  World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Uncertainties and Vulnerabilities ( Jan. 2012). 
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Transforming through Transparency
Opening Up the World Bank’s Sanctions Regime
Conrad C. daly and Frank a. Fariello, Jr.
The World Bank,1 whose mission it is to fight against global poverty,2 is one of 
the world’s premier international financial institutions.3 The Bank’s sanctions 
system emerges out of the Bank’s fiduciary obligation to ensure that the funds 
that its shareholders contribute are used with attention to economy and effi-
ciency for their intended purposes.4 As fraud and corruption compromise the 
effectiveness of development projects5 and have a perverse and deleterious 
1  In this chapter, “World Bank” is used to refer collectively to two institutions, the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development 
Association (IDA). IBRD began operations in 1947, with the purpose of providing loans to 
developing countries, while IDA was founded in 1960 to provide financing on concession-
al terms to the poorest and least credit-worthy developing countries. The World Bank is 
part of the World Bank Group, a constellation of institutions including, in addition to IBRD 
and IDA, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guar-
antee Agency (MIGA), and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).
2  See IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article I, Section i (Dec. 27, 1945) (“To assist in the recon-
struction and development of territories of members”); and IDA Articles of Agreement, Ar-
ticle I (“The purposes of the Association are to promote economic development, increase 
productivity and thus raise standards of living in the less-developed areas of the world in-
cluded within the Association’s membership”). The first president of the World Bank, Eu-
gene Meyer, highlighted the place of “the economic development of the world as a whole. . . . 
[For] economic distress is a prime breeder of war.” IBRD, First Annual Meeting of the Board of 
Governors: Proceedings and Related Documents, 15 –16 (World Bank 1946).
3  Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and Its Recent 
Reforms 1 (World Bank 2012).
4  See IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article III, Section 5(b) (“The Bank shall make arrangements 
to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan 
was granted, with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without 
regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations”); and IDA Articles of 
Agreement, Article V, Section 6 (“The Association and its officers shall not interfere in the 
political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the politi-
cal character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be 
relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to 
achieve the purposes stated in this Agreement”). See also World Bank Sanctions Procedures 
(as adopted Apr. 15, 2012) (hereinafter, Sanctions Procedures), Article 1.01(a). 
5  See, for example, News & Broadcast, World Bank, Disclosure of Assets and Income by Public 
Officials Is Crucial to Curbing Corruption Finds New StAR Study, Press Release No. 2012/360/
FPD (Mar. 28, 2012), available at http://go.worldbank.org/6JFJF7TXA0; Stuart Yikona et al., 
Ill-Gotten Money and the Economy, Experiences from Malawi and Namibia (World Bank 2011), 
available at http://go.worldbank.org/0PHO7X3QA0. See also C. M. Matthews, Infrastruc-
ture Corruption Top of Mind for Public, Private Sectors, Wall St. J. (Apr. 19, 2012), available 
at http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/04/19/infrastructure-corruption-top 
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effect on systems and societies,6 they are the target of the Bank’s sanctions 
system. This chapter considers the Bank’s recent commitment to opening up 
its sanctions regime and to making that system more transparent and account-
able, highlighting the particularly innovative manner in which the Bank has 
opened up its system. The desired end of this opening up is a sanctions regime 
that inspires confidence through the witnessing of the robust deliberative pro-
cess that underlies it, the promotion of good governance at large, and an in-
crease in stakeholder confidence. Opening up the process both encourages 
contractors to participate in Bank-financed projects and also garners further 
support for the fight against poverty by profiting those who play by the rules. 
The result is a system with significant due process protections that empowers 
stakeholders at all levels. 
This chapter is divided into four parts: 
•  First, this chapter offers an introduction to the nature of the Bank’s sanc-
tions regime, highlighting the particular challenges that it faces.7 
•  Second, it presents an outline of the development of the sanctions regime, 
focusing on the system’s rapid progression since its foundation in 1996. 
•  Third, it addresses the most recent changes to the system. 
•  Fourth, it examines how this progression is in accord with the Bank’s mis-
sion of establishing law and justice as developmental ends in and of them-
selves, with a special emphasis on transparency and accountability for 
the sake of improving both governance and stakeholder ownership and 
empowerment.
The chapter concludes with remarks on the relationship between law and 
development and what that relationship means for the Bank as it seeks to em-
power those for whom it works as well as to give them a sense of confidence 
in the Bank and the Bank’s systems as a whole.
Introduction to the Bank’s Sanctions Regime
Like other international financial institutions,8 the World Bank has tradi- 
tionally considered its decisions to exclude an entity or individual from work-
-of-mind-for-public-private-sectors/; David Chaikin & J. C. Sharman, Corruption and Money 
Laundering: A Symbiotic Relationship (Palgrave Series on Asian Governance 2009); Dayanath 
Jayasuriya, Anti-Money Laundering Efforts, Stock Market Operations and Good Governance, 1 
Qualitative Research in Financial Markets 46 –58 (2009).
6  See id. See also James D. Wolfensohn, People and Development: Address to the Board of Gover-
nors at the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in Voice for 
the World’s Poor: Selected Speeches and Writings of World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn, 
1995–2005 50 (World Bank 2005).
7  For a detailed discussion of the historical system’s evolution, see Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3.
8  Consider, for instance, the other multilateral development banks (MDBs), discussed further 
on. See infra note 39. The same is true for many other international organizations, such as the 
United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
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ing on Bank-financed projects or programs as a business decision and has thus 
subjected those decisions to an administrative regime.9 That process of ex-
clusion for corrupt or fraudulent behavior is known as “debarment.”10 The 
principal stated goal of World Bank Group sanctions proceedings is to protect 
the World Bank Group’s funds and not to “punish” respondents: the sanc-
tions imposed do not entail any form of physical coercion, nor even an obliga-
tion to repay money to the Bank.11 From such a perspective, relatively little 
due process12 is due to respondents as compared with during civil or criminal 
proceedings.13 
There are, however, several factors that complicate the classification of 
such actions as otherwise-banal business decisions. First, with aggregate new 
lending commitments of approximately US$43 billion, aggregate outstanding 
liabilities of US$258 billion, and assets of US$314 billion for fiscal year 2011,14 
and as the Bank directly or indirectly employs tens of thousands of people,15 
9  See Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3. This model has not gone without criticism. See, for ex-
ample, Alnoor Ebrhaim, The World Bank Must Fix Its Business Model, Financial Times (Oct. 5, 
2009).
10  See Sanctions Procedures, supra note 4.
11  The Bank’s system allows for five different sanctions—reprimand, conditional nondebar-
ment, debarment, debarment with conditional release, and restitution or remedy—only the 
last of which imposes the obligation of financial reparation. Sanctions Procedures, supra note 
4, at Article 9. Of course, these stand apart from the typical contractual remedies available to 
the Bank under the general conditions. 
12  Due process is the legal requirement that the sovereign respect the legal rights that are owed 
to persons; it is a “central promise [of] assurance that . . . government must operate within 
the law (‘legality’) and provide fair procedures.” Legal Information Institute (LII), Cornell 
University, at http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process. The principle ensures a bal-
ancing of sovereign power (or the law of the land), on the one hand, and the rights of the 
individual, on the other. See, for example, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 382 (1970) ( J. Black, 
dissenting).
13  As a body of public law, administrative law addresses and controls how government and 
its agencies govern. See William F. Fox, Jr., Understanding Administrative Law (4th ed., Lexis 
2000). Generally, fewer rights are afforded to respondents in an administrative system than 
in civil or (especially) criminal proceedings; in administrative proceedings, the interests and 
prerogatives of the sovereign and the invocation of its discretionary powers are at stake. 
14  See Moody’s Investors Service Credit Analysis: IBRD (World Bank) (Feb. 27, 2012), available at 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/Moodys_IBRD_Report_2012.pdf. The Bank also 
provides financing in the form of development policy loans (DPLs), which provide bud-
get support and other unlinked financing against achievement of defined policy measures 
rather than to finance specific expenditures. The Bank’s sanctions regime does not extend 
to DPLs because it is not possible to trace the use of loan proceeds. This approach (or the 
lack of one) has come under increasing criticism. See, for example, Independent Advisory 
Board (IAB), 2010 Annual Report 11-12 ( Jan. 2011), available at http://go.worldbank.org 
/S262CF3KD0 (acknowledging the “significant challenges and difficulties concerning efforts 
to investigate the extent, if any, of corrupt behaviors that may arise in connection with the 
implementation of [DPLs],” but encouraging management “to consider ways and means 
of sharpening the criteria for [DPLs]”). It bears noting that the effect of cross-debarment 
renders the figures—and the effect of debarment—even greater. See infra note 40 et seq. and 
accompanying text.
15  Moisés Naím & Uri Dadush, Dr. Kim Comes to Washington, Huffington Post (Apr. 4, 2012), avail- 
able at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/moises-naim/kim-world-bank_b_1396618.html.
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the stakes of exclusion from Bank-financed projects are substantially higher 
than those surrounding even the most significant business decisions made 
by the largest private corporations.16 Moreover, debarment not only entails 
substantial financial consequences but also causes considerable public noto-
riety and reputational damage.17 Second, debarring an entity has significant 
market effects, especially when a limited number of entities are capable of per-
forming highly specialized work.18 Third, the Bank’s decision to debar is not 
one that affects those entities with which the Bank itself would otherwise work, 
but rather affects the pool of entities from which the borrower might choose to 
work; that is, the Bank, on the basis of providing project financing, unilaterally 




16  That is to say, the economic implications of exclusion from the possibility of participating 
in the large potential market of World Bank Group–financed projects are greater than those 
of being excluded from the activities of any one private actor. For instance, to make a mon-
etary comparison, the market value of Apple in 2011, the world’s most valuable company, 
is around US$337 million, with 12-month sales surpassing the US$100 billion mark. Scott 
DeCarlo, The World’s 25 Most Valuable Companies: Apple Is Now on Top, Forbes (Aug. 11, 2011), 
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottdecarlo/2011/08/11/the-worlds-25-most 
-valuable-companies-apple-is-now-on-top/.
17  Consider, for instance, the press coverage surrounding the sanctioning of Siemens. See, for 
example, Siemens Selects Initial Projects for US$100 million Integrity Initiative, Siemens AG, 
Ref. No. AXX20101225e (Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://www.siemens.com/press/en 
/pressrelease/?press=/en/pressrelease/2010/corporate_communication/axx20101225.htm; 
Vanessa Fuhrmans, Siemens Settles with World Bank on Bribes, Wall St. J. ( Jul. 3, 2009), available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124655953719287521.html. 
18  In this regard, consider, for instance, the debarment of a Siemens subsidiary. See News & 
Broadcast, World Bank, World Bank Group Debars Limited Liability Company Siemens (OOO 
Siemens) for Engaging in Fraud and Corruption in a World Bank–Financed Project in Rus-
sia, Press Release No. 2009/168/EXC (Nov. 30, 2009), available at http://go.worldbank 
.org/VZ1113XEG0. In addition to having a subsidiary entity debarred, Siemens AG paid 
US$100 million to fight corruption as part of a settlement with the World Bank Group. See 
News & Broadcast, World Bank, Siemens to Pay $100m to Fight Corruption as Part of World 
Bank Group Settlement, Press Release No. 2009/001/EXT ( Jul. 2, 2009), available at http://
go.worldbank.org/WXRNSDVI40. Siemens, France’s Alstom, and Canada’s Bombardier are 
the world’s big-three passenger train manufacturers. See, for example, Robert Wright, China 
to Loosen West’s Grip on Rail Sector, Financial Times (Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://www 
.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/83d7e478-bec0-11df-a755-00144feab49a.html#axzz1sKPOrVA4. For 
the argument that certain private contractors may be too big to debar, see Drury D. Steven & 
Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar? 80 Fordham L. Rev. 775 (2011). See also 
FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog, Is Debarment a Viable FCPA Enforcement Option? (Apr. 19, 
2011), available at http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2011/04/19/is-debarment-a-viable-fcpa 
-enforcement-option/.
19  Others, for reasons such as the absence of privity and the substantial influence that the Bank 
is capable of exerting, have described the Bank’s behavior as “imperialism” or “neocolonial-
ism.” Catherine Caufield, Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations (Henry 
Holt & Co. 1996); Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and 
the Democratization of Development, 6 Harv. Hum. Rights J. 159 (1993); Steve Berkman, The 
World Bank and the Gods of Lending (Kumarian Press 2008); Payal Parekh & Oren Weinrib, Why 
the Developing World Hates the World Bank, 122 The Tech 5 (Mar. 12, 2002), available at http://
tech.mit.edu/V122/PDF/N11.pdf.
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Thus, Bank operational debarments—taken in the absence of any privity—are 
more than mere run-of-the-mill business decisions about, say, buying pens or 
paper.20
Although none of the aforementioned factors necessarily takes the Bank’s 
regime out of the realm of administrative law, the Bank, in an effort to lead 
by example, and considering law and justice as developmental ends in and 
of themselves, affords respondents additional due process protections, more 
than what are usually required under the general principles of administra-
tive law.21 Arguments have been made that the World Bank Group’s system 
ought to develop its legal regime based on, alternatively, theories of global 
constitutionalism,22 the exercise of international public authority,23 or the 
emerging global administrative law (GAL) principles.24 The Bank has taken 
a more open-ended approach by working toward a quasi-judicial model in-
spired by various sources of law from around the world. Such an innovative 
approach results in a sui generis form that is not dominated by any single 
tradition (neither common law nor civil law) or by any one national system. 
In pursuing the objectives of effectiveness and efficiency, the Bank has been 
equally attentive to ensuring that the process reflects certain fundamental 
20  It is worth noting that the World Bank Group maintains a separate sanctions system for 
its own corporate procurement. See World Bank Vendor Eligibility Policy (as adopted 
Jun. 18, 2010), available at http://go.worldbank.org/W40WJB5AA0. To be deemed a re-
sponsible vendor with whom the World Bank Group will conduct business, a vendor must 
meet a range of standards, most of which relate to the financial and organizational capacity 
of the vendor to deliver or perform the services, as well as its track record in not having seri-
ously violated the terms of a World Bank Group contract in the past. In addition, a vendor 
must not have committed “any act or offense indicating a lack of integrity or honesty that 
seriously and directly affects [its] present responsibility . . . , including fraudulent, corrupt, 
collusive, coercive, or obstructive practices.” 
21  “‘Respondent’ means an entity or individual alleged to have engaged in a Sanctionable Prac-
tice and who has been designated as such in a Notice.” Sanctions Procedures, supra note 4, at 
Article 1.02. 
22  See Jan Klabbers, Anne Petters, & Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law 
(Oxford U. Press 2009).
23  See Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann, & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of 
Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 German 
L.J. 1375, 1377 (2008) (“The legal framework of governance activities of international institu-
tions should be conceived of as international institutional law, and enriched by a public law 
perspective, i.e. with constitutional sensibility and openness for comparative insights from 
administrative legal thinking”), and the other articles in the same special issue on public 
authority and international institutions.
24  See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Admin-
istrative Law, 16 L. & Contemp. Probs. 15, 17 (2005) (defining global administrative law “as 
comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings 
that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in par-
ticular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned 
decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they 
make”), and the other articles in the same symposium. See also articles in the symposium 
Global Administrative Law in the Operations of International Organizations in 6 Intl. Org. 
L. Rev. (2009); Pascale Hélène Dubois & Aileen Elizabeth Nowlan, Global Administrative Law 
and the Legitimacy of Sanctions Regimes in International Law, 36 Yale J. Intl. L. 15–25 (2010). 
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principles and values associated with the rule of law from around the world.25 
In so doing, it is particularly mindful of the varied—and ever-evolving—le-
gal traditions and conceptions of its members.26 Such a creative approach 
gives the Bank’s system a certain formality while allowing it to retain a nec-
essary flexibility.27 That flexibility is particularly useful in dealing with par-
ties coming from different developmental backgrounds. The unique mix of 
formality and flexibility is a development of the Bank’s legal heritage that 
goes beyond traditional understandings of either civil or common law.28 This 
legal innovation—with its sensitivity to culture and tradition and its imple- 
mentation of robust due process guarantees—is particularly important in a 
world where international organizations (IOs) are increasingly helping to form 
international law.29 
The system’s evolution, with its progressive permutations and additions, 
has made the regime increasingly robust and juridical. Although it was not the 
intention of the framers that the Bank’s system be overly “legalistic,”30 such 
an evolution is an almost-inevitable by-product of a two-tiered adversarial 
process that allows for legal representation and, more recently, publication of 
reasoned decision making.31 The Bank has instituted these structural changes 
in the spirit of due process and of rule of law. Although this judicialization 
has had the unintended consequence of increasing the system’s intricacy—a 
25  Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3, at 6–7. Elements of the rule of law are embedded in the writ-
ings of modern and Western political philosophers such as Locke, Montesquieu, Ricardo, 
and Weber. More broadly, a concept of the rule of law is inherent in natural law ideals as 
expressed by Aristotle and Aquinas, as well as in religiously inspired legal systems such as 
Islamic sharia. As far back as the third century B.C., the Chinese legal thinker Han Fei pro-
moted the view that laws had to be predictable, public, and consistent. 
26  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. See Karen Gottschang Turner, Rule of Law, in The 
Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History vol. V, 164 (Stanley N. Katz ed., Oxford U. 
Press 2009).
27  For an instance of such duality considered in the US national context of prosecution and 
prosecutorial discretion, see Nathan Piwowarski, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Rule of Law: 
Is It Time for a Little Formalism? (Or, Mr. Prosecutor: How Formalists Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love Discretion), King Scholar Senior Seminar Paper, Michigan State University College 
of Law (2007), available at http://www.law.msu.edu/king/2007/index.html.
28  Robert D. Cooter & Hans-Bernd Schafer, Solomon’s Knot: How Law Can End the Poverty of Na-
tions 94–95 (Princeton U. Press 2012).
29  See, for example, José E. Alarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford U. Press 
2005).
30  See, for example, Dick Thornburgh, Ronald L. Gainer, & Cuyler H. Walker, Report Concern-
ing the Debarment Processes of the World Bank (Aug. 14, 2002 [Rev.]), available at http://
go.worldbank.org/1O93GTKH40 (hereinafter, Second Thornburgh Report) at 27 (“[I]t 
should be kept in mind that the Sanctions Committee procedures are designed and intended 
to be very informal and avoid unnecessary legal complexities. For that reason, circumspec-
tion should be employed in evaluating former judges and litigating attorneys—persons 
whose careers have been steeped in the mastery of formal hearing procedures of particular 
national jurisdictions and who are thus more likely than others (for example those whose 
primary experience has been with informal arbitration proceedings or administrative pro-
ceedings) to exhibit a penchant for procedural formality and rigidity”).
31  Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3, at 28.
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weight that weighs most heavily on lesser-capacity respondents—that same 
augmentation of due process protections has the benefit of assuring all re-
spondents ever-greater protection, therein helping to ensure that respondents 
have an opportunity to have their full and fair day in court. Respondents need 
not fear lengthy proceedings; despite its evolution toward greater due pro-
cess, the Bank’s sanctions process remains far more expeditious than national 
court systems.32 
The Innovative History of the Bank’s  
Ever-Expanding Sanctions Regime
Year by year, the Bank’s system has become more expansive and innovative, 
providing an ever more complete means of protecting the Bank and the projects 
that it finances from the deleterious effects of fraud and corruption. Initiated 
in 1996,33 the implementation of the Bank’s sanctions regime coincided with 
an increased focus on corruption as a development issue.34 Since its inception, 
the Bank’s sanctions regime has grown dramatically: in 1999, only corrup-
tion, fraud, and collusion were referred to in the Procurement and Consultant 
Guidelines.35 In 2004, “coercive practice” was added to this list of “sanction-
able practices,” therein prohibiting the threatening of competing bidders, gov-
ernment officials, or others.36 In 2006, a fifth rubric of “obstructive practices” 
was added to the guidelines and targets actions that impede an investigation, 
such as destroying evidence or threatening witnesses.37 Moreover, the regime 
was expanded beyond fraud and corruption in the limited area of the procure-
ment context alone to cover all fraud and corruption that may occur in connec-
tion with the use of Bank financing in the preparation and/or implementation 
of Bank-financed projects at large.38 These reforms were accompanied by new 
32  On average, a sanctions case (excluding investigation) takes approximately one year. When 
a case is not appealed to the Sanctions Board, the median time for sanctions proceedings is 
about six months. 
33  Second Thornburgh Report, supra note 30, at 12. 
34  See Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3, at 9.
35  All current and historical guidelines are available at the World Bank website. See World 
Bank, Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers, sec-
tion 1.22 (Oct. 1, 2006), available at http://go.worldbank.org/U9IPSLUDC0 (hereinafter, 
Consultant Guidelines); World Bank, Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA 
Credits, section 1.14 (May 1, 2010), available at http://go.worldbank.org/1KKD1KNT40 
(hereinafter, Procurement Guidelines).
36  Reform of the World Bank’s Sanctions Process ( Jun. 28, 2004), Policies Guiding INT’s Work, World 
Bank, available at http://go.worldbank.org/VVY6KYS720.
37  Expansion of Sanction beyond Procurement and Sanctioning of Obstructive Practices ( Jul. 28, 
2006), Policies Guiding INT’s Work, World Bank, available at http://go.worldbank.org 
/VVY6KYS720.
38  See President’s Memorandum to the Executive Directors, Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanc-
tions Regime beyond Procurement and Sanctioning of Obstructive Practices ( Jun. 12, 2006). Con-
currently, amended sanctions procedures were adopted, reflecting both the 2004 and the 
2006 rounds of sanctions reform.
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harmonized definitions of the first four sanctionable practices, as used by all 
of the five major multilateral development banks (MDBs).39
In 2010, in a move that further expanded the system, the Bank signed 
a cross-debarment accord with the other four major MDBs,40 allowing for 
the signatories to cross-debar firms and individuals found to have engaged 
in wrongdoing in MDB-financed development projects.41 Not only did this 
agreement establish the first four sanctionable practices as common among 
the five MDBs (as already noted); it also codified a common standard of proof, 
namely, the “more likely than not”42 standard.43 
The Bank is constantly monitoring the implementation of its sanctions 
framework with a view to improving its effectiveness and efficiency, in dia-
logue with all internal actors as well as with the other major MDBs and other 
IOs. Similarly, the Bank is always looking for inspiration to improve transpar-
ency and fairness.
This chronological development has been presented without any reference 
to the infrastructural developments; a few notes ought to be made. The sys-
tem began in 1998 with relatively few structural due process checks and bal-
39  See Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption, Interna-
tional Financial Institutions Anti-corruption Task Force (Sep. 2006), available at http://
go.worldbank.org/VVY6KYS720. The agreement includes the African Development Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
Inter-American Development Bank Group, and the World Bank Group. 
40  See News & Broadcast, World Bank, Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up Fight against Corrup-
tion (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://go.worldbank.org/B699B73Q00. See also Integrity Vice 
Presidency Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2008: Protecting Development’s Potential 2 (World Bank 
INT 2009), available at http://go.worldbank.org/T40HHT3RF0.
41  See World Bank, Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up Fight against Corruption, supra note 40; In-
tegrity Vice Presidency Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2008, supra note 40. See also Stephen S. Zim-
mermann & Frank A. Fariello, Coordinating the Fight against Fraud and Corruption: Agreement 
on Cross-Debarment among Multilateral Development Banks, in International Financial Institutions 
and Global Legal Governance (Hassane Cissé, Daniel D. Bradlow, & Benedict Kingsbury ed., 
World Bank 2011). Cross-debarment is permitted for any of the first four sanctionable prac-
tices, namely, corruption, fraud, collusion, and coercive practices. 
42  See Sanctions Procedures, supra note 4, at Article 8.01(b)(i). See also Anne-Marie Leroy, Ad-
visory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with Recent Sanctions Cases, No. 2010/1 
(Nov. 15, 2010), paragraphs 45–51, in the UN Juridical Yearbook 2012 (“The standard of proof 
is predicated on the same basic considerations that underlay the omission of an explicit 
mens rea requirement from most of the definitions, namely the administrative nature of the 
proceedings and INT’s lack of investigative tools. This standard of proof is understood as 
being equivalent to the ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ essentially the standard to be found 
in civil cases in most jurisdictions. When this nomenclature was adopted in 2004, it was felt 
that the phrase ‘more likely than not’ would be more understandable to non-lawyers. How-
ever, the ‘more than 50%’ approach may not be the most useful or appropriate either at the 
EO stage or at the Sanctions Board stage. Firstly, it suggests a formulaic approach to the evi-
dence while . . . the Sanctions Procedures calls for a discretionary approach. [Secondly . . .], 
the EO’s assessment of the evidence requires special considerations, given that he or she is 
looking at only one side of the case. The EO is actually charged with assessing the sufficiency 
of the evidence”), 
43  World Bank, Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up Fight against Corruption, supra note 40. 
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ances; an entirely internal sanctions committee reviewed allegations of fraud 
and corruption and recommended an appropriate sanction to the president of 
the Bank, who made the actual decision.44 In 2001, a nascent yet independent 
prosecutorial and investigatory branch, the Integrity Vice Presidency (INT), 
was established, therein consolidating functions that had been spread across 
various units of the Bank.45 INT was one of the first specialized units created 
specifically to address fraud and corruption allegations and integrity issues at 
an international level.46 The system evolved into its current two-tiered process 
in 2007, with an initial determination made by the Evaluation and Suspen-
sion Officer (EO) and with the possibility of a de novo review by the World 
Bank Sanctions Board.47 Further modifications were made to assure the inde-
pendence and adequacy of the various actors,48 and measures for controlling 
lingering vulnerabilities at either end of the sanctions process were added.49 
Additional added features include the means of sanctioning corporate affili-
ates50 and the possibility of resolving disputes through settlement (termed as 
“negotiated resolution agreements” and “deferral agreements,” depending on 
the type of settlement).51 
Given that the regime is inherently an administrative one, the Bank’s 
sanctions system has evolved into one that affords respondents substantial 
44  See Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3, at 10. See also Ko-Yung Tung, General Counsel, World 
Bank, The World Bank’s Institutional Framework for Combating Fraud and Corruption, 
remarks delivered at the Seminar on Monetary and Financial Law International Monetary 
Fund (May 8, 2002).
45  The then Department of Institutional Integrity was given institutional independence and 
reported directly to the president. See, for example, Ko-Yung Tung, remarks delivered at the 
Seminar on Monetary and Financial Law International Monetary Fund (May 8, 2002).
46  Although the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services was created somewhat earlier (1994), 
that office has a much more general mandate than does INT. See UN Office of Internal Over-
sight Services at http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/.
47  See Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3, at 10–11.
48  See, for example, Paul A. Volcker et al., Independent Panel Review of World Bank Group Depart-
ment of Institutional Integrity (Sep. 13, 2007) (recommending, among other things, that INT 
be elevated to the status of a vice presidency with reporting lines directly to the president, 
as well as the creation of the external Independent Advisory Board to facilitate oversight 
of INT). 
49  Inefficiencies and lingering vulnerabilities undermined the effectiveness of the system, both 
at the “front end” (for example, firms under investigation remain eligible to bid for Bank- 
financed contracts) and at the “back end” (for example, sanctioned firms were normally re-
leased from debarment without any demonstration of rehabilitation). These weaknesses led 
to the implementation of, first, in May 2009, the possibility for INT to request early tempo-
rary sanctions for the time prior to the commencement of formal proceedings, and, second, 
the institution of the Integrity Compliance Office, which provided guidance to sanctioned 
parties and monitored implementation of respondents’ compliance programs. For more, see 
Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3, at 12–17. The drive for greater efficiency also led the Bank to 
consider and then pilot negotiated resolutions to sanctions cases (aka settlements) in lieu of 
full-blown sanctions proceedings. 
50  See Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3, at 17–18.
51  Sanctions Procedures, supra note 4, at Article XI. See Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3, at 20–22.
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procedural protections.52 Indeed, in a comparative study with the other major 
MDBs and with other IOs, the Bank’s procedures are substantially more elabo-
rate.53 The Bank, with different needs and with a greater variety of interests 
than most other IOs, has deemed such provisions to be well merited: on the 
one hand, the Bank funds a diversity of projects in a diversity of places, im-
plicating stakeholders around the world; on the other hand, more than half 
of respondents are sanctioned by default because they do not respond in any 
way to notices of sanctions proceedings, and only one-third of respondents 
appeal the EO’s recommended sanction.54 Moreover, recognizing that due 
process standards are not ubiquitous,55 the Bank has not created a one-size-
fits-all system: although operating within the expeditious contours of an ad-
ministrative model, the Bank has developed a series of gradations within its 
regime. Thus, at one end of the spectrum, the system allows for more expedi-
ent processing when allegations are less serious and when the corresponding 
due process requirements are less onerous; at the other extreme, when allega-
tions are considerably weightier, the full system, with all of its incumbent due 
process guarantees, is engaged. Such legal innovations allow the Bank to more 
attentively engage respondents while fulfilling its fiduciary duty.
The Commitment to Transparency: An Ever-Improving System
The Bank’s decision to increase due process protections for respondents in its 
sanctions regime is doubly beneficial. First, it ensures that the Bank appro-
priately fulfills its fiduciary duty under its Articles of Agreement.56 Second, it 
corresponds with the Bank’s emerging role of seeking to encourage not only 
economic development but also the growth of socially accountable societies 
founded on and embracing law and justice.57 As this edition of the World Bank 
52  See Fox, supra note 13. See also, Second Thornburgh Report, supra note 30 at 2 et seq.
53  See Zimmermann & Fariello, supra note 41.
54  Dubois & Nowlan, supra note 24, at 21–22. 
55  See discussion of due process at note 12. The US Supreme Court has said that due process, 
“unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, 
place and circumstances.” Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1975) (quoting Cafeteria 
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 [1961], describing the flexibility of due process). The 
court highlighted the flexibility of the notion by continuing that its protections are required 
only when the “particular situation demands” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 
[1972]).
56  IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, at Article III, Section 5(b), and IDA Articles of 
Agreement, supra note 4, at Article V, Section 1(g).
57  See News & Broadcast, World Bank, The Global Partnership for Social Accountability: A New 
Mechanism to Support Civil Society Organizations, Press Release No. 2012/406/WBI (Apr. 19, 
2012), available at http://go.worldbank.org/1393388IP0; Hassane Cissé, Conflict, Fragility 
and Development in a Globalized World: Challenges and Implications for the Law of the Future, 4th 
HiiL Law of the Future Conference ( Jun. 23, 2011) (“[D]iverse . . . forms of violence result 
in fragility, or the weakening, diminishing and destruction of institutions that would other-
wise contain conflicts and resolve injustice peacefully. This definition of fragility constitutes 
the flip side of what has been defined as ‘rule of law’”); Q&A with Hassane Cissé, Global 
Forum: How Open Data Links Rule of Law to Economic Growth, East African (Apr. 9 –15, 2012) 
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Legal Review so clearly shows, and as this chapter emphasizes with regard to a 
specific facet of the Bank’s activities, law and justice are not merely means to an 
end but are themselves ends, albeit ends that will further other developmental 
ends, such as economic growth.58 Such theories of inclusive development are 
not new,59 although they are (relatively) new in their implementation.60 
The Bank’s vision of inclusive growth and development—that is, broad-
based investment in human beings61—is one that the Bank has embraced at 
large.62 This vision is apparent in the World Bank Inspection Panel, which en-
sures that a voice is afforded to those affected by Bank-financed projects in 
which there has been a breach of Bank protocol.63 The vision dovetails with 
(“Business actors need to trust [governmental and social] institutions, and especially judicial 
institutions. The system has to be robust, efficient and respond to people’s needs. If business 
people don’t trust that rulings will be timely and just, they will find other ways to solve 
disputes. More often than not, they will prefer to bypass the justice system and buy out-
comes—in other words, resort to corruption. This spills over beyond the business sector and 
becomes a social problem, setting the clock back for development. . . . A working system has 
to be fair, transparent, accessible to everyone, and timely. . . . Only then can we have tools to 
hold government accountable, so that concepts like the rule of law, justice, social inclusion, 
empowerment and accountability move beyond simple words to become reality, and part 
and parcel of the development process”). See also Justin Yifu Lin, Demystifying Success: The 
New Structural Economics Approach (World Bank Apr. 2011); Siobhán McInerney-Lankford & 
Hans-Otto Sano, Human Rights Indicators in Development: An Introduction (World Bank 2010). 
58  See, for example, Justin Yifu Lin and Célestin Monga, The Growth Report and New Structural 
Economics (World Bank 2010); Q&A with Hassane Cissé, supra note 57 (“Development goes 
beyond providing economic growth. It has to address equity, equality and justice, and these 
are at the heart of the rule of law. If these are not dealt with, you don’t have the foundation 
for economic development”). See also Cooter & Schafer, supra note 28.
59  For example, see David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Re-
flections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4 Wis. L. Rev. 1062 
(1974); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 World 
Bank Research Observer 1 (1998); Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Economic Answer 
to Terrorism (Basic Books 1989); Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Knopf 1999); Kaushik 
Basu & Ravi Kanbur ed., Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen (Oxford 
U. Press 2009). See also Cooter & Schafer, supra note 28.
60  Although the Bank has long acknowledged the important role of civil society and has worked 
with civil society organizations for decades, having, for example, established what would be 
called the Civil Society Fund in 1983, the Bank has stepped up efforts and is committed to 
such activities and to such development. The Global Partnership for Social Accountability, supra 
note 57. See also Lin and Monga, supra note 58.
61  See Elena Ianchovichina, Susanna Lundstrom, & Leonardo Garrido, What Is Inclusive 
Growth? PRMED Knowledge Brief (Feb. 10, 2009), available at http://go.worldbank.org 
/LG5Z4L6LR0. See also Jim Yong Kim, My Call for an Open, Inclusive World Bank, Financial 
Times (Mar. 28, 2012). 
62  World Bank, The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development 
(World Bank 2008); Lin and Monga, supra note 58, at 14 (“Long-term sustainable and in-
clusive growth is the driving force for poverty reduction in developing countries, and for 
convergence with developed economies”).
63  Inspection Panel, World Bank, at http://www.inspectionpanel.org/. The Inspection Panel 
is an independent, “bottom-up” accountability and recourse mechanism that investigates 
IBRD/IDA-financed projects to determine whether the Bank has complied with its opera-
tional policies and procedures (including social and environmental safeguards), and to ad-
dress related issues of harm. 
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the selection of Dr. Jim Yong Kim,64 a medical doctor and developmentalist, 
as president rather than the more traditional choice of an economist or of a 
politician.65 Similarly, it is a motivating factor behind the Global Forum for 
Law, Justice and Development, of which the Bank will serve as Secretariat, 
and which aims to support the development of strong legal and judicial insti-
tutions by sharing and generating knowledge through international collabo-
ration.66 In the spirit of improving social accountability,67 among other things, 
the Bank has worked vigorously to develop means of measuring success be-
yond traditional economic metrics; critically, it is tying these new measures to 
governance and anticorruption strategies.68 The key tool therein is transpar-
ency; as US Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis once quipped, “Sunlight is 
. . . the best disinfectant.”69 
64  See, for example, Obama Nominates Dartmouth President Jim Yong Kim to Lead World Bank, 
Time (Mar. 23, 2012) (“Officials believe [Kim’s] experience will help counter criticism from 
developing countries that have grown weary of the U.S. stranglehold on the World Bank 
presidency”). See also News & Broadcast, World Bank, World Bank’s Executive Directors Select 
Dr. Jim Yong Kim 12th President of the World Bank Group, Press Release No. 2012/395/SEC 
(Apr. 16, 2012), available at http://go.worldbank.org/AX89KWI2H0.
65  Annie Lowrey, College President Is Obama’s Pick for World Bank Chief, NY Times (Mar. 23, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/business/global/dartmouth 
-president-is-obamas-pick-for-world-bank.html. Kim’s acceptance is striking because he 
has openly—and articulately—challenged “[t]he idea that robust economic growth will au-
tomatically lead to a better life for everybody” and has even gone so far as to argue that 
“the structure and current rules of today’s market-led economic globalization [that is, in 
2000] widen the chasm between the privileged and the destitute, imperiling the lives of the 
world’s poor.” See Jim Yong Kim et al. ed., Dying for Growth: Global Inequality and the Health of 
the Poor 7, 3 (Common Courage Press 2000). A better metric for the success of development, 
Kim et al. argue, is “[f]ocusing on health rather than other traditional indicators of wealth.” 
Kim’s unorthodox background led both to considerable criticism of his nomination (Hats 
Off to Ngozi: A Golden Opportunity for the Rest of the World to Show Barack Obama the Mean-
ing of Meritocracy, The Economist [Mar. 31, 2012]) and to much praise (Thomas J. Bollyky, 
How to Fix the World Bank, NY Times [Apr. 8, 2012]); Gillian Tett, Right Time for a World Bank 
Renaissance Man, Financial Times [Mar. 30, 2012]). Kim has responded to criticism by saying 
that his thoughts in 2000 are not applicable: “Our concern [in 2000] was that the vision was 
not inclusive enough, that it wasn’t, in the bank’s words, ‘pro-poor.’ The bank has shifted 
tremendously since that time, and now the notion of pro-poor development is at the core of 
the World Bank.” Annie Lowrey, Obama Candidate Sketches Vision for World Bank, NY Times 
(Apr. 9, 2012). Kim has also noted that his top priority is “spurring economic growth that 
creates jobs.” Nicole Kekeh, Dr. Kim Wins Top Job at the World Bank, Forbes (Apr. 17, 2012), 
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/worldviews/2012/04/17/dr-kim-wins-top-job 
-at-the-world-bank-promises-inclusive-leadership/.
66  Charter of the Global Forum for Law, Justice and Development.
67  See, for example, World Bank president Robert Zoellick’s comments on the need to “democ-
ratize development” in his Peterson Institute for International Economics speech, The Middle 
East and North Africa: A New Social Contract for Development (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://
go.worldbank.org/QQ10SJQOJ0; see also Robert Zoellick’s talk at the conference “Support-
ing Social Accountability for Better Results” (Apr. 19, 2012).
68  The Global Partnership for Social Accountability, supra note 57. See also Governance and Anti-
corruption Key Principles, Governance & Anticorruption, World Bank, available at http://
go.worldbank.org/32PINXVIJ0; Beyond Transparency: What’s Next? Governance for Develop-
ment, available at http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/beyond-transparency-what 
-s-next.
69  Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It 13 (Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1913).
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In this vein, the Bank is contemplating further reforms to its sanctions 
regime, with particular emphasis on improving transparency and participa-
tion—both of the sanctions process itself and of the policy making that sur-
rounds it—as well as due process protections, and exploring ways to afford 
better access to low-capacity respondents. Although there is more to be done, 
the Bank has attempted to remain true to its calling to empower the disem-
powered. This cyclical process results in ever-greater legitimacy of the Bank 
and its sanctions regime, as well as in greater efficiency and effectiveness.
The Legal Orientation of the Bank’s Sanctions Regime:  
Toward Ever-Better Governance 
The Bank’s current system draws from different legal disciplines, not reflect-
ing any single national system, or even any single legal tradition—indeed, 
that is the point. With stakeholders around the world, the World Bank con-
tinually strives to remain both global and worldly—that is, to represent the 
communities of the world while remaining not merely relevant but vibrant 
in a developmental sea populated by multiple players of all sizes.70 In devel-
oping its own system, the Bank draws from both common law and civil law 
traditions, as well as looking to national systems for inspiration. The Bank’s 
incorporation of elements on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness has al-
lowed it to create its own sui generis tradition, a tradition that operates best in 
this transnational space where IOs are increasingly developing the meaning 
of international law.71 Moreover, legal diversification has the added bonus of 
allaying potential perceptions that the Bank is biased in favor of any given na-
tional system. This sui generis system is a major legal innovation that allows 
the Bank, notwithstanding its size, to bring an impressive degree of particular-
ity, precision, and attention to its dealings with varied stakeholders. 
To understand the orientation and nature of the Bank’s sanctions system, 
one must understand that the ultimate aim of the system is not to punish but 
rather to correct and rehabilitate: the system seeks to reintroduce those enti-
ties that have been implicated in fraudulent or corrupt behavior back into the 
market after a certain minimum period of debarment and upon adoption of 
adequate and effective policies and measures to guard against future miscon-
duct.72 Thus, the system’s baseline sanction is “debarment with conditional 
70  See, for example, Robert B. Zoellick, Why We Still Need the World Bank: Looking beyond Aid, 
Foreign Affairs (Mar./Apr. 2012), available at http://go.worldbank.org/45JDG1N1E0.
71  See Alarez, supra note 29.
72  See Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3, at 15. The nuance is subtle yet important, and it has been 
overlooked by many observers. For an example of the confusion, see Dionne Searcey & David 
Crawford, World Bank Punishes Units of Alstom SA for Bribery, Wall St. J. (Feb. 23, 2012), avail-
able at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203918304577238943984834040 
.html; and Greg McArthur, Meet the World Bank’s Anti-bribery Cop, The Globe and Mail 
(Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://m.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry 
-news/the-law-page/meet-the-world-banks-anti-bribery-cop/article2330154/?service=mobile. 
Notwithstanding the Bank’s desire to rehabilitate vendors, the Bank recognizes its role in 
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release”: in other words, the sanctioned party will be excluded from the pos-
sibility of participating in Bank-financed projects for a period of time, and, on 
condition of proper implementation of appropriate compliance measures, al-
lowed to bid once more.73 Operating—as one would expect from bankers—on 
the understanding that corruption taints the market but that the free market 
is generally good for all involved, the aim is one of release from debarment 
and reintegration within the Bank’s (otherwise open) bidding system. Com-
pliance with such measures, as well as the system’s objective of rehabilitation 
and reintroduction, is facilitated through the guidance offered by the integ-
rity compliance officer (ICO), whose office also monitors and decides whether 
conditions have been satisfied.74 
The Bank, as much as any other organization, strives toward good gover-
nance—that is, the process of effectively addressing shared problems through 
group decision making.75 Good governance comes only through good rapport 
and good communication between those governing and those who are gov-
erned.76 Critical to such a process are the principles of both transparency and 
accountability.77 Transparency, which is premised on free access to information, 
guards against the particular problems of capture and conflicts of interest.78 
supporting the rule of law; to this end, if INT substantiates findings of fraud or corruption, 
the Bank will refer cases to national authorities for prosecution. See, for example, Referrals 
Made to Governments in FY 10–11, Integrity Vice Presidency Annual Report, Fiscal 2011 44 (World 
Bank INT 2011), available at http://go.worldbank.org/T40HHT3RF0; see also FAQs, Fraud 
& Corruption, World Bank, at http://go.worldbank.org/JF938Z5CU0.
73  See Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3, at 14–17.
74  Similarly, the integrity compliance officer (ICO) decides whether conditions established by 
the sanctions board or EO as part of a conditional nondebarment sanction have been satis-
fied. The conditions imposed are likely to be similar to those imposed under debarment 
with conditional release, including, for example, adoption or improvement of an integrity 
compliance program and/or other remedial actions related to the relevant misconduct. See 
Sanctions Procedures, supra note 4, at Article 9.03 (Compliance with Conditions for Non-
debarment and Release from Debarment). The ICO was created in 2010. See INT, Sanctions 
and Compliance, at http://go.worldbank.org/G9UW6Y0DC0. 
75  See, for example, Wesley Carrington, Jim DeBuse, & Hee Jin Lee, The Theory of Governance & 
Accountability (U. of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development 2008).
76  Huma Haider, Claire Mcloughlin, & Zoë Scott, Topic Guide on Communication and Governance 
(CommGAP & GSDRC 2011), available at http://go.worldbank.org/7BUHFCCQ70.
77  See, for example, Carrington, DeBuse, & Lee, supra note 75; Haider, Mcloughlin, & Scott, su-
pra note 76. See also Caroline Freund & Mélise Jaud, Democratic Transitions: Successful, Grad-
ual, and Failed, in Accountability and Transparency, World Bank Economists’ Forum 2012 (May 9, 
2012); Ryan Booth, Deon Filmer, & Jamele Rigolini, Does Electoral Competition Raise Account-
ability?, in Accountability and Transparency, World Bank Economists’ Forum 2012 (May 9, 2012); 
Marco Larizza, Ryan Jabonski, & Audrey Sacks, Electoral Competition and Access to Information 
on Public Service Provision: Evidence from Sierra Leone, in Accountability and Transparency, World 
Bank Economists’ Forum 2012 (May 9, 2012); Carolin Geginat, Adrian Gonzalez, & Valentina 
Saltaine, Access to Information in Business Regulation, in Accountability and Transparency, World 
Bank Economists’ Forum 2012 (May 9, 2012).
78  “Capture” refers to the manipulation of policy formation and/or to the distortion of the rule-
making process that results in substantial individual gain to the detriment of society or the 
nation at large; a classic example comes from the profits that accrue to oligarchs of resource-
rich countries rather than to the countries and to their citizens. In this context, a “conflict of 
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Accountability, which contemplates the relationship between the organization 
and its stakeholders, ensures that the organization remains attentive to the 
needs and interests of its stakeholders and holds managers responsible for 
deviations thereof.79 However, accountability can operate only in a transpar-
ent environment.80 
The World Bank Group as a whole has committed itself to furthering the 
objectives of good governance, transparency, and accountability.81 Notably, the 
World Bank Group has decided that its internal documents should be made 
available to the public: adopted at a World Bank Group–wide level under the 
2010 Access to Information Policy, all information not on a list of exceptions 
is disclosed to the public (rather than only information corresponding to a 
positive list).82 
The sanctions system was construed as an exception to the open informa-
tion norm and thus stands apart: understanding that the nature of information 
concerning the sanctions system is fundamentally different from information 
generally in the Bank’s possession, and recognizing the need to assure the 
objectiveness of the deliberative process apart from the potential disruptive 
effect of media attention, the Bank walled off the sanctions system.83 Thus, in 
short, the general presumptions underlying the Access to Information Policy 
do not apply to the sanctions regime. 
Notwithstanding the exception that was carved out for the sanctions pro-
cess, it is undesirable if not untenable to maintain the system behind a veil of 
interest” occurs where there is self-interest competing with a communal interest. See Ro-
berta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, 34 Brook. 
J. Intl. L. 883, 946 (2009). See also Geginat, Gonzalez, & Saltaine, supra note 77; Joel Hell-
man & Daniel Kaufmann, Confronting the Challenge of State Capture in Transition Economies, 
Fin. & Dev. (IMF September 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft 
/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm. 
79  See, for example, Helen Darbishire, Proactive Transparency: The Future of the Right to Infor-
mation? CommGAP, World Bank, available at http://go.worldbank.org/7BUHFCCQ70. See 
also UN DESA DPADM, Transparency and Accountability in the Public Sector in the Arab Region, 
in Concept Paper 2: Transparency and Accountability in Public Financial Administration, 
RAB/01/006 (Mar. 2004). For a discussion of the evolution of accountability in public orga-
nizations and what the term has come to mean, see B. G. Peters in Restoring Accountability Re-
search Studies, Vol. 3: Linkages, Responsibilities and Accountabilities (D. Savoie ed., Public Works 
and Government Services Canada 2006).
80  Id.
81  In the words of former World Bank president Robert Zoellick, “Accountability and transpar-
ency are important pillars of the World Bank’s work.” Inspection Panel, available at http://
www.inspectionpanel.org/. See also Lisa Bhansali, Defining Our Path to the “Rule of Law,” 
Governance for Development, World Bank (Apr. 17, 2012), available at http://blogs.world 
bank.org/governance/defining-our-path-to-the-rule-of-law.
82  See The World Bank Policy on Access to Information (Jul. 1, 2010), paragraph 13, available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/LN06W7ZCB0. See also Disclosure Policy Review & Global Con-
sultations, World Bank, available at http://go.worldbank.org/FSBLXEWJ50.
83  One of the categorical exceptions in which most information is kept confidential is “other 
disclosure regimes,” which includes the Bank’s sanctions regime.
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secrecy;84 therefore, the regime’s actors have worked steadily toward the goal 
of ever-greater transparency. A series of events in 2011 is particularly reveal-
ing. In January 2011, the first notable step to enhance transparency was taken 
with the updating and making public of the Bank’s Sanctioning Guidelines.85 
These guidelines, which attempt to balance predictability with sufficient and 
equitable flexibility, afford clarity about the imposition of sanctions and offer 
guidance to INT in its negotiation of settlements.86 In November 2011, the Bank 
released, for the first time, a detailed information note describing the entire 
sanctions regime.87 This note gives the public an understanding of the sys-
tem as a whole, making public the system’s internal relations and operations, 
information that was previously largely unknowable to outsiders. An even 
bigger step came in December 2011, when the Bank published both the undis-
puted first-tier determinations (that is, those of the EO),88 and, in decisions that 
are fully reasoned and include relevant facts and the applied legal reasoning,89 
the decisions of the system’s appellate body (that is, those of the Sanctions 
Board).90 These developments evince the Bank’s commitment to making fair-
ness, transparency, and accountability key tenets of the World Bank Group’s 
sanctions reform agenda91—indeed, the Bank continually explores ways to 
further transparency and accountability.
It should be cautioned that, although the actors of the sanctions system are 
seeking to make the system more open, total disclosure is not contemplated. 
For instance, disclosure is limited to undisputed EO determinations and to 
Sanctions Board decisions, not to all documents or products of the system. 
Thus, for the sake of the deliberative process, confidentiality is maintained 
throughout the process, with disclosure of undisputed determinations and 
decisions made only when they are final. Similarly, INT maintains a “positive 
list” approach that is intended to cover information that could “be harmful to 
innocent persons; undermine the work of these groups; or could interfere with 
84  Such notions are in keeping with general notions of due process, for example, Article 6, 
Section 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights (“In the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal estab-
lished by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly”).
85  World Bank Group Sanctioning Guidelines (Jan. 1, 2011), Key and Reference Documents, 
World Bank, available at http://go.worldbank.org/CVUUIS7HZ0.
86  Sanctions Regime—The 2008–2010 Reforms, World Bank, available at http://go.worldbank 
.org/P7Z3PKTXP0. See also Leroy & Fariello, supra note 3, at 19.
87  The World Bank Group’s Sanctions Regime: Information Note, available at http://
go.worldbank.org/CVUUIS7HZ0.
88  See Sanctions Procedures, supra note 4, at Article 10.01(b); Evaluation and Suspension Officer 
Determinations in Uncontested Proceedings, World Bank, available at http://go.worldbank 
.org/G7EO0UXW90.
89  Sanctions Board Law Digest, World Bank, available at http://go.worldbank.org/S9PFFM 
D6X0.
90  Id.
91  See, for example, Notes from the Sanctions Board Chair, in Sanctions Board Law Digest, supra 
note 89. 
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the work of the groups that play an independent role within the institution.”92 
Thus, although the actors have taken the initiative of making the sanctions 
system as accessible as possible, the entirety of the process is not made public.
In effect, the result of this transparency is an increase in both empower-
ment and confidence for stakeholders and external participants. Publication 
of the Sanctions Board Law Digest is an excellent illustration: the Digest fosters 
greater access to and awareness of the public while resulting in greater cer-
tainty and deterrence due to the regime’s heightened visibility.93 At the same 
time, the Digest offers illustrations of the legal principles at play and how they 
are to be applied.94 The transparency resulting from offering to the public the 
decision-making process—the logic, its application, and the context for judg-
ment—serves as a mechanism for accountability for all the various actors in 
the system. Instruments like the Digest also enforce the notion of indepen-
dence, a notion central to a properly functioning dispute-resolution system.95 
On the flip side, appeals for abuse of discretion keep both Bank Management 
and the ICO (who monitors implementation of the compliance systems) ac-
countable. As a result, stakeholders have not only reason to be confident in 
the Bank and in its actors but also the tools necessary for ensuring continued 
high standards of quality, and Bank adherence to those standards and to the 
rules that shape them. 
92  See INT, The Disclosure of Information Policy of the Integrity Vice Presidency (Feb. 3, 2011), avail-
able at http://go.worldbank.org/J65IMLGAX0. The positive list is limited to (1) redacted fi-
nal investigation reports (FIRs) that set out findings and recommendations at the conclusion 
of INT’s external investigations and may be followed by sanctions proceedings; (2) redacted 
Detailed Implementation Review reports (DIRs) of integrity risks in WBG-financed projects, 
and assessments of measures designed to prevent them; (3) INT’s annual report; (4) reports 
and other information generated as part of INT’s preventive efforts, for example, thematic 
reviews, “lessons learned” publications, training, and capacity-building materials; (5) policy 
papers; and list of debarred companies. 
93  See President’s Introduction, in Sanctions Board Law Digest, supra note 89 (“Sanctions pro-
tect Bank Group funds and member countries’ development projects by excluding proven 
wrongdoers from our operations and financing. Sanctions also deter other participants or 
potential bidders in Bank Group–financed operations from engaging in fraud, collusion, or 
corruption. By holding companies and individuals accountable through a fair and robust 
process, the Bank Group’s sanctions system promotes integrity and levels the playing field 
for those committed to clean business practices”).
94  See Notes from the Sanctions Board Chair, in Sanctions Board Law Digest, supra note 89.
95  In both common and civil law traditions, emphasis is placed on rule of law principles, no-
tably that of separation of powers and its incumbent notion of judicial independence. The 
notion of separation of powers was first discussed by Locke, Second Treatise on Government 
chapter XII, section 143 (1690). However, Montesquieu is the best-known theorist who has 
treated the topic. Montesquieu, L’esprit des lois vol. 1, book XI, chapter 6, page 219 (1749). 
Because the judiciary is generally understood as the “weakest” branch of government, it is 
widely accepted that it must have the most substantial structural independence from undue 
influence. In the words of US Supreme Court chief justice Marshall, “The greatest scourge 
an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a 
corrupt, or a dependent judiciary.” Quoted in John B. Cassoday, John Scott, & John Marshall, 
The American Lawyer vol. VII, 60 (Stumpf & Steurer 1899).
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The move toward transparency is good practice and is in keeping with 
general rule of law dictates.96 Moreover, it is hoped that such confidence will 
further encourage worldwide participation in the combat against fraud and 
corruption and in the development of law and justice. Opening up the sanc-
tions system demonstrates both to those “in the docket” as respondents and 
to external observers that the Bank has a robust and deliberative sanctions 
system. This kind of a system inspires trust and confidence, thereby encourag-
ing engagement with the Bank at all levels, be it at the level of the sanctions 
process or in deciding whether to do business with the Bank. 
Conclusion 
Poverty persists and economies stagnate or fail when innovation and growth 
lag.97 Law and justice offer the infrastructure to nurture the trust and certainty 
that in turn promote innovation and growth.98 However, economic growth 
should not be considered a panacea for social problems, nor should the ben-
efits of providing law and justice be understood as merely the handmaid of 
economic growth.99 Just law encourages social cohesion, equality, citizen em-
powerment, and justice—“[a]fter all, the law is, or ought to be, but the hand-
maid of justice”100 and “an unjust law is no law at all.”101 More sophisticated 
and more formal legal systems expand economic opportunities by creating 
trust among strangers and expectations of generalized reciprocity,102 therein 
encouraging the building of communities of hope, trust, and prosperity. De-
velopment, therefore, cannot be read as advancing economic development in 
the strictest sense of the term; a sense of ownership and empowerment must 
also be nurtured. Accordingly, more attention must be paid to strengthening 
governance. To achieve such an end, legal and governance institutions must 
be developed, and a sense of the importance of the rule of law must be fos-
tered.103 However, such development can occur only if stakeholders believe 
96  “The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear 
in meaning, and apply equally to everyone.” Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 
Foreign Affairs 96 (1998).
97  Cooter & Schafer, supra note 28, at 5. See also Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest 
(Penguin 2011).
98  Cooter & Schafer, supra note 28, at 1–26. See also Ferguson, supra note 97; Daron Acemoglu 
& James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (Random 
House 2012).
99  See Carothers, supra note 96, at 95–105. See also Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: 
International Lawyers and Globalization, 3 Euro. J. Intl. L. 423–48 (1997); Shirley V. Scott, Inter-
national Lawyers: Handmaidens, Chefs, or Birth Attendants? A Response to Philip Alston, 9 Euro. J. 
Intl. L. 750 –56 (1998). See also Jim Yong Kim et al. ed., Dying for Growth: Global Inequality and 
the Health of the Poor 7, 3 (Common Courage Press 2000). 
100  Lord Penzance, Combe v. Edwards (1878), L. Reports 3 P.D. 142.
101 St. Augustine of Hippo.
102  Cooter & Schafer, supra note 28, at 82 et seq.
103  See, for example, Lisa Bhansali, Defining Our Path to the “Rule of Law,” Governance for Devel-
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that the systems are accountable, which in turn requires transparency. Lead-
ing by example, the World Bank is adhering to social accountability by mak-
ing its sanctions regime increasingly transparent and robust.
Internationally, the Bank plays an active role104 in combating the “cancer of 
corruption.”105 However, for enduring change to occur there must be not only 
outside support but also the will to reform; that will can come only from with-
in the community.106 Merely enacting good laws does little without substantial 
investment and corresponding changes in implementation and enforcement 
that nurture mutual trust.107 Realizing as much from its extensive experience 
in rule of law and justice reform projects,108 the Bank emphasizes transparency 
and accountability across its work, and in its own sanctions regime in particu-
lar, is intended to create a sense of trust, confidence, and ownership, that (it is 
hoped) will elicit that ever-so-essential will for change. 
The Bank has further bolstered transparency’s transformative effect by 
crafting an innovative sui generis system that allows it to attentively and 
opment, World Bank (Apr. 17, 2012), available at http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance 
/defining-our-path-to-the-rule-of-law.
104  In taking up this area, the Bank has overcome the strictest interpretations of the “political 
prohibition” that bars it from interfering in the political affairs of its members. The IBRD Ar-
ticles of Agreement contain a provision that states that “[t]he Bank and its officers shall not 
interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions 
by the political character of the member or members concerned.” See IBRD Articles of Agree-
ment, Article IV, Section 10. IDA Articles of Agreement contain an identical provision. See 
IDA Articles of Agreement, Article V, Section 6. Almost-identical provisions are contained in 
the Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, Article VIII, Section 5(f); 
the Articles of Agreement of the Asian Development Bank, Chapter VI, Article 36; and the 
Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, Chapter V, Article 38. In contrast, 
the constituent documents of EBRD and EIB do not contain any such restriction. See also 
Hassane Cissé, Should the “Political Prohibition” in Charters of International Financial Institu-
tions Be Revisited? The Case of the World Bank, in International Financial Institutions and Global 
Legal Governance (Hassane Cissé, Daniel D. Bradlow, & Benedict Kingsbury ed., World Bank 
2011).
105  Wolfensohn, supra note 6, at 50. See also Transparency International USA, World Bank– 
Siemens Agreement Sends Strong Signal ( Jul. 2, 2009), available at http://www.transparency 
-usa.org/news/documents/TIUSASiemensRelease7.2.09.pdf. For example, the Bank is 
keenly engaging with national authorities. See, for example, News & Broadcast, World Bank, 
World Bank Welcomes Norwegian Convictions of Three Former Employees of Norwegian Company 
“Norconsult” in Bribery Case in Tanzania, Press Release No. 2012/029/INT ( Jul. 22, 2011), 
available at http://go.worldbank.org/VO2EW48OO0.
106  See Carothers, supra note 96, at 96.
107  Id., at 104.
108  Compare, for example, the great increase in projects over the course of the years: Initia-
tives in Legal and Judicial Reform 2002 (World Bank 2002) (listing 330 Bank-financed projects 
related to legal and judicial reform, including a US$58 million loan to Russia), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/PJHSQT4RA0; Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform 2004 (World 
Bank 2004) (approximating the number of Bank-financed projects related to legal and judi-
cial reform at 600), available at http://go.worldbank.org/PJHSQT4RA0; Initiatives in Justice 
Reform 2009 (World Bank 2009) (noting that the Bank’s current justice sector assistance and 
reform portfolio comprises nearly 2,500 justice reform activities in developing or transition 
countries), available at http://go.worldbank.org/PJHSQT4RA0.
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expeditiously engage respondents of all shapes and sizes. Until recently, those 
borrowing from the Bank had their freedom restricted: not only did borrowers 
not understand the nature of the Bank’s debarment system; they also had lim-
ited decision-making powers as the Bank decided on whether certain contrac-
tors were employable. The opening up of the Bank’s sanctions regime gives 
increased confidence to borrowers and contractors alike, as they can see the 
robust and deliberative nature of the Bank’s system; this opening up also will 
make the sanctions system more predictable and accessible. 
Of course, the sanctions system—as with any judicial recourse—remains 
a contingency: it is the unhappy alternative, not the desired route. That said, 
confidence in the system is of enduring importance to bolstering the rule 
of law, as obscuring the nature of that system can have a chilling effect: for 
those entities doing business with the Bank, not knowing the basis on which 
the Bank debarred, and yet remaining subject to the possibility of a public 
shaming, detracted from the Bank’s legitimacy, as well as adding a degree of 
uncertainty and hassle to working with the Bank. Opening up the sanctions 
system builds confidence in that system, empowers stakeholders, and has the 
correlative benefit of building confidence in doing business with the Bank. 
In matters of governance and of rule of law, the Bank is practicing what it 
preaches, thereby assuring stakeholders that, in doing business with the Bank, 
they are not throwing caution to the wind. Such relations improve the political 
economy of Bank-financed development projects.
* * *
Left unchecked, fraud and corruption have broad, corrosive, and lingering 
effects on countries and on communities; they undermine the effectiveness 
of development projects and erode confidence in systems and in societies.109 
The consequence of unchecked corruption is an increase in corruption, as well 
as a general lack of public confidence in democratic processes, slowed eco-
nomic growth, the deepening of inequality, and a general breakdown in social 
norms of sensitivity.110 Shoring up the rule of law helps temper corruption and 
crime.111 The Bank’s sanctions regime plays a key role in combating fraud and 
109  See Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) Implementation Plan, OPCS, World Bank 
(Sep. 28, 2007), available at http://go.worldbank.org/ZFUWCFJQ80; FAQs, Fraud & Cor-
ruption, World Bank, at http://go.worldbank.org/JF938Z5CU0. See also Wolfensohn, supra 
note 6, at 50; Yikona et al., supra note 5; Chaikin & Sharman, supra note 5; Jayasuriya, supra 
note 5, at 46–58.
110  Id. For instance, the growth of corruption in South Africa resulted in citizens not knowing 
how to report corruption and, even more alarmingly, in the general belief that reporting 
would not be beneficial and fear of the consequences of reporting. See Hennie van Vuuren, 
Small Bribes, Big Challenges: Extent and Nature of Petty Corruption in South Africa, 9 S. Afr. 
Crime Quarterly (2004). In an interesting though counterintuitive and somewhat question-
able conceptualization, Cooter & Schafer argue that certain corruption can serve a beneficial 
purpose insofar as it subverts laws that impede economic growth; unfortunately, no con-
sideration is made of the subversive rule of law effects of this “good” corruption. Cooter & 
Schafer, supra note 28, at 168–72.
111  See Carothers, supra note 96, at 99.
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corruption around the world, and it is hoped that the opening up of the pro-
cess to stakeholders will help to combat corruption further. 
The international community has recognized that “[c]ommunity devel-
opment draws on existing human and material resources in the community 
to enhance self-help and social support, and to develop flexible systems for 
strengthening public participation. . . . This requires full and continuous ac-
cess to information, learning opportunities . . . , as well as funding support.”112 
By developing an effective and innovative sanctions system, and in making 
that system transparent, the Bank is stepping up its efforts to fight fraud and 
corruption, with the ultimate goal of strengthening and empowering com-
munities. The World Bank’s dream is of a world without poverty; impoverish-
ment, however, can come in many forms, and, so the Bank—and the actors in 
its sanctions regime—is expanding the battlefront. 
112  The Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (Nov. 21, 1986).
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Human Rights and Development
Regime Interaction and the Fragmentation  
of International Law
Siobhán Mcinerney-Lankford
Human rights and development interact in a range of ways, and so too do the 
legal and policy frameworks, or regimes, that govern each.1 In this chapter, 
“regimes” are defined as “sets of norms, decision-making procedures, and or-
ganizations coalescing around functional issue-areas.”2 This chapter considers 
the connections between human rights and development from the perspective 
of public international law as “regime interaction,” focusing specifically on 
the links between human rights law and development policy. It departs from 
the premise of the centrality of law as a defining feature of human rights3 and 
legal accountability as a key contribution of human rights and development.4 
It espouses the view that more attention is due to human rights law and hu-
man rights obligations in the context of development.5 From this the chapter 
considers the degree to which human rights are integrated explicitly into de-
velopment policies and programs and the extent to which human rights are 
recognized as law in those contexts.6 
  The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they 
represent. The author thanks Mac Darrow, Olufemi Elias, Nathan Lankford, Victor Mosoti, 
Hans-Otto Sano, Andres Rigo Sureda, and Chantal Thomas for comments on earlier drafts 
of this article, and Behnaz Bonyadian, Christian Jimenez-Tomas, and Laura Lalime-Mowry 
for research assistance. Responsibility for errors or omissions remains with the author.
1  M. Young, Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge U. Press 2012). 
2  M. Young, Introduction, in Young, id., at 9. The term is understood to cover both the for-
mal or binding legal frameworks governing a particular area or issue, including treaties, 
norms, legislation, rules, and regulations, and softer measures such as policies, statements, 
programs, processes, and directives. Nevertheless, the term “regime” is a nonlegal term with 
no fixed definition that has generated a vast body of literature in both international relations 
and public international law. See, for example, S. Krasner ed., International Relations (Cornell 
U. Press 1983).
3  D. Forsythe, Human Rights Studies: On the Dangers of Legalistic Assumptions, in Methods of Hu-
man Rights Research (F. Coomans, F. Grünfeld, & M. Kamminga ed., Intersentia 2009). Despite 
the author’s thesis and cautions, he acknowledges that “law has remained central to the 
notion of human rights. That is because, . . . it is law that authoritatively defines a society’s 
understanding of what are human rights at a given point in time.” 
4  See S. McInerney-Lankford, Human Rights and Development: A Comment on Challenges and Op-
portunities from a Legal Perspective, 1(1) J. of Human Rights Practice 74–75 (2009).
5  For a critical view of the value of international human rights treaties, see O. Hathaway, Do 
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 Yale L. J. 1935–2042 (2002).
6  This chapter considers the potential influence of human rights on development, rather than 
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In particular, this chapter explores the place of international human rights 
obligations and human rights treaties in development policies and assesses 
the impact of this role in operational terms.7 It notes that, despite growing 
recognition of human rights as the subject of binding international law obliga-
tions on the part of development agencies and banks, and despite increased 
emphasis on policy coherence, the trend across development is far from uni-
form and in many respects is inconsistent and divergent.8 The chapter argues 
that the relationship between human rights and development policy can be 
analyzed as regime interaction. This interaction exemplifies the fragmentation 
of international law, most evident in the uneven integration of human rights 
law obligations into development policies and processes. 
This chapter contends that the growing recognition of human rights in 
legal and operational terms could advance international policy coherence and 
mediate risk. It also suggests that the ability of international development in-
stitutions and their regimes to adapt to evolving international norms could 
be expanded to human rights.9 It argues for the place and relevance of hu-
man rights in development regimes rather than suggesting particular ways 
in which potential norm conflicts between the regimes should be resolved. It 
therefore invites consideration of the relationship of human rights and devel-
opment in terms of regime interaction and suggests a frame for future consid-
eration of norm interaction. 
The Relationship of Human Rights and Development
Human rights and development connect in a range of ways. The following 
discussion does not review in detail the conceptual discussions developed 
elsewhere but rather sets the context for the ensuing discussion of how human 
rights are reflected in development policy frameworks or regimes to facilitate 
a discussion of how those regimes interact and the place of legal obligations 
within that relationship. 
Human rights and development are different: achieving a positive result 
in a given field, such as health, is not the same as realizing the right to health; 
nor will such a result “automatically promote respect for the corresponding 
right and imbue the rights-holder and duty-bearers with a long-term guaran-
tee [or] set of structural claims.”10 Yet, at some intuitive level, human rights 
the reverse, although it assumes the two-way nature of the relationship between the two. See 
World Bank, Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank (World Bank 1998).
7  This approach departs from the view that “when we speak of universal human rights, it is 
international law that defines them in a positivistic sense, for better or worse.” Forsythe, 
supra note 2, at 61.
8  P. Uvin, Human Rights and Development 47 (Kumarian Press 2004).
9  A. Rigo Sureda, The Law Applicable to the Activities of International Development Banks, in Re-
ceuil des cours 217 (Martinus Nijhoff 2005).
10  Anand Grover, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, A/HRC/17/25 (Apr. 12, 2011), 
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and development share affinities. In substantive ways, they occupy many of 
the same sectors or spheres, and in certain types of operations, development 
bears distinct similarities to human rights. 
The “normative and institutional pluralism”11 that exists between human 
rights and development results in overlapping activities and mutual influence 
among their governing regimes, such that the demarcation between them is 
sometimes difficult to draw.12 It may even be said that the overlap between 
the two areas or regimes is increasing and that the range of development poli-
cies and activities now affecting areas governed by human rights treaties is 
growing. Some practitioners have even observed that there has not been an 
evolution in the thinking on matters related to human rights to correlate with 
the expansion in the mandate of development institutions.13 
Moreover, “complex problems have ramifications in many specialized 
directions.”14 Attempts at strict demarcations between different regimes or 
competencies fail to register the complex realities of international human 
rights and development, giving rise to both an increased potential for con-
flicting norms in international law and a “situation of ongoing institutional 
diversity and pluralism and the day-to-day and relatively mundane occur-
rences of overlapping forms and inter-regime activity.”15 This is particular-
ly true because development and human rights share consistent goals16 but 
pursue them differently, and their agendas overlap extensively17 and in mutu-
ally reinforcing ways.18 
paragraph 50, quoting P. Uvin, Human Rights and Development 52–53 (Kumarian Press 2004).
11  M. Young, Regime Interaction in Creating, Implementing and Enforcing International Law, in 
Young, supra note 1, at 86.
12  On the overlap of domains of activity and regulatory processes at the international level, see 
B. Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Administrative Law in the Institutional Practice of Global Regu-
latory Governance, in World Bank Legal Review vol. 3 (H. Cissé, D. Bradlow, & B. Kingsbury ed., 
World Bank 2012). 
13  Sureda, supra note 9, at 217.
14  Judge Weeramantry dissenting, Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Advisory Opinion 
(1999) (I) ICJ Rep. 66.
15  Young, supra note 11, at 85. 
16  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Rights and Human Development, 
in Human Development Report 2000, sections 19–28 (UNDP 2000). See S. Jahan, Millennium 
Development Goals and Human Rights (2002), available at http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte 
/human_rights/jahan.htm. See also Report of the Millennium Project, Investing in Development: 
A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, which characterizes the MDGs 
as human rights: “[The MDGs] are also basic human rights—the rights of each person on 
the planet to health, education, shelter, and security as pledged in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the UN Millennium Declaration” (page 1), available at http://www 
.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/fullreport.htm.
17  P. Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development 
Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27(3) Hum. Rights Q. 758. 
18  OHCHR, Frequently Asked Questions on Human Rights Based Approach to Development Coopera-
tion (UN 2006), and UNDP, Human Development Report 2003: Millennium Development Goals: A 
Compact among Nations to end Human Poverty (UNDP 2003). See also J. L. Roy, Implementing the 
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Examples of this convergence can be identified in the areas of social protec-
tion, education, governance, and health, as well as in thematic terms through 
activities aimed at the protection of women, indigenous peoples, children, and 
persons with disabilities. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) illus-
trate the proximity and compatibility of human rights and development, even 
if they are critiqued for their silence on human rights19 and their failure to ad-
dress inequalities and the plight of the most vulnerable.20
At a deeper level, human rights and development may be viewed as con-
verging in shared principles such as equality, participation, accountability, 
transparency, and voice, as well as in attention to vulnerable groups, all of 
which are principles that have become hallmarks of good development prac-
tice.21 Both development and the international human rights frameworks give 
expression to these principles in different ways that evince a convergence of a 
more deliberate and strategic sort. 
However, in general legal and policy terms, the international frameworks 
governing human rights and development occupy separate spheres governed 
by distinct regimes. Nowhere is this more apparent than in relation to legal 
obligations.22 
International human rights are the purview of treaty frameworks such 
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)23 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),24 
along with a range of other universal instruments and their protocols gov-
erning issues such as gender discrimination,25 child rights,26 disabilities,27 
Millennium Development Goals: Our Human Rights Obligation, 15(1) Libertas, who opines, “many 
of the MDGs can be reinforced by the binding human rights obligations of states.”
19  Alston, supra note 17, at 796. See, generally, OHCHR, Claiming the Millennium Development 
Goals: A Human Rights Approach (United Nations 2008), available at http://www2.ohchr 
.org/SPdocs/Claiming_MDGs_en.pdf.
20  See, for example, M. Langford, A Poverty of Rights: Six Ways to Fix the MDGs, 41(1) IDS Bul-
letin 87 ( Jan. 2010).
21  S. McInerney-Lankford & H.-O. Sano, Human Rights Indicators in Development: An Introduc-
tion 31– 36 (World Bank 2010).
22  Id., at 36–40.
23  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), UN GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
UN GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976).
24  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), UN GA Res. 
2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force Jan. 3, 1976).
25  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
UN Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (1979), 1249 UNTS 14 (entered into force Sep. 3, 1981).
26  Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), UNTS 3, 28 I.L.M. 1456 (entered into force 
Sep. 2, 1990).
27  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ICRPD), A/RES/61/106 (adopted 
Jan. 24, 2007).
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torture,28 and migrant workers.29 This is complemented by regional human 
rights law frameworks and monitoring systems in Europe (ECHR,30 the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the EU31), the Americas,32 and Africa.33
Development, for its part, is defined more by broad-based goals such as 
the MDGs and general statements, strategies, programs, and policy frame-
works of development institutions, which do not generally incorporate inter-
national legal norms34 directly or explicitly. Philip Alston has noted the resis-
tance to human rights in the context of the MDGs, attributing it to the fact that 
human rights are “a quintessentially legal domain and thus not one which is 
suitable for use in a general development studies context.”35 Thus, the binding 
legal frame of development cooperation tends to operate either at the level of 
the constitutive instruments of development agencies or at the transactional 
level of individual legal agreements underpinning particular operations. Al-
though each of these instruments is an international agreement36 subject to 
public international law,37 the bulk of the development policy framework is 
not the domain of international legal norms, is not usually framed in terms of 
treaties, and does not readily admit a place for treaty obligations such as those 
flowing from human rights treaties. 
Moreover, despite the more recent emphasis on accountability in develop-
ment frameworks,38 these frameworks do not involve legal accountability of 
28  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment (CAT ) (Dec. 10, 1984), 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force Jun. 26, 1987).
29  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Mem-
bers of Their Families, CPRMW (Dec. 18, 1990), UN GA Res. 45/158 (annex), 30 I.L.M. 1521 
(1991) (entered into force Jul. 1, 2003).
30  See http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html.
31  Official Journal of the European Union C 83/389, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/Lex 
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403:en:PDF.
32  American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San Jose), OAS Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 
UNTS 123 (entered into force Jul. 18, 1978), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/en 
glish/treaties/b-32.html.
33  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 
58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
34  By norms, this chapter refers to legally binding rules that create rights and obligations be-
tween subjects of international law.
35  P. Alston, What’s in a Name: Does It Really Matter if Development Policies Refer to Goals, Ideals or 
Human Rights? 22 SIM Special 101 (1997).
36  Because these international agreements are entered into by UN members, the agreements are 
subject to the registration requirement of Article 102 of the UN Charter. See A. Broches, The-
ory and Practice of Treaty Registration with Particular Reference to Agreements of the International 
Bank, in Selected Essays World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects of Public and Private International 
Law 99 (Martinus Nijhoff 1995). All treaties and international agreements registered with the 
United Nations are available at http://treaties.un.org/.
37  I. Shihata, The World Bank Legal Papers 151 (Martinus Nijhoff 2000), in discussing the World Bank 
general conditions, confirms that the Bank’s loan and guarantee agreements are international 
agreements that, although insulated from domestic law, are subject to public international law.
38  For example, Global Monitoring is a monitoring framework focused on “how the world is 
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the sort associated with treaties such as human rights treaties, and arguably 
cannot therefore empower poor or marginalized groups to claim their rights 
in the development process and bridge the gap between global standards and 
local circumstances.39 Indeed, some people have argued that accountability 
itself cannot be separated from contests over the realization of rights and the 
distribution of resources.40
In general terms, therefore, human rights and development are governed 
by distinct regimes, including separate legal frameworks, that interact only 
occasionally and in ways that are far from clear. Only very rarely do human 
rights law obligations, such as those emanating from human rights treaties, 
receive formal recognition in the development regimes, and even then the 
operational consequences of such obligations are not always apparent. This 
chapter draws on the well-known concept of fragmentation of international 
law to analyze the relationship between human rights and development and 
the interaction of the legal and policy regimes that govern each.41 
The fragmentation of international law is generally understood to refer to 
the way in which international law is split into “highly ‘specialized boxes’ that 
claim relative autonomy from each other and from the general law.”42 It is the 
subject of extensive academic commentary,43 viewed by many as a product of 
the expansion and diversification of public international law and connected 
with the proliferation of special regimes. Some view fragmentation as a prob-
lem that undermines the general law and the systemic nature of international 
law,44 while others view it as inevitable, perhaps even capable of strengthening 
special regimes.45 Some of the literature focuses on the resolution of conflict 
between the norms of various special regimes,46 whereas other work explores 
doing in implementing the policies and actions for achieving the MDGs and related devel-
opment outcomes. It is a framework for accountability in global development policy.” See 
http://go.worldbank.org/AECE2VJFU0 .
39  See P. Newell & J. Wheeler, Rights, Resources and the Politics of Accountability (Institute of De-
velopment Studies 2006).
40  Id.
41  The putative causes of this fragmentation are discussed in more detail below.
42  ILC Study Group, Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of Interna-
tional Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 256 (2006).
43  P. M. Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the 
International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. Intl. L. & Pol. 791–807 (1999); J. Pauwleyn, Bridging 
Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-connected Islands, 25 Mich. J. 
Intl. L. 903–17 (2004); K. Wellens & R. Vinaixa ed., L’influence des sources sur l’unité et la frag-
mentation du droit international (Bruylant 2006). The 105th Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law addressed some similar themes in Harmony and Dissonance in International 
Law (2011).
44  M. Koskenniemi & P. Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 
Leiden J. Intl. L. 553 (2002), discuss a range of views on the various risks of fragmentation.
45  B. Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 Mich. J. Intl. L. 845 (2004).
46  For example, M. Milanović, Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights? 20 
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the ways in which norms and institutions from disparate regimes overlap and 
interact.47 This chapter adopts the latter approach, applying it to the interac-
tion of regimes governing human rights and development.
Human Rights and Development: Regime Interaction  
and Policy Coherence
What, then, is the nature of the interaction between the regimes governing 
human rights and development?48 Where and how do the regimes interact at 
the level of legal and policy discourse? In particular, how are human rights 
reflected in the development policy frameworks of bilateral and multilateral 
donors? This section outlines the various levels of formal interaction between 
the development and human rights regimes in high-level political statements 
and soft law, as well as the individual policies of particular agencies and insti-
tutions. From there, it assesses the nature and quality of the transposition of 
human rights, whether in general references, as principles, or as legal obliga-
tions with direct operational implications.
International Political Statements and Soft Law
Soft law measures dating from the 1960s link human rights and development. 
These recognize that failure to reach development goals impedes the realiza-
tion of human rights and that “the achievement of lasting progress in the im-
plementation of human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national 
and international policies of economic and social development.”49 Perhaps the 
most direct attempt at linking human rights and development emerges in the 
right to development. In 1986, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declara-
tion on the Right to Development,50 which pronounces the right to develop-
ment as a new human right, one of the so-called third generation of human 
rights. At the same time these initiatives were under way at the international 
political level, philosophers such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum were 
forging links between human rights and development. Sen’s concept of devel-
opment as freedom, under which the essential goal of development is expand-
ing substantive human freedoms, or “capabilities,” has a natural affinity with 
human rights and human rights–based approaches to development, particu-
larly in its emphasis on the importance of voice for marginalized groups.51 
Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 69 (2009). 
47  M. Young ed., Regime Interaction in International Law (Cambridge U. Press 2012).
48  For a definition of regimes, see Young, supra note 1.
49  Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehe-
ran, Apr. 22 to May 13, 1968, UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/41, at 3 (1968).
50  Declaration on the Right to Development, A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986). See also S. Marks, 
Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980’s, 33 Rutgers L. Rev. 435 (1981); 
S. Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality? 17 Harv. Hum. 
Rights J. 137 (2004).
51  A. Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford U. Press 2000).
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The Declaration on the Right to Development underscores the links be-
tween human rights and development by “[r]ecognizing that the human per-
son is the central subject of the development process and that development 
policy should therefore make the human being the main participant and ben-
eficiary of development.” Article 1 states, “The right to development is an in-
alienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples 
are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural 
and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental free-
doms can be fully realized.”
In 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, in addition to 
reaffirming the right to development, asserted that “[d]emocracy, develop-
ment, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interde-
pendent and mutually reinforcing.”52
Although such measures represent efforts to connect human rights and 
development cohesively, they also underscore the fragmentation of interna-
tional law by not being binding and by the fact that they do not connect hu-
man rights obligations operationally with development.53 The marginality of 
the right to development in normative terms and the vagueness surrounding 
content and meaning in the operational frameworks of development agencies 
are evidence of the separateness of the human rights and development frame-
works rather than an example of their convergence.
In 2000, the global community adopted the Millennium Declaration, 
which contains commitments to respect human rights and uphold the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights.54 This was followed by the 2010 Millen-
52  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23 ( Jul. 12, 1993; adopted by 
the World Conference on Human Rights on Jun. 25, 1993), paragraph 8. 
53  The discourse around the right to development has often been a polarized one, generat-
ing sharp differences between developed and less developed countries in the context of de-
mands for redressing economic imbalances and a new international economic order. For a 
thoughtful review of the history and implications of the right to development, see I. Bunn, 
The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law, 15 Am. U. Intl. L.J. 1425 
(2000). On the right to development more generally, see S. Choudhury, The Right to Develop-
ment in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 1992).
54  Section V of the Millennium Declaration, on human rights, democracy, and good gover-
nance, reads:
   24. We will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well 
as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the right to development.
  25. We resolve therefore:
  • To respect fully and uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
   • To strive for the full protection and promotion in all our countries of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights for all. 
   • To strengthen the capacity of all our countries to implement the principles and prac-
tices of democracy and respect for human rights, including minority rights. 
   • To combat all forms of violence against women and to implement the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
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nium Summit Outcome document, Keeping the Promises: United to Achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals,55 which contains several references to human 
rights and international law instruments, reaffirming full respect for interna-
tional law and principles56 and for all human rights, including the right to 
development.57 It also notes that gender equality and women’s full enjoyment 
of human rights are essential to economic and social development, including 
the achievement of the MDGs.58 Agencies such as the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have continued to emphasize the 
importance of human rights to development as part of a broader agenda of 
international policy coherence.59 This was affirmed by the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights in the context of the right to development: “We must 
foster policy coherence and systemic integration of human rights, including 
the right to development, across sectors, across institutions and across layers 
of governance. Human aspirations for well-being can be realized only when 
there is a strong accountability framework.”60 
In the area of aid effectiveness, although the 2005 Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness61 does not contain any explicit reference to human rights as 
a cross-cutting theme,62 it does confirm five core principles deemed essential 
to improving the effectiveness of development assistance and contributing to 
meeting the MDGs: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for re-
sults, and mutual accountability to improve the quality of aid and its impact 
on development. In 2008, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) proclaimed re-
spect for human rights as a cornerstone for achieving enduring impact on the 
   • To take measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human rights of mi-
grants, migrant workers and their families, to eliminate the increasing acts of racism 
and xenophobia in many societies and to promote greater harmony and tolerance in all 
societies. 
   • To work collectively for more inclusive political processes, allowing genuine partici-
pation by all citizens in all our countries. 
   • To ensure the freedom of the media to perform their essential role and the right of the 
public to have access to information.
55  Integrated and Coordinated Implementation of and Follow-Up to the Outcomes of the Major 
UN Conferences and Summits in the Economic, Social, and Related Fields. Follow-up to the 
Outcome of the Millennium Summit, A/65/L.1 (Sep. 17, 2010).
56  Paragraph 2, 2010 Millennium Summit Outcome document. 
57  Paragraph 3, 2010 Millennium Summit Outcome document.
58  Paragraph 12, 2010 Millennium Summit Outcome document.
59  See below for a discussion of international policy coherence.
60  Closing Statement by the High Commissioner for Human Rights at UN General Assem-
bly Event to Commemorate the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Right to Development (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents 
/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11583&LangID=E.
61  See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf and http://ec.europa.eu/devel 
opment/icenter/repository/SEC_PDF_2009_1137_F_ACTE_PCD_EN.pdf (2009).
62  Paragraph 42 of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness notes the need for “har-
monisation efforts on other cross cutting issues such as gender equality and other thematic 
issues.”
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lives and potential of poor women, men, and children, stating that it is “vital 
that all our policies address these issues in a more systematic and coherent 
way.”63 
In paragraph 13(c), the AAA goes further: “Developing countries and do-
nors will ensure that their respective development policies and programmes 
are designed and implemented in ways consistent with their agreed inter-
national commitments on gender equality, human rights, disability and en-
vironmental sustainability.” The 2011 outcome document from the Fourth 
High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan explicitly preserves the 
commitments of the AAA and, like the AAA, contains provisions on human 
rights. In addition, it provides for the right to development and confirms that 
the “common principles which—consistent with our agreed international 
commitments on human rights, decent work, gender equality, environmental 
sustainability and disability—form the foundation of our cooperation for ef-
fective development.”64 
 The trend among such high-level statements and declarations is clearly 
in favor of recognizing human rights more explicitly and in terms of obliga-
tions and international commitments. This movement promotes a vision of 
development and human rights that supports international policy coherence 
and that recognizes the potential impacts of actions in one policy realm on 
other areas. At the level of general political statements, therefore, the trend 
increasingly recognizes the relevance of human rights law obligations to de-
velopment cooperation, including aid effectiveness.
Development Policies
At an institutional level, the policies of many development agencies and banks 
reflect the points of convergence, albeit in different ways. This section traces 
the links between human rights and development in these policies, noting the 
ways in which they approach the question of human rights as the subject of 
binding international law obligations.
References to Human Rights
Some policies contain general or preambular references to human rights, but 
the operational implications of these references remain unclear. Such references 
might cite the importance of human rights in the development process or in-
clude provisions regarding the respect of human rights of particular groups; 
some even go so far as to define human rights by reference to the relevant 
international legal instruments. Examples are found in the indigenous peoples 
63  Accra Agenda for Action, paragraph 3. 
64  Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, Outcome Document (Dec. 1, 
2011), paragraph 11, available at http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/images/stories 
/hlf4/OUTCOME_DOCUMENT_-_FINAL_EN.pdf. See also references to human rights and 
rights-based approaches in relation to the Millennium Declaration (paragraph 3) and the role 
of CSOs (paragraph 22).
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policies of a number of multilateral development banks, such as the World 
Bank65 and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The IDB Operational 
Policy on Indigenous Peoples makes numerous references to indigenous peo-
ples’ rights,66 defined as “the rights of indigenous peoples and individuals, 
whether originating in the indigenous legislation issued by States, in other rel-
evant national legislation, in applicable international norms in force for each 
country, or in the indigenous juridical systems of each people, hereinafter col-
lectively referred to as the ‘applicable legal norms.’”67 The policy enumerates 
the relevant international and regional human rights instruments, also mak-
ing reference to the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies.68
Human Rights as General Principles 
The frameworks of some agencies evidence a more strategic engagement with 
human rights, acknowledging their importance for development policy and 
practice69 and highlighting the links between human rights and sustainable 
65  Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples 4.10, the preamble of which reads: “This policy 
contributes to the Bank’s mission of poverty reduction and sustainable development by en-
suring that the development process fully respects the dignity, human rights, economies, 
and cultures of Indigenous Peoples.”
66  http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=691261.
67  Id., paragraph 1.2.
68  Page 1, footnote 4 , IDB Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples, reads:
   [T]hose international norms in force for each country are defined as follows: Interna-
tional legislation includes, as in force for each country, the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (1966), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1976), the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966), the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (1990), the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 
107 concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-
Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (1957), ILO Convention 169 concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (1989), Agenda 21 ad-
opted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
(1992), and the International Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), as well as the 
corresponding international jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights or similar bodies whose jurisdiction has been accepted by the relevant coun-
try. Other international instruments currently in preparation, such as the draft United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the draft American Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, establish aspirational principles that may 
be taken into account to the extent that these instruments are finalized and subscribed 
by the relevant country.
  The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in September 2007.
69  NZAid, Human Rights Policy Statement, 4 (2002), available at http://www.nzaid.govt.nz 
/library/docs/nzaid-human-rights-policy.pdf; Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Democratisation and Human Rights for the Benefit of the People: Strategic Priorities for Dan-
ish Support for Good Governance, page 3 (2009), available at http://www.um.dk/NR 
/rdonlyres/D04B984F-41A2-4E7E-81C1-A35C09F95964/0/DraftDHRstrategyFINALVER 
SION030309.pdf. Denmark’s general policy on development, “The Right to a Better Life,” 
was adopted in 2012. The first of five strands of the strategy is freedom, democracy, and 
human rights. Available at http://um.dk/en/danida-en/goals/strategy/.
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development.70 Others draw connections between the international human 
rights law framework and the MDGs71 and compliance with human rights 
principles and improvements in MDG-oriented development.72 Several agen-
cies have well-established human rights mainstreaming policies73 or policies 
founded on a rights perspective.74 Such policies promote the integration of hu-
man rights into country programs or existing aid interventions across sectors 
or promote the rights of certain groups such as children, women, minorities 
and indigenous peoples, or persons with disabilities. 
Human Rights–Based Approaches
Some governments have adopted human rights–based approaches to develop-
ment.75 At the global level, the United Nations is the most prominent example 
of a general rights-based approach to development,76 founded directly on the 
legal obligations enshrined in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration, and 
70  Human Rights and Australia’s Aid Program. From an aid perspective, development and hu-
man rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. For development to be sustainable, 
individuals in developing countries must have secure and long-term access to the resources 
required to satisfy their basic needs, be they economic, social, cultural, civil, or political.
  At the broadest level, therefore, the entire Australian aid program contributes to the realiza-
tion of human rights. See http://www.ausaid.gov.au/keyaid/humanrights.cfm.
71  Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Human Dignity for All: A Human Rights Strategy 
for Foreign Policy. There are major similarities between the MDGs and the objectives of the 
human rights instruments. Both aim to eliminate hunger, improve access to education and 
health care, and improve the position of women, children, and other vulnerable groups. 
All the MDGs also have an equivalent in the international human rights instruments, par-
ticularly the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
and the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
72  BMZ, Human Rights in German Development Policy, BMZ Strategy Paper 4 (2011), at section 
2.3; see also Germany’s Development Policy Action Plan on Human Rights (2008 –10).
73  See, for example, F. Uggla, Mainstreaming at Sida: A Synthesis Report 7, Sida Studies in Evalu-
ation No. 5 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/40/39070485.pdf and 
http://www.sida.se/English/.
74  Sweden’s policy for democratic development and human rights in Swedish develop-
ment cooperation, 2010–14. Memorandum Appendix to Government Decision 2010-01-2 
(UF2009/33076/UP). “With this policy, the Government is raising its level of ambition and 
clarifying its aims concerning Swedish development cooperation in working towards the goal 
of democratic development and greater respect for human rights in developing countries.” 
Contrasting a rights-based approach and a rights-based perspective, see L. Munro, The “Human 
Rights-Based Approach to Programming”: A Contradiction in Terms? in Rights-Based Approaches to 
Development Exploring the Potential and the Pitfalls 187–206 (S. Hickey & D. Mitlin ed., Kumarian 
Press 2009). According to Munro, a rights-based approach insists that everything the organiza-
tion does be based on human rights, whereas a rights-based perspective is less absolute.
75  For instance, a key aim of Germany’s Development Policy Action Plan on Human Rights 
(2008 –10) is “systematically integrating a human rights based approach into develop-
ment.” Available at http://www.bmz.de/en/service/infothek/fach/konzepte/konzept167 
.pdf?follow=adword. 
76  See, especially, UNICEF’s rights-based approach to programming, Munro, supra note 74, 
at 193–202. For a critical review of human rights–based approaches in development, see 
M. Darrow & A. Tomas, Power, Capture and Conflict: A Call for Human Rights Accountability in 
Development Cooperation, 27 Hum. Rights Q. 471–538 (2005).
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the core UN human rights treaties. The 2003 UN Interagency Common Un-
derstanding of a Human Rights–Based Agreement77 was adopted by the UN 
Development Group (UNDG) to ensure the consistent application of a human 
rights–based approach by UN agencies, funds, and programs at global and 
regional levels, especially at the country level in relation to the UN Common 
Country Assessments/UN Development Assistance Frameworks (CCA 
/UNDAF), which were established to strengthen the coherence and effective-
ness of the UN system’s contribution to countries’ development efforts. The 
Common Understanding establishes a set of principles that guide and define a 
human rights approach; it confirms the central importance of the international 
human rights treaty framework in all development cooperation programs.78 
The secretary-general’s 2002 reform program included a decision, known 
as “Action 2,” to mainstream human rights across country programs.79 Ac-
tion 2 was followed by further reform programs in 200580 and backed by the 
commitment of world leaders at the 2005 UN World Summit81 to mainstream 
human rights within their national policies and in the development programs 
of the United Nations. Several UN agencies have led efforts to catalog their 
experiences and guidance on integrating human rights and rights-based 
approaches.82 In November 2009, the UNDG established a Human Rights 
77  The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation Towards a Common 
Understanding Among UN Agencies, available at http://www.undg.org/archive_docs 
/6959-The_Human_Rights_Based_Approach_to_Development_Cooperation_Towards_a 
_Common_Understanding_Among_UN.pdf.
78  Those principles are
   1. All programmes of development co-operation, policies and technical assistance 
should further the realisation of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. 
   2. Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide 
all development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the 
programming process. 
   3. Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacity to meet 
their obligations and/or of “‘rights-holders’’ to claim their rights.
79  Secretary-General, Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change, A/57/387 
(Sep. 9, 2002), from which the strengthening and mainstreaming of human rights in the UN 
have come to be known as “Action 2.” Action 2, related to strengthening UN support for the 
promotion and protection of human rights worldwide, was adopted by UNDG, ECHA, and 
OHCHR in 2003 pursuant to the secretary-general’s report. Its main goal is to develop the 
capacity of UN humanitarian and development operations to strengthen national human 
rights promotion and protection systems consistent with international norms and principles. 
See http://www.un.org/events/action2/. 
80  Paragraph 126 contains the commitment to integrate the promotion and protection of human 
rights into national policies and support the further mainstreaming of human rights through-
out the UN system. See also Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Develop-
ment and Human Rights for All (UN 2005), available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/.
81  2005 World Summit Outcome: Resolution adopted by the UN GA A/RES/60/1.
82  UNICEF Guidelines for Human Rights Based Programming Approach CF/EXD/1998-04 
(Apr. 21, 1998), available at http://www.fao.org/righttofood/kc/downloads/vl/docs 
/212951.pdf; UNDP, Human Rights in UNDP: A Practice Note (Apr. 2005), available at http://
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Mainstreaming mechanism, supported by a multidonor trust fund, to coor-
dinate UN systemwide work on human rights in development cooperation.
Human Rights Obligations as a Policy Frame
Some policies integrate human rights explicitly in terms of international law 
obligations. In these policies, human rights have potentially far-reaching impli-
cations because the policies rely on the legally binding quality of human rights 
to ground their approach, even if the references are more general and operate 
as an overall frame. For example, a tenet of the Austrian Development Coop-
eration (ADC) Human Rights Policy Document (2006) establishes “[h]uman 
rights as a normative principle, as a programming principle, and as an in-
strument for evaluating interventions.” The ADC policy states: “A stronger 
link between these two areas offers a legally based framework and a planning 
instrument for policies and programs. It steers the focus in poverty reduction 
away from the needs of the poor towards the obligations of the state and the 
capabilities/potential of citizens to demand their rights.” Like a number of 
other bilateral aid agencies, the Swedish International Development Coopera-
tion Agency (SIDA) has a well-established practice of mainstreaming human 
rights.83 In keeping with this practice, Sweden’s policy for democratic devel-
opment and human rights in Swedish development cooperation84 highlights 
the human rights perspective,85 which it defines based on the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and international and regional human rights 
conventions, and further confirms that “[a]lthough contradictions or tension 
may exist between different rights, states cannot choose to disregard certain of 
their obligations under international law.”86 
New Zealand’s International Aid and Development Agency document 
Human Rights Policy Statement (2002) and its Human Rights Implementa-
tion Plan of Action 2004–09 similarly confirm the role of donor and partner 
human rights treaty obligations in linking human rights and development. 
Likewise, the policy of German development cooperation rests on common 
human rights law obligations. Germany’s Development Policy Action Plan 
www.undp.org/governance/docs/HRPN_English.pdf. The UNDP Strategic Plan, 2008–11 
makes numerous references to human rights and clarifies the role of the program: “16. Un-
derscores that while UNDP should uphold universal United Nations norms and standards, 
including those related to human rights, UNDP does not have any normative or monitor-
ing role with regard to human rights.” UNDP Strategic Plan, 2008–2011: Accelerating Global 
Progress on Human Development, DP/2007/43/Rev.1, 4 (May 22, 2008). More generally, see E. 
Mandeville, United Nations Development Programme, in Encyclopedia of Human Rights 150 –57 
(D. Forsythe ed., Oxford U. Press 2009).
83  See, for example, Uggla, supra note 73.
84  Memorandum Appendix to Government Decision 2010-01-2 (UF2009/33076/UP). “With 
this policy, the Government is raising its level of ambition and clarifying its aims concerning 
Swedish development cooperation in working towards the goal of democratic development 
and greater respect for human rights in developing countries.”
85  See Munro, supra note 74.
86  SIDA, Memorandum Appendix to Government Decision 2010-01-2, 6.
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on Human Rights 2008–2010 highlights the shared obligations of donors and 
partners under human rights treaties:
Human rights provide us with legally binding standards to which 
we, in common with our partner countries, have committed our-
selves inside and outside our borders. We have jointly ratified inter-
national human rights treaties and so it is our joint responsibility to 
work for the respect, protection and fulfillment of human rights. By 
meeting our obligations, we want to help our partners specifically 
and effectively to meet theirs.87 
The 2011 BMZ strategy paper Human Rights in German Development 
Policy supports this view, affirming that human rights form the overarching 
framework for development policy. It states that the implementation of hu-
man rights conventions is a legally binding obligation and that this “provides 
the binding frame of reference for Germany’s development cooperation with 
partner countries.”88 
Among multilaterals, the UN system’s human rights approach89 and UN 
guidance in development activities are broadly based on human rights treaty 
obligations,90 even if the broader question of the UN’s own human rights ob-
ligations remains contested.91 A sophisticated example is UNICEF’s human 
rights–based programming approach, which treats the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) as a central programming document, relying on it di-
rectly and explicitly. In addition, although the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child is the monitoring body established by the CRC, and although UNICEF 
does not have a formal role in monitoring CRC compliance, UNICEF has, over 
time, become active in all stages of the reporting process. In this respect, the 
UNICEF example illustrates the possibility of institutional coordination be-
tween development programming and treaty monitoring activities.
The position of other international organizations has similarly signaled 
broader recognition of the role of human rights in development. The OECD 
Development Assistance Committee’s (2007) Action-Oriented Policy Paper on 
Human Rights and Development (AOPP) is predicated on a vision of human 
rights as integral to development and of human rights and equitable, sus-
tainable development being mutually reinforcing. This approach is squarely 
87  BMZ, Development Policy Action Plan on Human Rights 2008–2010, 4. The policy also includes 
a comprehensive list of human rights treaty resources (18–19).
88  BMZ Human Rights in German Development Policy, BMZ Strategy Paper 4, introductory 
summary, paragraph 2 (2009).
89  See supra note 77.
90  See, for example, UNDAF guidelines available at www.undg.org. Within the UNDG, imple-
menting a human rights–based approach to development programming is the focus of the 
Human Rights Mainstreaming Mechanism (HRM); see also the UN Common Learning Pack-
age on Human Rights–Based Approach. 
91  For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of this question in the context of the UN’s develop-
ment operations, see M. Darrow & L. Arbour, The Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Develop-
ment Operations of the United Nations, 103 Am. J. Intl. L. 446 (2009).
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based on the international human rights law framework: “Human rights con-
stitute a unique, internationally shared and accepted normative framework, 
reflecting global moral and political values. International human rights law 
has evolved to protect and safeguard the integrity and dignity of the person, 
by establishing legal obligations on states.” The first of 10 principles, intended 
to serve as a basic orientation on human rights in key development areas and 
activities where donor harmonization is of particular relevance, states: “Build 
a shared understanding of the links between human rights obligations and 
development priorities through dialogue.” 
Another acknowledgment of the place of human rights obligations in de-
velopment policy, albeit indirectly and from a private sector perspective, is the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) Policy on Enviromental and Social 
Sustainability, which is part of the IFC Sustainability Framework.92 The 2012 
policy recognizes the responsibility of business to respect human rights inde-
pendently of state duties to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights.93 In a 
footnote to the term “human rights,” the policy states that “for the purposes of 
this Policy, IFC shall be guided by the International Bill of Rights and the eight 
core conventions of the International Labour Organization.”94
Human Rights as Operational Norms in Development Policy Frameworks
Despite the broad support for human rights adduced in the policies reviewed 
above, not all such provisions translate into a reliance on human rights in a 
direct operational sense. Indeed, not all agencies with human rights–related 
policies accept that they are under a legal obligation to promote and respect 
human rights, and intrinsic arguments for including human rights in develop-
ment cooperation are not always limited to legal ones.95 Subtle differences in 
terminology are also discernible in some policies’ treatment of human rights 
in terms of responsibilities rather than in more definite legal terms such as 
obligations with specific policy consequences resulting from their invocation.
The policies of a number of agencies and institutions are distinguished 
by the strength of the legal and policy provisions integrating human rights, 
with the potential for significant operational implications. At their strongest, 
such policies emphasize human rights as a shared legal framework, highlight-
ing both partner and donor obligations under international human rights law 
and offering concrete operational entry points for their application in devel-
opment activities. 
92  http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate 
_site/IFC+Sustainability/Sustainability+Framework.
93  IFC Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability ( Jan. 1, 2012), paragraph 12, avail-
able at http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/7540778049a792dcb87efaa8c6a8312a/SP 
_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
94  Id. 
95  OECD DAC, Integrating Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, Challenges and Ex-
periences 29 (OEDC 2006), study by L.-H. Piron & T. O’Neil.
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The European Union provides an example of a policy approach connect-
ing the dictates of the international human rights law frameworks and the pol-
icy requirements applicable in development cooperation. Although its trade 
and external policies have been critiqued for internal incoherencies,96 for their 
potential negative impacts on human rights in developing countries,97 and 
for failing to fully integrate human rights, the EU has, since 1995, adopted “a 
distinct policy” on human rights in its external relations. As a result a human 
rights clause98 is introduced into all trade and development agreements with 
third countries or nonmembers,99 making the protection of human rights an es-
sential element of any trade and development agreement.100 As with a number 
of the bilateral examples discussed above, the centrality of human rights to 
EU development cooperation draws explicitly on legal commitments that are 
both internal and external to the EU itself,101 anchoring human rights opera-
tionally in development through the treaty obligations of member states.102 
Thus, Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement makes the respect of human rights 
an essential element of the agreement, basing that clause explicitly on interna-
tional obligations and commitments concerning respect for human rights.103 
96  B. Mahnkopf, EU Multilateral Trade Policy: Neither Coherent nor Development Friendly, Global 
Labour University Working Paper No. 2 (Feb. 2008).
97  J. Nwobike, The Application of Human Rights in African Caribbean and Pacific–European Union 
Development and Trade Partnership, 6(10) German L.J. 1381 (2005). Examples include the fu-
ture potential human rights impact (ex ante study) of EU economic partnership agreements 
on dairy and  honey farmers in Zambia and the right to food of milk and maize farmers in 
Uganda (2009).
98  “The essential element” of an agreement, or the “human rights essential element clause.” 
See EU Council Decision 7255/95. Human Rights Clauses in Community Agreements with Non-
member Countries (May 24, 1995). See also Commission Communication on the Inclusion of 
Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements between the Commu-
nity and Third Countries COM (95) 216 (May 23, 1995). 
99  M. Cremona, Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EC’s Trade Agreements, in The Euro-
pean Union and World Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay Round (N. Emiliou & D. O’Keefe ed., 
Wiley 1996); E. Reidel & M. Will, Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements of the EC, in The 
EU and Human Rights (P. Alston ed., Oxford U. Press 1999).
100  See also Cotonou Agreement—partnership agreement between the EC and ACP countries, 
concluded in 2000, a revised version of which entered into force on July 1, 2008. Negotiations 
for a second round of revisions were concluded on March 19, 2010. 
101  http://www.ihrnetwork.org/eu-development-policies_215.htm. Internal commitments are 
based on the Treaty on European Union and were confirmed in the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Instrument for Democratization 
and Human Rights (2006).
102  According to the International Human Rights Network, “Human rights are central to 
EU Development Cooperation matching similar commitments to its humanitarian aid and 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The policies flow from the legal obligations of its 
Member States, as well as from EU treaty provisions which recognize human rights as com-
mon values underpinning EU partnership and dialogue with third countries.” See http://
www.ihrnetwork.org/eu-development-policies_215.htm.
103  Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement provides: 
  Essential Elements and Fundamental Element 
   1. Cooperation shall be directed towards sustainable development centered on the hu-
man person, who is the main protagonist and beneficiary of development; this entails 
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The centrality of human rights treaties is similarly reflected in the 2007 
EU European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. This instrument 
establishes a mechanism under which the community provides assistance 
within the framework of the community’s policy on development coopera-
tion and economic, financial, and technical cooperation with third countries, 
consistent with EU foreign policy as a whole, contributing to the develop-
ment and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and of respect for 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms.104 The instrument draws directly 
from international and regional human rights legal frameworks,105 and its 
aims are squarely based on human rights106 and the international and regional 
legal frameworks that enforce them.107 Other developments in the EU con-
text reveal the increasing relevance of international human rights standards 
respect for and promotion of all human rights. Respect for all human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, including respect for fundamental social rights, democracy based 
on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance are an integral part of 
sustainable development. 
   2. The Parties refer to their international obligations and commitments concerning re-
spect for human rights. They reiterate their deep attachment to human dignity and 
human rights, which are legitimate aspirations of individuals and peoples. Human 
rights are universal, indivisible and inter-related. The Parties undertake to promote 
and protect all fundamental freedoms and human rights, be they civil and political, or 
economic, social and cultural. In this context, the Parties reaffirm the equality of men 
and women. . . . Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, 
which underpin the ACP-EU Partnership, shall underpin the domestic and interna-
tional policies of the Parties and constitute the essential elements of this Agreement. . . . 
These areas will also be a focus of support for development strategies. The Community 
shall provide support for political, institutional and legal reforms and for building the 
capacity of public and private actors and civil society in the framework of strategies 
agreed jointly between the State concerned and the Community. 
104  Regulation (EC) No. 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 
20, 2006, on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human 
rights worldwide, 29.12.2006 EN Official J. of the European Union L. 386/1.
105  Paragraph 7 provides: “The Community’s contribution to the development and consolida-
tion of democracy and the rule of law, and of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms is rooted in the general principles established by the International Bill of Human 
Rights, and any other human rights instrument adopted within the framework of the United 
Nations, as well as relevant regional human rights Instruments.”
106  Paragraph 2(a) provides: “Such assistance shall aim in particular at (a) enhancing the re-
spect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as proclaimed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international and regional human rights 
instruments.” 
107  Paragraph 2(b) provides: “Such assistance shall aim in particular at (a) enhancing the re-
spect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as proclaimed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international and regional human rights 
instruments.” However, it is worth noting that the recent EU Communication on the MDGs 
does not highlight the role of human rights frameworks in any significant way, other than 
to mention that “[MDGs] emphasize the importance of a Human Rights based approach to 
development.” European Commisssion, A Twelve-Point EU Action Plan in Support of the Mil-
lennium Development Goals, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Regions, 6 (2010). See also Annual 
Action Programme 2011 for the European Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and 
Human Rights Worldwide (EU Commission Mar. 29, 2011).
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in fostering sustainable development in EU trade policy. Examples include 
the European Parliament resolution that encourages greater cooperation at 
the multinational level between the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
main UN institutions in the human rights field. This resolution states that the 
Parliament considers that closer links with the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights via special procedures would be par-
ticularly useful to provide a multilateral trade framework that would enhance 
respect for human rights and considers, similarly, that the high commission’s 
expertise could be taken into account by WTO panels and the appeals body 
when cases of serious breaches of human rights are observed. In addition, the 
Parliament’s resolution considers that the Human Rights Council’s universal 
periodic review should be a useful tool to monitor compliance with human 
rights provisions in international trade agreements and supports the practice 
of including legally binding human rights clauses in the EU’s international 
agreements.108 
The EU development policy landscape was further defined by new poli-
cies on the future of development policy and the instrument of budget support 
in October 2011. Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for 
Change seeks to focus aid on fewer countries and fewer sectors while prioritiz-
ing human rights, democracy, and other key elements of good governance.109 
The EU Commission’s 2011 position on budget support to third countries110 
reiterates the linkage between human rights and development, indicating that 
its proposed approach “would lead to enhanced importance of human rights, 
democracy and good governance trends in determining the mix of instru-
ments and aid modalities at country level.”111 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) provides another example of broad 
legal and policy commitment to human rights. As an EU institution, EIB is 
bound by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and takes the charter as 
a point of departure.112 EIB policy integrates an approach to human rights 
focused on respect for environmental, social, and economic rights and takes 
108  European Parliament resolution of November 25, 2010, on human rights and social and en-
vironmental standards in international trade agreements (2009/2219 [INI]). For a critical 
view of the traditional models on the value added of human rights in trade, see A. Lang, The 
Role of the Human Rights Movement in Trade Policy-Making: Human Rights as a Trigger for Policy 
Learning, 5 New Zealand J. Pub. Intl. Law. 77–102 (2007).
109  European Commission, Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change 
(EU Commission Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/devel 
opment-policies/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf.
110  European Commission, The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries (EU 
Commission Oct. 13, 2011).
111  The policy provides that “the EU should assess whether pre-conditions exist to entrust Good 
Governance and Development Contracts to a partner country, i.e.; whether fundamental 
values of human rights, democracy and rule of law or a clear path towards international 
standards exist and whether such a Contract could clearly act as a driver to accelerate this 
movement.” 
112  http://www.eib.org/about/news/business-and-human-rights.htm.
The World Bank Legal Review142
human rights considerations into account in its project evaluations. The EIB is 
reviewing its existing project social performance standards in light of the prin-
ciples of the UN Respect, Protect, and Remedy framework113 and will update 
existing project guidelines and operational practices based on the outcome of 
that review.
The direct links between human rights and development frameworks are 
evident in the 2005 framework document of the New Economic Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),114 which contains several references to hu-
man rights as a foundation,115 objective, and responsibility of the mechanism. 
It recognizes that “development is impossible in the absence of true demo- 
cracy, respect for human rights, peace, and good governance.”116 The African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM),117 which operates as part of the NEPAD, 
links the final stage of its review to existing human rights mechanisms such 
as the African Commission on Human Rights.118 In this, the African-led policy 
is an example of a framework that explicitly links development with human 
rights and human rights obligations as well as the regional institutional mech-
anism that monitors them.119 
Some donors specify that human rights obligations operate as minimum 
legal standards against which their development activities are judged for con-
sistency. In these instances, human rights treaty obligations are operationally 
connected with the core of development cooperation policies and activities. An 
example of this is Canada’s 2008 Official Development Assistance Account-
ability Act, which contains a human rights clause requiring development op-
erations financed by Canada to be consistent with international human rights 
standards.120 
113  See infra note 164.
114  http://www.nepad.org/home/lang/en.
115  Id., paragraph 180. The NEPAD has, as one of its foundations, the expansion of democratic 
frontiers and the deepening of the culture of human rights. A democratic Africa will become 
a pillar of world democracy, human rights, and tolerance. The resources of the world cur-
rently dedicated to resolving civil and interstate conflict could therefore be freed for more 
rewarding endeavors. 
116  Id., paragraph 79.
117  An important accountability-related mechanism to the NEPAD, the APRM is an instru-
ment voluntarily acceded to by member states of the African Union (AU) as an African self- 
monitoring mechanism. The APRM is central to the NEPAD process for the socioeconomic 
development of Africa.
118  The APRM base document, available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/aprm/docs 
/book3.pdf, Article 25, states: “Six months after the report has been considered by the Heads 
of State and Government of the participating member countries, it should be formally and 
publicly tabled in key regional and sub-regional structures such as the Pan-African Parliament, 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the envisaged Peace and Security 
Council and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) of the African Union.” 
119  See analogies with the IDB policy linkages to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
discussed in the subsection References to Human Rights.
120  Canada, 2008 Official Development Assistance Accountability Act, which came into force on 
June 28, 2008, states in Section 4(1): “Official development assistance may be provided only if 
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The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) adopts 
a similar approach, establishing direct operational implications for human 
rights obligations in development activities. Unlike other multilateral devel-
opment banks (MDBs), the Agreement Establishing the EBRD sets forth a po-
litical mandate for the EBRD to further the transition to multiparty democracy 
and to encourage a respect for human rights, making an explicit provision for 
human rights in its preamble.121 Thus, “the preamble and the phrasing of Ar-
ticle 1 seem to imply that the founding members expected that the EBRD in its 
operations would be sensitive to the human rights of residents in the countries 
of its operation.”122 Building on its foundational agreement, the EBRD’s 2008 
Environmental and Social Policy incorporates human rights as a minimum 
standard defined in accordance with human rights instruments. “The EBRD 
will not knowingly finance projects that would contravene obligations under 
international treaties and agreements related to environmental protection, 
human rights and sustainable development as identified through project 
appraisal.”123 The fact that the baseline underpinning this policy is rooted in 
human rights treaties has not insulated the EBRD from NGO criticism that the 
Bank’s commitment to human rights is weak in practice.124
A similar example is found in the Council of Europe Development Bank 
(CEB), administered under the authority of the Council of Europe, which has 
the protection and promotion of human rights as one of its principal aims. 
the competent minister is of the opinion that it (a) contributes to poverty reduction; (b) takes 
into account the perspectives of the poor; and (c) is consistent with international human 
rights standards.”
121  The preamble of the agreement establishing the EBRD provides that contracting parties are: 
   [c]ommitted to the fundamental principles of multiparty democracy, the rule of law, re-
spect for human rights and market economics; . . . Welcoming the intent of Central and 
Eastern European countries to further the practical implementation of multiparty de-
mocracy, strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights and their willingness to implement reforms in order to evolve towards market-
oriented economies. 
  Article 1 provides:
 Purpose
   In contributing to economic progress and reconstruction, the purpose of the Bank shall 
be to foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and to promote 
private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central and Eastern European countries 
committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and mar-
ket economics.
122  A. McAuley, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in Oxford Encyclopedia of 
Human Rights vol. 2, 169, 171 (D. Forsythe ed., Oxford U. Press 2009).
123  EBRD, Environmental and Social Policy, paragraph 9. Paragraph 37 specifies that EBRD’s 
country and sector strategies should summarize the principal environmental, human rights, 
gender equality, and other social issues in the relevant country or sector and sets out the 
EBRD’s proposals for taking these issues into account in its operations, where appropriate. 
See http://www.ebrd.org/pages/about/principles/sustainability/policy.shtml.
124  For a brief discussion of such critiques, see A. McAuley, The European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, in Oxford Encyclopedia of Human Rights 172 (D. Forsythe ed., Oxford U. Press 
2009).
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The CEB is institutionally grounded in human rights, and the secretary gen-
eral of the Council of Europe is required to review all project applications to 
assess whether they conform to the political and social aims of the Council 
of Europe. Thus, the CEB’s human rights framework includes loan regula-
tions that require projects to conform to provisions of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European 
Social Charter. 125 In addition, the CEB Environmental Policy, which describes 
the environmental and social principles that guide its project-related opera-
tions, connects socially and environmentally sustainable development to hu-
man rights and mandates that “the CEB will not knowingly finance projects 
which are identified as undermining human rights.”126 In a similar vein, albeit 
domestically rather than externally focused, the Council of Europe Parliamen-
tary Assembly adopted a resolution inviting its 47 member states to be guided 
by OHCHR’s 2006 Principles and Guidelines on a Human Rights Approach to 
Poverty Reduction in their policymaking and budget decisions.127
Human Rights and Development: Initial Observations  
on Regime Interaction
As the foregoing review illustrates, the interaction of human rights and de-
velopment regimes is significant and increasing but widely divergent. It is 
difficult, however, to discern an automatic consequence from the mere men-
tion of human rights (or even human rights obligations) in a development pol-
icy framework. Even the adoption of a human rights policy or human rights 
mainstreaming approach does not necessarily have immediate or concrete op-
erational consequences. Not every such policy or provision requires particular 
forms of assessments or analyses, nor will each generate specific guidelines or 
parameters in financing decisions or dialogues. 
The review reveals the limited engagement of most development policy 
frameworks with human rights as binding legal obligations. In many instances, 
human rights are referred to in general or preambular terms; in others, they 
receive mention as principles or cross-cutting themes—none of which has a 
clear legally binding underpinning. Moreover, more explicit and elaborate ar-
ticulations of the links between human rights and development, such as in 
125  CEB, Policy for Loan and Project Financing, adopted June 2006 under Administrative 
Council Resolution 1495, Council of Europe, Paris, available at http://www.coebank.org 
/Upload/legal/en/ppfp_english.pdf. These CEB contractual covenants are a unique fea-
ture: CEB can suspend, cancel, and/or demand early reimbursement of a loan if a project’s 
implementation leads to a human rights violation. (See, for example, Article 3.3(g)(iii) of the 
CEB loan regulations.)
126  CEB, Environmental Policy, available at http://www.coebank.org/Upload/infocentre 
/brochure/en/environmental_policy.pdf#search=%22environmental%22.
127  Council of Europe Parliamentary Report and Draft Resolution, Doc. 12555, Combating Pov-
erty (Mar. 28, 2012), paragraph 7, provides: “The Assembly strongly supports the Principles 
and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies proposed by 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and 
invites member states to take due account of the Guidelines in their public policymaking and 
relevant budgetary decisions.”
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the declaration of the right to development and the various resolutions built 
upon it, are not legally binding. Most of the policy examples that integrate hu-
man rights obligations do so in ways confined to particular policies, themes, 
or groups, or in a manner so general that their specific impacts are hard to 
identify. The operational impacts of human rights legal obligations are only 
beginning to be explored in policies like those of the European Union or Can-
ada, where human rights obligations are operative in a direct legal and policy 
sense and they trigger some immediate consequence or action.
In addition, although the trend in both political statements and develop-
ment policies appears to be greater integration of human rights in develop-
ment policy and a gradual recognition of the potential relevance of human 
rights obligations in development contexts, the majority of development pol-
icy frameworks evidence the separability of human rights and development 
and the fragmentation of international law. 
Human Rights, Development, and the Fragmentation  
of International Law
Fragmentation of International Law: Causes and Consequences
Why are there such significant divergences and disconnects between human 
rights and development? Why do these disconnects persist when the same 
countries are parties to the human rights treaties and members of develop-
ment agencies and banks?128 The reasons are similar to those underpinning 
the fragmentation of law in general. Some practitioners opine that not only 
has there never been a single global legislature or appellate court to mold a 
unified body of law, but there has never been a uniform will for such a sys-
tem. Instead, states have implicitly or explicitly conceived of particular issues 
and problems and responded by agreeing to new laws and supporting inter-
national organizations.129 Some observers go further and argue that the “un-
wieldy and intransigent nature of regimes is often intentional and may reflect 
a wish by powerful states to protect their dominance.”130 Other reasons for 
fragmentation and impediments to coherent regime interaction include lack 
of coordination at the domestic level, states adopting inconsistent national po-
sitions across different international fora, and a lack of transparency within 
particular regimes.131
128  On the diversity of policy formulations that emanate from international organizations, see 
Alston, supra note 17, at 95–106, who argues that diversity can be explained by “a desire to 
maintain as much policy flexibility as possible. This helps to accommodate a broad array of 
approaches on the part of different governments, gives the organization itself considerable 
leeway to define or redefine its priorities, and makes it easier to move away from failed poli-
cies towards new ones” (97).
129  M. Young, Introduction, in Young, supra note 1, at 2.
130  Id., at 10.
131  Young, supra note 1, at 95.
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The specific reasons for the divergences between human rights and de-
velopment regimes are thus complex and multifaceted, varying across institu-
tions and over time.132 They are often connected with historically entrenched 
understandings of institutional roles and mandates133 and linked to the pre-
dominance of different disciplines, evidence bases, premises, and values 
within those different regimes.134 “Functional differentiation leads to path de-
pendency, higher transaction costs, ‘tunnel vision’ and even solipsistic and 
imperial tendencies within regimes.”135 The separateness may be rooted in 
legal factors, such as the emergence of the relevant frameworks at different 
times; the fact that laws (treaties) are implemented by different institutions 
with different powers of enforcement and relative strengths; the absence of a 
uniform ratification of the laws (treaties) by all member states;136 and the fact 
that the laws aim to fulfill particular sets of preferences within the interna-
tional legal system that may not be in harmony.137 
In the case of development agencies, these factors are underscored by es-
tablished legal interpretations of constitutive instruments, which in some cases 
include strong political prohibitions that have special relevance for human 
rights.138 Governments take very different positions on human rights, even 
more so when human rights are connected with development interventions 
or aid resource allocations. Indeed, the reluctance to connect development co-
operation policies and activities with human rights legal obligations may be 
attributable to the clarity, enforceability, and lack of flexibility such obligations 
impose. They may also be reinforced by perceptions of human rights obliga-
tions as less amenable to measurement or less empirically based. 
What are the consequences of such fragmentation? What practical prob-
lems or risks does it generate, and how do these translate for human rights in 
the context of development?
132  S. McInerney-Lankford, Human Rights and Development: Some Institutional Perspectives, 25(3) 
Netherlands Q. Hum. Rights 459 (2007).
133  Y. Yokata, Non-political Character of the World Bank, 20 Japanese Ann. Intl. L. 39 (1976).
134  See D. Seymour & J. Pincus, Human Rights and Economics: The Conceptual Basis for Their Com-
plementarity, 4 Dev. Pol. Rev. 387–405 (2008).
135  Young, Introduction, in Young, supra note 1, at 11.
136  See discussion of parallel membership below.
137  Young, supra note 1, at 88–89.
138  See, for example, in relation to the IBRD, I. Shihata, Political Activity Prohibited, in World Bank 
Legal Papers 219–44 (Martinus Nijhoff 2000); I. Shihata, The Exclusion of Political Consideration 
in the Bank’s Articles—Its Meaning and Scope in the Context of the Institutional Evolution, in The 
World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays 62–78 (Martinus Nijhoff 1995). Also relevant 
in this context is I. Shihata, Human Rights, Development and International Financial Institutions, 
in The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays and Lectures Volume II 553–78 (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1995), to be contrasted with EBRD, Political Aspects of the Mandate of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1991), available at http://www.ebrd.org/pages 
/research/publications/institutional/procedures.shtml, and Political Aspects of the Mandate 
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Relation to Ethnic Minorities (1991), 
available at http://www.ebrd.org/pages/research/publications/institutional/ethnic.shtml.
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Although some commentators have argued that fragmentation is inevi-
table139 and endemic to international law,140 and others note the ways in which 
it may benefit specialized regimes,141 many point to the risks of systemic ambi-
guity and incoherence. The first and most obvious consequence of fragmenta-
tion is the undermining of coherence in international law in general and in-
ternational policy coherence in particular.142 Policy coherence aims to prevent 
duplication and avoid contradiction in government policy actions by promot-
ing consistency across related subject matters and assessing the impacts of di-
verse areas of international policy on one another.143 It operates both vertically 
—ensuring that states implement treaty obligations through laws, policies, 
and processes—and horizontally—ensuring that state policies across sectors, 
departments, or ministries are consistent or compatible with one another.
Promoting international policy coherence is an objective of growing im-
portance for international development agencies and organizations. In the 
context of development, this objective aims to “ensure that government poli-
cies are mutually supportive of the countries’ development goals.”144 It implies 
“strengthening synergies and weeding out inconsistencies between non-aid 
policies and development objectives.”145 The EU has made policy coherence a 
point of emphasis in development, particularly since the Lisbon Treaty;146 in 
139  A growing body of literature is emerging on global administrative law that addresses, among 
other themes, the constraints and enduring reasons for “nonconvergence” and assesses the 
normative case for and against the promotion of a unified field of global administrative law; 
see, for example, B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, & R. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law, 68 L. & Contem. Probs. 15 (2005); and B. Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Administrative 
Law in the Institutional Practice of Global Regulatory Governance, in World Bank Legal Review 
International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance 3 –33 (World Bank 2011).
140  S. Humphreys, Technology Transfer in Three Regimes, in Young, supra note 1, at 195, citing the 
ILC Study Group, supra note 42.
141  B. Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 Mich. J. Intl. L. 845 (2004).
142  See, for example, M. Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights 106 (Oxford U. Press 2007).
143  http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,2340,en_2649_33721_35320054_1_1_1_1,00.html. This 
idea has relevance to efforts in the UN human rights mechanisms to enhance coherence 
and harmonization among treaty bodies; see UN Report of the Working Group on Harmonisa-
tion of Working Methods of Treaty Bodies ( Jan. 9, 2007); Report on Working Methods of the Hu-
man Rights Treaty Bodies Relating to State Party Reporting Processes: Note by the Secretariat, HRI 
/MC/2007/4 ( Jun. 1, 2007); and Report on the Implementation of Recommendations of the 5th 
Intercommittee Meeting and the 18th Meeting of Chair Persons, Note by the Secretariat, HRI 
/MC/2007/6 (May 29, 2007).
144  OECD, Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development, C/MIN(2008)2/FINAL ( Jun. 
4, 2008).  
145  European Commission, EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development, Commission Staff 
Working Paper (Dec. 15, 2011).
146  Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty requires that “[t]he Union shall take account of the objec-
tives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect 
developing countries.” Some observers have voiced criticism of the implementation of this 
objective, including in relation to human rights. See http://coherence.concordeurope.org 
/pdf/Concord_Report_15_AW_LORES.pdf. See also EU Report on Policy Coherence for Devel-
opment (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Publica 
tion_Coherence_DEF_en.pdf.
The World Bank Legal Review148
May 2010, the European Parliament created the Standing Rapporteur on Policy 
Coherence for Development, responsible for facilitating interaction between 
the parliamentary committee on development and other committees. Policy 
coherence for development focal points have also been appointed within the 
European Commission Directorates-General and the External Action Service. 
In 2008, the ministers of Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries issued a Declaration on Policy Coherence 
for Development, which acknowledges the increased economic interdepen-
dence among countries, as well as between development policies and oth-
er areas of public policy.147 Although it does not mention human rights, the 
declaration stresses the importance of policy coherence in achieving interna-
tionally agreed-upon development goals, including those contained in the 
Millennium Declaration,148 which includes commitments related to human 
rights. The OECD launched an international platform for policy coherence in 
development:149 “OECD countries recognize the need for greater coherence 
in policies across sectors that affect developing countries. Aid alone cannot 
address the needs of the developing world. Policies in areas like agriculture, 
trade, investment, migration and others have a profound impact on develop-
ing countries, yet they often work at cross-purposes.”
Fragmentation and policy incoherence are apposite in the context of hu-
man rights, including threats to “the quality and coherence of international 
law as a whole and resulting in serious conflicts and tensions between pro-
grammes and principles.”150 Such fragmentation has potential impacts on the 
levels of protection afforded by international human rights law through the 
emergence of “special normative regimes in various areas of technical cooper-
ation described as ‘self contained’ in order to highlight their operation outside 
the general international law.”151 This in turn potentially leads to “the erosion 
of international law, conflicting jurisprudence, forum shopping and the loss of 
legal security”;152 some argue that it undermines the international rule of law.153 
It is not inconceivable that development and human rights regimes yield 
different interpretations of the same rule of international law, which risks gen-
147  OECD, Policy Coherence for Development.
148  For example, paragraph 4. Paragraph 9 contains states’ pledge to “ensure the implementa-
tion, by States Parties, of treaties in areas such as arms control and disarmament and of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law.” See also paragraphs 24–26 and 30.
149  http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_18532957_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.
150  I. Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in The Rights of Peoples 1, 15 
( J. Crawford ed., Clarendon Press 1988).
151  B. Simma, Self Contained Regimes, 15 Netherlands Yearbook Intl. L. 111, 136 (1985); Kosken-
niemi & Leino, infra note 154, at 560.
152  ILC Study Group, supra note 42, paragraph 9.
153  M. Scheinin, Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—Conflicts 
or Harmony, in The Status of International Treaties on Human Rights 43 –45 (Venice Commission 
ed., Council of European Publishing 2006).
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erating confusion and even injustice.154 This has led some observers to point 
to the risk of a lower standard of protection due to a special regime not tak-
ing into account more detailed guidance or robust protection provided for in 
general law or by other organizations.155 Others point to the failure to assess 
human rights impacts of policy measures, noting the potentially detrimental 
consequences for human rights in developing countries.156 
The growth of development law or policy-making processes alongside the 
proliferation of human rights law and standards exemplifies the phenomenon 
of the fragmentation of international law. The growing reach of development 
policy and transgovernmental regulation157 into areas governed by human 
rights treaties increases the likelihood of regime interaction between human 
rights and development, as evidenced in the substantive and policy overlaps 
described above. The potential for norm conflict is a growing problem inher-
ent in the fragmentation of international law due to the partial and poorly un-
derstood points of convergence between human rights and development re-
gimes and the lack of clarity around operational implications of human rights 
provisions in development frameworks. This situation is heightened by the 
neglect of human rights obligations and the absence of a clear, governing legal 
baseline where regimes do interact and their norms conflict. 
The fragmentation in general and these specific consequences in particu-
lar generate a risk of accountability gaps158 for human rights in development 
processes and outcomes.159 Although rights and accountability interact in 
complex ways in any setting, and although they play an especially complex 
and dynamic role in development,160 the point here is that neglecting rights 
154  M. Koskenniemi & P. Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 
Leiden J. Intl. L. 553 (2002), discuss a range of views on the various risks of fragmentation.
155  As in the case of Van Alphen v. The Netherlands, where the partially dissenting judges inquired 
as to whether it was “permissible today for the Europe Convention on Human Rights to 
provide a lower level of protection than that which is recognized and accepted in other orga-
nizations.”
156  M. Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights 106 (Oxford U. Press 2007). See also her 
related discussion of disparate and contradictory trends in of international legal regimes and 
the need for international policy coherence; id., 150, 156.
157  Kingsbury et al., supra note 139, at 16.
158  There is a growing body of literature on the theme of accountability in the context of global 
governance and constitutionalism; see G. de Búrca & J. Scott ed., Law and New Governance in 
the EU and the US (Hart Publishing 2006).
159  On this theme as applied to the World Bank, see D. Clark, The World Bank and Human Rights: 
The Need for Greater Accountability, 15 Harv. Hum. Rights J. 205 (2002); S. Skogly, The Hu-
man Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Cavendish Press 
2001); D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF and Human Rights, 6 Transnatl. L. & Contemp. 
Probs. 48–89 (1996); D. Bradlow & C. Grossman, Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A 
New Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF, 17 Hum. Rights Q. (1995); D. Bradlow, The World 
Bank, the IMF and Human Rights, 6(1) Transnatl. L. & Contemp. Probs 48 (1996); M. Darrow, 
Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the IMF and International Human Rights Law (Hart 
Publishing 2003); W. van Genugten, P. Hunt, & S. Mathews, World Bank, IMF and Human 
Rights (Wolf Legal Publishers 2003). 
160  Newell & Wheeler, supra note 39, at 7.
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altogether in development will significantly undermine accountability. That 
is, the potential to advance accountability for development or access to re-
sources or basic services is difficult to advance in a context in which rights 
are not explicitly acknowledged. The identification of such gaps is symptom-
atic of broader concerns that exist about accountability and legitimacy in the 
context of globalization, the expansion and scope of authority of multilateral 
organizations, and the increase in numbers of NGOs.161 Thus, human rights 
accountability may be difficult to locate and uphold where human rights 
law obligations are not integrated into development policies162 in a way that 
states—as donors or clients—can pursue development activities without sys-
tematic assessments of the human rights consequences of these and without 
formal legal recourse where those consequences are negative in respect to 
both process and outcomes.163 
Arguing for Coherence Based on Human Rights Obligations 
The trend of increasingly explicit recognition of human rights obligations 
and instruments may have positive potential for human rights protection in 
development. This suggestion is supported by the increased emphasis on in-
ternational policy coherence, in particular, coherence based on states’ human 
rights obligations. Indeed, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Hu-
man Rights, adopted by states in the UN Human Rights Council, include a 
principle on ensuring policy coherence: “8. States should ensure that govern-
mental departments, agencies, and other state-based institutions that shape 
business practices are aware of and observe the State’s human rights obliga-
tions when fulfilling their respective mandates, including by providing them 
with relevant information, training and support.”164 This section assesses the 
value of coherence and regime interaction in international law in relation to 
human rights and development. It focuses on international human rights trea-
ties165 to suggest how the pursuit of international legal coherence could be 
approached and why it might benefit development regimes. 
161  R. Grant & R. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99(1) Am. Pol. 
Science Rev. 29 (Feb. 2005).
162  This point does not, however, ignore other important forms of accountability, such as social 
accountability. Nor does it assume that legal accountability mechanisms are the sole or most 
effective means of ensuring that people can claim and realize their rights.
163  On this theme, see P. Twomey, Human Rights–Based Approaches to Development: Towards 
Accountability, in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action 45–69 (M. A. Baderin & R. 
McCorquodale ed., Oxford U. Press 2007). 
164  John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Busi-
ness and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Frame-
work, A/HRC/17/31 21 (Mar. 2011).
165  In this it does not disregard the potential source of obligations in custom or general prin-
ciples of law, but focuses on treaties as the most visible and clear source of such obligations 
for the purposes of the present discussion. For a more elaborate discussion of this argument, 
see S. McInerney-Lankford, International Financial Institutions and Human Rights: Select Per-
spectives on Legal Obligations, in International Financial Institutions and International Law 239 
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Principle 8 of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
elaborates on the importance of both vertical and horizontal policy coherence 
based on government’s human rights obligations. “Vertical policy coherence 
entails States having the necessary policies, laws and processes to implement 
their international human rights law obligations. Horizontal policy coher-
ence means supporting and equipping departments and agencies, at both 
the national and sub-national levels, that shape business practices . . . to be 
informed of and act in a manner compatible with the Governments’ human 
rights obligations.”166 
Principles of international law may promote strategic regime interaction 
and advance policy coherence between human rights and development in rel-
evant ways. For instance, the principle of systemic integration,167 derived from 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,168 states that 
in addition to the treaty’s context, “any relevant rules of international law ap-
plicable in relations between parties” should be taken into account under the 
general rule of interpretation of treaties. This principle is, according to some, 
“the most influential principle in terms of reception of international law,”169 
and one that could be used more generally to argue for taking relevant bind-
ing human rights obligations into account in certain development contexts. 
In particular, this principle might support the integration of relevant human 
rights obligations at the levels of strategies, programs, processes, or projects 
as “relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties.” This 
(D. Bradlow & D. Hunter ed., Kluwer International 2010).
166  Guiding Principles, supra note 164, at 11–12.
167  C. McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 
54 ICLQ 279–320 (2005).
168  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), UNTS Vol. 1155 (entered into force Jan. 
27, 1980).
169  Forowicz, 13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Article 31:
    General rule of interpretation: 
   1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
   2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addi-
tion to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
   a. Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in con-
nexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
   b. Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclu-
sion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
   3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
   a. Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; 
   b. Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agree-
ment of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
   c. Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
   4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
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would apply only when the human rights treaty in question was ratified by 
the state involved and would be delimited also by subject matter relevance. 
Countries are both parties to human rights treaties and members of devel-
opment organizations, and what they do in each realm has potential relevance 
to the other.170 Without arguing for this principle as a prerequisite for regime 
interaction, the existence of parallel membership171 between the regimes gov-
erning human rights and development is a factor in assessing the relevance of 
human rights to development and the relationship between their norms. 
Binding human rights treaty obligations could be relied upon substantively 
and in the interpretation of a range of development measures in areas cov-
ered by a particular human rights treaty provision. In the case of ambiguity or 
conflict, a human rights treaty obligation and its accompanying interpretation 
and elaboration by the relevant expert treaty body could provide policy guid-
ance grounded in the law. Human rights offer an established legal foundation 
upon which to base international policy coherence:
The fact that both donors and partner countries have ratified the 
international human rights treaties provides a uniquely valuable  
reference point for harmonisation efforts. A mutually agreed, uni-
versal normative framework already exists, supported not only by 
political commitment, but also by the force of legal obligation. As 
well, at the operational level, there is growing convergence in the 
integration of human rights in development.172
The foregoing does not deny the influence of cultural relativism, diver-
gent interpretations of human rights norms, and differences among the social 
orders across countries and regions, which can be accentuated with respect to 
rights. In “a pluralist international society in which human rights are not pro-
tected at all or only minimally protected the social basis for global administra-
tive law based on individual rights is largely absent.”173 What is contended 
here is that the legal basis for integrating human rights into development, and 
possibly other spheres of international regulation, does exist in the shared hu-
man rights treaty obligations of states.
What are the practical benefits of such integration for development? 
 
170  On the related question of the law binding international organization as subjects of inter-
national law, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has long established that such organiza-
tions are “bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of interna-
tional law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are 
parties.” Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between WHO and Egypt, Advisory 
Opinion, 1980 ICJ Reports, at 89–90.
171  Young, supra note 1, at 94–96.
172  OECD DAC Human Rights Task Team, Human Rights and Aid Effectiveness, DAC Update 3 
(Apr. 2007).
173  Kingsbury et al., supra note 139, at 46.
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Coherence and Legal Accountability 
Some might argue that coherence is a benefit in and of itself and that it un-
derpins the international rule of law and legal certainty upon which every 
specialized body of international law depends.174 This chapter suggests that 
pursuing such coherence based on the principle of systemic integration could 
ensure the consideration of human rights treaty obligations and thereby pro-
mote legal accountability for human rights in development processes and 
outcomes. Strengthening accountability by framing development in terms of 
legal entitlements175 would help ensure that development benefits the poor-
est and most vulnerable, thereby promoting poverty reduction goals too. An-
choring relevant aspects of development regimes in applicable human rights 
treaty obligations could mitigate incoherence by providing a relatively clear 
legal and normative baseline for assessment. 
Thus, coherence around binding human rights treaty obligations would 
support states parties (whether as donors, partners, or merely members of 
development agencies and banks) upholding their human rights obligations 
and ensure accountability for human rights in development processes and 
outcomes. Such a renewed consideration of applicable legal norms could 
strengthen accountability more generally176 by reinforcing legal accountability 
in frameworks that are more usually the purview of broad policy commit-
ments, programs, and processes than of treaties.177 
Do No Harm/Do Good
A more strategic engagement of development and human rights regimes 
might ensure that development policies and activities adapt to evolving in-
ternational norms such as human rights.178 In particular, it would help ensure 
that states “do no harm” and that, at a minimum, states engaged in develop-
ment bilaterally or through multilateral agencies consider their obligations 
and endeavor not to undermine human rights standards.179 That is, the in-
tegration of relevant human rights standards based on international human 
rights law obligations could support the prevention and mitigation of undue 
174  See supra notes 153 and 154.
175  P. Gready, Rights-Based Approaches to Development: What Is the Value-Added?, 18(6) Dev. in 
Practice 737 (Nov. 2008).
176  On the theme of accountability in globalized lawmaking and the emerging principles and 
requirements of global administrative law, see Kingsbury et al., supra note 139, at 44 –45 and 
58–59.
177  International trade agreements and environmental treaties do feature somewhat more prom-
inently in development policies; see World Bank OP 4.01—Environmental Assessment ( Jan. 
1999), available at http://go.worldbank.org/RUEQVWD550. 
178  Sureda, supra note 9, at 217.
179  This point is eloquently made by Andres Rigo Sureda, former deputy general counsel of the 
World Bank: “The IBRD is rightly concerned with its borrowers respecting the treaties that 
bind them in the course of its operations. In its work, there should not be any question that 
the IBRD is bound to respect them. [It] itself should not be instrumental in creating opportu-
nities for the violation of human rights.” Supra note 9, at 218.
The World Bank Legal Review154
harm, especially of a social and environmental nature. In this, human rights 
obligations, such as the obligation to respect, would serve as a minimum stan-
dard against which development policies and activities could be assessed to 
ensure against harm in both processes and outcomes. 
An apposite example of such a standard emerges in the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on Business and Human Rights.180 Principle 13 states: 
The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business  
enterprises: 
a. Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts 
through their own activities, and address such impacts when they 
occur; 
b. Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that 
are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their 
business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those 
impacts. 
Although the principles are primarily an elaboration of business enter-
prises’ responsibilities rather than state legal obligations, they offer concep-
tual and practical guidance by analogy.
The different regimes might benefit from interaction and mutual defini-
tion. There may be potential for mutual reinforcement among norms derived 
from human rights and development regimes181 such that human rights ob-
ligations of donors and partners could inform development policy and its 
monitoring and evaluation frameworks,182 or development cooperation activi-
ties could advance the realization of human rights (particularly economic and 
social rights).183 For instance, one could argue that a state party’s obligations 
under Article 12 of the ICESCR, protecting the right to health,184 might be rele-
180  See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 164; and UN OHCHR, Corpo-
rate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretative Guide 15 –22 (advance unedited 
version, Nov. 2011).
181  See M. Robinson & P. Alston, The Challenges of Ensuring the Mutuality of Human Rights and 
Development Endeavours, in Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement 
(M. Robinson & P. Alston ed., Oxford U. Press 2005). 
182  The fact that the monitoring and internal reviews of the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP), World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) do not take the established 
system of international human rights monitoring into account is noted as a concern by P. 
Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development De-
bate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27(3) Hum. Rights Q. 755, 814 
(2005).
183  See an analogous argument on the potential for a positive role for a development agency 
(World Bank) to support the realization of the right to food. G. van Hoof & B. G. Tahzib, 
Supervision with Respect to the Right to Food and the Role of the World Bank, in International Law 
and Development 334 (Paul de Waart, Paul Peters, & Eric Denters ed., Martinus Nijhoff 1988).
184  Article 12 of the ICESCR provides: 
   1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the en-
joyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 2. The steps 
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vant to the design and implementation of a development project, program, or 
strategy in the health sector.185 In particular, Article 12 could inform both mini-
mum standards for process and outcomes by reference to the core obligation 
to ensure minimum essential levels of the right to health.186 One could argue 
further that general comment 14, issued in 2000 by the Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights on the right to the highest attainable stan-
dard of health, could provide relevant guidance to a state party engaged in 
development cooperation activities in the health sector.187 For instance, guid-
ance could be drawn from the four dimensions established by the committee: 
availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality.188 The right to health might 
inform a program’s focus on nondiscrimination and equality and the rights of 
the most vulnerable groups. It might also provide specificity in terms of both 
freedoms and entitlements, as well as precision in terms of more particular 
entitlements implied by the right, such as maternal and reproductive health; 
water; prevention, treatment, and control of diseases; and a healthy workplace 
and environment.189 
One outcome of the regime interaction described above would be to facili-
tate the adaptation of development to evolving international norms such as 
human rights. This would help “transform development priorities from being 
measured in macroeconomic terms by focusing on the needs and interests of 
specific human groups.”190 Or, to argue this point further, this would move 
development from a matter of needs and trade-offs to one of rights and obli-
gations. In this way, a more explicit integration of rights would focus on poor 
people’s ability to realize the rights to resources and enhance accountability in 
development.191 At a less formal legal level, it can be argued that human rights 
to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization 
of this right shall include those necessary for: 
   (a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for 
the healthy development of the child; (b) The improvement of all aspects of environ-
mental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, 
endemic, occupational and other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would 
assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.
185  Grover, supra note 10, paragraphs 24, 49.
186  Id., paragraph 19.
187  See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, Sub-
stantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 
12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2000/4 
(Aug. 11, 2000).
188  See also E. Reidel, The Human Right to Health: Conceptual Foundations, in Realizing the Right to 
Health vol. 3, 28–30 (M. Robinson & A. Clapham ed., Swiss Human Rights 2009).
189  Paul Hunt, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, E/CN.4/2003/58, paragraph 25 
(Feb. 13, 2003).
190  M. Koskenniemi, Hegemonic Regimes, in Young, supra note 1, at 322.
191  Newell & Wheeler, supra note 39, at 1, place accountability at the intersection between rights 
and resources.
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principles such as participation, inclusion, and transparency in respect to 
regime interaction and in the structures and processes that govern develop-
ment can promote accountability within it.192
Specificity and Technical Guidance 
In the context of development as a shared,193 stable, bounded structure of trea-
ties with substantial and in some cases near-universal ratification,194 the human 
rights law framework includes a number of key strengths. These offer a le-
gitimate195 and delimited legal and normative baseline founded on the volun-
tarily undertaken commitments of states that bind them under international 
law. Human rights treaties are binding international agreements, and, like 
trade agreements or environment treaties, human rights treaties generate le-
gally binding norms and enjoy high levels of ratification.196 However, human 
rights treaties predate many of these other treaties and have well-established 
bodies of interpretation and jurisprudence to support them. Beyond their nor-
mative power and legally binding nature, such treaties introduce a measure of 
specificity with regard to substantive and procedural standards—their provi-
sions have been the subject of extensive commentary through the interpreta- 
tions of treaty monitoring bodies,197 the individual complaints brought under 
those treaties,198 and, in the case of the regional human rights bodies, binding 
court rulings. 
In recent years, the UN human rights treaty bodies have enhanced the 
accuracy and consistency of interpretation by supporting the development of 
human rights indicators by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR).199 The framework adopted by the OHCHR offers method-
192  See, for example, Young, supra note 1, at 107.
193  AOPP, Principle 1, paragraph 40(1).
194  See, for example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is ratified by all but 
three countries in the world (the United States, Somalia, and South Sudan); of those nonstate 
parties, the United States has signed the treaty and is, according to Article 18 of the VCLT, 
therefore obliged not to act against the object and purpose of the treaty. On the role and 
strengths of international human rights treaties, see B. Simma & P. Alston, The Sources of Hu-
man Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General Principles, 12 Australian Yearbook of Intl. L. 
81–108 (1992).
195  Grant & Keohane note that the standards of legitimacy against which power wielders can 
be held accountable derive from different sets of norms, and that legitimacy derives from 
conformity with human rights norms; supra note 161, at 35.
196  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/index.htm.
197  UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/index.htm. 
198  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm. Five of the human rights 
treaty bodies (CCPR, CERD, CAT, CEDAW, and CRPD) may, under particular circum- 
stances, consider individual complaints or communications from individuals.
199  This work was initiated in 2005 at the request of the intercommittee meeting of UN human 
rights treaty bodies to help it assess the use of statistical information in states parties’ reports 
in assessing the implementation of human rights. See Report on Indicators for Monitoring Com-
pliance with International Human Rights Instruments, HRI/MC/2006/7; a report was issued in 
2011 that applied the analysis to economic, social, and cultural rights (Report of the UN High Com-
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ological, institutional, and practical considerations for the effective use of hu-
man rights indicators. The OHCHR has developed a series of indicators for 
approximately 12 human rights, covering economic, social, and cultural rights 
as well as civil and political rights.200 These indicators may be of particular 
use for development in supporting the measurement of economic, social, and 
cultural rights by charting progress, stagnation, and retrogression, as well as 
patterns of discrimination and marginalization.201 Indeed, beyond being posi-
tively received and used within the UN system, other agencies and human 
rights bodies,202 and NGOs, the indicators have been employed by certain 
governments in national development plans. 
Connected with the advances in empirical approaches and measurement 
methodology on human rights indicators and benchmarks, there is a grow-
ing body of work on human rights impact assessment (HRIA).203 HRIAs have 
been developed across a range of sectors, supporting the case for both the 
feasibility of bringing human rights law to bear in other areas of law and the 
possibility of generating concreteness and specificity to back the normative 
underpinning of human rights. In particular, such assessments advance the 
possibility of identifying rights and duties in a range of contexts and help 
specify both the human rights claims of rights holders and the corresponding 
human rights obligations of duty bearers. Such assessment can also identify 
the immediate, underlying, and structural causes of nonrealization of human 
rights, as well as offer recommendations on mitigation and approaches for 
redress,204 monitoring, and evaluation. 
Conclusions
As suggested above, the fragmentation of international law may be as en-
demic as it is pervasive, and it may even constitute a semideliberate state of 
affairs. The specificity of roles of different international regimes and their in-
stitutions should be respected for legal, technical, and political reasons; this 
may be required to afford institutions a necessary measure of flexibility and 
allow them to leverage their comparative advantages in their respective fields 
of competence. A host of legal challenges attendant on a project of pursuing 
missioner on Human Rights, E/2011/90). See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Indicators 
/Pages/documents.aspx.
200  Report on Monitoring and Promoting the Implementation of Human Rights, HRI/MC/2008/3.
201  Report of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, E/2011/90, paragraphs 23–24.
202  For example, the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency. Also relevant is the work 
on human rights benchmarks commissioned by the EU Parliament Subcommittee, Briefing 
Paper: Human Rights Benchmarks for EU External Policy, EXPO/B/DROI/2011/15, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/fr/studiesdownload.html?languageDocume
nt=EN&file=67511.
203  See, for example, S. Walker, The Future of Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade Agreements 
(Intersentia 2009).
204  Grover, supra note 10, paragraph 22.
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coherence have been expertly documented by the ILC Study Group, among 
others. These include the absence of a hierarchy among norms;205 the fact that 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not provide clear guidance 
on the meaning of “systemic integration” or on how to reconcile conflicting 
norms; and the lack of an international legislature or appeals court to resolve 
conflicts around norms and their interpretation. The questions and challenges 
arising from international bodies reviewing the actions of other international 
organizations are myriad,206 and their complexity is evident in the EU-Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights context,207 with no sense that they would be 
any less fractious or challenging in the context of human rights agencies and 
development organizations. The general limits on competences and resourc-
es of various international agencies may be heightened in respect to human 
rights obligations when institutions operate subject to political prohibitions208 
that have historically been interpreted to bar human rights considerations.209 
At a technical level, the body of knowledge on human rights measure-
ment methodology, although growing, is incomplete despite significant prog-
ress in areas such as human rights impact assessments and human rights indi-
cators. Human rights assessment itself is controversial: it is attended by risks 
of politicization, annexation, and externalization and, many argue, impossible 
to undertake in a completely neutral or objective manner. Resources are a 
relevant consideration here as well: HRIAs are costly and time-consuming, 
and monitoring and implementation require substantial institutional commit-
ments and large amounts of data. 
For development agencies that do not operate from a normative base and 
do not fulfill an enforcement role with respect to human rights norms, the fact 
that the instrumental case for human rights in development has yet to be per-
suasively established presents an additional challenge. That is, although risk-
based arguments related to “do no harm” can be made, the empirical basis for 
arguing that integrating human rights increases development effectiveness is 
less clear. This is compounded by the relatively small number of quality hu-
man rights indicators developed, the dearth of human rights data (especially 
205  ILC Study Group, supra note 42, at paragraph 31.
206  Kingsbury et al., supra note 139, at 45.
207  See, for example, C. Costello, The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: 
Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe, 6(1) Hum. Rights L. Rev. 87–130 (2006); 
T. Lock, EU Accession to the ECHR: Implications for the Judicial Review in Strasbourg, 35 Euro-
pean L. Rev. 777 (2010).
208  For example, IRBD Articles of Agreement, Article IV, Section 10, and Article III, Section 5 
(Dec. 27, 1945), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources 
/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf. Similar provisions exist in the constituent instruments of a 
number of other development banks, such as the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the African Development Bank.
209  Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights, in The World Bank in a Changing World 
Selected Essays and Lectures vol. 2, 567 (Martinus Nijhoff 1991); similarly, see Ibrahim Shihata, 
Human Rights and International Financial Institutions, in id., 553.
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in developing countries), and the difficulty of establishing causation or attri-
bution between human rights requirements and development outcomes.
Nevertheless, despite the legal, political, and practical challenges of argu-
ing for the integration of human rights obligations into development regimes, 
and despite the elusive nature of coherence in the international legal system, 
the core relevance of human rights to development must be recognized, and 
the legal treaty obligations underpinning human rights are one reason to do 
so. These treaty obligations form part of the body of evolving international 
norms that have practical relevance and legal pertinence for development re-
gimes such that the latter should interact with, and adapt to, them. Interaction 
between human rights and development regimes could be mutually benefi-
cial, potentially strengthening aspects of each regime. At the very least, hu-
man rights should not be ignored in development frameworks, in respect of 
a minimum no-harm threshold. The overall benefit of such interaction and 
systemic integration would be enhanced by accountability for human rights 
in development, at least at the macrolevel of regimes, through a more formal 
type of “hierarchical, supervisory, accountability” system210 and through alter-
native accountability models based on a more “dynamic experimentalist vision 
of benchmarking, borrowing, innovating, monitoring and mutual learning.”211
Human rights and development are inextricably interwoven, but their 
governing frameworks and regimes have remained largely separate. A grow-
ing, but as yet uneven, integration of human rights into development re-
gimes is occurring, and there is some evidence of growing recognition of the 
relevance of human rights treaty obligations in development regimes. This 
trend signals—despite the prevailing distinctions, fragmentation, and poten-
tial conflict—evidence of the possibility for strategic links between human 
rights and development regimes and the political will to forge them. The 
trend also augurs well for the possibility of mutually beneficial norm defini-
tion through regime interaction at the formal legal level in ways that both 
avoid harm and do good.
210  Kingsbury et al., supra note 139, at 58, drawing on Grant & Keohane, Accountability and 
Abuses of Power in World Politics, IILJ Working Paper 2004/7, at 14. 
211  Kingsbury et al., supra note 139, at 58, drawing on Grant & Keohane, supra  note 211.
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Legal Transplantation and Legal  
Development in Transitional China
Chenguang Wang
China claims that its legal system and the rule of law it intends to build have 
strong Chinese characteristics distinct from those in the Western world and 
closely associated with the Chinese socialist political system and social envi-
ronment.1 There is no doubt that China’s legal system and its commitment 
to building a rule of law have had a great effect on the nation’s social and 
economic development; the Chinese economic boom could not have been 
achieved without a functional legal system compatible with international and 
foreign legal practices. In this regard, legal transplantation was a useful tool in 
the establishment of the Chinese legal system.2 This chapter does not examine 
the credibility of China’s legal system, but rather proposes that the Chinese 
legal system has borrowed elements from other legal systems in order to pro-
mote its unique market economy reform and social transition in the context of 
globalization.
Legal Transplantation Is a Typical Aspect of Legal Development
A function of comparative law is to better understand and improve national 
legislative work through comparison with foreign and internal legal systems.3 
Comparison of different legal systems and the adoption of foreign law on the 
basis of such comparison or military occupation are established practices in 
  The author is grateful for Dr. Ju Chengwei’s assistance in collecting materials and offering 
valuable comments on the draft and also for Mr. Hassane Cissé’s insightful comments on the 
paper.
1  Wu Bangguo, chairman of the National People’s Congress of China, has emphasized that 
the Chinese legal system embodies Chinese socialist characteristics. In 2011, he announced 
that “China has established a legal system with Chinese characteristics” and that “we do not 
use the legal systems in some Western countries as models to cast China’s legal system with 
Chinese characteristics.” He further indicated that “we are not going to make those laws 
which exist in foreign systems but do not fit into the Chinese social environment and reality.” 
Wu Bangguo, Annual Report of the National People’s Congress’ Work of 2011, available at http://
english.gov.cn/2008-03/15/content_921044.htm.
2  Wu Bangguo has said that “we should also learn from foreign experiences in the law making 
process and adopt those experiences useful to us.” Id.
3  Shen Zongling, On Comparative Law 50–51 (Peking U. Press 1998); Konrad Zweigert & Kein 
Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law 17 (Oxford U. Press 1998); Alan Watson, Society & 
Legal Change 141 (Scottish Academic Press 1977); Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Hans W. Baade, 
Peter E. Herzog, & Mirjan R. Damaska, Comparative Law: Cases-Text-Materials 9 (5th ed., West 
Press 1998). 
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history. Legal transplantation—the movement of laws and legal institutions 
from one state to another—is central to the study of comparative and inter-
national law.4 In the midst of globalization, legal transplantation has become 
more frequent and common. The purposes of legal transplantation are not 
confined to better understanding and improving national legal systems; le-
gal transplantation also promotes the convergence, at least in some fields of 
law, of different national laws in the global arena. Legal transplantation can 
be used to improve a national legal system and to promote a uniform global 
legal framework in the areas of international trade, environmental protection, 
antiterrorism, international peace, and the protection of human rights.
The concept of legal transplantation is an ancient one. Solon of Athens 
studied laws of other Greek city-states as a basis for social reform. Aristotle 
studied more than 150 constitutions of other cities to compose Politics. It is said 
that the XII Tables, the first Roman code, incorporated references to ancient 
Greek city-states.5 While the Roman Empire declined, the conquering German 
tribes retained the Roman legal tradition.6 During the Renaissance and the 
Industrial Revolution, the use of comparative law became increasingly signifi-
cant in the rising nation-states. Even the “original” Western legal systems were 
affected by foreign law: French and German legal systems are based on the 
Roman legal tradition;7 Anglo-American law is also influenced by civil law.8 
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the emergence of the global market and 
colonization brought these legal systems to Africa, Asia, and Latin America.9 
After World War II, globalization engulfed the world. The US model of law 
and development introduced “ideal” legal models to the newly indepen- 
dent states.10 Despite the failure of the first law and development movement, 
4  Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine 
Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 839 (2003). 
5  René David & John E. C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to 
the Comparative Study of Law 1–2 (2d ed., Stevens & Sons, 1978); Andrew Borkowski, Textbook 
on Roman Law 26 (Blackstone Press Limited 1994).
6  Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law 77–92 ( Johns Hopkins U. Press 1985); M. H. Hoeflich, Law, 
Society and Reception: The Vision of Alan Watson 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1086 (1987).
7  John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western 
Europe and Latin America 10 (2d ed., Stanford U. Press 1985).
8  Watson demonstrates that Commentaries on the Laws of England, by William Blackstone, the 
founder of English law, was based on a reference to Dutch scholar Dionysius Gothofredus’s 
(1549–1622) interpretation of the Institutes of Justinian. English and American conflicts of 
law referred to Praelectines Iuris Vivilis et Hodienrni by Ulrich Huber, a Dutch scholar. See 
Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 94, 109–110 (U. Georgia Press 
1993). Jerome Frank points out that “[c]ivil law tradition has many impacts on common law.” 
He expounds on the far-reaching but often neglected impacts of civil law tradition on Ameri-
can common law in the areas of the constitution, conflicts of law, legal interpretation, and 
judicial procedure: “The influences of civil law on common law are legion. Many of them 
doubtlessly can’t be detected.” Jerome Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law: Some 
Reflections on “Comparative” and “Contrastive” Law, 104 U. Penn. L. Rev. 888 (1956).
9  David & Brierley, supra note 5, at 69–73; and Shen, supra note 3, at 75–77.
10  Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 163 (2003). 
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subsequent movements emerged with different theoretical foundations and 
strategic emphases.11 The collapse of the former Soviet Union and the social-
ist bloc encouraged the transplantation of the European and American legal 
model to East European and former Soviet Union countries as they tried to 
restructure their legal systems.12 In today’s world, no national legal system 
can be separated entirely from foreign and international law.
Many comparative law scholars emphasize the importance of legal trans-
plantation in legal and social development. Orucu states that “the movement 
of legal institutions and ideas is trans-border and such transmigration is a 
natural phase in legal development. This is both a historical and present fact 
and the future will see more of it.”13 He further asserts, “It is a truism that the 
amount of innovation in law is small and borrowing and imitation is of central 
importance in understanding the course of legal change.”14 Sacco holds that 
“borrowing and imitation is therefore of central importance to understanding 
the course of legal change.”15 Watson points out that direct transplants of legal 
systems have proliferated in human history and constitute the most important 
forces for legal development.16 Watson questions Savigny’s volksgeist (popu-
lar consciousness), the Marxist theory of economic determinacy, and Jhering’s 
and Pound’s theory of the sociology of law. He contends that the relation 
between law and society is more remote than people think and that legal rules 
are not designed for the particular society in which they operate.17 
Not all scholars recognize the important role of legal transplantation in 
legal development. Montesquieu asserts that “the political and civil laws of 
each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which this human rea-
son is applied. They should be adapted in such a manner to the people for 
whom they are framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation 
11  David M. Trubek, Law and Development in a Time of Multiple Visions: The Challenge of the New 
Developmental State, presentation at Renmin University Law School, available at http://
www.law.ruc.edu.cn/Article/ShowAritcle.asp?ArticleID=11151. Trubek states, “In the first 
moment, law was seen as a strong tool to be used by the state to shape and guide behavior. 
In the second it was promoted as a shield against state intervention and a framework for pri-
vate transactions.” The third moment is a new type of law and development in developing 
countries, exemplified by China and Brazil, which show “signs of wanting to move beyond 
neo-liberalism without simply trying to return to the developmental state of the 1950s and 
1960s. . . . The new theories stress the idea that policies must be constructed through experi-
mentation and public-private collaboration and tailored to the needs of specific industries 
and regions, . . . [and] suggest the need for variation within each nation as well as among 
them.”
12  Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality 
and the Transplant Effect, 47 European Eco. Rev. 166 (2003). 
13  Esin Orucu, Law as Transposition, 51 Intl. Comp. L. Q. 205 (Apr. 2002).
14  Id., at 206.
15  Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 
394 (1991).
16  Watson, supra note 3, at 95.
17  Watson, supra note 6 at 8.
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suit another.”18 Savigny advocates volksgeist and theoretically rules out the 
feasibility of legal transplantation. In the contemporary field of comparative 
law, Kahn-Freund and Legrand represent the opposite theory, which objects 
to the possibility of legal transplantation. They hold that transplantation is 
impossible due to ingrained differences in the systems involved—transplan-
tation does not occur at all: the product of moving a rule elsewhere is always 
something else, “not the same rule.”19 
In recent years, 
both these absolutist visions have long collapsed into a middle 
ground, densely populated by authors who reject both the sunny 
aspects of Watson’s world of ever-flourishing transplants and Le-
grand’s rejection of that vision. Much of the study has followed a 
culturalist path, under which outmoded legal formalism was re-
placed by realist, socio-politico-cultural theories that consider law 
as a living social construct. Here, legal culture was offered as a key 
determinant of the viability of transplantation; complete isolation-
ism and hermeneutical closeness were replaced by a vision of law as 
rooted in its cultural/social frameworks, but also amenable to vari-
ous influences, among them foreign ones.20 
Even those who assert that legal transplantation is the normal path of le-
gal development, such as Watson, cannot refute the effects of national spirit, 
domestic economic and social foundations, and distinct culture, religion, and 
political factors on legal development. Watson quotes Engels’ statement that 
“in a modern state, law must not only correspond to the general economic 
position and be its expression, but must also be an expression which is consis-
tent in itself, and which does not, owing to inner contradictions, look glaringly 
inconsistent.”21 Watson believes that these social factors are the cause of the 
transplantation of various forms of legal rules.22 
In the post–Cold War world, ideological barriers for legal transplantation 
may seem insignificant and legal transplantation may appear to be a common 
phenomenon. But legal systems are based on the foundation of democracy, 
human rights, and a market economy and have enforced the impulse for ex-
portation or transportation. Developing and transitional countries with newly 
developed market economies have introduced foreign laws in response to 
the pressures of economic development, democratization, and globalization. 
“To be in line with international conventions” is the accepted practice in the 
process of globalization, which encourages convergence or harmonization of 
legal systems in the areas of economic transactions, cultural exchanges, en-
18  Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws vol.1, 6 (Cosimo Inc. 2007). 
19  Margit Cohn, Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of Unreasonableness and Proportionality 
Review of the Administration in the United Kingdom, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 586 (2010). 
20  Id., at 587–88.
21  Watson, supra note 3.
22  Watson, supra note 6, at 97.
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vironmental protection, international peace, and some public law fields. The 
formation of a common market and the wide acceptance of universal values 
provide a solid foundation for legal convergence and harmonization. The 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and various foundations that sup-
port economic and social development in developing and transitional coun-
tries often require the reform of legal systems and the establishment of the rule 
of law as prerequisites for providing funds and other assistance. This obliga-
tion further promotes legal transplants from developed countries to develop-
ing countries. “However, the economic development, democratization, and 
globalization have today so sharply increased the number of legal transplants 
that at least in developing countries, most major legislation now has a foreign 
component.”23 The common trajectory of legal transplants is from developed 
and international legal regimes to developing countries. 
Thus, from both historical and practical perspectives, legal transplants are 
a common form of legal development. With the irresistible trend of globaliza-
tion, the role of legal transplantation becomes ever more significant. 
Typology of Legal Transplants 
The transplantation debate continues, on issues of form, basic conditions, ef-
fects, function, compatibility, and implementation. There is little true consen-
sus on the typology of and basic conditions for legal transplantation.
In practice, governments of different countries adopt different approaches 
toward legal transplantation because of practical concerns about national sov-
ereignty, culture, history, ideology, and social system. Support or disapproval, 
toleration or rejection, wholesale or selective acceptance, uncritical or flexible 
adoption of different types of law—legal transplantation takes diversified and 
multidimensional forms. Moreover, the social, economic, and institutional con-
texts often differ remarkably between the countries of origin and of transplant, 
creating fundamentally different conditions for effectuating the imported le-
gal order in the latter. Transplant countries therefore are likely to suffer from 
the transplant effect, that is, the mismatch between preexisting conditions and 
institutions and transplanted law, which weakens the effectiveness of the im-
ported legal order.24 Although Su Li’s concept of “indigenous legal resources” 
explains the mismatch problems from the Chinese perspective,25 an examina-
tion of the typology of and basic conditions for legal transplantation is in order.
Watson divides voluntary legal transplantation into different types:
•	 	The transplantation of original law into an uncivilized area by massive 
immigration
23  Miller, supra note 4.
24  Berkowitz, Pistor, & Richard, supra note 10, at 171.
25  Su Li, The Rule of Law and Its Indigenous Resources (China U. of Political Science & Law Press 
2004). 
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•	 	The transplantation of original law into a civilized area
•	 	The voluntary acceptance of another nation’s law by the native people 
In addition, there are other types, such as imposed acceptance, selective 
adoption, intrusion, filtration, and tacit acceptance. Watson believes that both 
the type and scale of transplantation vary and that, without specific study of 
individual cases, categorization has little value and cannot bring new ideas to 
comparative study.26 Although legal transplantation is a normal form of legal 
development, it is by no means the only form. A particular social environment 
and country-specific factors are the major determinants of the development of a 
legal system. The necessity for and inevitability of revision, adaption, and natu-
ralization of transplanted rules by the recipient country cannot be overlooked. 
Miller uses motives of legal transplantation to categorize its types. This 
categorization helps explain the internal impetus for legal transplantation in 
China. Miller believes that there are four types of legal transplantation: 
•	 	The cost-saving transplant
•	 	The externally dictated transplant
•	 	The entrepreneurial transplant
•	 	The legitimacy-generating transplant27 
This typology shifts the focus of transplantation from the donor’s per-
spective to the recipient’s perspective. In practice, “many transplants are a 
mix of the four types, and one rarely encounters a type in pure form.”28 
The Cost-Saving Transplant
Implemented to save time and costly experimentation, a cost-saving trans-
plantation “involves a drafter who when confronted with a new problem pulls 
a solution from elsewhere off the shelf of the library to save having to think up 
an original solution.”29 This type of transplantation has the benefit of speed, 
convenience, and direct application. However, it must be supplemented by a 
functional and systematic approach that is “the starting point and basis of all 
comparative law and that different legal systems can be compared only if they 
solve the same factual problem, satisfying the requirement in adequate legal 
regulation.”30 In the cost-saving approach, the prospective laws and mechan-
ics to be transplanted are analyzed and selected after it has been determined 
26  Watson, supra note 6, at 29–30.
27  Miller, supra note 4, at 842.
28  Id.
29  Miller, supra note 4, at 845.
30  Zweigert & Kötz, supra note 3, at 34; see also Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Ruling 
the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, in Constitutionalism, In-
ternational Law and Global Governance 9 ( Jeffrey Dunoff ed., Cambridge U. Press 2009); Djalil 
Kiekbaev, Comparative Law: Method, Science or Educational Discipline? 7.3 Electronic J. Comp. 
L. (Sep. 2003), available at http://www.ejcl.org/73/art73-2.html. 
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that both the donor and the recipient face similar social problems capable of 
being solved by the transplanted rules, and that the transplanted rules and 
mechanics will function in the same manner in both countries. Basing the de-
cision purely on function is not sufficient because social environments may 
differ substantially, rendering the transplant a failure. This approach poses 
difficulties that make a complete checklist for comprehensive analysis of func-
tion and social factors unrealistic.31 
China adopted this approach. It “pays attention to draw ‘international ex-
perience’ in the process [of] drafting important laws and regulations, namely, 
comparing with the relevant foreign and international laws.”32 For example, 
in the initial stage of “opening to the outside,” China had no experience in 
the area of foreign investment. To attract foreign investment and cooperation, 
the Chinese legislature reviewed laws relating to joint ventures and foreign 
investment from more than 20 countries. It borrowed directly from foreign 
and international experience in drafting its first law, the Sino-Foreign Equity 
Joint Venture Law, and thus laid the legal foundation for attracting foreign 
investment.33 To meet the needs of the increasing volume of foreign trade, 
the legislature has applied the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods to cases of international trade involving Chi-
nese parties. In the areas relating to market formation and transaction, such as 
property, intellectual property rights, securities, companies, and bankruptcy, 
the legislature has also borrowed from foreign experience. This practice has 
become a conventional and regular step in China’s legislative process—the 
legislature sends staff and experts to other countries for field study or to col-
lect similar laws for further research and adoption.34 By using this cost-saving 
transplant model, China has implemented laws based on foreign and interna-
tional laws and mechanics to foster economic development. 
The Externally Dictated Transplant
“Externally dictated transplants have become ubiquitous, particularly in 
developing countries. This kind of transplantation may involve a foreign 
individual, entity, or government that indicates the adoption of a legal model 
as a condition for doing business or for allowing the country a measure of 
political autonomy.”35 In the era of colonialism, a typical way to effect legal 
31  Dunoff & Trachtman, id. 
32  Shen, supra note 3, at 52.
33  Zhao Xin & Zhang Li, Deng Xiaoping on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Laws: A Political 
Declaration, Procuratorial Daily (Sep. 9, 2009). 
34  Li Lin, Thirty Years of Reform & Open Policy and China’s Legislative Development, 7(2) Beijing 
Union U. Rev.—Social Science, 8–10 (2009). See also the civil law section of Comparison of Ar-
ticles of Contract Law of the PRC with Relevant Foreign Contract Rules (Legislative Affairs Com-
mission of the National People’s Congress ed., Law Press 1999). This detailed comparison 
indicates clearly that, in the process of drafting this statute, the legislative body conducted 
systematic and detailed comparisons and borrowed from successful foreign practices.
35  Miller, supra note 4, at 847.
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transplantation was to dictate acceptance of foreign law. In the contempo-
rary world, adoption dictated by military occupation or colonization is rare, 
although adoption in developing counties dictated by other means, such as 
economic or diplomatic pressure, is not uncommon. China accepted certain 
unfavorable rules and conditions imposed by powerful trading partners in 
the process of negotiating for its membership in international organizations.36 
Facing an established international market and regulatory regimes, China 
had to comply with externally imposed requirements and standards, includ-
ing inspections and reviews by foreign agencies. To participate in the global 
market and export China-made products, China had little choice. Because of 
the pressure of this model, a recipient country often becomes the victim of 
economic, political, ideological, and diplomatic confrontation while reflecting 
the intrinsic demand for globalization and harmonization of the international 
legal framework; this type of legal transplantation is very common. 
The Entrepreneurial Transplant
This model refers to individuals and groups who reap benefits from investing 
in, learning about, and encouraging local adoption of a foreign legal system. 
Its success depends on an exporter willing to provide capital and an importer 
interested in the import, each side guided by what it might gain domestically 
by operating internationally.37 In tandem with China’s opening to the outside 
and economic development, economic entities ranging from large state-owned 
enterprises to small private companies want to participate in international in-
vestment and trade, resulting in direct contact with foreign companies and 
acceptance of foreign rules. For example, all Chinese companies (both state 
owned and private) must follow foreign rules when they intend to participate 
in a foreign securities market. Some enterprises directly apply foreign com-
modity standards or labor standards in order to export their products to par-
ticular countries. Products with quality below the standards of the importing 
country have no chance of entering the market; labor safety standards (such 
as safety protection and work environment) below a legal requirement in the 
importing country may result in the blockade and boycott of the exported 
products. Some scholars claim that legal transplantation through private ac-
tors, by borrowing law through private contracting, has formed another type 
of transplantation. Through the channel of contracting, private transactors 
“smuggle” law across borders.38 As a large export-oriented trading country, 
36  Pitman B. Potter, Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaptation of Global-
ized Norms and Practices, 2 Wash. U. Global Studies L. Rev. 121–25 (2003). Potter analyzes the 
demands for China to adopt the principles of transparency, uniformity, national treatment, 
nondiscrimination, and compatibility with WTO rules, as well as the demands for certain 
rules and mechanics in the areas of trade, service, intellectual property rights, foreign ex-
changes, customs, independent courts, and dispute settlement. 
37  Miller, supra note 4, at 849–50.
38  Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global 
Supply Chains as an Example, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 713 –14 (2009). 
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China has implemented this model of legal transplantation through private 
economic and cultural exchanges. 
The Legitimacy-Generating Transplant
This model refers to the process of consciously emulating the most prestigious 
foreign legal systems. Developing countries tend to regard the legal orders in 
developed countries as models to be copied. The wide acceptance in develop-
ing countries of the doctrine and mechanics of the separation of powers and 
an independent judiciary, which are deemed as legitimate legal orders by the 
people just coming out of dictatorship, is an example.39 
Different legal systems have their respective levels of prestige. “A country’s 
legal family is a significant determinant of the effectiveness of its legal system. 
Countries belonging to the English common law family have the most investor-
friendly laws, French and German civil law countries have the least investor-
friendly laws, and the Scandinavian countries fall somewhere between.”40 The 
US securities market is widely regarded as a prestigious legal regime because 
of its efficiency, flexibility, and security. In the process of drafting its securities 
laws and building its securities market, China turned to the US model. Similar 
borrowing and acceptance occurred in the areas of companies, insurance, an-
titrust, banking, and accounting. Despite the fact that the US securities market 
was hit hard by the worldwide financial crisis, because of its critical role and 
function in the international securities market, its legal regime is still regarded 
by many countries as the most prestigious legal model, even though this model 
may harbor potential risks, such as financial bubbles and speculation.
These four models focus on the motives and purposes of legal transplan-
tation. A pure form of any one model is rare in practice, and a mix of the 
four is common.41 This mix will take different forms. For example, although 
China employs all these transplantation models, its incremental approach, 
the stability required by social transition, the national independence asserted 
by China in the international community, and its unique historical and social 
backgrounds constitute a unique Chinese environment of legal development 
that is distinct from those in other transitional and developing countries. 
Legal transplantation in China may have created a new model, positioned 
within a legal framework underpinned by socialism, based on the Chinese so-
cial environment, and developed to explore the possibilities of a Chinese social-
ist market economy and the Chinese socialist rule of law. Legal transplantation 
is an effective instrument to promote a legal system with Chinese characteris-
tics that mixes transplantation models based on rational and active selection. 
39  Id.
40  Berkowitz, Pistor, & Richard, supra note 10, at 166.
41  Miller, supra note 4, at 842.
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Conditions for a Successful Legal Transplant
Simply establishing a typology of transplantation does not, of course, guaran-
tee the success of legal transplantation. No matter what type of transplantation 
is employed, the process may end in failure or with setbacks. The failure of the 
first law-and-development movement triggered reexamination of the concept. 
Trubek and Galanter offered the first critique. In 1974, they asserted that the 
movement was dead because of excessive dependence on the governments 
of newly independent states and the one-sided intention of American schol-
ars and lawyers to bring the legal order of developed countries to new states 
without considering the social conditions of the recipient countries.42 The sec-
ond wave of the law-and-development movement was initiated by neoliberal-
ism and the free market doctrine espoused by Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher. This new round took the rule of law as its banner; democracy, free 
market doctrine, and liberalism as its theoretical foundation; and the Wash-
ington Consensus as its guiding principle. The collapse of the socialist bloc 
headed by the Soviet Union cleared the way for the introduction of American 
and European legal systems into Russia and East European countries. But to 
a great extent, the results have not been satisfactory. The global financial crisis 
delivered a heavy blow to the theory and strategy of law and development. As 
a result, scholars question the credibility of the legal transplants in this mode 
and wonder how to guarantee the success of a legal transplantation, and how 
to use legal transplantation to achieve positive social effects. 
The success of a legal transplant does not depend exclusively on the 
choices of laws to transplant, on the system selected as the model, or on 
the faithful introduction of an entire system. No less important to success 
are the conditions for transplants in the recipient country. These conditions 
may already exist or may have to be created to ensure that a transplant is ac-
cepted. These conditions include internal demand for the transplant and the 
local environment, such as relevant institutions, procedures, and social factors 
that promote and implement the transplanted laws and systems.43 A friendly 
environment for transplanted laws is one in which social and popular atti-
tudes favor acceptance of the transplant, and in which there exists the capacity 
to absorb the transplant and the ability to resolve possible conflicts between 
the transplanted law and indigenous law and customs.44 If these conditions 
are absent or incomplete, no matter how magnificent the intention behind the 
transplant or how well designed it is, its final result will be disappointing. 
In the past 30 years, as China has faced numerous challenges in the tran-
sition from a planned economy to a market economy, it has experienced 
an astonishing economic boom and rapid changes in its social structure. The 
42  David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in 
Law and Development Studies in the United States, 14 Wis. L. Rev. 1062 (1974).
43  Berkowitz, Pistor, & Richard, supra note 10, at 179.
44  Zhang Jianyuan, Symptoms and Diagnosis of Legal Transplantation—Taking HIV Legal Policy as a 
Case for Study, 4 Ideological Front (2010). 
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decisive factor for such change has been the strong desire, embraced by the 
populace, the government, and the party in power, to build a “strong mod-
ernized country” and to elevate living standards. The Cultural Revolution 
brought the Chinese economy to the edge of bankruptcy; under the planned 
economy commodities were in short supply and living standards remained 
at a very low level. The populace concluded that in the wake of the Cultural 
Revolution there was a need to “shift the working focus to socialist modern-
ization and economic construction”45 and to improve living standards. Based 
on a strong consensus, the policy and practice of borrowing, introducing, and 
transplanting foreign and international law and legal systems triumphed. De-
spite different views regarding choices and modes of transplantation, consen-
sus to borrow foreign and international laws was achieved and maintained. 
By rationally borrowing and transplanting foreign laws to constitute a new 
legal system that pushes social reform and maintains the open-door policy, 
China has turned onto a new road. 
In regard to basic conditions for a successful transplant, China faces a 
complicated situation. First, as to the institutions and mechanisms that could 
facilitate transplantation, the existing apparatus, such as law enforcement 
agencies and judicial organs, has traditional ways of operating that are rife 
with defects and loopholes and often incompatible with newly transplanted 
law or mechanisms. When China introduced contracts as a means for market 
transactions, for example, organs such as the State Administration for Indus-
try and Commerce still had the mind-set of a planned economy and exercised 
their control over business contracts by requiring them to be registered with 
the administration. Second, legal consciousness in China may still lag behind 
the laws that are being introduced. Although China has made an effort to 
build a legal system and promote the rule of law, the law is not regarded as 
the predominant norm in Chinese society, and the legal system and apparatus 
are not considered the primary means for constructing a new social structure 
or solving social problems. The Communist Party and state policies (or even 
the decisions of individual leaders) continue to play more significant roles 
than the law. In the areas of rural economic reform and state-owned enter-
prise reform, policy is more effective and timely than law.46 Law is often used 
to enforce or institutionalize policy. In this regard, social and legal conditions 
are not sufficient for newly introduced laws that cannot have immediate le-
gal effects without policy support. Finally, an inadequate legal consciousness 
creates hurdles to acceptance and implementation of introduced laws and 
mechanisms. 
45  The Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (Dec. 22, 1978).
46  The Chinese Communist Party’s policy is usually carried out in party documents. For ex-
ample, to promote rural reform in China, every year’s first party document states major rural 
reform policies from 1982 to 1986 and from 2004 to 2012. Thus, the “first party document” 
is the nickname of rural reform policy. These policies often introduce new reform measures 
that do not have sound legal grounds and will push law in new directions. 
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China is in the long process of learning how to march to the rule of law. 
There are bound to be defects, problems, and loopholes in the legal system 
and in society as this process unfolds. For example, after drafting securities 
laws and regulations based on foreign models (introducing foreign law), 
listed companies with state assets are habitually interfered with by the state 
organs exercising power over them as state-owned enterprises. Based on these 
kinds of conditions, securities law and regulations operate differently than 
does the original model and their functions are very much restricted. 
Traits and Effects of Legal Transplantation in China
At this point, China has a relatively comprehensive legal system. Although 
the legal system needs to be developed and perfected, its role in promoting 
economic and social development and constructing a new legal and social 
structure is widely recognized. The system has borrowed and transplanted 
many foreign laws and legal mechanisms that have been integrated into the 
system and play a significant role in providing readily gained experience and 
shortening the process of lawmaking. Why have these transplants been suc-
cessfully integrated into the Chinese system? 
Integration of Transplanted and Aboriginal Concepts
The modern Chinese legal system is built on Western legal patterns that have 
been transplanted on a grand scale. The traditional Chinese legal system (such 
as the Tang and Qing royal codes and legal apparatus) no longer exists in 
China. Nevertheless, the legal system has maintained certain traits, including 
strong nationalist and socialist characteristics. 
The traditional Chinese legal system, which lasted for more than 2,000 
years, is an aboriginal legal system. The system was fundamentally trans-
formed due to the formation of international markets and the effects of glo-
balization. Although the legal culture and ideology of the system maintain 
a strong influence (both positive and negative), the Chinese structure and 
system have been entirely taken over. This transformation took place in the 
late Qing dynasty and early Nationalist Republic, when the royal “ancestor’s 
law and the traditional legal system” were abandoned and replaced by the 
Western legal system. Transplantation has since become a significant feature 
of the Chinese legal system.47 After the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949, the new government of China abandoned the Western legal 
pattern and introduced the legal system of the Soviet Union. This massive 
process of transplantation ended in the early 1960s, when China broke away 
from the Soviet Union. During the disaster of the Cultural Revolution, the 
legal system modeled on the Soviet example was dismantled. With the ending 
of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government led by Deng Xiaoping 
47  Zhou Shaoyuan, Chinese Legal Changes and Legal Transplantation in the 20th Century, 2 Chinese 
and Foreign Legal Science (1999). 
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decided to initiate structural reforms and open China’s door to the world. 
A policy of strengthening the legal system was begun to rebuild the ruined 
legal system. Since then, China has borrowed and introduced many foreign 
and international laws and mechanisms. Nevertheless, the dominant ideas 
in the process of transplantation are either “insisting on Chinese learning as 
the foundation and Western learning for practical use,” as introduced in the 
late Qing period, or “Chinese characteristics” (socialism under Chinese con-
ditions), used currently, in which the transplanted laws and mechanisms are 
organically combined with traditional Chinese culture, popular ideology, and 
local environments. Therefore, China’s legal development is unlike that in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the law-and-development movement 
of the 1960s, when foreign experts espoused the wholesale transplantation of 
the Western legal system. 
In the process of transplantation, China has emphasized the following 
concepts: 
•	 	An insistence on the nationalistic and socialist nature of legal develop-
ment, by which China tries to integrate transplanted laws and mecha-
nisms into the framework of the legal regime embedded in Chinese cul-
ture, particularly ideology and the dominant political doctrine.
•	 	An insistence on facing and solving real Chinese problems, by which 
China adopts a functional approach to set up clear targets for the trans-
planted laws and mechanisms in order to combine the transplanted laws 
with Chinese social reality.
•	 	An insistence on national sovereignty and the principle of “taking facts as 
basis,”48 by which China’s legislative, administrative, and judicial agen-
cies, after carefully analyzing the Chinese social environment and interna-
tional needs, have maintained their authority of initiation and renovation 
and never blindly borrowed.
•	 	An insistence on integration within the national legal system, in which 
transplanting goes through careful study and adaptation in order to make 
individual transplants compatible with other laws and mechanisms. 
This type of transplantation might be described as “selective transplan-
tation”—China has built its legal system with its own needs and purposes 
in mind. Although there are debates over the concepts of “Chinese charac-
teristics” and socialism, and these concepts do need further explanation and 
substantiation, the concepts emphasized by China have the de facto effect of 
guaranteeing the independence of the Chinese legal system and maintaining 
its distinctive traits, and therefore integrating the introduced laws and me-
chanics into the social environment and the existing Chinese legal framework. 
The unique approach taken by China to incorporating foreign elements into 
48  Gu Ang’ran, Significance of Contract Law Legislation, in Legislative Materials on Contract Law of 
China, 37 (Law Publishing House 1999). See also Li Peichuan, Theory and Practice of Chinese 
Socialist Legislation 31–34 (China Legality Press 1991). 
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its legal system represents a major innovation and has directly advanced the 
country’s economic development. As a result, China has been successful in 
avoiding an unhappy marriage of the transplanted and aboriginal systems as 
evidenced in other developing countries. This particular way of integration 
has also avoided the result of “rejection reaction”49 and guaranteed the natu-
ralization of transplanted laws while maintaining their vitality. If legal trans-
plants have played an important role in promoting social transition and reform 
in China, the above-mentioned general approaches, unique models, and tactics 
of legal transplantations were preconditions for success. 
Selective Transplantation
“Selective adoption is the process of interplay by and mixing of the interna-
tional rules and local cultural norms.”50 This concept, proposed by Potter, 
relates to the application of international rules and foreign laws in different 
countries, particularly in developing countries in today’s environment of glo-
balization. China’s legal transplantation is by no means a blind or wholesale 
form of transplantation; to a great extent, it is a transplantation based on “self-
need.” It requires that recipients scrutinize the target laws to be transplanted, 
the problems to be solved by transplanted laws, the possible social effects of 
transplantation, and the differences and similarities of the social environments 
of exporting and importing countries in order to come up with an active, pur-
poseful, and selective legal transplant. 
In the current development wave, international institutions such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund often make the rule of law 
a prerequisite of financial support and ask recipient countries to implement 
overall or fundamental legal reform. Facing such requirements, many recipi-
ent countries have no other recourse but to accept. There is nothing wrong 
with such requests, but they often overlook the internal environment of the 
recipient countries, making the countries passive in the process of reform and 
transplantation. Therefore, the transplanted laws often appear aimless or mis-
matched to local needs or environments. 
In contrast, China, in its social transition and legal development, has 
adopted selective borrowing and transplantation rather than wholesale ab-
sorption.51 In economic law, China adopted a series of foreign investment 
and trade laws and regulations when it opened the door to attract foreign 
49  Wang Chenguang, Inter Borrowing and Absorption of Legal Systems of Different Countries—An 
Important Topic in Comparative Law, 4 China Legal Science (1992). 
50  Pitman Potter, Selective Adoption and Institutional Capacity Building: Methods of Applying In-
ternational Rules under the Impacts of Globalization, in The Hypothesis of “Selective Application” 
and China’s Legal Practice 2 (Pitman Potter & Gu Xiaorong ed., Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences Press 2009). 
51  Pitman Potter, Selective Adaptation of Economic Governance Norms in China: Transparency and 
Autonomy in Local Context, in Pitman & Gu Xiaorong, id., at 30. Chen Yun, On the Approaches of 
China’s Rule of Law Resources, in Legal Transplantation and Legal Naturalization 298 (He Qinhua 
ed., Law Publishing House 2001). 
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investors and businesses. At the same time, China made a number of rules in 
the areas of foreign currency exchange, choices of laws, and management of 
joint ventures in order to maintain autonomy in conducting foreign trade. In 
the political field, China emphasizes its socialist nature and the Communist 
Party’s leading role and rejects the doctrine of separation of powers while 
it explores efficient means of restricting power, actively borrows and intro-
duces foreign laws of legal supervision and control of governmental power, 
and sets up anticorruption bureaus in the procuratorial organs. In the process 
of judicial reform, China has pushed for adjudicative reform based on the ad-
versarial model of common law while hesitating to adopt fully the principle 
of judicial independence; it introduced the reform of evidence rules based on 
the foreign evidence structure; and it actively promoted China’s guiding case 
system, based on the pattern of case law.52 These selective and adapted trans-
plants play effective and practical roles with clear purposes in the incremental 
process of reform. 
Openness and Tolerance for Transplanted Laws
Chinese reform has another characteristic: to allow a “bold charge” (da dan 
chuang),53 even new methods may be incompatible with the current rules. 
Generally speaking, Chinese reform adopts an incremental approach and fol-
lows a piecemeal path, but it also encourages bold experiments and tolerates 
failures,54 including in the process of legal transplantation. 
In the aspects of structure and legal framework, particularly in the area of 
reforming concrete rules and institutes, the bold introduction and transplanta-
tion of foreign effective laws and mechanisms have been a regular practice in 
pushing legal reform. Theoretically, there is a consensus that “borrowing and 
absorbing foreign laws cannot take the distinction of capitalism and socialism 
as a standard for borrowing and absorbing, but take the functional approach 
as standards to test whether the borrowing and absorbing is conducive to so-
cial reform and economic development or not.”55 
Transplants of concrete rules and mechanisms have affected many areas 
of the law. In the field of civil law, transplants have included the right to 
privacy, spiritual damages, and the principle of changing situations; in the 
criminal field, presumption of innocence, exclusion of illegal evidence, and 
evidence rules; in the administrative law field, administrative litigation, ad-
ministrative permission, and protection of private information; and in the 
52  Detailed reform is demonstrated in Supreme People’s Court, The Third Five-Year Reform Pro-
gram of the People’s Courts (Mar. 2009). See also Xia Jinwen, Contemporary Chinese Judicial Re-
form: Achievements, Problems and Future—An Analysis of People’s Courts, 1 China Legal Science 
(2010); Huang Zaizai, On Legal Transplantation and Establishment of China’s Case Law System, 4 
Shanghai Carders Management College of Pol. & L. Rev. (2002). 
53  The phrase “bold charge” was used by Deng Xiaoping when he made his famous visit to 
Shenzhen and encouraged further reforms in 1991. 
54  Cao Ying & Hu Liguo ed., Xiaoping’s Centenary 551 –52 ( Jinghua Press 2004). 
55  Wang, supra note 49. 
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commercial and economic law field, company law, anti-unfair competition, 
protection of consumer rights, intellectual property rights, and the stock 
market. In the social protection field, a social security and social insurance 
system is garnering attention.56 
The Chinese model of legal transplantation has had significant impacts 
on social transition and economic development. It facilitates the integration of 
the existing system with the transplanted system by reducing the conflicts be-
tween them; at the same time, it exerts enormous momentum for social transi-
tion. A good example is in the field of foreign investment: China has success-
fully introduced many foreign laws and at the same time kept transplanted 
laws compatible with society. Thus, the transplanted laws and mechanisms 
maintain their vitality and effectiveness in the Chinese environment while 
promoting the transformation of the old legal and social systems. This model 
creates a vital framework that is capable of accommodating the contradictions 
of innovation and status quo and of reform and stability. 
The Chinese model promotes a mixed legal system. China’s current legal 
system is an open system that has absorbed positive experience from many 
foreign and international systems. It is based on a continental legal tradi-
tion and actively borrows from the common law tradition, for example, in 
the fields of commercial law and banking law. This mode of transplantation 
implements the cost-effective formation of a modern legal system in line with 
international practice and development in other countries. Legal transplanta-
tion has the advantage of providing legal rules more advanced than existing 
ones in developing countries. Rather than following the conventional method 
of going through all the developmental stages, legal transplantation may help 
a developing country effectively and efficiently upgrade its old-fashioned 
system. When China started to foster social reform and economic develop-
ment, it could not wait for slow autogenous development but looked at more 
advanced systems with experience in the market economy; nor could it ac-
cept the wholesale transplantation of foreign legal systems. By using this new 
innovative method of legal transplantation, China adopted market rules and 
mechanisms that have proved successful in other countries and successfully 
built a new market system and developed new market behavior patterns. 
The Chinese model pushes social reform and development. Chinese legal 
transplantation is never made without a clear purpose; therefore, legal trans-
plantation is always directed toward tackling particular problems or issues. 
This problem-oriented approach is based on social reality and effectively 
56  See Chen Xiaojun, On Contract Law Evolution in China, 6 Commercial L. Research (1999); Yu 
Guohua, On Comparative Study of China’s Contract Law, 2 Exploration (2000); Li Xiaoming, 
On the Presumption of Innocence Principle and Its Legislation, 6 China Prosecutor (2005); Wu 
Weishan, Calling for Legislative Efforts for Presumption of Innocence, 7 People’s Forum (2005); 
Wei Zong, Major Points of Administrative Litigation Law, 6 China Legal Science (1988); Ren 
Erxin, Economic Analysis of Commercial Legislation in China, 2 Gansu College of Pol. & L. Rev. 
(2001); Chen Yadong, Several Important Issues in Social Insurance Law Making, 6 Social Protec-
tion Research (2009). 
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plants the transplanted rules in Chinese soil. The function and potential 
effect of facilitating social development are embedded at the beginning of any 
process of transplantation. 
Conclusion
Although some scholars claim that “the amount of innovation in law is small 
and borrowing and imitation is of central importance in understanding the 
course of legal change,”57 China’s experience shows that legal transplantation 
as a means of legal reform and development requires innovation: innovation 
in the methods and ways of transplantation, and innovation in the content of 
transplanted laws and mechanisms to ensure that they fit into the recipient le-
gal system. Legal transplantation is conducted not for the transplantation per 
se but for social development. The Chinese approach toward legal transplan-
tation and the selective strategy of transplantation constitute an innovative 
model that enables the recipient legal system to be reformed and revitalized, 
which in return empowers society to accept successful experience from other 
countries and to rise to the challenges of social transition, modernization, and 
globalization.
57  Orucu, supra note 13.
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Rule of Law as a Watermark
China’s Legal and Judicial Challenges
Stéphanie Balme
Because the law and legal systems are crucial in promoting business interac-
tions in the course of globalization, one might well ask, what is the status of 
the law and the legal system in China, the world’s second-biggest economy?1 
This chapter answers that question by examining the major turning points 
in Chinese legal theory and legal practices since the 1990s, when China be-
came a global economic and political actor. It covers some of the major ac-
complishments of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the end of the 
Mao era and the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s “open door policy” in 1978 and 
after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Under 
Deng Xiaoping, law reforms legitimized the process of economic change. The 
legal framework affected business growth, while China’s wealth helped build 
a modern court system. Generally, access to justice for ordinary citizens is bet-
ter today than ever before in Chinese history.
After three decades, reform objectives have evolved from quantitative 
reforms to more qualitative reforms. This chapter explores some of the key 
constraints and challenges facing China today in terms of legal and judicial 
practices. The lack of guarantee to a fair trial is a recurring concern. One might 
well ask if Chinese law is inherently unfair because it denies due process or be-
cause of deficient enforcement mechanisms. Reform of China’s legal and judi-
cial systems relies on a balance among the country’s ruling party and various 
legal groups with diverging opinions and standards. Supremacy of the con-
stitution, the law in action rather than in statutes, and legal certainty are fun-
damental challenges in building a rule of law in China. Legal certainty refers to 
clarity, predictability, and fairness in the implementation of legal rules. New to 
China’s legal tradition, this Western standard has been translated into Chinese 
( falü quedingxing) even though it does not yet have a legal recognition. 
  The author wishes to thank Professor Wang Chenguang (Tsinghua University), Ms. Marina 
Lou, and M. Can Zhao (Sciences Po Paris) for their comments on an earlier version of this 
chapter. The author is entirely responsible for its final content.
1  World Bank, Doing Business (World Bank 2004).
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From Laws of Power to the Power of the Law?
The difficulty in establishing a genuine and innovative rule of law in China 
can be explained by the fact that, at the conceptual level, traditional law has 
been repeatedly rejected by China’s own lawmakers. The modern law that 
exists is a combination of a system influenced by Western legality,2 the Maoist 
legacy (a combination of Stalinist theories with Chinese characteristics), and 
traditional legal reasoning as well as modern court practices.
After the establishment of the PRC in October 1949 by Mao Zedong, a 
Soviet-style revolutionary regime of criminal justice was implemented. The 
new government regarded the existing system of law as a straitjacket that aided 
criminal suspects and in turn restricted its own prosecutorial powers. The anti- 
rightist movement in 1957, which witnessed the persecution of hundreds of 
thousands of people, further marginalized the role of law in society. In 1959, 
the Ministry of Justice was abolished. During the Cultural Revolution, from 
1966 to 1976, the poorly shaped legal system, which lacked fundamental stat-
utes such as criminal law, civil law, and administrative law, was almost entirely 
abolished. Only after the disastrous Cultural Revolution did reformist leader 
Deng Xiaoping use law to promote his policies: legal changes in China in 1978 
were a technical response as well as a political answer to the fragmentation of 
the state under Mao. This is the point at which China began to take the role 
of law seriously and to embark on the current process of legal construction.3
In assessing China’s main achievements in terms of legal and judicial 
developments since 1978, this chapter focuses on two areas: the legislative 
arena and access to justice. Compared to the anarchical and rigorous charis-
matic rule of the Maoist period, modern law has become, at least in theory, a 
legitimate instrument of public action both for authorities and for civil soci-
ety. To use Max Weber’s typology, China has moved from a charismatic type 
of authority to a more rational-legal authority where legitimacy derives from 
the existence of a legal order. However, as shown in this chapter, the rheto-
ric of the rule of law is often confined to a formula of legal positivism, or 
pure theory.
Important New Regulatory Policies
The development of China’s current legal system dates to the late 1970s. The 
founding text is a speech given by Deng Xiaoping on December 13, 1978, an-
nouncing the “policy of opening up,” as well as the official communiqué of 
December 22, 1978, published at the end of the third plenary session of the 
11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This com-
muniqué formally abolished the dominant party policy of class struggle and 
2  Philip C. Huang, Chinese Civil Justice: Past and Present (Rowman & Littlefield 2010). 
3  See Wang Zhenmin & Li Zhenghui, The Rule of Law History, Theory and Criticism, 80(6) L. & 
Phil. Lib. 647–70 (2007).
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the orthodox Marxist conception of law, according to which law is an instru-
ment of bourgeois or proletarian dictatorship. 
The period between 1978 and 1982 marked a transition in terms of the 
Chinese legal system. The CCP clearly controlled the legal reform agenda. 
With the trial of the Gang of Four (November 1980 to January 1981), the new 
regime demonstrated its willingness to use legal instruments for dispute reso-
lution (despite clear flaws in the trial, such as insufficient legal representa-
tion, evidence errors, and political instruction to the special court). The work 
carried out since then has been considerable: restoration of the Ministry of 
Justice, rehabilitation of victims of the Cultural Revolution and the antiright-
ist movement, and enactment of a new constitution, followed by a decade 
referred to by some Western academics as “legal bulimia.”
The Struggle between Two Philosophies: Rule by Law and Rule of Law
The idea of “rule by law” gradually emerged as the nation transformed from a 
planned economy to a state market economy. The fifth National People’s Con-
gress (NPC) adopted the current constitution of the PRC on December 4, 1982. 
Comprising 138 articles, the constitution reflects a major change that shifts 
the primary task of the state from a class struggle to economic development 
and social reform. It stipulates the objectives of the state, the fundamental po-
litical and economic systems of the country, a list of basic citizens’ rights, and 
the structure and power of the political regime.
In June 1985, the first of a series of educational campaigns on the “popular-
ization of the law” (pufa) was launched with the idea of creating a Chinese “so-
ciety governed by law” ( fazhi shehui) and not “rule by men” (renzhi). The main 
slogan was a call to “reinforce the legal system and improve legislative qual-
ity” ( jianquan de lifa zhidu yu hao de lifa zhiliang). In the 1990s, China adapted 
many international economic and trade laws with a view to the country’s ac-
cession to the WTO. Over a period of more than 20 years, a genuine system 
of economic and trade laws was thus instituted. Until 2004, constitutional 
amendments were concerned almost exclusively with changing the orthodoxy 
of economic matters: namely, the diversification of property rights (1988), the 
establishment of a socialist market economy (1993), the acceptance or recogni-
tion of the individual and semiprivate economy (1999), and the recognition of 
private property rights (2004).4 
Moreover, based on previously existing contract laws, the 1999 economic 
contract law (symbolically promulgated on October 1, the date of the found-
ing of the PRC) further validated the principles of autonomy, freedom, and 
equality of contracting parties. The law is voluminous (more than 400 arti-
cles) and was rapidly disseminated in consideration of investors, particularly 
4  See also Donald Clarke, Peter Murrell, & Susan Whiting, The Role of Law in China’s Economic De-
velopment, available at http://econweb.umd.edu/~murrell/articles/ChinaInstitutions.pdf. 
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foreigners.5 Contract law is now involved in almost every commercial transac-
tion in China. Article 26 gives contracting parties the right to request adjust-
ment or even rescission of a valid contract but also sets up strict precedents. It 
aims to bring more certainty to an uncertain economic situation, stating: 
After a contract is legally formed, in view of objective circumstances 
not anticipated by the parties when the contract was formed, caused 
neither by force majeure nor commercial risks, and significant 
changes occur such that continuing the performance of the contract 
is unfair and inequitable to one party or the objective of the con-
tract cannot be fulfilled, then a party or both parties may request the 
People’s Court to modify or rescind this contract. 
Ten years later, in the aftermath of the international economic crisis, the 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued a judicial interpretation of the 1999 eco-
nomic contract law to provide guidance on the right to rescind or modify a 
contract when a “fundamental change of circumstances” has occurred.
A New Objective: “An Administration Based on Law”
Between the mid-1980s and China’s entry into the WTO in December 2001, the 
government focused on enhancing the administrative law system to control 
governmental authority, which had previously been unlimited, and on adapt-
ing the legal system to comply with international norms. This period saw the 
re-emergence of administrative law and use of the slogan “an administration 
based on law” ( yifa xingzheng). By the mid-1990s, theories on administrative 
law were said to be “exploding,”6 with the appointment of more administra-
tive law professors and the founding of the National School of Administration 
(now called the Chinese Academy of Governance). 
In April 1989, a new administrative litigation law allowed citizens and 
all legal persons to bring legal challenges against “specific administrative 
actions.” Through the mid-2000s, various regulations were passed to allow 
administrative sanctions, such as the Regulations on Public Security Manage-
ment and Sanctions (Zhi’an guanli chufa tiaoli), and to restrict the power of 
administrative organs. Passed in the mid-1990s, the State Compensation Law 
(Article 2) states: 
Where State organs or State functionaries, in violation of the law, 
abuse their functions and powers infringing upon the lawful rights 
and interests of the citizens, legal persons and other organizations, 
thereby causing damage to them, the victims shall have the right to 
State compensation in accordance with this Law.7 
5  Available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/.
6  See Zhang Li, Le contrôle juridictionnel de la légalité des actes administratifs en Chine: Eléments 
d’analyse comparée des contentieux administratifs chinois et français (Bruylant 2010).
7  http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=109. 
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Other notable laws were the Law on Administrative Punishments (1996), 
the Law on Administrative Supervision (1997), the Implementation Regula-
tions (2004), and the Administrative Licensing Law (2004).8 
In ancient China, people beat a drum outside the government offices ( ya-
men) to start litigation, to petition a visiting imperial envoy, or “to appeal to 
the emperor” ( gao yu zhuang). As recently as a few decades ago, the petition 
system had not been standardized. Under Mao, the government developed 
a comprehensive network of agencies, the xinfang (letters and visits) offices, 
throughout the county, as well as a petition system (shangfang). These mecha-
nisms were “to petition the government for a redress of grievances by means 
of letters (xin) or visits ( fang),” according to Isabelle Thireau and Hua Linshan.9
The xinfang system today looks different. Under Mao, only people defined 
as “legitimate” could express grievances. Nowadays, the xinfang offices must, 
in principle, allow anyone to exercise his or her constitutional rights. Also, 
under Mao, the petition system mostly involved the denunciation of enemies 
and counterrevolutionaries. Now, it aims to maintain social stability by com-
pensating people and solving people’s problems. In May 2005, a principle of 
“solving problems at the grassroots level” (ba xinfang wenti jiejue zai jiceng) was 
adopted. For the first time, an individual or organization could not retaliate 
against petitioners; if it did, it would face legal action. Although there has 
been an increase in the number of petitioners (12.72 million letters, calls, or 
visits in 2003, for example) and a growing number of visits, the success rate 
(in terms of petitioners’ cases being accepted) for these visits has always been 
low, less than 1 percent, according to unofficial statements.
In the wake of Li Maorun v. Langzhong Police Station in 2001, citizens can 
sue local governments for actions in violation of their rights, including ad-
ministrative punishments, administrative coercive measures, interference 
with the operation of enterprises, refusal to take action or perform an obli-
gation, unlawful demands for performance of duties, and violations of indi-
vidual rights or property rights. Cases commonly involve encroachment by 
the government on the interests and rights of ordinary citizens, inadequate 
compensation for land appropriation, illegal land seizures, and expropriation 
or house demolition. Since the mid-2000s, administrative litigation and land-
mark cases involving the government have increased as citizens become more 
comfortable using legal measures to protect their property from government 
violation. 
The relationship between the xinfang system and the judicial system re-
mains unclear. In 2011, it is still difficult for the judiciary to give transparent and 
consistent judgments or efficient enforcement. Judicial review of government 
action is not permitted in situations of “national defense,” a loosely interpret-
ed concept, or foreign affairs. In addition, judicial review is not permitted for 
8  See Chen Jianfu, Chinese Law: Context and Transformation 207–60 (Martinus Nijhoff, Brill 
Academic 2008).
9  Isabelle Thireau & Hua Linshan, Les ruses de la démocratie: Protester en Chine (Le Seuil 2010).
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“abstract administrative action,” which refers to rule and policy-making activ-
ities. The relationship between the state and citizens in public administration 
is still problematic in terms of not being regulated by due process. 
A Growing Recognition of Labor and Economic Rights
By the late 1990s, restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had led to 
the closure, merger, or privatization of underperforming SOEs and the laying 
off of more than 30 million workers (xiagang zhigong). Although various ar-
rangements were made for the laid-off workers (for example, buying out em-
ployment, reducing salaries, and providing assistance for self-employment), 
the smashing of the “iron rice bowl” (i.e., job security and guaranteed ben-
efits) triggered massive labor disputes and unrest.
Scholars and think tanks developed a five-year program (1996–2001) for 
the government with the objective of developing labor protection laws in the 
new market situation. The Labor Law of 1999 (Laodong Fa) states that it will 
“protect the legitimate rights and interests of laborers, re-adjust labor rela-
tionship, establish and safeguard the labor system compatible to the socialist 
market economy, and promote economic development and social progress” 
(Article 1). It further states that
laborers have the right to equal treatment, choose occupations, ob-
tain remunerations, take rests, have holidays and leaves, receive 
labor safety and sanitation protection, get training in professional 
skills, enjoy social insurance and welfare treatment, and submit ap-
plications for settlement of labor disputes, and other labor rights 
stipulated by law. (Article 3)
China’s Labor Law of January 1, 2008, requires that labor contracts be in 
writing and limits the use of term contracts and probationary periods for em-
ployees. Their length of probationary periods is limited based on the terms of 
the employment contract, with a maximum of six months. “Virtually every 
violation of the law gives the employee the right to sue the employer for pen-
alties and damages in the local employment arbitration bureau or in the local 
courts,” explains lawyer Steve Dickinson.10
In March 2001, China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, but it still places a reservation on obligations re-
garding Article 8, which guarantees trade union rights and the right to free-
dom of association. Legislative activity in this area developed rapidly as the 
workers’ movement intensified in 2007 and 2008. Four important laws were 
adopted to face this new legal challenge: the Law on Prevention and Treat-
ment of Occupational Diseases, the Employment Promotion Law, the Law on 
Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration, and the Social Insurance Law.
10  Steve Dickinson, China’s New Labor Law: Power to the People, China International Business 
Magazine (2007), available at http://www.chinalawblog.com.
Rule of Law as a Watermark 185
Legal Empowerment at the Local Level
According to Zhu Jingwen’s quantitative measure of rule of law reforms in 
China, in 1979, there were 15 laws, 68 administrative regulations, and 72 local 
regulations. In 2006, there were 36 laws, 164 national administrative regula-
tions, and 14,124 local regulations.11 Thus, between 1979 and 2006, the average 
annual growth of national laws and national administrative regulations was 
around 11 percent, compared with more than 30 percent for local regulations. 
These figures reveal that there was a massive legislative effort over 30 years, 
particularly at the local level. This situation contributed to a growing deficit of 
legal visibility and accessibility of regulations and laws in China.
With China’s integration into the international economy through the 
WTO and the increasing development of the Internet, the decade of 2000–2010 
was characterized by new and multiple interactions between authorities and 
civil society in defining the legal reform agenda. The Law on Legislation (Lifa 
Fa), enacted in March 2000, was designed to rationalize the system and regu-
late legislative processes. It also set up procedures for public participation, 
such as publication of legislative drafts and public hearings (tingzheng). 
In March 2008, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, Wu Bangguo, controversially announced that a socialist le-
gal system with Chinese characteristics had been fundamentally accomplished. 
“There are laws to cover basically every area of economic, political, cultural and 
social activities in the country,” he stated in a report on China’s Assembly.12
 
  Table 1. Number of Laws and Regulations in China, 1979-2005





1979 15 68 72 404
1982 21 145 485 1055
1989 15 111 1,508 3,339
1991 27 111 1,601 3,879
1996 40 118 3,475 6,349
2000 31 171 5,628 8,846





11.8%            10.7%          33.1%        21.3%
  Source: Zhu Jingwen, Report on China Law Development: Database and Indicators  
(RUC Press 2007). 
 Translation S. Balme.
11  Zhu Jingwen, Report on China Law Development: Database and Indicators (RUC Press 2007).
12  Id.
The World Bank Legal Review186
Toward Better Access to Justice
China’s judicial system resumed in 1979, after the chaotic events of the Cultural 
Revolution. The reform of the judiciary must be assessed through the lens of 
judicial transformation under the Maoist regime. During successive Maoist 
campaigns, particularly in 1950–53, 1957–58, 1967–71, and 1975–76, the num-
ber of cases registered as criminal cases exceeded the number of civil cases. 
Post-Mao China’s legal and judicial reforms were characterized by stop-and-
go cycles. For example, the last historical period, after Mao’s death, when the 
number of criminal cases almost reached the number of civil cases was during 
the 1983 “strike hard” ( yanda) campaign against criminal suspects. 
In 1981, Deng Xiaoping used the trial of the Gang of Four to display the 
regime’s intentions to govern with reference to the law instead of by indi-
vidual political decisions. Since then, ordinary, daily justice has been largely 
depoliticized and professionalized. According to Professor Zhu Jingwen, the 
percentage of judgments made through formal procedures increased from 
16.5 percent to 35.7 percent between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s.13 Ac-
cording to the China National Bureau of Statistics, recent growth in the num-
ber of civil disputes has been irregular: from 5,346,986 in 2008 to 6,458,573 in 
2009 and 4,980,721 in 2010. Altogether, between 2008 and 2010, Chinese juris-
dictions received and adjudicated 16,786,280 cases. The number of marriage 
and heritage disputes (1,286,437 cases in 2008; 1,423,180 cases in 2010) and the 
number of contract disputes (2,905,603 cases in 2008; 3,222,555 cases in 2010) 
also increased during this period.14
In 30 years, successive reform plans have evolved from quantitative re-
forms (reestablishing a judiciary, building courts, hiring judges, and training 
lawyers) to more qualitative reforms such as enhancing the quality of judi- 
cial training, improving access to justice, and creating alternative dispute-
resolution techniques. For litigants who have access to the Internet, judi-
cial services are increasingly available in China, and, according to author Bi 
Shaofeng, legal aid services are more developed than in the past in coastal 
areas and in remote places.15 However, few legal aid offices or legal clinics (falü 
yuanzhusuo, falü zhensuo) exist in rural areas or for nonprivileged categories of 
the population such as the migrant workers or disabled persons.
An Emerging Country with an Emerging Judiciary
China is a centralized state with a decentralized judicial administration that 
is largely funded and supervised by local governments. All civil servants in the 
judicial organs are appointed by local people’s congresses. The SPC, not the 
Ministry of Justice, supervises the judiciary at various levels through a hierar-
13  Zhu Jingwen, Judicial Transformation and Legal Sociology in China (2008).
14  http://www.stats.gov.cn.
15  Bi Shaofeng, Rural Legal Clinics: An Educational Handbook (China Law Press 2010).
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chical system of more than 3,000 courts. Politics and law committees (Zhengfa 
wei) of the CCP at various levels are in charge of the direction and cooperation 
of courts, procuratorates, and police. The committees ensure the CCP’s leader-
ship over judicial issues in every tribunal. The public security organs ( gong’an 
jiguan) represent the principal police authority, which is responsible for con-
ducting criminal investigations and, with the authorization of procuratorates 
(except under certain circumstances), arresting suspects. The committee also 
ensures the CCP’s leadership over judicial issues in every tribunal. Lawyers 
are kept under control by both the legislative and the judicial branches.
Since 2002, anyone with a university degree can take the Unified Judicial 
Exam (Tongyi sifa kaoshi), which is common to all legal professions, including 
lawyers, judges, and prosecutors. Every year, approximately 300,000 candi-
dates (50 percent of whom are from 11 provinces, although the largest por-
tion are from Beijing and Guangdong) take this competitive exam. Since 2010, 
the passing rate has been slightly above 20 percent. Among the 90 percent of 
undergraduates who take the exam, only a minority are law students who 
specialize in law. However, overall, the number of graduates from law schools 
or legal institutes in China increased from around 8,000 in 1996 to more than 
135,000 in 2010. There are more than 640 “real” law schools around the coun-
try, and the legal education market is booming. 
In 2002, among the 360,000 candidates who registered to take the exam in 
order to obtain a Certificate of Legal Practice, the success rate was 8 percent, in-
cluding a very small proportion of candidates from the remote western regions. 
In 1980, the Provisional Law on Lawyering in the PRC defined lawyers as 
“state legal workers” and law offices as “legal counseling services” ( falü gu-
wenchu). In 1986, the Chinese National Lawyer’s Association was established 
in Beijing, with branches throughout the country. By 2012, a lawyer was de-
fined as “a professional who legally obtains a lawyer’s certificate and pro-
vides the society with legal services.” The Lawyers Law (Lüshi fa), as amended 
in October 2007, recognized the specificity of the lawyers as a legal profession. 
However, judges and prosecutors still greatly outnumber lawyers.
Except in the biggest cities and along the coastal provinces, the total num-
ber of lawyers per habitant in China is very low. In addition, the distribution 
of lawyers in China is uneven. In 1996, 100,198 people were “employed as 
attorneys” (this number refers to all categories of personnel working in a law 
firm; lüshi gongzuo renyuan); in 2011, this number was 204,000.16 This category 
can be divided between full-time attorneys (47,879; zhuanzhi lüshi), part-time 
attorneys (20,243; jianzhi lüshi), and legal workers ( falü gongzuozhe). From 1998 
to 2006, the number of people employed as “lawyers” increased from 101,220 
to 164,516. The number of full-time attorneys increased dramatically (from 
51,008 to 122,242), while the number of so-called nonprofessional lawyers (not 
employed on a full-time basis) decreased from 17,958 to 8,068. In 2002, after 
16  http://www.stats.gov.cn.
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introduction of the Unified Judicial Exam for the professions of lawyers, 
judges, and procuratorates, the number of nonprofessional lawyers (or legal 
workers) decreased considerably. A majority of lawyers are now on full-time 
status and are supposedly fully qualified.
According to Sida Liu and Ethan Michelson’s studies on the development 
of the legal profession in China, the economic and institutional “vulnerabili-
ties” of Chinese lawyers constitute a difficult issue. Lawyers in medium-size 
cities often have to rely on state judicial agencies to find business and guaran-
tee the annual renewal of their license. Lawyers have to contend with “dead-
beat clients who fail to pay their legal fees, exploitative employers who fail to 
support their professional work and to protect their social security,” and insti-
tutional actors “who interfere with and obstruct [the lawyers’] work.”17 This 
situation weakens the role of lawyers in courts and constrains their capacity 
to represent clients.
China’s Judges Law (Faguan fa) was adopted in 1997 and amended in 
2001 after the establishment of the Unified Judicial Exam. Theoretically and 
legally, all judges in China have passed the exam. Their status is somewhat 
ambiguous: they are called “judge” ( faguan) in everyday life and “adjudica-
tor” (shenpanyuan) in court. Article 2 of the Judges Law states that “judges are 
the judicial personnel who exercise the judicial authority of the State.” They 
shall “faithfully implement the constitution and laws, and serve the people 
whole-heartedly” (Article 3). The functions and duties of judges in China are 
different from those of their counterparts in the West; Chinese judges must 
“take part in a trial as a member of a collegial panel or try a case alone accord-
ing to law” as well as perform all other functions and duties as provided by 
law (Article 5). In addition, they must accept legal supervision and “supervi-
sion by the masses” (Article 7).
In 1999, the SPC published its first guiding instrument for enhancing the 
judiciary: the Five-Year Reform Program for People’s Courts. This document 
aimed to enhance the efficiency and fairness of adjudication by reforming the 
courts’ “inquisitorial” trial pattern to a more “adversarial” trial pattern. Since 
then, the main slogan of the SPC has been “judicial efficiency and judicial 
fairness” (sifa xiaolü yu sifa gongzheng). In 2004, Measures on the Management 
of the Publication of Judgment Documents and Several Opinions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Strengthening the Work on Judicial Openness in People’s Courts 
were published, completing the transition.
A second Five-Year Reform Program for People’s Courts (2004–08) stressed 
the importance of bringing greater professionalism and integrity to the judi-
ciary. The reform program called for courts to begin “exploring within a certain 
geographic area the implementation of a system of uniform recruitment and 
17  See Ethan Michelson & Sida Liu, What Do Chinese Lawyers Want? Political Values and Legal 
Practice (Brookings Institution 2010), available at http://www.indiana.edu/~emsoc/Publi-
cations/Chapter14_Michelson_Liu.pdf. See also local reports such as those found at http://
www.fabang.com/a/20111207/460510.html.
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uniform assignment of judges for duties in the basic-level courts.” The SPC 
also explored the establishment of guaranteed national funding for local 
courts by inserting provisions in central and provincial government budgets. 
Conflict of governance (budget, nomination, management, and judicial inde-
pendence) between central and local judicial authorities remains a subject of 
concern for some judicial authorities.
A network of modern courts, inspired by Western architectural styles 
(Greek temple or US Supreme Court–style), affects citizens’ and litigants’ per-
ception of the judiciary. To that end, the SPC developed a policy of erecting 
new court buildings and investing in hardware and access to justice. Many 
older court buildings have been demolished. In 2007, the litigation fees’ man-
agement system was reformed, separating the collection of litigation fees from 
courts’ expenditures. Litigation fees are no longer directly handed to courts 
but are paid instead by litigants through designated banks that are often 
directly located within the courts. In April 2007, a regulation from the State 
Council (the Chinese government) unified charging standards and promoted 
lower litigation fees for civil and administrative disputes.
This regulation to reduce litigation fees “to diminish ordinary people’s 
burden and facilitate access to justice” had a direct and immediate impact on 
the Chinese courts’ source of income.18 In September 2007, an article in the 
Legal Daily explained that courts lost an average of 53.55 percent of their rev-
enues due to this change. Consequently, 2.4 billion renminbi was allocated 
to compensate local tribunals for the losses in budgets. In 2008 and 2009, the 
situation improved. Most courts have received partial or total compensation 
for losses and have implemented the regulation forbidding arbitrary fees.
In March 2009, the SPC promulgated a third Five-Year Program for the 
Reform of People’s Courts (2009–13), initiating a new round of court modern-
ization. This program was formulated with a view to maintaining social fair-
ness and justice and satisfying the new demands and new expectations of the 
general public regarding the judiciary. Much attention was paid to aspects of 
“judicial efficiency” such as the cost and speed of judicial procedures as well 
as the enforcement of judicial decisions. These qualities are crucial in the effort 
to build trust and confidence among litigants.
Since the mid-2000s, mediation has been given great significance by the 
Chinese Communist Party and therefore by all judicial organs. In 2009, the 
SPC, in its annual Report on the Work of People’s Courts, put forward the policy 
of mediation first, followed by a combination of mediation and adjudica-
tion. The same year, the SPC promulgated the Opinion on the Establishment 
18  See also the Report on the Implementation of the Central and Local Budgets for 2006 and on the 
Draft Central and Local Budgets for 2007, 9 (Ministry of Finance 2007), which states that in 2006, 
the central authorities supported the strengthening of government authority at the county 
and township levels. Funds were set aside in the central budget in 2006 to help lower-level 
procuratorial, judicial, and public security departments to improve conditions for process-
ing cases. Available at http://www.chinaview.cn.
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and Improvement of Dispute-Settlement Mechanisms with Coordination between 
Litigious and Non-Litigious Means. This opinion was a major step in the pro-
motion of the development of multiple dispute-settlement mechanisms, 
including arbitration and administrative and civil mediation, to avoid the 
danger of forced, or imposed mediation. 
In June 2012, the SPC revealed a detailed Working Guide to Improve Judicial 
Efficiency (Tigaosifa xiaolu gongzuo zhinan). The guide’s emphasis is on the quality 
and the effectiveness of justice to enhance judicial efficiency, which refers to a 
sense of providing accessible, professional, and fair dispute-settlement services. 
This implies incentive mechanisms for judges, the simplification of complicated 
dispute settlement procedures, the professionalization of the judicial manage-
ment system, and the reinforcement of a variety of dispute resolution mecha-
nisms, including some alternative or nonlitigation procedures. The guide is the 
product of an innovative international collaboration with the European Union, 
the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the Supreme People’s Court. 
It will provide a benchmark for local courts to use to evaluate their efficiency.19
China has stated its intention to undertake certain reforms, such as promot-
ing open, publicly accessible courtroom proceedings, more media interaction 
and public outreach, and more public access to written judgments including 
judges’ rationale. 
Thus far, these reforms have been uneven and limited in terms of both 
their substance and their geographic scope. Although several reforms have 
been designed to strengthen the professionalism of the judiciary and to ad-
dress judicial corruption and build public confidence, such as the passage of 
an ethics code for judges, they still need to be institutionalized and fairly, uni-
formly, and effectively enforced.
The improvement of the “hardware” of the legal and judicial systems has 
largely benefited plaintiffs and citizens in China. Civil justice in China has 
been overhauled. A broad range of reforms have been adopted, covering in-
stitutional as well as procedural aspects. Although the general context is dif-
ferent, the global aim of the reforms has been much the same as elsewhere in 
Europe where civil justice is being reformed: to ensure fair justice with greater 
efficiency in terms of both time and costs, in response to an increasing demand 
from the public at large. 
The Status of Human Rights vs Human Rights in Action
In the late 1980s, the term fazhi (legal system) was gradually abandoned in 
favor of its homonym fazhi (rule of law), which implies the necessity of the 
establishment of a formal system to guarantee people’s rights and to check 
governmental power. In December 1999, a notion similar to the concept of 
19  See Stéphanie Balme, Review of Efforts to Improve Judicial Efficiency and Costs (Governance for 
Equitable Development Aug. 2012).
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rule of law but not yet due process was incorporated into China’s constitution. 
Article 5 states:
No law or administrative or local rule and regulation shall con-
travene the constitution. All state organs, the armed forces, all 
political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and 
undertakings must abide by the constitution and the law. All acts in 
violation of the constitution and the law must be investigated. No 
organization or individual may enjoy the privilege of being above 
the constitution and the law. 
Another major step toward reforming the post-Mao state is the progres-
sive integration of human rights into Chinese law.
Until the 1980s, human rights discourses were ignored or attacked. Today, 
Marxist critics of human rights still exist among some CCP leaders who con-
tinue to advocate historical materialism, deny the notion of jus naturalism, em-
phasize collective rights over individual rights, advocate equality rather than 
liberty, and prefer “real rights” (the right of subsistence, for example) over 
so-called formal rights, such as freedom of expression.
However, Beijing has signed—if not ratified—most of the existing inter-
national treaties or conventions related to human rights, including the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(March 1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women (December 1979), the International Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (of 
December 1984; although China does not yet recognize the competence of the 
committee against torture); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (No-
vember 1989), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESC; 1997) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR; 1998).
In 1991, the Chinese government published its first white paper on human 
rights. In 2009, a national action plan on human rights was officially launched, 
demonstrating a general yet genuine recognition of the morality of human 
rights as described by Michael Perry: “each and every born human being has 
inherent dignity which is inviolable.”20
The 1996 Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) recognizes the “principle of pre-
sumption of innocence” (wuzui tuiding) of innocence without adopting the 
actual words, which are similar to those found in Article 11 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.21 Article 162(3) of the 1996 CPL states that, “if 
20  Michael J. Perry, Toward a Theory of Human Rights (Cambridge U. Press 2006).
21  According to the law, everyone charged with a penal offense has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty in a public trial at which he or she has had all the guarantees 
necessary for his or her defense. Stéphanie Balme, La justice pénale en Chine: Son évolution et 
son avenir; Analyse du projet 2011 de réformes de la Loi de procédure pénale (Institut des Hautes 
Etudes sur la Justice 2012); available at http://www.ihej.org/la-justice-penale-en-chine-son 
-evolution-et-son-avenir/.
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the evidence is insufficient and thus the defendant cannot be found guilty, 
he/she shall be pronounced innocent accordingly on account of the fact that 
the evidence is insufficient and the accusation unfounded.”
The right to life and the protection against cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
punishments (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6, 
paragraph 1) restricts the use of the death penalty to the most serious crimes. 
China’s Criminal Law, Article 40, stipulates: “the death penalty should only 
be applied to criminals who have committed extremely serious crimes and 
be restricted and excluded for juveniles, pregnant women, mothers and the 
insane.” A penalty of death must be based on clear and convincing evidence, 
leaving no room for other explanations of the facts.
The maximum term for concurrently applied sentences was raised from 20 
to 25 years (Article 69), and individuals originally sentenced to life imprison-
ment will be obliged to serve longer prison terms before they can be released 
through sentence reduction (Article 81). The most serious offenders will not 
be offered sentence reduction. However, the law requires lenient treatment 
of offenders aged 75 and older, and judges have been given more specific in-
structions about how “lenient punishment” should be applied in sentencing 
(Articles 17 and 49). Additionally, in 2010, 13 crimes (among a total of 68) were 
removed from death penalty eligibility under criminal law.
The official contestation, in the 1990s—following the Tiananmen Square 
incident—of the principle of the universality of human rights came not so 
much from a supposed Confucian tradition, but rather from a Marxist cri-
tique. Human rights still are sometimes considered a threat to the political 
status quo. Finally, this contestation is paradoxically growing at a time when a 
new generation of human rights (e.g., animal rights and rights to reputation) 
are emerging in China. Both a developing country and an emerging power, 
Chinese authorities question the path of contemporary developed societies on 
human rights and the rule of law. However, it seems that China’s authorities 
also do not want their performance to be subjected to international scrutiny. 
The diversity of voices in China makes the judicial and legal systems more 
difficult to change now than immediately after the Cultural Revolution. Open 
debates, the vitality of public opinion, reflections on publicized trials, and ju-
dicial cases are also assets as China’s rule of law faces new challenges.
Rule of Law in China: Current Challenges and Future Perspectives
Although the framework of law that has evolved since the end of the Cultural 
Revolution provides a foundation for rule of law, a more determined and sus-
tained effort is necessary to reform China’s legal regime in depth.
Experts observed a significant regression of the rule of law in the 2000s, 
under the guise of preserving social harmony. Wang Shengjun, the president 
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of the SPC, publicly advocated the policy of the “three supremes”: first, the 
supremacy of the party, then of the people, and finally of the constitution and 
the law. The many legal and judicial challenges faced by China can be sum-
marized by the increasingly urgent need to create a systematic legal frame-
work and a hierarchy of norms respectful of both collective and individual 
rights. Areas of potential reform include legal sources, legal writing and rea-
soning, due process, the stability of legal institutions, the predictability of the 
judicial process, and legal certainty.
Chinese judges are civil servants with no real power. The Ministry of Pub-
lic Security, the principal police authority, holds the power to conduct inves-
tigations and arrest suspects in criminal cases; a Politics and Law Committee 
(Zhengfa wei) is in charge of the direction and cooperation of people’s courts, 
people’s procuratorates, and the police. The committee also ensures the CCP’s 
leadership over judicial issues in every tribunal. Lawyers are kept under strict 
control by both the legislative and the executive branches. 
Conflicts of Norms
After more than three decades of reforms, China’s legal developments are not 
immune from defects; some are serious, such as a lack of hierarchy of norms 
and inconsistency among rules, the absence of a transparent and comprehen-
sive constitutional review system (weixian shencha), and a lack of harmoni-
zation of law and judgments. Also, the CCP charter and regulations are de 
facto full-fledged laws. What, then, is China’s grundnorm? 
To show the complexity of the situation in China, this section focuses on 
the evolution of three domains of law: criminal procedure, property, and an-
tidiscrimination. In criminal procedure and property law, abuses and legal 
uncertainty are mainly a consequence of unlawful behaviors, which are fa-
cilitated by the vagueness and ambiguities of the law. In antidiscrimination 
regulations, legal discrimination leads to behavioral abuses against the basic 
principles of rule of law.
The Criminal Procedure Law (CPL; 1996) and its amendments (2012) typ-
ify how the inconsistencies among laws at different levels generate an opposi-
tion to judicial discretion and foster a sense of arbitrariness. Ambiguities of 
and inconsistences among legal norms affect their credibility and reveal that 
the court system, which is not even charged with interpreting the law, is not 
a powerful institution. Chinese courts play very few roles in supervising the 
police during criminal investigations. Another example: the system of reha-
bilitation through labor (RTL) (laojiao) is an administrative sanction taken by 
the police and the RTL committee without interference from the procuratorate 
or the tribunal. Under the RTL system, a person can be deprived of liberty 
without having interacted with any judicial authority.
Although the CPL was revised in 2012, many ambiguities remain both 
with and within the Lawyers Law. Amended in October 2007, the Lawyers Law 
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allows lawyers to meet with clients without the presence of police officers. 
Lawyers have an obligation of confidentiality but are limited by the fact that 
theycannot keep certain information secret (Article 38 of the Lawyers Law). In 
addition, a lawyer can be condemned if he or she influences a client not to con-
fess to a crime (Article 38 of the CPL). In China, the absence of a guarantee to 
the right to a fair trial is a serious issue, especially because the right to remain 
silent is not clearly established.
The CPL stipulates that evidence obtained through torture cannot be used 
as grounds for a verdict. However, the law emphasizes that accused persons 
must give “truthful answers” (rushi huida) and that “resistance to answer will 
be treated severely” (kangju congya). The March 2012 revision of the CPL ex-
hibits a punitive philosophy, mainly based on the traditional Marxist notion 
of crime, and the goal of maintaining public order. (There are more than 60 
references to the terms “raison d’Etat” or “state secrets” in the revision.) A lack 
of empowerment by the judges within the judicial system, in contradistinction 
to the role played by the public security forces, emphasizes the effectiveness of 
exceptional police procedures on ordinary judicial procedures.
Legal guarantee of ownership rights is a fundamental characteristic of a 
state that has rule of law. China’s legal system does not provide legal certainty 
in this regard for the following reasons: the system of ownership is extremely 
complex in China and public ownership often trumps private ownership; the 
lack of legal quality (precise rules) leads to legal uncertainty; and the judicial 
system does not have a strong authority to regulate chaotic legal norms. 
In 1949, civil codes enacted under the previous, Nationalist, regime were 
abolished. Land reform policies in 1950 resulted in massive and violent land 
expropriations and the abolishment of the notion of private property and own-
ership rights. The land collectivization that took place during the Maoist pe-
riod led to the replacement of the notion of property rights (suoyou quan) with 
“a system of property” (suoyou zhi). After the Cultural Revolution, the aboli-
tion of the people’s communes allowed a growing recognition of the notion 
of “real rights,” espoused by administrative regulations specifying rules of 
transfer and the attribution of rights. In 1986, the General Principles of Civil 
Law (Minfa tongze) defined, for the first time since the Kuomintang’s codes, 
the notion of property rights.
The Rural Land Contracting Law of 2002 (Nongcun tudi chengbao Fa) clari-
fied the rights and obligations of the rural household and the agricultural col-
lective based on a contractual system (chengbao zhi). In 2007, after a decade of 
consultations and debates, a Property Law was adopted by 96.9 percent of the 
2,889 legislators of the NPC, with 53 delegates opposing and 37 abstaining.
In 2004, a constitutional amendment specified that “the lawful private 
property of citizens is inviolable” (Article 13). Yet, according to the Property 
Law of 2007, “the state may in the public interest [ gonggong liyi] expropriate 
or take over land for its use in accordance with the law and provide compat-
ible compensation [xiangying buchang]” (Article 10, paragraph 3). Because the 
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notion of public interest is vague and the judiciary has almost no independent 
authority, the law does not provide protection or legal certainty to the people 
whose land is being expropriated.
The legal system has improved in recent years in that access to property 
rights is now guaranteed. Still, because urban lands belong to the state and 
rural lands belong to collective organizations, owners’ rights are limited when 
expropriations are deemed justified by public authorities. For rural lands, each 
farmer must be allocated a land parcel based on a contractual system of 30 to 
70 years, depending on the status of the land (cultivated land, forest land, 
etc.). As for nonrural lands, rights are delegated by the state, which can trans-
fer, use, and exchange the land (the notion of sûreté in European systems). 
To fight against the many abusive expropriations that took place in China 
between 1990 and 2010, new local and administrative regulations have been 
passed, creating a chaotic legal structure. This lack of legal quality has led to 
increasing legal uncertainty. For example, a Law on Planification of urban and 
rural zones (Articles 22–26) was enacted in 2007, as was a resolution amend-
ing the Land Management Law (Tudi guanli Fa). These texts present two major 
amendments to the existing system: “According to the needs of public inter-
est, the state can expropriate [zhengshou] or requisition [zhengyong] land and 
provide adequate compensation.” In other words, the state can expropriate 
collectively owned land for the purposes of national projects such as dams, 
railroads, and highways through a transfer of land from collective owner-
ship to state ownership, and requisition does not entail a change in owner-
ship. The state can also temporarily lease land from a collective for public 
benefit, but in theory, it must return the land once the lease is over. These 
provisions include the rights to use and profit from contracted land, to profit 
from the transmission of the land’s management authority, and to organize 
and manage one’s own production.
Judges review disputes on compensation for expropriated land based 
on the 2007 Administrative Law on Urban Land and Real Estate Property. 
According to Article 45 of that law, only the central government (some-
times in coordination with provincial governments) can expropriate lands 
with the precondition of obtaining a “demolishing license.”22 Lands can be 
expropriated only for public service construction, not for commercial use, 
and transformation of farmlands into “industrial land” is limited. However, 
the distinction is primarily administrative, and courts seldom take expropria-
tion cases. In most cases, local governments decide expropriations.
Persistence of Legal Discrimination 
When he was working as a consultant to the World Bank on China’s labor 
legislation in the late 1990s, Ronald Brown noticed a job advertisement that 
 
22  Li Bin, Droit de la Propriété et Expropriation en Droit Chinois (Université Paris I 2010). 
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read, “Seeking an office clerk. Female, decent height and appearance. ‘All 
five facial organs must be in the right place’ [wu guan duanzheng].”23 In China, 
discrimination based on physical appearance is common.24 Although general 
antidiscrimination provisions are included in various laws, administrative 
regulations and local regulations remain discriminatory.25
The 1982 constitution recognizes that “all citizens are equal before the 
law” (Article 33). Women enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life—
political, economic, cultural, and social—including family life (guaranteed by 
Article 48 of the constitution and the 2005 Law on the Protection of the Rights 
and Interests of Women). The Labor Law of 1995 states that employees must 
not be discriminated against on the basis of nationality, gender, or religious 
belief (Article 12). The 1991 Disabled Persons Protection Law, amended in 
2008, protects “the lawful rights and interests of people with disabilities.”
Professor Li Dun, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
showed that the Civil Servants Recruitment Health Check-Up Standard 
(Gongwuyuan pinyong tijian biaozhun) issued by the Ministry of Health and 
the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security was unconstitutional.26 
This “standard” prevents people with various physical conditions, includ-
ing HIV/AIDS, from taking civil service jobs. It also violates many norms that 
have superior legal authority, including the Employment Promotion Law and 
the International Labor Organization Convention on Nondiscrimination in 
Employment.
Although the number of lawsuits against discrimination is increasing, 
there is little sanction for violations. The first landmark case was that of Zhang 
Xianzhu in 2002. Zhang was a 25-year-old college graduate who received the 
highest score on the Wuhu city (Anhui Province) civil service qualification 
exam but was rejected by the civil service because he tested positive for the 
hepatitis B virus (HBV). Zhang filed an administrative suit against the local per-
sonnel bureau alleging that the rejection of HBV carriers was a discriminatory 
practice, which violated his fundamental constitutional rights. On April 2, 
2003, the Wuhu court issued its judgment, affirming the validity of the gov-
ernment regulation while ruling that the decision by the defendant to refuse to 
 
 
23  Ronald Brown, China’s Employment Discrimination Laws during Economic Transition, 
19 Columbia J. Asian L. 361 (Spring 2006).
24  Investigation Report on Hepatitis B Discrimination in China’s Higher Education System (Oct. 2008) 
by the Yirenping Center (a Chinese NGO operating in Beijing), and Investigation Report on 
Hepatitis B Discrimination in Multinational Corporations Based in China (Feb. 2009).
25  For further information, see Legal Protection against Employment Discrimination Handbook 
(Sep. 2007), and Investigation Report on Employment Discrimination in Shenzhen (May 2010). See 
also Lin Yanling ed., Report on Non-discrimination in Employment: Legal Systems and Practices 
in Asia (Social Sciences Academic Press 2010).
26  Professor Li Dun was invited by the Ministry of Health to participate in the drafting of The 
Regulations on HIV Prevention and Treatment. Interview with the author.
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hire the plaintiff based on his HBV status lacked sufficient evidence. The court 
refused to grant Zhang’s request to enter the civil service on the ground that 
the recruitment period was over. However, the court failed to invalidate the 
discriminatory government regulation on constitutional grounds. A decade 
later, the judicial decision has not been enforced, but the trend in recent regu-
lations regarding public hiring and university admission has mandated that 
physical tests for employment screening not include testing for HBV.
A Weak Constitutional System
In China, the lack of respect for the constitution is explained by the de facto 
absence of a hierarchy of norms (despite a clear theoretical definition of the 
“sources of the law” [ fa yuan]), resulting in confusion both in the organization 
and in the legal texts, administrative regulations, and decrees. It can also be 
explained by the lack of a clear conception of the position of the constitution 
in the hierarchy of the normative system, despite unambiguous terms used 
to designate it, such as the “fundamental law” ( genben dafa) or the “mother 
of all laws” (mufa). The constitution in truth is an abstract political document 
remote from people’s daily life and social operation. 
The government and the CCP have a long history of using policy rather 
than law to steer social development. Every change or amendment of the 
constitution is initiated by CCP policy changes. This practice results in pay-
ing lip service to the constitution and marginalizing its legal function. The 
constitution then serves as a footnote to party policy and governmental prac-
tice. There are numerous examples of liberties taken with the text of the con-
stitution and of legal deadlock arising from social complexity and confusion 
of the legal system due to the absense of consensus on the effective sources 
of the law.
The lack of respect for the constitution testifies to the historical lack of 
respect for the hierarchy of norms in general, due to their nonexistence in 
both practical and conceptual terms. However, since the Law on Legislation 
in 2000 established a principle of unity of the legislative system and initiated a 
hierarchy of norms, the constitution is theoretically at its highest position. The 
next challenge lies in the political courage of the government and the CCP to 
respect the constitution not only in words but in action.27 Another means is 
to entrust the Supreme People’s Court with a role that is neither recognized in 
the political system as a whole nor compatible with its present organization, 
given that the existing system is one of an a posteriori and legislative review of 
the constitution through the work of the National People’s Congress.
While debate on constitutionalism is very rich, it has not yet been fol-
lowed by any official call for open debate or adoption. Probably in May 2004, 
the Law and Regulation Filing Office (Fagui shencha bei’an shi) was created 
27  See Cai Dingjian & Wang Chenguang, China’s Journey toward the Rule of Law: Legal Reform, 
1978–2008 (Brill 2010). 
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within the Commission for Legal Affairs (Fazhi gongzuo weiyuanhui) of the 
Standing Committee of the NPC. Constitutional experts have been critical of 
this new body whose activities and structure have remained secret.
Chinese scholars hold the view that a legal apparatus is a common 
good through which citizens and organizations may achieve justice. They also 
believe in the theoretical supremacy of the constitution as a means to effec-
tively check and control governmental and political power by establishing a 
constitutional review system. The Western concept of constitutionalism is ac-
cepted academically but the political conception of a constitution as a substan-
tive legal norm is not.
Indeed, in Western rule of law democracies, the constitutionality of the 
law is intended to give rise to precise and rigorous examination. The constitu-
tionality of the law is a matter of legal certainty and judicial consistency, of the 
practical reliability of legislative arrangements, and of democratic guarantees.
Addressing the Role of Judges within the Judicial System 
Since 2010, judicial reform in China has been more piecemeal than systemic. It 
also has been oriented more toward access to justice for citizens than toward 
reform of the system and its actors. As in the rest of the world, litigants in 
China ask for much better legal services and have higher expectations than 
in the past. Litigants, via social networks, demand that their disputes be han-
dled with greater transparency and uniformity in applying substantive and 
procedure law. The growing call in China that alternative dispute resolutions 
and mediation be viewed as intertwined with formal litigation procedures 
expresses a movement toward “informalizing” legal institutions.
In this context, the legal profession faces many challenges in China. One is 
uneven geographical distribution: in 2011, there were more lawyers in Shang-
hai than in the whole of Shaanxi Province, and more lawyers in the city of 
Shenzhen than in Fujian Province. In 2010, there were 23,000 lawyers in Bei-
jing, out of a total estimated 140,000 lawyers nationwide.28 Other problems 
include an uneven level of professionalization and an accompanying lack of 
specialization (the number of defense lawyers trained every year in the coun-
try is low); an absence of legal recognition of the unique capacity of lawyers 
to act as agents ad litem; and an inadequate representation of lawyers in courts 
compared to the number of judges and procuratorates. Also, lawyers’ fees re-
main far too high for most litigants.
Many non-lawyer legal experts act as agents ad litem in litigation 
procedures and lawsuits in China. Experts have shown that in China, lawyers 
face competition from a variety of alternative legal service providers, includ-
28  Beijing Bar Association, interviews with the author in January and May 2012. 
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ing legal workers at grassroots levels and other practitioners, presenting a 
challenge to the government on how to regulate these competing groups.29
Lack of trust and credibility regarding the court system are among the 
most pressing issues the government faces. It is important to build trust 
among judges and all the actors involved in courts’ management; to remain 
flexible with planned new reforms; and to create mechanisms for institution-
alizing changes and build the conditions for achieving sustainable reforms 
within the judiciary.30 
One of the main weaknesses of the Chinese judiciary system is the ex-
tremely decentralized administration of a centralized legal system where na-
tional laws tend to be abstract and local specificities are given short shrift. 
The role of people’s courts in the harmonization and convergence (if not 
unification) of legal practices must be encouraged. The main goal is to cre-
ate better cooperation between and consistency of the lawmaking and judi-
cial-making process to achieve a greater uniformity in the application of law 
and to protect citizens. People’s courts should ensure that rules are interpreted 
consistently throughout the country. This interpretation can be achieved only 
if courts are given real power and a specific status and specific tasks within 
the judicial system.
Both legal harmonization and consistency of law enforcement require that 
the judicial body play both legal and moral roles. Reforms need to be oriented 
toward the reform of the judges’ status.
Conclusion
During recent decades, the Chinese legal system has undergone a fascinat-
ing transformation from barely any law to a relatively comprehensive and 
complicated network of laws and norms. The foundations of the legal-rational 
state are undergoing rapid change. The law has been not only an instrument 
of post-socialist transition, social control, and governance but also a means of 
social transition and market reform in China. The concept of law is perceived 
as a modern means of regulation, a tool in the service of this objective. 
In 30 years, the rule of law rhetoric in China has moved from a concept 
focused on economic considerations (the Deng Xiaoping era) to one focused 
on maintaining stability within society and the control of the CCP (during the 
Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao era). Yet, the rapid legal development cannot hide the 
defects in China’s legal system. Besides those mentioned above, the biggest 
29  See Terence Halliday, Ethan Michelson, & Sida Liu, China’s Emerging Middle Class: Beyond 
Economic Transformation, ch. 14 (Cheng Li ed., Brookings Institution Press 2010).
30  See Randall Peerenboom, Economic and Social Rights: The Role of Courts in China (Oct. 17, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1693613.
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problem is that the notion of due process of law is underdeveloped because of 
the lack of constitutional review and the low predictability of legal outcomes. 
Despite ideological transformations, social changes, and radical economic 
reforms, the world’s second-biggest economy is not yet governed by the rule 
of law. Many observers in and outside China question whether rule of law is 
necessary for a rich, emerging country such as China. The lack of legal cer-
tainty affects leadership succession processes as well as governance on a large 
scale and confidence in business. Demands for rule of law changes by public 
and legal professionals have been unprecedented.
What China can achieve depends on how the legal system develops and 
whether the concept of the rule of law can be translated into judicial practices. 
What China can achieve depends largely on what China wants.
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Achieving Development through  
Innovative Constitutionalism
A China Story
Zhenmin Wang and Yuan Tao
Constitutions are created to balance political powers, to regulate the behavior 
of political institutions and individuals, and to protect citizens’ rights. The 
interplay between constitutionalism and reality constantly changes, with the 
evolution of a constitution the most obvious proof of that transformation. 
Traditionally, constitutionalism has been correlated with separation of pow-
ers, limited government, and democracy. Today, however, a constitution is no 
longer seen as a purely political and legal document; it is also viewed as a 
document incorporating guiding economic principles, and growing attention 
is being given to the economic functions of a constitution and how consti-
tutions might be used to promote economic development. Most transitional 
and developing nations face the challenge of proper allocation of available 
economic and financial resources as well as the compatibility of economic de-
cisions with the constitutional framework and the limitations created by that 
framework. The economic function of the constitution can be used to narrow 
the gap between practical enforcement of the economic, social, and political 
rights granted by the constitution and the economic policy, budget legislation, 
and administrative policies conducted by the national government.
Constitutions in the 18th and 19th centuries were purely political docu-
ments. They had little to do with economy. The first constitution to introduce 
economic provisions was the 1918 Weimar Constitution of Germany. As con-
stitutions have evolved, some are more focused on citizens’ rights vis-à-vis the 
government and private property ownership, while others provide for both 
political and economic affairs in a comprehensive fashion. A key challenge for 
modern constitutionalists, especially in developing countries, is how to use 
constitutional provisions to facilitate economic advancement and the devel-
opment of a market economy.
If a constitution can be defined as a framework of fundamental rules and 
principles according to which a state is governed, the locus of constitutional-
ism lies at the intersection of law and politics. Every theory of constitutional-
ism must take both law and policy into account and apply them in a way that 
is open to country-specific variations. The purpose of a constitution should be 
multifold: the balanced and rational allocation of governmental powers among 
various branches and levels; the assurance that government behavior is sub-
ject to supervision and constraints; the obligation that government agencies or 
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executive officials, whether appointed or elected, be bound by the constitution, 
abstain from abuse of power and corruption, and be held accountable to the 
people; and the protection of basic human rights and freedom. 
Based on this definition of a constitution, economic constitutionalism en-
compasses and addresses several issues: first, what economic freedoms and 
rights can the constitution provide for the people; second, to what extent 
may the government intervene in economic affairs; and third, where does the 
boundary lie for government intervention in the economic arena—in other 
words, how does the government redistribute resources and social wealth 
among members of the society.
The evolution of China’s constitution is an example of the changing and 
multifaceted nature of economic constitutionalism. The first National People’s 
Congress (NPC) adopted China’s first constitution in 1954. In 1975, the consti-
tution was completely revised to become the second constitution. Three years 
later, it was rewritten and adopted as the 1978 constitution. In 1980, the Chi-
nese authorities established the high-profile Constitution Revising Committee 
with the mandate to thoroughly review the 1978 constitution and make a new 
one. After two years’ consultation and deliberation, the new constitution was 
passed by the fifth NPC in 1982. The 1982 constitution has been amended four 
times: in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004. Most of the amendments are related to 
economic freedoms, especially the constitutional and legal status of private 
economy. As such, not only is the 1982 constitution, and its amendments, a 
document for legal and political affairs, but it also provides a foundation for 
economic development and economic justice.
The 1982 constitution was adopted shortly after Deng Xiaoping took pow-
er and initiated China’s “opening and reform” policy. Law played a vital role 
in Deng’s administration as he sought to provide greater institutional order 
to support China’s development. The 1982 constitution puts the constitution 
above all organizations in the country, including the Communist Party of Chi-
na (CPC). Post-Deng leaders have modified the constitution through amend-
ment, rather than replacement, preserving the continuity of economic reform 
ideology ushered in by Deng. Amendments have been used to constitutional-
ize ideological landmarks of unfolding economic developments. For example, 
the constitution was revised in 1988 to make reference to a private sector to 
complement the “socialist public economy.” The 1993 amendments added the 
phrase “socialism with Chinese characteristics” to the preamble and intro-
duced the “socialist market economy,” thus incorporating Deng’s economic 
theory into the document. A reference to the recently deceased Deng was 
added to the preamble in 1999. The constitution was amended in 2004 to guar-
antee private property rights and provide for compensation for expropriated 
land, an important signal for both foreign investors and China’s own busi-
ness sector. In addition, in keeping with the tradition of each Chinese leader 
leaving his imprint on the constitution, President Jiang Zemin introduced his 
theory of the “three represents” into the preamble. This provided ideological 
coverage for inclusion of the business class (“bourgeoisie”). 
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China has been the fastest-growing major economy in the world for 
30 years, with an average annual growth rate above 10 percent. By 2012, as 
the second-largest economy in the world, China could claim that per capita 
income had grown at an average annual rate of more than 8 percent over the 
previous three decades, increasing from 379 yuan, or US$44.6, in 1978 to about 
US$5,184 (US$8,394 purchasing power parity, or PPP) in 2011, according to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).1 According to the World Bank, China’s 
economic growth fueled a decline in the poverty rate from 85 percent in 1981 
to 16 percent in 2005 (poverty being defined in 2005 as the number of people 
living on less than US$1.25 per day).2
There are many reasons for such an economic achievement, and the con-
stitution and its amendments have played a crucial role in this development. 
This chapter examines how a developing country such as China made such 
remarkable progress by enacting a new constitutional system, in particular, a 
new economic constitutionalism. This chapter shows how China’s economy 
exemplifies the development of a more traditional constitution into one that 
reflects many of the advantages of economic constitutionalism. The following 
pages trace China’s constitutional history to show this development, noting 
major changes that reflect innovative policies in China’s particular historical 
context. 
The Basic Economic System Established by the 1982 Constitution
The political revolution that aimed to build China into a socialist country re-
sulted in the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. However, 
the 1954 constitution characterized the country as “neodemocratic” because 
private ownership and property rights were allowed to exist and were in fact 
protected. But the 1954 constitution was short-lived—it was cast aside for 
years, including during the 10-year “Cultural Revolution” (1966–76). 
Although socialist reform was completed in the late 1950s, the constitution 
remained unchanged until 1975. Reflecting the ultra-leftist ideology of the Cul-
tural Revolution, the 1975 constitution declared that China was a “pure social-
ist country.” The constitutional protection of private economy that appeared 
in the 1954 constitution was abolished. The 1975 constitution incorporates the 
protection of public ownership, eliminating all elements of private economy. 
As a result of the paradigm shift that took place after the Cultural Rev-
olution, during the 1982 constitution-making process, a main consideration 
was how to build an economy-friendly constitutional system and establish 
a rational economic system. In its preamble, the 1982 constitution stipulates 
“the basic task of the nation in the years to come is to concentrate its effort on 
[socialist] modernization.” 
1  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China. 
2  Shauna Chen & Martin Ravallion, “The Developing World Is Poorer than We Thought, but No 
Less Successful in the Fight against Poverty (World Bank Aug. 2008).
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Public Ownership of the Means of Production  
and Distribution Principles
Article 6 of the 1982 constitution stipulates that “the basis of the socialist eco-
nomic system of the People’s Republic of China is socialist public ownership 
of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and col-
lective ownership by the working people.” 
Article 6 also provides for distribution principles: the system of socialist 
public ownership supersedes the system of exploitation of person by person; 
it applies the principles of “from each according to his ability” and “to each 
according to his work.”
There are two forms of socialist public ownership mandated in the 1982 
constitution. First, ownership by the whole people: Article 7 states that “the 
state economy is the sector of socialist economy under ownership by the whole 
people; it is the leading force in the national economy. The state ensures the 
consolidation and growth of the state economy.” Second, collective ownership 
by the “working people”: Article 8 provides that 
rural people’s communes, agricultural producers’ co-operatives, 
and other forms of cooperative economy such as producers’ supply 
and marketing, credit and consumers co-operatives, belong to the 
sector of socialist economy under collective ownership by the work-
ing people. Working people who are members of rural economic col-
lectives have the right, within the limits prescribed by law, to farm 
private plots of cropland and hilly land, engage in household side-
line production and raise privately owned livestock. The various 
forms of co-operative economy in cities and towns, such as those in 
the handicraft, industrial, building, transport, commercial and ser-
vice trades, all belong to the sector of socialist economy under collec-
tive ownership by the working people. The State protects the lawful 
rights and interests of the urban and rural economic collectives and 
encourages, guides and helps the growth of the collective economy.
The 1982 constitution allows for the individual economy of urban and ru-
ral working people, but only as a complement to the socialist public economy. 
The official policy toward individual economy is that the state protects the 
lawful rights and interests of the individual economy. The state guides, helps, 
and supervises individual economy through administrative control. These 
provisions stem from the then-prevailing ideology that emphasized “socialist 
ownership” and tended to marginalize private ownership. 
Although the 1982 constitution does not permit Chinese citizens to run 
private companies, it does permit foreign enterprises, other foreign economic 
organizations, and individual foreigners to invest in China and to enter into 
various forms of economic cooperation with Chinese enterprises and other eco-
nomic organizations in accordance with Chinese law. All foreign enterprises 
and foreign economic organizations in China, as well as joint ventures with 
Chinese and foreign investment located in China, must abide by the laws of 
China. Their lawful rights and interests are protected by the law (Article 18).
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Property Rights 
According to Article 9 of the 1982 constitution, mineral resources, waters, 
forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land, beaches, and other natural 
resources are owned by the state, that is, by the whole people, with the excep-
tion of the forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land, and beaches that 
are owned by collectives in accordance with the law. The state ensures the 
rational use of natural resources and protects rare animals and plants. The ap-
propriation or damage of natural resources by any organization or individual 
by whatever means is prohibited. This provision is important for the state to 
maintain economic stability. 
Urban land is owned by the state. Land in rural and suburban areas is 
owned by collectives, except for those portions that belong to the state in ac-
cordance with the law. House sites and private plots of cropland and hilly 
land are owned by collectives. The state may in the public interest take land 
over for its use in accordance with the law. No organization or individual may 
appropriate, buy, sell, or lease land or unlawfully transfer land in other ways. 
All organizations and individuals who use land must make rational use of the 
land (Article 10).
The 1982 constitution emphasizes that socialist public property is sacred 
and inviolable (Article 12). The state protects socialist public property. Ap-
propriation or damage of state or collective property by any organization or 
individual by whatever means is strictly prohibited. 
As for private ownership, Article 13 stipulates that “the state protects the 
right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses, and other 
lawful property. The state protects by law the right of citizens to inherit pri-
vate property.” Therefore, the 1982 constitution seems to suggest that citizens 
cannot have large-scale property such as factories or companies. 
Management of Economic Affairs
According to the 1982 constitution, China practices economic planning on the 
basis of socialist public ownership, with a view to a proportionate and coor-
dinated growth of the national economy by balancing economic planning and 
market regulation. Disruption of the state economic plan by any organization 
or individual is legally prohibited. 
Constitutions in many countries do not stipulate how to manage the econ-
omy. Yet, China’s constitution has very detailed provisions on economic af-
fairs. For example, Article 14 states that the 
state continuously raises labor productivity, improves economic re-
sults and develops the productive forces by enhancing the enthusi-
asm of the working people, raising the level of their technical skill, 
disseminating advanced science and technology, improving the sys-
tems of economic administration and enterprise operation and man-
agement, instituting the socialist system of responsibility in various 
forms, and improving organization of work. The state practices strict 
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economy and combats waste. The state properly apportions accu-
mulation and consumption, pays attention to the interests of the col-
lective and the individual as well as of the state, and, on the basis of 
expanded production, gradually improves the material and cultural 
life of the people.
The constitution also provides that state-owned enterprises have decision-
making power in operation and management within the limits prescribed by 
law, on the condition that they respect the centralized leadership of the state 
and fulfill all their obligations under the state plan. State-owned enterprises 
practice democratic management through congresses of workers and staff. 
Collective economic organizations also enjoy decision-making power in 
conducting independent economic activities, on the condition that they accept 
the guidance of the state plan and abide by the relevant laws. Collective eco-
nomic organizations practice democratic management in accordance with the 
law, with the entire body of their members electing or removing management 
and deciding on major issues concerning the operations and management of 
their community.
Economic Freedoms and Rights 
The 1982 constitution provides for a wide range of freedoms and rights related 
to economic affairs. All citizens are equal before the law. Every citizen enjoys 
these rights and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the 
constitution and the law (Article 33).
The 1982 constitution also recognizes that the freedom of individual citi-
zens is inviolable. No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or by 
decision of a people’s procuratorate or by decision of a people’s court, and 
arrests must be made by a public security organ. Unlawful deprivation or 
restriction of a citizen’s freedom by detention or other means is prohibited; 
unlawful search of the person of citizens is also prohibited (Article 37). The in-
dividual dignity of citizens is inviolable. Insult, libel, false charge, or frame-up 
directed against citizens by any means is prohibited (Article 38). The home of 
a citizen is inviolable. Unlawful search of, or intrusion into, a citizen’s home is 
prohibited (Article 39). The freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens 
are protected by law (Article 40).
In addition to the above political rights, citizens have the right as well as 
the duty to work. Using various channels, the state creates conditions for em-
ployment, strengthens labor protection, improves working conditions, and, 
on the basis of expanded production, increases remuneration for work and 
social benefits. Work is a duty of every able-bodied citizen. The state provides 
necessary vocational training to citizens before they are employed (Article 42). 
Working people have the right to rest (Article 43). 
Social security is provided for under the 1982 constitution. The state pre-
scribes the system of retirement for workers and staff in enterprises and un-
dertakings and for functionaries of organs of the state. The livelihood of re-
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tired personnel is ensured by the state and society (Article 44). Citizens have 
the right to material assistance from the state and society when they are old, 
ill, or disabled (Article 45). Citizens have the duty as well as the right to re-
ceive education (Article 46). 
Citizens have the freedom to engage in scientific research, literary and 
artistic creation, and other cultural pursuits. The state encourages and assists 
creative endeavors conducive to the engagement in education, science, tech-
nology, literature, art, and other cultural activities (Article 47). 
The exercise by citizens of their freedoms and rights may not infringe 
upon the interests of the state, society, or the collective, or upon the lawful 
freedoms and rights of other citizens (Article 51). 
Economic Reforms and Constitutional Amendments  
in 1988, 1993, and 1999
When the constitution was enacted in 1982, China was embarking on large-
scale and wide-ranging economic reform. During the pilot phase of the re-
form, various restrictions were placed on economic autonomy. For example, 
the original 1982 constitution did not permit citizens to own and run private 
companies, although it did permit foreign citizens to do so in China. A sig-
nificant portion of China’s economy was still based on the state plan. The re-
strictions imposed by the constitution became obstacles to economic reform. 
Since 1988, China has amended the constitution four times, all in the interest 
of further liberalizing its economy and promoting greater economic freedom.
1988 Constitutional Amendments
On April 12, 1988, the seventh NPC made two constitutional amendments. 
One concerns private economy. It reads: 
The state permits the private sector of the economy to exist and de-
velop within the limits prescribed by law. The private sector of the 
economy is a complement to the socialist public economy. The state 
protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the 
economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and control over the 
private sector of the economy. 
Thus, owning and operating private businesses is legitimized, whereas 
some citizens were penalized before 1988 simply for owning a factory that 
employed seven or more employees. If a private business owner employed 
six or fewer helpers under the original 1982 constitution, it could fall under 
the “individual economy,” or sole proprietorship, which was protected by Ar-
ticle 11. Therefore, this amendment, which decriminalized private economy, 
opened the door for the development of a market economy. 
The other amendment also relates to economic development. Article 10 
was amended from “no organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell, 
or lease land or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means” 
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to “no organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell, or otherwise en-
gage in the transfer of land by unlawful means. The right to the use of land 
may be transferred according to law.” This amendment laid out a constitu-
tional foundation for the development of the real estate industry. 
1993 Constitutional Amendments 
On March 29, 1993, the eighth NPC made more amendments to the 1982 con-
stitution. 
One amendment states that “China is at the primary stage of socialism” 
and introduces “the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.” 
This amendment provides a rationale for promoting a private and market-
oriented economy. 
A more fundamental change was introduced with another amendment. 
Article 15 was amended from
The state practices economic planning on the basis of socialist public 
ownership. It ensures the proportionate and coordinated growth of 
the national economy through overall balancing by economic plan-
ning and the supplementary role of regulation by the market. Dis-
turbance of the orderly functioning of the social economy or disrup-
tion of the State economic plan by any organization or individual is 
prohibited 
to
the state has put into practice a socialist market economy. The state 
strengthens formulating economic laws, improves macro adjust-
ment and control and forbids according to law any units or indi-
viduals from interfering with the social economic order. 
According to this amendment, the economy in China is no longer a 
planned economy but a market-oriented one, even though many Western 
countries still do not recognize the market economy status of China.
1999 Constitutional Amendments
On March 15, 1999, China again proposed a sweeping set of constitutional 
amendments. Seven amendments were passed altogether. Important changes 
to the economic system include the following. 
•	 	Deng Xiaoping theory was incorporated into the constitution as state 
guidance, in addition to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought.
•	 	It was acknowledged that “China will stay in the primary stage of social-
ism for a long period of time.” 
•	 	Rule of law was officially introduced for the first time. Article 5 was added: 
“The People’s Republic of China practices ruling the country in accor-
dance with the law and building a socialist country under rule of law.” 
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•	 	Article 6, which covers the economic system, was amended from 
The basis of the socialist economic system of the People’s Republic 
of China is socialist public ownership of the means of production, 
namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership 
by the working people. . . .  The system of socialist public ownership 
supersedes the system of exploitation of man by man; it applies the 
principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to 
his work.” 
to 
The basis of the socialist economic system of the People’s Republic 
of China is socialist public ownership of the means of production, 
namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership 
by the working people. The system of socialist public ownership su-
persedes the system of exploitation of man by man; it applies the 
principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to 
his work.” 
 . . . 
During the primary stage of socialism, the state adheres to the basic 
economic system with the public ownership remaining dominant 
and diverse sectors of the economy developing side by side, and 
to the distribution system with the distribution according to work 
remaining dominant and the coexistence of a variety of modes of 
distribution.
•	 	Article 11, on private economy, was amended from 
The individual economy of urban and rural working people, oper-
ating within the limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the 
socialist public economy. The state protects the lawful rights and 
interests of the individual economy. . . . The state guides, helps and 
supervises the individual economy by exercising administrative 
control. . . . The state permits the private economy to exist and de-
velop within the limits prescribed by law. The private economy is a 
complement to the socialist public economy. The state protects the 
lawful rights and interests of the private economy, and guides, su-
pervises and administers the private economy. 
to
Individual, private, and other nonpublic economies that exist within 
the limits prescribed by law are major components of the socialist 
market economy. . . . The state protects the lawful rights and inter-
ests of individual and private economies, and guides, supervises, 
and administers individual and private economies.
Thus, the status of the nonpublic economy was endorsed by official con-
stitutional amendments. 
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2004 Constitutional Amendments 
The 2004 constitutional amendments are significant. 
From “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”  
to “Chinese-Style Socialism”
In the preamble, “along the road of building socialism with Chinese character-
istics” was revised to “along the road of Chinese-style socialism.” This seem-
ingly editorial change means that the socialism in China is “made in China,” 
not imported from another country or copied from textbooks. This change 
has been widely interpreted to mean that the development model in China is 
unique in nature, neither capitalist nor conventionally socialist. Both capitalist 
and traditional socialist models have their merits and demerits. In this amend-
ment, China recognizes the value of both systems. How China develops its 
own model will be based on Chinese circumstances and the current world sit-
uation, rather than on transplanting economic systems from other countries. 
The Three Represents 
In the preamble, “under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
thought, and Deng Xiaoping theory” was revised to “under the guidance of 
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, and the im-
portant thought of ‘three represents.’ ” 
This change is more than merely political window dressing. Since 1988, 
when a constitutional amendment first green-lighted private economy, the 
private sector has undergone substantial development. By 2004, the private 
sector dominated the local economy in many coastal provinces. Historically, 
however, according to the constitution, China was a country for workers and 
farmers, not the bourgeoisie. The Chinese government constitutionally did 
not represent nonpublic sectors. The “three represents” means that the party 
and the state (government) must always represent the development trend 
of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced 
culture, and the fundamental interests of the majority of the Chinese people. 
Thus, the Chinese Communist Party and the government also represent the 
private sector and the business class. According to this amendment, China is 
not only a country for workers and farmers but also a country for the emerging 
private sector. This ideology will guide the party and the government for years. 
State Compensation for Land Expropriated or Requisitioned
Article 10 was amended from “The state may, in the public interest, requisition 
land for its use in accordance with the law” to “The state may, in the public 
interest and in accordance with the provisions of law, expropriate or requisi-
tion land for its use and shall make compensation for the land expropriated 
or requisitioned.” 
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Protection of Lawful Rights and Interests of the Nonpublic Sectors 
Article 11 was amended from “the state protects the lawful rights and inter-
ests of the individual and private sectors of the economy, and exercises guid-
ance, supervision, and control over individual and the private sectors of the 
economy” to 
The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the nonpublic 
sectors of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of 
the economy. The state encourages, supports, and guides the devel-
opment of the nonpublic sectors of the economy and, in accordance 
with law, exercises supervision and control over the nonpublic sec-
tors of the economy.
Citizens’ Lawful Private Property Is Inviolable 
Article 13 was amended from “The state protects the right of citizens to own 
lawfully earned income, savings, houses, and other lawful property” and 
“The state protects according to law the right of citizens to inherit private 
property” to “Citizens’ lawful private property is inviolable”; “The state, in 
accordance with law, protects the rights of citizens to private property and to 
its inheritance”; and “The state may, in the public interest and in accordance 
with law, expropriate or requisition private property for its use and shall make 
compensation for the private property expropriated or requisitioned.” 
For the first time, a socialist constitution explicitly provides for the protec-
tion of private property. 
Social Security System 
In 2004, China added to Article 14: “The state establishes a sound social secu-
rity system compatible with the level of economic development.” 
Human Rights 
China added Article 33: “The state respects and preserves human rights.” This 
is the first time that the Chinese constitution has formally recognized the val-
ue of human rights. 
Conclusion
The multifarious nature of constitutionalism has inspired different under-
standings of the meaning of “constitutionalism.” Adding to this confusion is 
the inevitable disparity between what is contained in the text of a constitu-
tion and how those provisions are implemented. By all accounts, however, 
progressive economic constitutionalism has contributed to China’s change in 
one generation from a poverty-stricken country to one of the world’s largest 
economies. While China has been learning from the rest of the world, it has 
established its own way of development based on its unique circumstances. 
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China’s experience shows that constitutional changes and economic re-
forms are intertwined and that they should be coordinated in a gradual and 
pragmatic manner. It took many years for China to recognize and accept con-
cepts such as private economy, market economy, private property rights, hu-
man rights, and rule of law. There is no statically ideal constitution in any 
dynamically changing society; constitutionalism does not mean that there 
must be a perfect constitution before its practice. Perhaps there is no perfect 
constitution—constitutional development is a never-ending process. 
Ultimately, a constitution resides in the particular historical and circum-
stantial settings of its country. One country can draw experiences from other 
countries, but it is impossible to transplant a constitutional system completely. 
To achieve national modernization, democracy alone is not adequate; it 
must be governed by constitutionalism and rule of law. The presence or ab-
sence of constitutionalism and rule of law is crucial to the success or failure of 
democracy. The development of democracy and constitutionalism can be cate-
gorized into two models: the success of the British-American model lies in the 
establishment of constitutionalism and rule of law in the first place, followed 
by democracy under a ready and stable constitutional and legal framework; 
while the French model aimed to introduce full democracy first and establish 
constitutionalism and rule of law later. Either way, to emphasize constitution-
alism does not mean to ignore the development of democracy, or vice versa. 
A synergetic coordination of constitutionalism and rule of law is the ultimate 
goal for China. 
The past and current financial crises have proved that a free market 
economy is not omnipotent. Government involvement and redistribution of 
resources and social wealth are not always counterproductive. Early consti-
tutions in Western countries established a completely free market economy 
system, which was suspicious and hostile toward government intervention. 
As the recent crisis has shown, however, a modern constitution should give 
the government reasonable powers to regulate the market economy and al-
locate social resources. This has nothing to do with ideology—it is a matter of 
distributive justice and social administration. 
Daniel Webster wrote, “One country, one constitution, one destiny.”3 To 
a great extent, the nature of a country’s constitution determines the destiny 
of the country. From the Chinese legal perspective, a constitution not only 
reflects the country’s economic base but also contributes to the economic base. 
As such, the constitution in China is not only the supreme law of the state but 
also an active social, economic, and political program for social transforma-
tion and development.
3  From a speech of March 15, 1837; reported in Edward Everett ed., The Works of Daniel Webster 
349 (Little, Brown 1853).
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The Role of Laws and Institutions  
in Expanding Women’s Voice, Agency, 
and Empowerment
Jeni Klugman and Sarah Twigg
“Voice, agency, and empowerment” refers to the ability of individuals and 
groups to make effective choices. Across all countries, the ability of women 
and men to exercise voice and agency differs—and women are usually at a 
disadvantage. The World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Devel-
opment (WDR 2012)1 highlights the vital importance of women’s voice and 
agency in both the household and society in general. This report—a landmark 
for the World Bank because it recognizes both the intrinsic and instrumental 
values of women’s voice, agency, and empowerment—identifies shrinking 
gender differences in voice and agency as a policy priority for future action.
Voice, agency, and empowerment have intrinsic value for women’s in-
dividual well-being and quality of life; they are valuable ends in their own 
right. This concept is in line with Amartya Sen’s view of development as the 
process of enlarging a person’s ‘‘functionings and capabilities to function, the 
range of things that a person could do and be in her life.”2 But the WDR 2012 
also shows that these goals are instrumental in achieving sustainable social 
and economic development. When women and men have equal voice and 
participation in public life, significant societal benefits result. For example, 
public health spending in the United States increased dramatically in the early 
1920s after women won the right to vote. Women’s participation in politics led 
to an intensive scaling up of hygiene campaigns and a sharp decline in child 
mortality. It is estimated that roughly 20,000 child deaths were averted every 
year because women won the right to vote, which explains about 10 percent of 
the reduction in child mortality in the United States between 1900 and 1930.3 
What roles do laws play in fostering women’s voice, agency, and empower- 
ment? Laws formalize individual and collective rights and provide the frame-
work within which people are empowered to exercise their voice and agency. 
Laws and their effective implementation and enforcement can be especially 
  The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of 
the World Bank or its Executive Directors. The authors are grateful to Humay Gulyieva for 
assistance and Tazeen Hasan for comments.
1  World Bank, World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development (World Bank 
2012) (hereinafter, WDR 2012).
2  A. Sen, Development as Capability Expansion, 17 J. of  Dev. Planning 41–58 (1989). 
3  Grant Miller, Women’s Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History 
(Stanford Medical School & NBER 2007).
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important for disadvantaged individuals and groups as they try to overcome 
underlying discrimination and structural inequalities—although laws some-
times serve to further entrench disadvantage and existing inequalities. 
The interaction between laws on the one hand and voice and agency on 
the other is mutually reinforcing. Changes in agency, patriarchal attitudes, 
and social norms can be important triggers for changes in laws, as evidenced 
by the significant role played by women’s collective movements since 1975 in 
promoting more egalitarian family laws in 70 countries around the world.4 At 
the same time, the very act of bestowing the stamp of legality, or illegality, has 
been a catalyst for increasing agency and transforming attitudes when intro-
duced as part of a multisectoral package. As Martin Luther King declared, “It 
may be true that the law cannot make a man love me. . . . But if it keeps him 
from lynching me, I think that’s pretty important also.”5 
There has been some progress in recognizing women’s equality and wom-
en’s rights at the international level. The Convention to Eliminate All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), agreed upon in Mexico in 1975, 
has been a pioneering instrument of human rights for women. It addressed for 
the first time discrimination in the private sphere, including the extension of 
protection to women against family violence, and sought to tackle substantive 
inequalities. To this end, CEDAW recognized the centrality of eliminating all 
forms of discrimination in order to achieve equality for women; it articulated 
the need to eliminate prejudices, customary practices, social norms, and ste-
reotyped roles for men and women; and it focused on achieving equality of 
outcomes, that is, equality in real terms.6 There are many examples of CEDAW 
helping to win tangible gains for girls and women, as in India, where the 
Supreme Court in 1997 relied on CEDAW to draw up a set of guidelines and 
norms for the processing of sexual harassment complaints.7
This chapter, building on the evidence and insights presented in the WDR 
2012, reviews the potential power of laws to expand women’s voice and agency. 
The analysis follows the framework set out in the WDR 2012, which finds that 
limited progress in women’s agency is explained by mutually reinforcing con-
straints in markets, formal institutions, and informal institutions (see figure 1). 
This points to the need to systematically analyze the interplay of these sectors. 
The focus of this chapter is confined to the role of formal and informal laws.
4  Mala Htun and S. Laurel Weldon, Communism, Colonialism and Clerical Power: Historical Lega-
cies and Feminist Activism in the Struggle over Family Law (Harvard U. 2011).
5  Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Towards Freedom, speech given at Dartmouth College (May 23, 
1962). 
6  For broader discussion of the significance of CEDAW for women’s rights and gender equal-
ity see Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, & Thomas G. Weiss, UN Ideas That Changed the World 
(United Nations 2009).
7  Vishaka and others v. State of Rajasthan and others (AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 3011) J.S. Verma 
C.J.I., Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar, & B.N. Kirpal, JJ.
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Figure 1. Limited Progress in Women’s Agency Is Explained by Mutually Reinforcing  
Constraints in Markets, Formal Institutions, and Informal Institutions
Source: WDR 2012, 153.
The chapter begins by outlining the pathways through which laws affect 
women’s empowerment and their ability to exercise voice and agency, fol-
lowed by a review of the role of plural legal systems and customary and reli-
gious laws. It then investigates the reality of laws in practice, which includes 
looking at issues such as access to justice and enforcement of laws, and closes 
with a discussion of the role of social norms in shaping or constraining the 
application of laws.
Pathways through Which Laws Enhance Women’s Ability  
to Exercise Voice and Agency
Laws formalize individual and collective rights and provide the framework 
within which people exercise agency. Progress has been made globally in re-
forming legislative and constitutional frameworks to advance gender equal-
ity and women’s rights. A nondiscrimination clause covering gender now 
appears in the constitutions of 97 countries, and 132 countries have constitu-
tional guarantees of equality before the law. 
Yet many countries still have legal provisions that overtly discriminate 
against women in both statutory and customary law, sometimes in the consti-
tution and sometimes despite what the constitution requires. Indeed, in 47 of 
the countries with constitutional equality provisions, legislation on access to 
institutions means women are less able than men to interact with public au-
thorities and the private sector. This includes restrictions on a woman’s ability 
to get a job, sign a contract, register a business, open a bank account, be the 
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head of the household, or choose where to live.8 According to Women, Busi-
ness, and the Law, of the 53 countries studied that formally recognize custom-
ary or religious law as valid sources of law under the constitution, more than 
half exempt such laws from constitutional provisions on nondiscrimination or 
equality.9 This discrepancy reveals a disconnect between constitutionally pro-
tected rights and statutory and customary law, which affects what plays out in 
practice. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, the constitution 
expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender and provides for 
equality before the law; yet married women cannot get a job, sign a contract, 
register a business, or be the head of a household in the same way as men. The 
constitution does not invalidate customary law that is discriminatory or in 
conflict with constitutional provisions of equality. 
Family laws, laws related to gender-based violence, and laws related to 
economic opportunities are among the domains of law most likely to limit 
women’s empowerment; these are discussed briefly below. In some countries, 
women’s citizenship rights are limited—a woman cannot confer citizenship 
on a foreign spouse in the same way as a man in 35 countries, and in 20 of 
those, women cannot confer citizenship on their children.10 
Restrictions can limit women’s mobility and access to work. Countries 
such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and the Republic 
of Yemen, where married women are required to have male permission to 
travel or to work outside the home, show how the law itself can restrict wom-
en’s agency. One result of this restriction is very low rates of female labor 
force participation—ranging from as low as 20 percent (Yemen) to 32 percent 
(Iran)—compared with male labor force participation of 73 percent (Iran) to 80 
percent (Saudi Arabia). 
Legal disparities can reduce women’s ability to participate on an equal 
footing with men in the economy. Women, Business, and the Law finds that 
greater lack of legal gender parity in business and institutional laws is associ-
ated with lower labor force participation by women (both in absolute terms 
and relative to men) and lower levels of women’s entrepreneurship. This is 
supported by a study in Africa that found that gender gaps in legal capacity 
and property rights limited women’s roles as entrepreneurs. The gap between 
the share of women and men who are employers is 30 percent higher in coun-
tries where there are larger gender disparities in economic rights.11 
8  World Bank, Women, Business, and the Law 2012: Removing Barriers to Economic Inclusion 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2012) (herein-
after, WBL).
9  Twenty-seven countries do not consider customary or personal law as invalid if the law 
violates constitutional provisions on nondiscrimination or equality; id. 
10  WBL, supra note 8.
11  M. Hallward-Driemeier & T. Hasan, Empowering Women: Legal Rights and Opportunities in 
Africa, World Bank Africa Development Forum Series (2012).
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Women’s collective voice in society is a critical component of the full ex-
ercise of empowerment and agency. There are many examples of women’s 
groups at the local level and movements at the national and global level en-
abling voice and affecting change. Perhaps one of the better-known examples 
is the Self-Employed Women’s Association in India (SEWA), which represents 
the interests of a large number of informal sector workers and entrepreneurs. 
SEWA provides information, support, and training services to its members; 
offers a platform for voicing concerns; and has created space for public action 
through which women workers have actively challenged their employers and 
the state.12 A major campaign in 2003 in support of better wages for incense 
stick rollers resulted in around half of all workers (10,000 women) receiving 
an increase in pay; another 2,000 were able to restart working after having re-
ceived training in new techniques.13 In situations like this, the legal framework 
is key—in Ethiopia, where the framework for civil society has been tightened 
since 2009, civil society organizations are unable to receive foreign funding if 
they engage in any work pertaining to human rights. The Ethiopian Women 
Lawyers Association (EWLA) is one civil society organization whose work 
has been affected. EWLA provided free legal aid to more than 17,000 women 
in 2008 and supported other activities that tens of thousands of participants 
benefited from. As a result of the legislation passed in 2009, EWLA cut back 
services, which now are restricted to limited legal aid for women provided by 
volunteers.14 
For their voices to be transformative, women need to be present when 
and where decisions are made—in parliament, legal institutions, formal pro-
fessional institutions, and local and state governments. Yet, women make up 
only 19 percent of parliamentarians worldwide, and in some regions their 
presence is even lower. In the Middle East and North Africa, women are only 
1 in 10 parliamentarians, and in Papua New Guinea there is only 1 female 
parliamentarian.15 
Quotas, while sometimes controversial, can be an effective means of im-
proving women’s representation. More than half of the countries in the world 
have implemented some type of political quota, in the form of voluntary quo-
tas by parties on electoral lists, reservation of a certain share of candidate po-
sitions for women, or reservation of a share of legislative slots. The use of 
such quotas has led to a dramatic increase in female leaders across the globe. 
Voluntary party quotas, for example, currently in place in 51 countries, can 
both reflect and fuel changes in public attitudes and signify a commitment 
12  WDR 2012, supra note 1.
13  J. Blaxall, India’s Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA). Empowerment through Mobiliza-
tion of Poor Women on a Large Scale: A Case Study from Reducing Poverty, Sustaining Growth; 
What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why: A Global Exchange for Scaling Up Success (World Bank 
2012).
14  Amnesty International (Mar. 11, 2012), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news 
/news-item/ethiopia-human-rights-work-crippled-by-restrictive-law.
15  Inter Parliamentary Union, available at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm.
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to gender equality, which also contributes to higher levels of female partici-
pation. Mandatory quotas in the form of reserved legislative seats have had 
positive results for women’s representation and participation in South Asia 
and parts of Africa. In Rwanda, where the constitution stipulates a 30 percent 
quota for women members of parliament, this number has been far exceeded: 
women now make up 56 percent of the lower house and 39 percent of the up-
per house.16 This change has translated into legislative gains for women in the 
form of revised family and inheritance laws, for example, and women report 
increased respect from family and community members, enhanced capacity to 
speak and be heard in public forums, greater autonomy in decision making in 
the family, and increased access to education.17 
The same is true in the private sector. Women have low representation 
on the boards of large firms (around 12 percent in Europe, 10 percent in the 
Americas, 7 percent in Asia and the Pacific, and 3 percent in the Middle East 
and North Africa). Quotas can be one way to tackle that representation. Nor-
way was the first country to introduce legislated corporate quotas in 2003, 
prior to which female representation had increased slowly. Female board rep-
resentation jumped rapidly from around 16 percent in 2004 to the mandated 
40 percent in 2008. In Australia, the prospect of reform had a positive effect on 
women’s participation. In 2011, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corpo-
rate Governance Council implemented a diversity policy requiring all publicly 
listed companies in Australia to set gender-diversity targets. Anticipation of 
the reforms had a positive impact on women in ASX leadership—which saw a 
600 percent increase in new women board appointees between 2009 and 2010 
(increasing from 5 percent to 27 percent).18 
Yet there have been some unexpected negative consequences of quotas. 
Reports from Rwanda suggest there has been some withdrawal of men from 
politics, increased marital discord, and a perception that marriage as an in-
stitution has been disrupted by the upheaval of gender roles.19 In Pakistan, 
quotas that violated strong social norms have been associated with increased 
discrimination of women.20
We now turn to look more closely at three key domains of law that af-
fect women’s voice and agency: family law, which is an underlying building 
block; laws regulating domestic and gender-based violence; and laws regulat-
ing women’s economic rights.
16  International Parliamentary Union, available at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm.
17  J. Burnet, Women Have Found Respect: Gender Quotas, Symbolic Representation and Female Em-
powerment in Rwanda, 7(3) Politics and Gender 303–34 (2011).
18  Australian Human Rights Commission, available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/sex_dis 
crimination/programs/women_leadership.html.
19  Burnet, supra note 17.
20  Mona Lina Krook, The Diffusion of Electoral Reform: Gender Quotas in Global Perspective, paper 
presented at the European Consortium for Political Research, Lisbon (2009).
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Family Law
Laws that regulate relations within the household play a significant role in fos-
tering or restricting women’s empowerment and agency. Legislation directed 
at domestic relations between men and women can lead the way in chang-
ing social attitudes. But change on this front has been slow. According to the 
WDR 2012, progress in law reform has been the slowest in areas that regulate 
household relations (family laws). Major inequalities still exist in inheritance 
rights; 26 countries have statutory inheritance laws that differentiate between 
women and men.21 These inequalities have serious negative consequences for 
women’s empowerment because inheritance is often a key way to accumulate 
assets. They can also have serious consequences in terms of impoverishment 
of widows.22 
Land laws and laws around land titling are important for access to assets, 
especially for female farmers and entrepreneurs. Joint ownership in marriage, 
for example, increases women’s ability to use land in accessing economic op-
portunities, while mandatory joint land titling has the added benefit of pro-
tecting a wife’s rights to land in the event of her husband’s death. Evaluations 
are under way to help document how much difference these policies make in 
practice. 
In many countries, women and girls still have fewer inheritance rights 
than men and boys. All Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) countries, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America re-
formed their inheritance laws more than 50 years ago to reflect more equal 
distribution, while in other regions the picture is mixed. All 14 countries from 
the Middle East and North Africa included in Women, Business, and the Law 
have differential inheritance rights for women as compared to men, as well as 
7 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 3 in South Asia, and 2 in East Asia and the Pacific. In 
majority-Muslim countries, important doctrinal differences affect the extent to 
which females and males inherit equally. In Turkey, for example, inheritance 
rights for girls and boys have long been equal in law and in practice, while in 
Bangladesh, the law provides for unequal inheritance rights, albeit with the 
option for families to agree on more equal distribution. 
Law reform to improve women’s inheritance rights could provide an ef-
fective means to reduce gender discrimination and improve a wide range of 
socioeconomic outcomes for women. There are some solid examples of re-
form. In Rwanda, following reforms to inheritance laws in 1999 that provided 
for women’s equal inheritance rights with men, land tenure reform was 
passed in 2004 to ensure that Rwandan men and women have secure title for 
21  Countries included in Women, Business, and the Law with gender-unequal inheritance laws 
are Bangladesh, Burundi, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Tunisia, the United Arab 
Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen. See WBL, supra note 8. 
22  See D. van de Walle, Welfare Effects of Widowhood in a Poor Country (World Bank 2011).
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their land. The law provides that new land titles for couples include the names 
of both the husband and the wife and that girls are able to inherit land from 
their parents in the same way as boys.23 In India, law reforms at the state level 
that eliminated gender discrimination in inheritance rights resulted in delays 
in the age of marriage for girls and improvements in girls’ education—girls’ 
mean years of schooling increased by between 11 and 25 percent following the 
reforms in 1994.24 
UN Women’s 2011–2012 Progress of the World’s Women Report notes that, his-
torically, legal jurisdiction was divided between public and private matters, 
leaving the private sphere of the family and intimate relationships outside 
formal justice systems. The seeming resistance by governments to step into 
the private sphere to regulate personal relations is reflected in the reservations 
demonstrated by many countries in signing on to CEDAW. Out of the 187 coun-
tries that have ratified CEDAW, 29 have registered reservations to Article 16, 
which calls for the elimination of all forms of discrimination in all matters 
relating to family and marriage relations. In many cases, reservations exist 
because family laws are subject to discriminatory plural legal provisions—an 
issue discussed in greater detail below.
In a number of countries, the act of marriage weakens a woman’s legal 
and property rights—married women cannot legally choose where to live in 
23 countries, married women do not have the same legal ownership rights to 
movable and immovable property as men (or unmarried women) in 7 coun-
tries, and married women cannot apply for a passport in the same way as men 
(or unmarried women) in 20 countries.25 
Marital property regimes that allow a woman to leave a marriage with 
a significant or equal share of household assets can increase her bargaining 
power, even if she never exercises that right.26 Conversely, laws restricting a 
woman’s options for exiting a marriage, such as those that leave her finan-
cially insecure in cases of divorce, can limit her agency and bargaining power 
within the family. Changing these laws can have a dramatic impact, as seen 
in the United States: domestic violence fell about 30 percent between 1970 
and 1990 after equitable divorce laws were introduced.27 Laws that constrain a 
woman’s mobility limit options for extended social and support networks and 
restrict her ability to leave in the case of disagreement, violence, or abuse. In 
20 countries covered by Women, Business, and the Law, married women cannot 
apply for a passport in the same way as a man; and in 4 countries, a married 
23  OECD, Women’s Economic Empowerment Issues (DAC Network on Gender Equality 2011).
24  Klaus Deininger, Aparajita Goyal, & Hari Naharajan, Inheritance Law Reform and Women’s 
Access to Capital: Evidence from India’s Hindu Succession Act, Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 5338 (World Bank 2010).
25  WBL, supra note 8.
26 WDR 2012, supra note 1.
27  Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and 
Family Distress, 121 Quarterly Journal of Economics 267–88 (Feb. 2006). 
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woman legally cannot travel outside her home or outside the country in the 
same way as a man. Yet, these numbers capture only formal statutory restric-
tions; the numbers are much larger when one considers customary laws. 
Laws that set a minimum age for marriage are important. Yet in 50 
countries, the minimum legal age of marriage is lower for females than for 
males28—as low as 14 years in Mexico, Mozambique, and Venezuela.29 Early 
marriage exposes girls to early pregnancy and childbirth, increases their risk 
of contracting HIV/AIDS, and can limit opportunities for education.30 For ex-
ample, only 2 percent of married girls between the ages of 15 and 19 in Nigeria 
attend school, compared with 69 percent of their unmarried female peers.31
Figure 2. Discrimination in Social Institutions Impedes Women’s Education and Literacy
     Source: OECD SIGI, 2009.
The OECD’s Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) captures criti-
cal societal norms and institutions that affect how women fare—using family 
code, physical integrity, son preference, civil liberties, and ownership rights—
and is applied to 102 developing countries. Figure 2 shows that countries 
with high levels of discrimination in social institutions have a lower ratio of 
28  UN Statistics Division (2010), “UNdata,” http://data.un.org, as cited in UN Women (2011–
2012).
29  http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=GenderStat&f=inID:19 (accessed Apr. 30, 2012).
30  S. Clark, Protecting Young Women from HIV/AIDS: The Case against Child and Adolescent Mar-
riage (International Family Planning Perspectives Jun. 2006).
31  Gordon and Sarah Brown Foundation, Out of Wedlock into School: A Review by Gordon Brown 
(Office of Gordon and Sarah Brown 2012).
The World Bank Legal Review222
female to male literacy rates; that is, women are less literate compared to men 
in countries with high levels of social institutional discrimination, while those 
countries where discrimination is lower are closer to parity in education.32 
The causality can run in both directions. Evidence from Turkey shows that 
extending compulsory education age by three years reduced the proportion 
of 16-year-old girls who were married by 44 percent, and those who had given 
birth by age 17 by 36 percent.33
Yet, even when countries reform their laws toward more equal treatment 
of men and women, differences can persist. The amendment of inheritance 
law reform in India resulted in a range of benefits for girls, as noted above, but 
it did not fully eliminate the underlying inequality in girls’ access to inherited 
land.34 This discrepancy may be due in part to a lack of dissemination of infor-
mation on the changed legal provisions. Laws are also sometimes ignored or 
weakly enforced, or they may be circumvented. 
Laws Regulating Domestic and Gender-Based Violence
Gender-based violence both reflects and reinforces inequities between men 
and women and damages the health, dignity, security, and autonomy of its vic-
tims. It is inextricably linked to gender inequality and perpetuates male power 
and control, in particular when it takes place within the home. Paragraph 12 of 
the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action codifies this message, stating: 
“Violence against women both violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment 
by women of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
Violence against women, much of which occurs in the private domain, has 
not been widely legislated against until recently. But significant progress has 
been made—as of April 2011, 125 countries had passed legislation on domestic 
violence, and almost two-thirds of countries, in efforts to make workplaces 
and public spaces safer for women, had passed laws on sexual harassment.35 
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa reflects progress in this area. The protocol states 
that “parties shall prohibit and condemn all forms of harmful practices which 
negatively affect the human rights of women and which are contrary to recog-
nized international standards.”36 
32  The SIGI is calculated based on the following indicators: early marriage, polygamy, parental 
authority, inheritance, female genital mutilation, violence against women, freedom of move-
ment, freedom of dress, access to land, access to credit, and access to property other than land.
33  Murat G. Kirdar, Meltem Dayıoğlu Tayfur, & İsmet Koç, The Effect of Compulsory Schooling 
Laws on Teenage Marriage and Births in Turkey, Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion 
Paper No. 5887 ( July 2011).
34  Deininger, Goyal, & Naharajan, supra note 24. 
35  UN Women (2011–2012), supra note 28, at Annex 4. 
36  African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa, paragraph 5 (2003).
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Yet, many penal and civil law codes fail to criminalize certain kinds of 
physical, sexual, or emotional violence. As a result, domestic violence sta-
tistics around the world are horrifying: at least 1 of every 10 ever-partnered 
women is physically or sexually assaulted by an intimate partner or someone 
she knows at some point in her life.37 Progress in legislating to prevent vio-
lence against women has been uneven across regions. The Middle East and 
North Africa in particular lag behind in legislating against all forms of vio-
lence against women—no country in the region has legislation criminalizing 
marital rape, less than 20 percent of the region has legislation against domestic 
violence, and just over 20 percent of countries have legislation against sexual 
harassment. Other regions are more varied—less than 40 percent of countries 
in East Asia and the Pacific have legislation against sexual harassment, and 
37  WDR 2012, supra note 1.
World Bank Efforts to Improve Women’s Land Rights  
Foster Empowerment and Agency
In recognition of the importance of property rights in fostering women’s empow-
erment and agency, the World Bank has been working with local authorities in 
some areas to facilitate more equal property ownership. 
In Aceh, Indonesia, where the 2004 tsunami affected 800 kilometers of coast-
line and destroyed close to 53,800 parcels of land, the Bank integrated gender 
into its post-tsunami reconstruction efforts. The land administration system sus-
tained significant damage—documentation of land ownership was washed away, 
one-third of the National Land Agency’s staff were killed, and physical boundary 
markers disappeared. The impact on women was particularly grave, because the 
tsunami deprived them of the safety nets offered by families, especially spouses 
and parents. In Aceh, land issues are traditionally considered to be the “natural” 
dominion of men, and this norm is reinforced by the lack of female representation 
on local committees and the absence of gender-disaggregated data.
The Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS) project 
integrated a well-functioning and gender-informed approach to land and prop-
erty rights by introducing joint titling and recording gender in the official register. 
Neither of these practices existed before. Considering that more than 275,000 land 
parcels have been registered during RALAS, the recording of gender is a signifi-
cant step forward. 
In addition, RALAS has been engaged in the promotion of women’s land 
rights by advocacy and policy dissemination with the study Gender Impacts of Land 
Titling in Aceh. The experience in Aceh has informed the work of reconstruction 
teams in Haiti, who recognize that taking gender-related factors into account in 
land administration can diffuse tensions over identity, status, and power that may 
threaten peace and security in postconflict situations.
The World Bank Legal Review224
just over 40 percent of countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have 
legislation against domestic violence.38 
Violence against women and girls perpetrated by family members also 
remains largely outside the law. Rape within marriage is illegal in only one-
third of all countries.39 Even where legislation exists, societal norms may result 
in persistently high rates of domestic violence. These norms may be widely 
shared by women and men. In too many countries—including Burkina Faso, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and Sierra Leone—more than half of women 
think it is acceptable for a man to beat his wife when they argue.40 
Laws Regulating Women’s Participation in the Economy
Women make up only 41 percent of the total workforce in the formal sector 
and tend to be concentrated in lower-paid and lower-status jobs.41 Evidence 
suggests that laws explain part of this disparity. Laws can restrict a woman’s 
participation in the economy, including restrictions on working hours, the sec-
tors in which a woman can work, and mandates requiring lower retirement 
ages for women. Women, Business, and the Law documents 44 countries that 
restrict the working hours of women and 71 that limit the industries in which 
women can work relative to men. These restrictions are evident across all in-
come levels and all regions of the world—this is not just a developing-country 
phenomenon. 
Statutory provision for child care and maternity leave and benefits, along-
side the recognition of flexi-time or part-time work, can improve women’s 
participation in the labor force. In Latin America, 19 of the 20 countries in-
cluded in Women, Business, and the Law legally require the state to provide or 
subsidize child care. These mandates can translate into available and afford-
able child care, as in Colombia, where the government’s Hogares Comuni-
tarios program pays women a small fee to take care of other women’s children 
and provides the caregiver food to feed the children three times a day.42 Yet, 
in Guatemala and Mexico, notwithstanding the legal obligation of the state to 
provide or subsidize child care, the lack of available care often pushes women 
into informal employment, and in Peru, 40 percent of working mothers take 
their children to work.43 
The availability of part-time or flexible work can increase women’s partici- 
pation in the labor force, particularly women with young children. In Argen-
38  UN Women (2011–2012), supra note 28, at Annex 4.
39  WDR 2012, supra note 1.
40  WDR 2012, supra note 1.
41  WBL, supra note 8.
42  Orazio Attanasio and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, Medium and Long-Run Effects of Nutrition and 
Child Care: Evaluation of a Community Nursery Programme in Rural Colombia (Centre for the 
Evaluation of Development Policies, Institute for Fiscal Studies EWP04/06 2006).
43  WDR 2012, supra note 1.
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tina, as a result of the availability of part-time employment contracts, partici-
pation by married women with children in formal employment increased 9 
percent and self-employment was reduced by 7 percent as compared to that 
by married women without children.44 In 41 countries, employees with chil-
dren who are minors have additional legal rights to flexible or part-time work 
schedules, whereas in many countries, part-time work is not legally recog-
nized at all.45 
There has been progress toward equal rights in the workplace, at least on 
the statutory side. More than 100 countries now have laws on nondiscrimina-
tion in hiring, and 128 have laws requiring equal pay for equal work. Laws 
against sexual harassment in the workplace are lagging, however, with only 
75 countries having formal sexual harassment laws in place. This may be a 
reflection of underlying social norms that permit such behavior, as touched on 
above and discussed further below.
Legal Pluralism and Its Impact on Women’s Agency
Many countries have plural legal systems that formally recognize religious or 
customary laws alongside statutes. Today, 52 countries recognize customary 
and religious law as valid sources of law under constitutions. This is most 
common in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 25 countries formally recognize at least 
one religious or customary law, followed by the Middle East and North Africa, 
where 11 countries constitutionally recognize alternative sources of law.46 The 
recognition of legal pluralism is generally welcome—reflecting the right of all 
communities to their own cultures and for indigenous communities the right 
to determine their own systems of law and justice.47 
Plural legal systems are not inherently good or bad for women’s agency; 
the value depends on the extent to which such systems (both statutory and 
customary) are nondiscriminatory.48 In practice, as documented below, plu-
ral legal systems can create barriers for women’s rights and access to justice. 
The plurality may affect both the content of the law—in Indonesia, there are 
six official religions and the state recognizes different provisions regulating 
marriage and divorce for each—and the process—in the United Kingdom, 
the 1996 Arbitration Act allows for private religious arbitration by Jewish and 
Muslim organizations on some disputes between spouses.49 
44  WDR 2012, supra note 1.
45  WBL, supra note 8.
46  WBL, supra note 8. 
47  UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN 
GA Res. 61/295 (2007).
48  Sandra Fredman, Anti-discrimination Laws and Work in the Developing World: A Thematic Over-
view (forthcoming). 
49  UN Women (2011–2012), supra note 28.
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Legal pluralism matters for the exercise of women’s agency because the 
scope of customary or religious laws often pertains to marriage, divorce, assets 
and land ownership, inheritance, or other “personal” laws. Legal pluralism 
can give rise to gender discrimination in family laws, gender-based violence, 
and procedural bias.
In at least 28 countries, parallel legal systems are exempt from meeting 
constitutional standards, such as nondiscrimination or equal protection pro-
visions. Among these countries, 20 differentiate between men and women in 
areas covering access to institutions and 15 differentiate between men’s and 
women’s legal capacity to own, manage, control, and inherit property.50 
Formal and informal customary and religious laws sometimes contra-
dict constitutional or statutory gender parity. The constitution of Botswana 
expressly exempts laws pertaining to divorce, adoption, marriage, and de-
volution of property and other personal and customary laws from the con-
stitutional equality guarantee. This exemption has permitted continuing dis-
crimination against women in customary law and practice, including early 
marriage, polygamy, and the continued practice of legal guardianship by men 
of unmarried women.51 In the Philippines, despite the constitutional guaran-
tee of equality before the law, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws permits 
polygamy and the marriage of girls under 18. Forced marriages are also still 
tolerated under this system.52
In other countries, including Kenya53 and South Africa, the constitution 
overrides such laws in cases of inconsistency, subordinating them to the over-
riding principle of equality. In South Africa, the bill of rights has enabled 
women to challenge discriminatory elements of customary law on the basis of 
their unconstitutionality.54
Plural legal systems can create barriers to women accessing justice. Mul-
tiple systems can lead to a complex web of overlapping systems, which can in 
turn generate gaps and exacerbate the challenges women already face in real-
izing their legal rights. Multiple legal systems can mean that issues such as do-
mestic violence are dealt with by alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms, 
often with the effect of decriminalizing the offense or allowing scope for the 
male perpetrator or his family to influence the victim. In Brazil, special crimi-
nal courts were set up as a form of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
for minor offenses. In practice, 60 to 80 percent of plaintiffs were women, 
mainly bringing complaints of physical abuse and threats. Reportedly, 
50  WBL, supra note 8.
51  S.15, Constitution of Botswana, as discussed in Fredman, supra note 48. 
52  Fredman, supra note 48. 
53  There is a limited exception for the Khadis courts, applying Muslim law; see WBL, supra note 8. 
Apart from that, no other customary or personal-status law is exempt, as made explicit in 
Article 2(4) and Article 60(1)(f) of the Constitution of Kenya.
54  South Africa Constitution, Section 39(3).
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90 percent of domestic violence cases ended at the first stage of conciliation, 
either because of intimidation by the accused or because the judge pressed 
for the case to be closed. Recognizing the negative impact of the trivialization 
of these crimes, Brazil passed a new law on domestic and family violence in 
2006, ending the practice.55 
Laws in Practice—Barriers to Access and Enforcement 
The expansion of economic opportunities, the adoption of progressive laws, 
and the evolution of legal systems are all critical to—indeed, necessary for— 
translating women’s rights into the true exercise of agency, but they are not 
sufficient on their own. Lack of access to justice for women in many parts of 
the world persists. This can be explained in part by the unaffordable costs of 
justice or the lack of awareness of rights. Women can be more adversely af-
fected by lack of access due to lower incomes, lower literacy, less mobility, and 
more restricted social networks. Lack of mobility and time, as well as social 
stigma and psychological trauma involved in bringing claims, often impedes 
women from seeking justice. When combined with rigid social norms, these 
factors can prevent women from seeking and receiving justice according to the 
rights they already have.
The vast majority of countries formally grant equal access to the court 
system for men and women. However, in 11 countries (the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Syrian 
Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates, the West Bank and Gaza, and the 
Republic of Yemen), the testimony of a woman carries less evidentiary weight 
than that of a man in family law cases. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
married women need the permission of their husbands to initiate legal pro-
ceedings in court.56 
Women face a range of social barriers to accessing the justice system. These 
can include a lack of knowledge about legal rights, dependence on male rela-
tives, and restriction of mobility, as well as the threat of social stigma outlined 
above. In Uganda, statutory land reform resulted in more ownership rights for 
women than traditional practices had accorded them, yet many women were 
unaware of these new rights or were precluded in practice due to the high cost 
of legal procedures and/or loyalty to customary practices.57
In some communities, social norms dictate that women cannot approach 
the justice system without the assistance of a male relative. This is the case in 
Timor-Leste, where 58 percent of Timorese, both men and women, disapproved 
55  See UN Women (2011–2012), supra note 28, for discussion.
56  WBL, supra note 8.
57  Debbie Budlender & Eileen Alma, In Focus: Women and Land, Securing Rights for Better Lives 
(International Development Research Centre 2011).
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of women speaking on their own behalf in local disputes.58 A lack of voice in 
household decisionmaking can also impede women from being sufficiently 
empowered to bring a claim before the justice system. A woman’s limited con-
trol over household property and assets can make her less likely to bring a 
claim of domestic violence, for example, because the case is likely to be taken 
against a family member upon whom she may be financially reliant. Social 
stigma in the case of sexual and domestic violence is a significant barrier in 
both developed and developing countries. In Haiti, fear of social stigmatiza-
tion and retribution, as well as distrust in the ability of the judicial system to 
protect them, causes many female victims of sexual violence to remain silent. 
It may also prevent victims from seeking medical attention.59 
Institutional barriers pose a significant challenge. Courtrooms may be dis-
tant and costs may be unaffordable. In Kenya, a formal claim for land in an 
inheritance case can involve up to 17 different legal steps, which translates 
into legal fees of as much as US$780. Service providers, including police, law-
yers, and court officials, may not be versed in or responsive to women’s needs. 
Data on sexual violence and robbery demonstrate that underreporting of of-
fenses by women results from the interaction of these various factors. Across 
57 countries, 10 percent of women say they have experienced sexual assault, 
but among those victims, only 11 percent reported the assault.60 And where 
women lack access to or control over financial resources or independent in-
come, the financial costs of pursuing legal recourse in the absence of free legal 
aid can be prohibitive. 
Police, court staff, and even judges often reflect the discriminatory atti-
tudes of wider society, and in some cases they may not be fully aware of the 
rights pertaining to women. This situation provides an additional barrier to 
women’s access to justice and results in women facing hostility or push-back 
from the very people who are supposed to uphold their rights. The first step in 
overcoming this barrier is better representation of women in the organizations 
charged with implementing and enforcing the law. Quotas have been used in 
Ethiopia, where one member on each land committee must be a woman. The 
benefits of this representation have been twofold—it has helped raise aware-
ness about land issues among local women, and it has increased their partici-
pation in the land registration process.61
The CEDAW committee expressed concern about bias in judicial deci-
sionmaking that stemmed from a complaint lodged by a rape survivor in the 
Philippines, which alleged that societal misconceptions about rape—such as 
the idea that rape victims are timid or easily cowed and that when a woman 
58  Asia Foundation (2008), as reported in UN Women (2011–2012), supra note 28.
59  Lisa Davis & Blaine Bookey, Respecting the Right to Health of Haitian Women and Girls, 13(1) 
Health & Hum. Rights (2011).
60  Lovett & Kelly (2009), as reported in UN Women (2011–2012), supra note 28.
61  N. Kumar & A. Quisumbing, Policy Reform towards Gender Equality in Ethiopia: Little by Little 
the Egg Begins to Walk (Institute for Food Policy Research 2010).
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knows her attacker, consent is implied—were relied on by the judge in ac-
quitting her alleged rapist.62 A 2004 report of the World Bank Workshop on 
the Development Implications of Gender-Based Violence demonstrates that 
women’s access to justice in the context of gender-based violence needs to be 
improved. In particular, the report notes that many judges and other legal pro-
fessionals lack the necessary knowledge about gender-based violence to apply 
international conventions on women’s rights, and that empowering ministries 
for women’s affairs is essential because they can play a central role in creat-
ing the political space needed for this issue to be included more frequently in 
policy dialogue.63 
There are some promising cases of reform in this area. Women in Indone-
sia identified high court fees as an obstacle to obtaining divorce certificates, 
which are required to access social assistance programs such as free health 
care, cash transfers, and subsidized rice. In response, the World Bank, in col-
laboration with PEKKA—an Indonesian NGO that works with more than 
12,000 female heads of household across 330 villages to raise awareness of 
women’s legal rights and to improve women’s access to justice through for-
mal legal processes—encouraged the Supreme Court to waive court fees for 
poor women and to hold circuit courts in rural areas. This quadrupled the 
number of people in remote areas who have been able to access the courts for 
family law matters. The Bank also worked with PEKKA to provide training 
for village paralegals on issues related to family law and domestic violence.
To promote greater understanding among government officials, a World 
Bank project in Kosovo is working with Municipal Cadastre Offices (land 
management offices) to implement more accurate procedures for registering 
land transactions, in part by ensuring that their practices are fully following 
the law, including the Gender Equity and Family Law, in all areas related to 
inheritance, purchasing, or the sale of property and mortgages. The goal is to 
help ensure that women receive their inheritance rights, that married wom-
en’s rights are properly registered, and that married women actually agree to 
the transactions made by their husbands.64 
World Bank Projects Have Unintended, yet Positive, Effects  
on Increasing Women’s Agency through Access to Justice
A project in Jordan aimed to enhance community-driven legal aid services to 
the poor. The project was housed within offices of an NGO providing social 
welfare services, which allowed women to seek advice without attracting at-
tention or hostility from their community. During a two-year period between 
62  UN Women (2011–2012), supra note 28.
63  World Bank, Report on the Outcomes of the Workshop: The Development Implications of Gender-
Based Violence (Gender and Development Group, PREM 2004).
64  World Bank, Mainstreaming Methods to Improve Property Rights in the Kosovo Real Estate Cadas-
tre and Registration Project (World Bank 2012).
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2009 and 2011, it provided free or reduced-cost legal counseling for 700 peo-
ple; more than 70 percent of its clients were women. Inspired by the example, 
the Jordan Center for Legal Aid, with the Jordan Bar Association, created the 
first pro bono lawyers’ association. The association provides a system of “one-
stop shops” for legal aid and counseling and improves access to and quality 
of service. The Ministry of Social Welfare agreed to refer poor women in need 
of assistance to the Justice Center for Legal Aid. 
In Vietnam, the World Bank has provided ongoing support to the govern-
ment to foster effective implementation of the 2007 Law on Gender Equal-
ity and the National Strategy on Gender Equality. The National Strategy on 
Gender Equality set out 5 objectives and 20 quantitative targets to eliminate 
discrimination and ensure women’s equal rights in the fields of labor employ-
ment, education, and health care; to improve the quality of women’s partici-
pation in economic, political, and social fields; and to enhance the capacity of 
national machinery for the advancement of women. To further these goals, 
the World Bank supported awareness raising and capacity building within 
relevant ministries, and worked with these ministries to build systems of ac-
countability, including through a series of development policy loans. 
Social and Cultural Norms Interact with Laws 
The persistence of patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted gender stereotypes in 
relation to women’s roles and responsibilities perpetuates gender inequality 
and limits the extent to which formally recognized women’s rights can be real-
ized in practice. As eloquently noted by Devaki Jain in her review of the United 
Nations’ 60-year quest for equality and justice, “Many cultural traditions have 
embargoes on many dimensions of women’s concerns and freedom. It is here 
that culture clashes with women’s access to the universality of human rights; 
often traditions and religious practices hurt and discriminate.”65 In this sense, 
disequalizing social norms and values can prevent laws from removing con-
straints to agency. 
A stark example of the impact norms can have on women’s empower-
ment, voice, and agency is the restriction on women’s mobility. Legal restric-
tions on mobility are present in certain countries: 4 of the 141 countries in-
cluded in Women, Business, and the Law legally restrict married women from 
leaving the home in the same way as a man; 16 countries restrict married 
women from getting a job in the same way as a man; and in 22 countries, 
married women cannot apply for a passport in the same way as a man. Social 
norms in many more countries dictate what is acceptable behavior for women. 
In all 19 countries included in the WDR 2012 qualitative study on gender and 
economic choice, for example, social norms were the most frequently cited 
constraint on women’s physical mobility. In Malawi, social norms deterred 
65  Devaki Jain, Women, Development and the UN: A Sixty-Year Quest for Equality and Justice, 
United Nations Intellectual History Project (Indiana U. Press 2005). 
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pregnant women from using a bicycle ambulance that was set up to improve 
emergency obstetric care.66
Social norms can interact with formal laws to dictate the extent to which 
women’s higher personal incomes translate into greater voice and bargaining 
power within the household. About 20 percent of the participants in the WDR 
2012 qualitative study said that husbands have complete control over their 
wives’ income. Participants also reported that when women do not retain con-
trol over their earnings, the potential empowering role of those earnings is 
limited.
High rates of domestic or gender-based violence can be traced to prevail-
ing norms. Several countries with serious problems of violence against women 
have passed legislation relating to domestic and other violence—Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Nepal, the Philippines, and Zambia—yet patterns of violence contin-
ue. A World Health Organization multicountry study revealed that 13 to 61 
percent of women experience physical violence in their lifetime,67 while more 
than 60 percent of women in Bangladesh experience some form of domes-
tic abuse during their lifetime.68 Thus, although legislation protecting against 
such behavior is critical, so is the effective implementation of laws and revised 
cultural perspectives about the acceptability of violence.
Because prevailing social norms in a number of areas can limit the effect 
of laws to the detriment of gender equality, concerted efforts on this front are 
needed. Gender norms can be persistent and resilient to change. This is par-
ticularly true when an increase in women’s empowerment and agency threat-
ens the balance of power within households and communities. The good news 
is that change is possible. In India, increased female leadership influenced 
adolescent girls’ career aspirations and educational attainment. Following a 
1993 law that reserved female leadership positions for women in randomly 
selected village councils, the gender gap in career aspirations closed by 25 per-
cent in villages that were assigned a female leader for two election cycles, and 
the gender gap in adolescent educational attainment was erased completely, 
with girls spending less time on household chores.69
66  K. Lungu et al., Are Bicycle Ambulances and Community Transport Plans Effective in Strengthen-
ing Obstetric Referral Systems in Southern Mali? 13(2) Malawi Med. J. 16–18 (2001).
67  World Health Organization, WHO Multi-country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Vio-
lence against Women (WHO 2005).
68  L. M. Bates et al., Socioeconomic Factors and Processes Associated with Domestic Violence in Rural 
Bangladesh, 30(4) Intl. Family Planning Perspectives 190–99 (2004).
69  Lori Beaman et al., Female Leadership Raises Aspirations and Educational Attainment for Girls: 
A Policy Experiment in India (2012), available at http://www.sciencexpress.org/12 January 
2012/Page 1/10.1126/science.1212382.
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Conclusions
This chapter has considered how laws can enhance or limit women’s voice 
and agency. There are several highlights. First, discrimination persists in many 
formal statutory legal systems, especially for married women. Second, many 
countries have plural systems of law related to marriage, divorce, succession, 
or other “personal” issues that limit rights that may exist. Third, the enforce-
ment of rights and the ability for women to seek redress are critical if rights 
are to encourage the exercise of voice and agency. Finally, and also related to 
enforceability, social and cultural norms interact with laws to limit or enhance 
their effectiveness.
Although there has been much progress on the front of enhancing wom-
en’s voice, agency, and empowerment, the challenges that remain are signifi-
cant. The dearth of gender-disaggregated data is also a limiting factor, imped-
ing the policy and advocacy work necessary to reform laws. 
The priorities now are twofold: legal reform is critical. But legal reform 
alone is insufficient. It must be combined with changes in accessibility and 
enforceability of laws and changes in social norms around gender roles and 
women’s abilities. Such norms can limit the effect of laws, services, or incomes 
to the detriment of women’s voice, agency, and empowerment. By employing 
innovative approaches, legal structures have the potential to significantly in-
crease women’s agency. The World Bank has a strong track record in working 
in partnership to promote women’s voice, agency, and empowerment through 
financing, innovation and learning, and investing in data and knowledge to 
help better understand and address the underlying inequalities. 
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“We Want What the  
Ok Tedi Women Have!”
Guidance from Papua New Guinea on Women’s 
Engagement in Mining Deals
Nicholas MeNzies aNd GeorGia harley
Despite global gender equality gains in education, life expectancy, and labor 
force participation, two areas of persistent inequality remain: asset gaps and 
women’s agency.1 In many developing countries, including Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), natural resources are citizens’ key asset. Women’s agency over these 
assets—their ability to make choices and transform those choices into actions 
and outcomes (or more simply, the ability to define goals and act on them)—is 
commonly weak. This is especially so when the resources are accessed for 
capital-intensive development. Empowering women to exercise agency and 
control over natural resources and the revenues that flow from them is thus 
an important contemporary focus for engagements related to gender equality 
and economic development.
The mining regulatory regime in PNG provides a relatively strong posi-
tion for communities. Agreements between the state, companies, and impact-
ed communities commonly include significant community benefits, such as a 
share of royalties and an equity stake in the mine. However, significant gender 
inequality, both locally and at the national level, means that women’s voices 
are rarely represented in agreement making.2 Women end up with control of 
  The authors would like to thank Belden Dasa, Musje Werror, Nigel Parker, Ian Middleton, 
Jamila Abassi, Almah Tararia, Patricia Kassman, Nicole Haley, Adriana Eftimie, Waafas Ofosu- 
Amaah, Lwanzo Amani, Sakuntala Akmeemana, Laura Bailey, and Phillipa Carr, who were 
closely involved in the design, implementation, and write-up of this work. Even so, errors 
of fact and interpretation are those of the authors, as are the views expressed in this paper, 
which should not be attributed to the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries 
they represent.
1  World Bank, World Development Report 2012 Gender Equality and Development. Strengthen-
ing the role of women in household and community decision making has been shown to 
have positive development impacts, as women tend to prioritize productive expenditures 
for their families and communities (including for food, health, and education) over unpro-
ductive consumption (such as of alcohol, cigarettes, and gambling).
2  Prior to the 2012 election, when three women were elected at once, only three women had 
ever been elected in the 37-year history of PNG’s parliament. Moreover, roughly two-thirds 
of women experience gender-based violence in their lifetimes, and maternal mortality rates 
are some of the highest in the region.
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few, if any, benefits, while bearing a disproportionate burden of the social and 
environmental costs of mining.3 
The Ok Tedi mine, located in the northern corner of PNG’s Western Prov-
ince, is an exception, albeit qualified, to this general state of affairs. The prov-
ince receives a significant share of mining revenues, yet service delivery in 
the area remains weak. On top of provincial government revenues, impacted 
communities have received benefits totaling more than 2 billion PNG kina 
(US$980 million) over the past decade.4 Revised compensation agreements 
at the Ok Tedi mine, called Community Mine Continuation Agreements 
(CMCAs), concluded in 2007 are an encouraging innovation.5 Women had a 
seat at the negotiating table and secured an agreement giving them 10 percent 
of all benefits, 50 percent of all scholarships, cash payments into family bank 
accounts (to which women are cosignatories), and mandated seats on the gov-
erning bodies implementing the agreement (including future reviews of the 
agreement). Women’s entitlements are elevated to legally enforceable rights at 
the heart of the mining company’s license to operate. Such an arrangement is 
unprecedented anywhere in the world. 
At the 2010 Women in Mining conference in the town of Madang,6 women 
from mining communities across PNG exclaimed, “We want what the Ok Tedi 
women have!” This chapter is based on research in the North Fly (one of three 
areas impacted by the 2007 agreement).7 It explores the process of negotiation 
and progress in implementation of the agreement, examining how the agree-
ment came about, assessing whether its promise is being realized in practice, 
3  See, for example, M. Macintyre, Modernity, Gender and Mining: Experiences from Papua New 
Guinea, in Gendering the Field: Towards Sustainable Livelihoods for Mining Communities (ANU E-
Press 2011). See also M. Macintyre, Petztorme Women: Responding to Change in Lihir, Papua New 
Guinea, Women’s Groups and Everyday Modernity in Melanesia, 74 (1–2) Oceania  (Special Issue) 
120–33 (2003). The experience of some indigenous communities in Australia and Canada 
provides examples of women playing key roles. See C. O’Faircheallaigh, Women’s Absence, 
Women’s Power: Indigenous Women and Negotiations with Mining Companies in Australia and 
Canada, Ethnic and Racial Studies 1–19 (2012).
4  Mine operator, Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) data.
5  The five main benefit streams under the CMCAs are cash (the mine operator disburses cash 
into a mix of family and some clan bank accounts with an annual payment per person); vil-
lage projects (each village submits applications for small-scale projects and goods, such as 
water tanks, outboard motors, and animal husbandry); investments (the foundation invests 
funds in projects to earn an ongoing return, such as passenger and cargo vessels on the Fly 
River, housing in Kiunga, and passenger planes); school scholarships (primary, secondary, 
and tertiary); and the Women and Children’s Fund (10 percent of all benefits are set aside for 
women, whose use is to be decided upon by women’s groups).
6  The third in a series of meetings focused on communities and women in mine-affected areas, 
sponsored by GoPNG and the World Bank as part of the ongoing sectoral program of techni-
cal assistance financed by the Bank in PNG.
7  Villages visited for this research were mine villages (Finalbin); river villages (Atkamba, 
Moian, and Yogi); and road villages (Ningerum, where people came from other road villages 
to participate in focus group discussions). All villages were in North Fly District (except for 
Moian, which is in Middle Fly). Impacts and conditions in Middle and South Fly districts are 
known to be different and are not covered in this study.
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and providing guidance for mining and gender practitioners hoping to use 
mining agreements to improve development outcomes for women, both in 
PNG and farther afield. 
Underpinning the approach to assessing the implementation of the agree-
ment are two widely held tenets of contemporary development practice:
•	 	Community-driven development (CDD) has played an increasingly im-
portant role in fragile institutional contexts. Rather than treating poor 
and marginalized people as the target of poverty-reduction efforts, CDD 
gives control over planning decisions and investment of resources to 
community groups and local governments—it operates on principles of 
empowerment, community ownership, participatory governance, greater 
downward accountability, and enhanced local capacity.8 Complexity of-
ten undermines accountability and transparency, and thus key principles, 
such as clear and simple rules of the game and access to information, are 
crucial to the premise of CDD.
•	 	A political economy approach to delivering development programs is 
one that is designed to mitigate some key risks (such as elite capture and 
leakage) through a better understanding of existing power structures 
and patronage systems and by working actively to overcome constraints. 
Implementation is an ongoing process of measuring progress against ar-
ticulated development objectives and adjusting delivery of the program 
accordingly.
Background of the Ok Tedi Mining Negotiations
The history, ownership structure, and importance of Ok Tedi to PNG’s economy 
have been critical in shaping the negotiation process and outcomes.
The mine and affected communities have been engaged in long-running 
disputes that primarily concern significant environmental damage from the 
disposal of tailings and mine waste into the Ok Tedi and Fly river systems.9 
The disputes occur in the historical context of tension over the impacts of the 
Panguna mine on Bougainville, which led to conflict and the creation of an au-
tonomous region with a pathway to independence from PNG. Issues of con-
cern regarding the Ok Tedi mine include loss of fish stocks and water sources, 
increased flooding leading to the destruction of forests and food gardens, and 
increased mosquito-borne diseases. Residents along the road between the 
8  Experience has shown that given clear rules of the game, access to information, and appro-
priate capacity and financial support, poor men and women can effectively organize in order 
to address local problems by working in partnership with other state and nonstate develop-
ment actors.
9  Ok Tedi website, http://www.oktedi.com/community-and-environment/the-environment 
/impacts-of-mining. The original project design included a tailings dam, but the dam’s foun-
dations were washed away in a landslide early in construction in 1984 and were not rebuilt. 
The national government and OTML agreed to allow the tailings to discharge directly into 
the river.
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Figure 1. Map of Western Province, PNG
Source: World Bank.
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mine and the river port in Kiunga also complain about dust from passing con-
voys. According to an independent environment expert, the riverine impacts 
are likely to be felt for “several hundred years” and are borne more heavily by 
women, who are traditionally responsible for crop production, than by men.10 
In 1994, affected communities mounted a class action lawsuit against the 
mine’s then major shareholder, BHP Pty Ltd, in the Supreme Court of Victoria, 
Australia, (where BHP is registered). The case was settled with a US$500 mil-
lion payout and a commitment to contain tailings and mine waste disposal.11 
The case drew international interest at the time for its use of tort law to secure 
the accountability of a multinational company for environmental damages.12
In 2000, due to community complaints about the mine’s continued use 
of riverine tailings disposal and the mine’s concern about ongoing environ-
mental liability, BHP queried whether the mine should close.13 The mine is the 
single largest contributor to the PNG economy,14 and thus the state had, and 
still has, a strong interest in its continued operation. 
To allow operations to continue, the mine’s majority shareholding was 
divested to a development trust, the PNG Sustainable Development Program 
Limited (PNGSDP), beneficially owned by the people of PNG and registered 
in Singapore to ensure relative independence from day-to-day politics.15 The 
10  Alan Tingay, Letter of Endorsement from the Independent Scientist Appointed to the CMCA 2006/7 
Review Process (Apr. 16, 2007) (Attachment B to CMCAs).
11  G. Banks & C. Ballard, The Ok Tedi Settlement: Issues, Outcomes, and Implications (Asia Pacific 
Press 1997). 
12  Since the Ok Tedi case, class actions have become increasingly prevalent, including actions 
taken against Freeport-McMoRan’s Grasberg mine in West Papua, Indonesia; Exxon-Mobil’s 
natural gas installation in Aceh, Indonesia; Unocal’s oil pipeline in Burma; Shell’s petroleum 
operations in the Nigerian delta; Rio Tinto’s copper mine on Bougainville; Texaco’s petro-
leum operations in the Ecuadorian Amazon; and Thor Chemical’s use of mercury-based 
chemicals in South Africa. See Banks & Ballard, supra note 11. See also Peter Newell, Access 
to Environmental Justice? Litigation against TNCs in the South 32(1) R. Crook and P. Houtzager, 
Making Law Matter: Rules, Rights and Security in the Lives of the Poor, IDS Bulletin 83–93 (2001); 
Halina Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability through National Courts: Implica-
tions and Policy Options, 24 Hastings Int. & Comp. L. Rev. 451–74 (2001).
13  BHP reported that, even if mining stopped immediately, downstream environmental im-
pacts would continue to increase and would likely persist for at least 50 years. Parame-
trix, Inc. and URS Greiner Woodward Clyde, Draft Executive Summary: Assessment of Human 
Health and Ecological Risks for Proposed Mine Waste Mitigation Options at the Ok Tedi Mine, 
Papua New Guinea; Screening Level Risk Assessment, prepared for Ok Tedi Mining, Ltd., 1–13 
(Aug. 13, 1999), available at http://www.oktedi.com.
14  In 2010, export earnings represented 18 percent of the country’s GDP, and taxes and divi-
dends to the national government represented 18 percent of tax revenue and 17 percent of 
government domestic revenue. 
15  The PNGSDP comprises a long-term fund and a development fund. The long-term fund in-
vests two-thirds of the net income received from OTML in low-risk investments for the future 
benefit of the people of PNG after the mine’s closure. It has a balance of more than US$1.2 
billion. The development fund invests one-third of net income received from OTML in sus-
tainable development projects. Two-thirds of those projects are national and one-third are 
focused in Western Province. For a full description of BHP’s exit strategy and the PNGSDP, 
see http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/20
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PNGSDP invests significant amounts in Western Province, including in com-
munities affected by the Ok Tedi mine, which, with other mine-related and 
government sources, creates a complex web of real and potential benefits for 
communities.16 The mine was required under law to enter into legally enforce-
able consent agreements with affected landowners and users. These became 
known as Community Mine Continuation Agreements (CMCAs). In 2001, the 
first CMCAs were negotiated. In accordance with a five-year review period, 
a revised set of CMCAs was negotiated in 2006 and 2007. The revised set of 
CMCAs now covers more than 90,000 people in 156 villages stretching from 
the villages in the Highlands around the mine site near Tabubil, along the Ok 
Tedi and Fly Rivers, to the mouth of the Fly (see figure 1).17 
Negotiation of the Agreement
Negotiations between mining companies, the state, and landowners are in-
variably subject to extreme asymmetries of information and power. These 
characteristics reduce the likelihood of equitable agreements and limit the po-
tential of mining investment to contribute to development outcomes. Over 
time, entrenched asymmetries can build tension between the parties and un-
dermine the durability of mining investment. The CMCA review process at 
the Ok Tedi mine addressed these challenges to some extent. 
For the CMCAs, the experience with Bougainville’s Panguna mine; the 
long history of dispute, litigation, and engagement around Ok Tedi; the 
mine’s beneficial ownership; and the advanced stage of the mine’s life were 
key factors resulting in a more positive consultation process being established. 
For the 2006–07 review, with over 20 years of experience in the area and pro-
duction ongoing during negotiations, the mine operator suffered fewer of the 
time pressures that mining companies often face when negotiating agreements 
prior to the commencement of operations. Mine management also responded 
to the international pressure (from NGOs and multilateral organizations) that 
the environmental damage and litigation had brought, with a desire to leave 
an improved legacy. 
Although not without its challenges, the 2006–07 CMCA review process 
was in many ways a model one, and the quality of the process was impor-
tant to women’s ability to secure the deal they did. The broadly consultative 
process, significant time taken, and independent facilitation and advice all 
helped to ameliorate asymmetries and build trust. The review process lasted 
11/06/14/000333037_20110614052552/Rendered/PDF/624980NWP0P1160ns00trusts0 
and0funds.pdf.
16  In addition to five main sources under the CMCAs, other sources of local projects include 
the Alice River Trust (set up after the class action suit), mine charitable projects, mine- 
implemented tax-credit projects, member-of-parliament-controlled constituency develop-
ment fund projects, and local government projects.
17  The number of villages has increased over time because some communities that were origi-
nally opposed to the agreements have since joined.
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18 months and cost K7 million (US$3.4 million), paid for by the mine. See the 
box below for a summary of the negotiating process.
 CMCA Negotiations: An Innovation
Independent international (the Keystone Center) and local (the 
Tanorama Network) facilitators were selected jointly by the mine 
and CMCA community leaders to design, support, and guide the 
process. Independent legal, environmental, and accounting advice 
was engaged for communities at no cost to them. Prominent former 
chief justice of the PNG Supreme Court, Sir Arnold Amet, was ap-
pointed as the independent legal observer; he became an adviser to 
the affected communities. The top-level negotiations were held in 
Tabubil, the township at the base of the mine. Regional-level meet-
ings were held in each of three impacted subregions, and village 
meetings in almost all the impacted villages. Delegates to regional 
meetings were directly elected by their village constituencies, and 
the representatives at the top-level negotiating table in Tabubil were 
elected from the regional meetings. 
Women’s Engagement in the Negotiations
The quality of the overall process provided a positive environment for women 
to exercise agency. Yet initially, women were not included at all. In the nego-
tiation’s early stages, all community representatives were men. In deference 
to their understanding of local custom, the independent facilitators did not 
challenge this situation. As one facilitator noted, “we had to be very careful 
not to be perceived as undermining local authority or customs.” Instead, fa-
cilitators asked the male representatives to ensure that they represented the 
views of their entire group, including women and children. The on-site nature 
of the discussions meant that, at least for the regional meetings, some women 
were able to sit outside the negotiations and listen, even though they were not 
seated at the negotiating table. 
As negotiations continued, it became apparent that women’s views were 
not being represented. The mining company’s management understood that 
the CMCAs would be more likely to achieve development outcomes if women 
were involved. One senior company representative reflected that “there would 
be a payout at the end, and there was some concern that the men may drink 
that away, or buy jeeps, cigarettes etc.” A delegate noted that “the women 
were so involved in health and education, they would end up being respon-
sible for implementing social projects in the region.” Improved development 
outcomes could foster community support in favor of the mine and reduce the 
chances of mining-related complaints. And so it was recognized that women’s 
voices should be heard in the negotiations. The combined support of the com-
pany and independent facilitators was critical in convincing the male benefi-
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ciaries and the state that women should have a seat at the main negotiating 
table. With negotiations at midpoint, a women’s delegation was established. 
As one facilitator noted, “the women were so happy that they had a seat at the 
table—they felt they had won something already.”
Women’s involvement was structured around a single delegate at the cen-
tral negotiating table and a separate women’s caucus that gathered outside of 
the main meeting to formulate negotiating positions. There were also consulta-
tions with women in impacted villages. The facilitators worked closely with 
the mine’s gender desk, which had received prior support from a national-level 
Women in Mining project18 and had assessed women’s development needs. 
Ume Wainetti was identified as the women’s delegate. Mrs. Wainetti is 
from the impacted region yet also has a national profile as former chair of 
the National Council of Women and current convener of the national Family 
and Sexual Violence Action Committee. In negotiations, Wainetti used cul-
tural cues and tactics, describing herself to other delegates as a “sister and 
aunty.” Coming from the impacted area, Wainetti could both be more asser-
tive and employ a range of emotions with the male village representatives 
more freely than an outsider. Wainetti ensured that she sat next to the mining 
company managing director at key moments. Presentations of health statis-
tics for women and children, combined with emotive personal stories, helped 
to influence the men at the table. One facilitator observed that Wainetti was 
“one of the best negotiators at the table.” Her competence in this regard likely 
stemmed from a combination of tertiary education (when most of the other 
delegates had only primary level), a combination of national status and local 
roots, and substantial leadership and negotiation skills acquired in national 
and international settings. 
In support of Wainetti as the women’s delegate, a caucus of about 
20 women constituted an important forum for both education and developing 
an informed negotiating position that Wainetti would take to the main nego-
tiating table. The caucus brought together at least two women from each of 
nine impacted areas, along with the provincial government’s women’s officer 
and female facilitators. A side workshop held over several days included in-
formation sessions from mine staff and independent experts about the overall 
mining operation, environmental impacts, and the benefit envelope. Wainetti, 
the facilitators, and the mine outreach team also visited women in mine- 
affected villages, exchanging views and developing a shared negotiating posi-
tion. As one facilitator put it, “they [the women’s caucus] were great because 
they were great leaders, great negotiators, not just because they were women.”
18  Launched in 2003, the Women in Mining and Petroleum project (funded by the World Bank– 
managed Japan Social Development Fund) has included the drafting of women in mining 
action plans for affected communities, three national conferences leading to a cabinet- 
endorsed five-year national action plan, and capacity building (including in basic literacy, 
numeracy, and economic development skills) to allow women to manage and benefit from 
the resources that accrue as a result of extractives industries.
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Initially, the women’s key proposal was that a minimum of 5 percent of all 
funds be specifically set aside (that is, ring-fenced) for the benefit of women 
and children. Wainetti described how women “wanted a separate pot to make 
sure that women and kids were not forgotten as usual.” The proposal was 
not intended to exclude women from the remainder of the benefits, nor was 
it intended to be a maximum amount that women would receive—rather, it 
was to be a separate minimum amount prioritized for specific initiatives for 
women and children. Drawing on personal relationships and networks, the 
women’s caucus approached influential players out of session to seek their 
support for the proposal. One such participant was Sir Arnold Amet, a well-
respected statesman. He was supportive, and suggested that they raise the 
figure. The delegation also secured the support of the mine’s senior manage-
ment. The figure of 10 percent was ultimately chosen on the basis that the male 
beneficiaries would be unlikely to accept more and that 10 percent might fly 
“under the radar” at the negotiating table. 
In tabling the proposal at the main negotiating session, the women’s del-
egate emphasized the complementary roles of women and men in the com-
munity and stressed that “we are not asking for much, only 10 percent.” 
Following a silence, Amet spoke in support of the proposal, followed by the 
mining company representative. One facilitator described how “the back-
ing of prestigious people was critical to the proposal being supported in the 
room.” No questions or concerns were raised, and the proposal was adopted 
unanimously. 
The women secured additional provisions on an ad hoc basis throughout 
the negotiation, including 
•	 	Cash compensation payments deposited into family bank accounts, to 
which women were encouraged by the mine to be signatories. (Previously, 
cash was transferred to clan accounts, which were controlled by men and 
subject to persistent concerns regarding misuse and leakage.)
•	 	Fifty percent of all educational scholarships awarded to women and girls, 
and women would make up half of the membership of the scholarship 
selection panels. 
•	 	Women represented in the CMCA’s key local governance bodies, village 
planning committees.19 Each committee would include two women repre-
sentatives out of the five members (or three women representatives out of 
a maximum of eight members). 
•	 	Women represented on each of nine regional trusts and on the board of 
directors of the Ok Tedi Fly River Development Program, the foundation 
responsible for the agreement’s implementation. 
19  Village planning committees engage in a participatory process to identify, plan, and allocate 
village-level CMCA projects. Committee members are elected every three years in a process 
supervised by the foundation. 
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To address what was seen by communities as poor implementation up 
to that point, key tenets of the 2007 agreement were new structures to ensure 
“a high level of ownership and decision-making power over resources, pro-
grams, and projects” by impacted communities. 
The agreement provides more explicit entitlements for women than any 
other mining agreement in PNG or, as far as can be discerned, globally. It 
thus represents an innovation in efforts to empower women to exercise agen-
cy over natural resources. However, the deal alone is not necessarily a suc-
cess for women. Ring-fencing can be seen as “both a victory for women and a 
failure.”20 On the one hand, it promises to improve the status of women by of-
fering control over a specific allocation of funds. Indeed, effects could be even 
greater if the women taking up decision-making roles over the ring-fenced 
funds are able to generate positive spillover effects for women in other areas, 
such as stronger household decision making, greater participation in political 
life, and economic empowerment.21 On the other hand, it is hard to argue on 
its face that control of 10 percent of all benefits for more than two-thirds of 
the population (once children are included) is fair. Further, if ring-fencing en-
trenches norms that women are somehow undeserving of equal participation 
and equal benefit sharing and excludes women from the remaining 90 percent 
of benefits, then its effectiveness should be questioned. Some of these issues 
can be addressed only in the context of implementation.
Implementation of the Agreement
The novelty of the deal secured for women in the 2007 agreement raised high 
expectations; experience during implementation has been mixed. 
Informed Awareness of the Women’s Deal Is Low 
Research reveals that in many villages, a wide cross-section of women and 
men had heard about “the women’s 10 percent,” but no beneficiaries were 
able to explain how much money was available, the process by which projects 
were selected, or what had been approved to date. Several women complained 
that they have not received guidance or training on how to access the benefits. 
“How do we get the money? . . . It is very hard. . . . Since the launching, no-
body knows what has happened with the 10 percent. There are no courses on 
how to apply for the money. Mothers are in a complete blackout.” More posi-
tively, male residents did not express any resentment or complaints about the 
women’s 10 percent other than a critique that the women weren’t using their 
20  See B. Sharp, Renegotiating a Papua New Guinea Compensation Agreement: Applying an Informed 
Consensus Approach, 69 Resource Management in the Asia Pacific, Working Paper No. 69 
(2008).
21  See, for example, the impact of reserved seats for women in Indian village councils on at-
titudes toward women, investment priorities, and reporting of crimes against women. For 
a summary of the results and links to the literature, see http://blogs.worldbank.org/impact 
evaluations/when-women-are-in-charge.
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money. This may suggest a “normalization” of women having control over 
some portion of resources. 
This lack of understanding of the women’s 10 percent echoes broader con-
fusion among communities about the CMCAs in general, mipela no clia (“We 
don’t understand/we’re not clear”) being the most common refrain when 
asked about the agreement. Few people (beyond those serving on the village 
planning committees), could explain the process for CMCA project approval. 
Even members of the committees did not appear to understand how much 
money was available for CMCA projects in their village or region. Benefi-
ciaries repeatedly expressed a desire for written information—“in black and 
white”—to dispel misinformation, build awareness, and foster accountability. 
Representatives of the foundation note the information problem but state 
that “we can’t get information to 90,000 people”: indeed, the geographical 
challenges are considerable. The foundation relies on village planning com-
mittee chairs to be conduits to the rest of their committee and the village at 
large. Minutes of meetings, notices, and verbal updates are sent to the chairs 
for dissemination. One mine representative explained low levels of beneficiary 
awareness as a function of community “backwardness,” perhaps reflecting 
an assumption that communities with little exposure to sophisticated finan-
cial topics are not able to understand the arrangements. This conclusion—that 
awareness is inherently and permanently constrained by the exotic novelty of 
trust funds and financial flows—is not uncommon on the part of community 
development technocrats and resource company staff. But global experience 
shows that targeted and skillful discussions at the community level can indeed 
empower village people to understand and engage effectively quite quickly.
The Ring-Fenced Women’s Fund Is Operational,  
but Impacts Are Not Widely Felt
In accordance with the agreement, a separate process was established to make 
decisions about the women’s ring-fenced benefits, governed by all-women 
groups elected by women from the beneficiary villages. From 2007 to 2010, 
K69.8 million (US$34 million) was set aside for the women and children’s 
fund.22 As of 2012, the major spending decision was to invest in three learn-
ing centers. This decision is in line with the intent of the CMCA, which fore-
shadowed initial investments in capacity building to allow women to actively 
engage in development processes—including the informed use of their funds. 
One learning center is open, and construction of the remaining two centers is 
yet to commence. Of the money that has been allocated, it is likely that much of 
it remains unspent. In one region (covering 18 villages), approximately US$20 
million of general funds (that is, not the 10 percent women and children’s 
fund) remained unspent as of September 2011, and figures show up to half 
22  This comprises K21.2 million from OTML, K8.6 million from the PNGSDP, and K40 million 
from the state. The payment from OTML has been made regularly, and PNGSDP funds have 
been forthcoming for women’s projects. State funding has been more difficult to access.
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of individual village funds have not been spent. One trustee attributed the 
underspending to the failure of villagers to submit project proposals. Under-
spending seems unlikely to be a consequence of lack of need for community 
improvements in the face of basic service failures and profound development 
challenges. A targeted effort to improve, simplify, and streamline the proposal 
process could yield results. 
In the villages, however, very few women have heard of the training 
centers, and neither women nor men report feeling any benefits from the 
10 percent deal. Women in the villages often express concern that they are not 
being faithfully represented in the women’s bodies to decide on use of the 
10 percent. Many of the women in these groups are the wives of local ward 
councilors or village planning committee chairmen, suggesting that elite 
divides may compound existing gender inequality. In one village, women 
complained that their representative on the regional women’s group had 
moved and was no longer resident in the village and did not provide feedback 
from meetings. Such an impression is reflected more broadly in the function-
ing of village planning committees, which appear beset by challenges related 
to information, coordination, and representation. Communities report that 
committees do not faithfully represent community interests, “hoarding infor-
mation and keeping benefits” for personal or family gain. Committee chairs 
are frequently reported to no longer reside in the village they represent (hav-
ing moved into towns), limiting their ability to identify community needs, 
convey information, and be held accountable for decisions made. 
Family Bank Accounts Show Promise
The introduction of family bank accounts for disbursing the cash compen-
sation component of the agreement appears to be having a positive impact, 
improving access to resources by both women and youth.23 Unlike with the 
project component, there is general understanding of the entitlements and the 
timing of the payments, including among women and youth. In most of the 
villages visited for this research, male and female beneficiaries reported that 
women are cosignatories to bank accounts.24 Women reported much greater 
access to money than under the previous system of clan accounts. They also 
claim to spend more productively than men, though this has not been inde-
pendently verified. Some youth also reported receiving their entitlements in 
cash from their parents.
23  The compensation amount varies per village but is in the order of K400 (US$200) per person 
per year, including for children. 
24  The exception to this was reported by communities in and around Ningerum. Prior to 2007, 
most families did not have bank accounts, so the mine and foundation undertook a process 
to provide bank accounts through two operators, BSP and PNG Microcredit. Bank repre-
sentatives traveled to each of the CMCA villages with the requisite paperwork and opened 
accounts for most families. The mine and foundation encouraged male and female cosigna-
tories to the accounts. 
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Even so, villagers face high transaction costs in accessing the cash com-
pensation. As in many parts of PNG, access to banking facilities in the CMCA 
area is extremely limited. Beneficiaries must travel to one of three bank loca-
tions, and travel costs are high. In one example, the cost of return boat-and-
bus travel from Atkamba village, on the lower Ok Tedi, to the nearest branch 
in Kiunga is K120 (US$57). For two parents (as account cosignatories) to ac-
cess funds for a family of five, the cost of transport alone would be more than 
15 percent of the annual compensation payment. Initial plans to provide bank-
ing in boats along the river were shelved due to security concerns of traveling 
with large amounts of cash. Mobile phone-facilitated payments have yet to 
reach the CMCA area, although the rollout of mobile towers offers promise in 
this regard. 
Family bank accounts appear not to have increased family savings. The 
foundation, mine, and villagers report that beneficiaries routinely withdraw 
the annual cash compensation amount in full. Monthly account-keeping fees 
of K7 (US$3.40) reduce the incentive for families to save money through the 
banking system. The full withdrawal of funds also poses administrative bur-
dens because this action automatically closes the account, which needs to be 
reopened to receive the following year’s payment. 
Implementation of the Scholarship Scheme  
Has Been Partially Successful
The implementation of the scholarship program has occurred in accordance 
with the CMCA. Women currently make up half of the members on the scholar-
ship selection panel. However, the selection process requires little discretion—
in practice, supply exceeds demand and the money set aside for scholarships 
each year exceeds the money demanded from all applicants.25 The selection 
panel simply identifies whether an applicant is from a CMCA village. Schol-
arships have been awarded for primary, secondary, and tertiary education in 
PNG. Full scholarships are awarded to younger students; for older students, 
the amount is dependent on the student’s scholastic achievement the previous 
year. This rubric is widely understood by beneficiaries and supported.
In practice, fewer than 50 percent of the scholarships are awarded to girls 
because fewer girls apply. Boys are often preferred for educational opportuni-
ties, because a girl’s productive capacity and eventual bride price payment 
regularly factor into the decision on whether to send her long-distance for 
formal education.26 Furthermore, few schools have boarding facilities, and 
parents have expressed a reluctance to send young girls to stay with relatives 
for long periods in light of security and financial concerns.
25  For example, according to personal communications from the foundation, the Highway 
(Tutuwe Trust) has allocated from K1 million to K1.5 million per year; Ok Tedi region (Waitri 
Trust), K500,000; and Nupmo Trust (Ningerum), K200,000 per year. 
26  Thanks to a peer reviewer for these insights.
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More broadly, villagers expressed concern about the lack of economic op-
portunities in the region for scholarship recipients (and others) after gradua-
tion. Few graduates return to the CMCA area, raising concern for future local 
economic development. 
Decision-Making Structures Do Not Reflect the Levels of Women’s 
Representation Mandated by the Agreement
In all the villages visited for this research, the village planning committee 
included only one woman, rather than the two or three required under the 
agreement. In most cases, the women’s representative is the wife or a family 
member of a ward councilor, village planning committee chairman, or other 
elite male. No committee chairs were women. In the villages visited, few 
women reported being aware of what the village planning committee does 
and few women participate in planning for CMCA village projects.
Three women have not been appointed to the board of the overarching 
foundation as required by the agreement. Indeed, there are no voting ben-
eficiary representatives—male or female—on the board. The overarching 
foundation continues to be controlled by the mine, which continues to hold 
75 percent of the foundation’s shares. The mine is assisting the impacted 
communities to set up an association (Ok Tedi Mine Impact Area Association) 
that could then take a shareholding in the foundation. The mine reports that it 
has taken longer than planned to build the capacity of the association and its 
members, and the foundation is working with the executive of the association 
to achieve this. Yet, two out of four seats on the foundation’s board are re-
served for mine company representatives, and the mine’s managing director 
chairs the board. Furthermore, the CMCA requirement for the mine to transfer 
equity in the mine to the foundation (for the benefit of the impacted communi-
ties) has not occurred. These missed opportunities mean that the foundation 
has not yet been able to make the transition to a “high level of community 
ownership,” as called for in the agreement. 
Lack of Community Ownership Affects Development Outcomes
The failure to transfer ownership and control to beneficiaries affects the de-
velopment approach adopted by the foundation and ultimately development 
outcomes. There is a sharp divergence between the views of those implement-
ing the agreement (primarily mine and foundation representatives) and the 
beneficiaries (the villagers) regarding the success of implementation. This is 
perhaps not surprising, not least because it is difficult for the foundation to 
visit every village frequently.27 Implementation could benefit from a structured 
mechanism through which valuable information about community needs, 
implementation challenges, and grievances—direct from beneficiaries—is fed 
back to the foundation to facilitate continuous improvement. The reliance on 
27  The service standard for 2011 was one visit to each village each year; for 2012, it was an over-
night stay.
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village planning committee representatives overlooks intracommunity equity 
issues that often arise in community development.
It is hard for mining companies to “do” community driven development. 
The ethos of mining companies tends to be technocratic, linear, output focused, 
grounded in the scientific method, and focused on engineering solutions in 
often-difficult physical environments. Community development, on the other 
hand, routinely revolves around political dynamics, privileging process as 
much as outcomes and balancing competing interests and versions of the truth. 
Although the forms for inclusive community development have been put in 
place by the agreement, their function currently falls short of community- 
driven development. 
This observation is exemplified in Moian village, where the mine arrived 
to install a water pump. Mine technicians selected a site easily accessible from 
the village health clinic, but 15–20 meters away from the village’s custom-
ary burial grounds. Residents expressed concern that the site was too close to 
their burial site and suggested an alternative location for the well farther away 
from the village, with a pipe to bring the water in. The technicians explained 
to the villagers that this would be more costly and the pipe would be likely to 
break—thus limiting the villagers’ access to water. They built the pump in the 
originally proposed location, which was a logical technical choice. The villag-
ers do not use the well, which is an equally logical sociocultural choice. The 
result is an unsatisfying development outcome. 
The foundation is taking some steps to improve the participation of vil-
lagers in project implementation. A skills census has been undertaken in each 
village to identify resident capacity to assist with projects. However, a focus 
on local labor is unlikely to result in greater community empowerment in the 
absence of specific actions that embed community ownership and control. The 
lack of community ownership is also demonstrated by another situation in 
Moian village, where neatly erected house poles dot the village. The poles 
were erected as part of a housing scheme decided on for all villages in the 
Middle Fly area. Each village received poles (cemented into place) and zinc 
roofing to connect to water tanks (delivered to the villages). The villages were 
asked to supply “local content” in the form of bush material for the floors and 
walls of houses. In addition to the poles and roofing, Moian also received a 
saw for villagers to cut the bush material. The saw reportedly broke. Land-
owners were unwilling to allow a broader group of villagers to cut trees for 
timber. The sets of poles remain unused, as does most of the zinc. Lopsided 
tanks dot the village collecting stagnant water. 
The Broader Impacts of the Deal Have Not Yet Accrued 
The strong leadership demonstrated by women during the early negotiation 
phase has not been present in the implementation phase. After a change in 
women’s leadership, there is no identifiable cadre of women who demonstrate 
a similar rigor and collective agency in implementation—a challenge given 
the dispersed nature of the population and poor communication. There are 
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a few positive spillovers for women from the CMCAs, with representatives 
of the mine and foundation reporting increased attendance and assertiveness 
of women in community consultations. However, village women report few 
changes in their own material circumstances, and there are few, if any, signs of 
greater entrepreneurship, participation in broader political life, or increased 
bargaining power for women. The anticipated empowerment gains appear 
not to have accrued.
This lack of spillovers is reflected in overall implementation of the agree-
ment. Since the original agreements were reached in 2001, more than K1 bil-
lion (almost US$500 million at today’s rates) has accrued to CMCA communi-
ties (with another K1 billion to the six villages immediately surrounding the 
mine site).28 Regional coordinators for the foundation report being “treated 
like the MP” given the amounts of money they oversee.29 Despite the signifi-
cant financial flows associated with the mine, there are few visible projects in 
CMCA villages, basic infrastructure and service delivery are severely limited, 
rates of poverty are high, and health and education indicators are poor—with 
women tending to be worse off than men.30 Some reasons for the lack of de-
velopment include slow rollout of the foundation and underspending, intra-
village divisions, poor village-level decision making, and elite capture. There 
are, however, very few observable projects funded from other sources, such 
as local government or from MP-controlled constituency development funds. 
The topographical and institutional landscape makes this an extremely chal-
lenging development context. The largely parallel CMCA governance struc-
tures are not linked to government: village planning committees do not coor-
dinate with ward development committees, and relations between the mine, 
the foundation, the PNGSDP, and the provincial government are a topic of 
continuing concern.31 
Looking Ahead: Guidance for Strengthening Women’s Engagement 
in Mining Agreements
The PNG government is considering changes to policy and law to apply the 
basic tenets of the Ok Tedi Agreements to mining contexts across PNG. From 
the government’s perspective, the agreement is an innovation worth model-
ing. Such policy reform is widely popular among women in other impacted 
communities, even though the details and shortcomings of the Ok Tedi deal 
28  Over the next two years of the mine’s current phase, another K292 million is projected to be 
received, and further extension of the mine’s life is being considered. 
29  As chair of a joint district planning and budget priorities committee for each constituency, 
MPs have significant control over sizable resources (K6 million in 2008; K4 million in 2009), 
which provides the potential for strong visibility and influence of MPs at the village level.
30  2007 CMCA Census Report Appendix: Basic Statistical Tables. See also D. Cammack, Chronic 
Poverty in Papua New Guinea (Chronic Poverty Research Center 2009).
31  There are efforts to address this through a project matrix that captures all the government, 
foundation, and PNGSDP projects to guide decisions on implementation and funding.
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are not well understood. Acknowledging the unique history and context of the 
mine, the CMCA process provides insights for other PNG resource projects as 
well as for stakeholders in other resource-rich countries that have “wealth” in 
the form of resources but suffer regular elite capture of rents, severe gender 
inequality, collective action problems, and chronic development challenges. 
With a view to informing future policy and practice in both PNG and else-
where and to improving empowerment outcomes for women, the following 
broad guidance is provided to mining and gender practitioners engaging in 
these kinds of deals.
Guidance for the Negotiation Phase of Mining Agreements
•	 	Mine operators can be powerful allies for women vis-à-vis male benefi-
ciaries if the business case for women’s inclusion is made.32 In mining areas, 
stronger roles for women—including as mine employees—may be associ-
ated with reduced risk of conflict and increased stability of production. 
Women should focus on highlighting how their participation increases 
efficiency in the use of funds and fosters opportunities to generate posi-
tive development outcomes while also reducing the risks of complaint, 
conflict, and disruption of production.
•	 	The characteristics of the individual women who participate in negotia-
tions can make a real difference to the negotiated outcome. Representatives 
who combine both local ties with national or international skills and experience 
can be particularly effective.
•	 	Separate caucusing sessions for women, alongside the primary negotiating 
stream, allow information to be shared, capacity to be built, and negotiat-
ing strategy to be developed.
•	 	Independent facilitators and advisers (environmental, legal, financial) help 
overcome asymmetries of information and power, build trust, and ulti-
mately construct more equitable and thus durable deals. This is of benefit 
for all stakeholders, but a transparent, open, and informed process also 
provides space for capable women. The PNG Mineral Resources Author-
ity has an officer (who was involved in the CMCA negotiations) who now 
advises women in negotiation processes across the country. Although this 
is a step forward, it cannot be the only mechanism, because the state is 
also a party to these agreements and thus faces possible conflicts of inter-
est. Similar tensions can arise for staff of mine gender desks, thus high-
lighting the importance of independent advice in improving negotiated 
outcomes.
•	 	A complex web of benefit streams undermines accountability, making it diffi-
cult for beneficiaries to understand their entitlements and know who is 
responsible for delivering what, let alone demanding performance if it 
32  Why Gender Matters: A Resource Guide for Integrating Gender Considerations into Communi-
ties Work at Rio Tinto (Rio Tinto 2010), available at http://www.riotinto.com/documents 
/ReportsPublications/Rio_Tinto_gender_guide.pdf (accessed Feb. 28 2012). 
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is not delivered. Complexity provides space for a small elite to exploit 
community benefits for personal gain; over time, confusion and capture 
can breed tension and conflict. It is better to deliver resources through a 
small number of channels that are easy for beneficiaries to understand 
and transparent in their delivery. This also enhances accountability while 
minimizing administrative overheads. 
Guidance for the Implementation of Mining Agreements
•	 	Family bank accounts (with women as cosignatories) enhance women’s control of 
cash compensation payments. Mobile banking could further enhance ac-
cessibility of funds in remote areas and strengthen women’s control over 
funds. Opportunities exist to incentivize savings, for instance, by lowering 
account-keeping fees, providing returns on investments, and instituting a 
“bonus” compensation payment or matching grant to accounts that retain 
an operating balance. In countries like PNG that have an increasingly in-
terested banking sector keen to exploit rapidly increasing teledensity and 
a regulator focused on financial inclusion (the PNG Central Bank), the 
potential for pilot programs that address the constraints outlined here is 
significant.
•	 	Setting aside scholarships for girls, and having women on scholarship 
selection panels, may not be enough to overcome cultural and logistical 
barriers. Further incentives could be built in to enhance gender equality of ed-
ucational opportunities, such as a requirement that boys’ scholarships are 
conditional on a matching number of girls’ scholarships, and supplemen-
tary financing for special provisions for girls’ safety and security while 
attending school away from home. 
•	 	Public written information reinforces accountability, even in communities with 
low literacy. Basic information about benefit procedures, amounts, dates, 
and feedback/grievance channels should be posted in public places, such 
as community halls, health clinics, schools, and churches, and posters and 
pamphlets should be distributed widely, summarizing information in lay 
terms. Mobile phones can also be used to convey information.
•	 	The responsiveness and accountability of village representatives to ben-
eficiary communities are undermined when representatives do not live in 
the village—often moving away using the fruits of their newfound status. 
Consideration should be given to instituting a residency requirement for vil-
lage representatives in the village they represent.
•	 	Structured feedback and grievance processes increase accountability and ensure 
that those responsible for project implementation have better information 
on activity performance and challenges and increase accountability. These 
procedures should allow beneficiaries to bypass their local representatives, 
who may be the subject of complaints, and to register mobile numbers to 
receive periodic texts asking for feedback on local issues. 
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Conclusion
The 2006–07 Ok Tedi negotiation process and the resulting CMCA agreements 
are innovative in that they secured enhanced rights for women in legally en-
forceable mining agreements, even in the context of severe gender inequality. 
However, legal rights are not sufficient in and of themselves to produce bet-
ter development outcomes. Implementation has faced many of the challenges 
facing other development efforts in PNG: logistical constraints, low adminis-
trative capacity, and elite capture. Nevertheless, the prevailing gender asset 
gaps in the context of the current global extractives boom highlight the need 
to engage women more proactively in mining agreements and support them 
in exercising greater agency over those resources. More attention to the princi-
ples and experiences of community-driven development, as well as more local 
political analysis, will likely benefit women’s engagement and outcomes. The 
particular guidance for enhancing women’s agency—in both the negotiation 
and the implementation phases—laid out above offers further opportunities 





Innovation in Asset Recovery
The Swiss Perspective
Rita adam
Recent international studies have strikingly illustrated the enormous chal-
lenges that corruption and similar crimes pose to developing and emerging 
economies. The World Bank has played a vital role in bringing these prob-
lems to light. According to World Bank estimates, developing countries lose 
between US$20 billion and US$40 billion each year through bribery, misap-
propriation of funds, and other corrupt practices. This amount represents 
20 percent to 40 percent of the total international development aid received 
by these countries. Against this backdrop, the importance of efficiently recov-
ering assets illicitly acquired by politically exposed persons (PEP) has been 
increasingly recognized.
Over the course of 25 years, Switzerland has become a world leader in the 
field of recovery of illegal assets held by former heads of state and other PEP. 
The expansion of expertise in and commitment to asset recovery issues was 
prompted by the events that followed the overthrow of Philippine dictator 
Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. The Swiss government reacted to the news within 
hours by invoking emergency constitutional powers to freeze all assets held 
by members of the Marcos regime with Swiss financial intermediaries. This 
immediate and determined action laid the foundation for the subsequent res-
titution, via official mutual assistance channels, of more than US$600 million 
to the new and democratically elected Philippine authorities.
In Switzerland today, there is broad political consensus about determined 
and proactive action on the part of the authorities against illicit assets held by 
former heads of state and other PEPs. Switzerland has no interest in its finan-
cial sector being abused to conceal assets of dubious provenance that should 
be used to benefit local populations in the form of state-run programs and 
projects. Questions of reputation and integrity have become key factors in the 
global competition among financial centers. Switzerland has proven its com-
mitment to tackling the underlying problems not only by its active participa-
tion in international initiatives but also in the number of cases that have been 
resolved worldwide. Over the past 25 years, Switzerland has returned to their 
countries of origin a total of US$1.7 billion in assets acquired unlawfully by 
PEPs. The World Bank puts the total value of PEP assets returned during the 
same time period at US$4–5 billion. As the world’s seventh-largest financial 
center, Switzerland is thus well ahead of other countries in terms of the resti-
tution of unlawfully acquired assets.
The Swiss authorities have acquired a great deal of experience in the 
restitution of PEP assets since 1986. One of the main lessons learned is the 
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importance of creativity and innovation in resolving cases successfully. No 
two asset recovery cases are exactly alike. As the example of the former Ni-
gerian head of state Sani Abacha underscores—at US$800 million, the largest 
sum of money ever returned worldwide—such cases are extremely complex 
because a large number of banks, countries, and third parties are usually in-
volved. Because mutual legal assistance (MLA) procedures often stretch over 
periods of many years, the interaction between internal and international in-
struments in each specific case is of the utmost importance.
Following a brief general overview of the Swiss legal framework for asset 
recovery, this chapter highlights two specific areas that have seen considerable 
progress and developments in recent years. First, the chapter addresses the 
creation of new legal provisions tailored specifically to cases in which the state 
structures in the country of origin are so weak that the restitution of unlaw-
fully acquired assets by international MLA channels is impossible. Second, the 
chapter turns to the Arab Spring and Switzerland’s initial findings on implica-
tions for asset recovery.
Overview of the Swiss Institutional and Legal Framework  
to Combat and Return Assets Illicitly Acquired by PEP
Switzerland has a comprehensive range of legal instruments and measures in 
place for turning away assets of criminal origin and for identifying, blocking, 
and returning them if they nonetheless find their way into the local financial 
center. Swiss banking secrecy law does not apply to assets of criminal origin 
and therefore does not impede existing protective and preventive measures 
in any way.1
The Swiss legal framework rests on five pillars comparable to the provi-
sions familiar in many other states. The various elements are outlined below.
Prevention of Corruption
The first pillar aims to prevent high-ranking foreign officials from illegally en-
riching themselves in the first place. Promoting good governance and tackling 
the root causes of corruption rate highly in Switzerland’s foreign policy. In its 
development cooperation, Switzerland gives priority to combining measures 
at the governmental level through institutional reforms and activities involv-
ing civil society, such as awareness raising, participative approaches, social 
audits, and investigative journalism.
Due Diligence/Know Your Customer
Another pillar is due diligence; Switzerland takes the necessary measures to 
prevent illicit assets of PEPs from being transferred to Switzerland or laun-
1  For more information, see http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/finec/intcr 
/poexp.html. 
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dered via the Swiss banking system and thus being brought into legal eco-
nomic circulation. Switzerland does not want to function as a safe haven for 
illicit assets of PEPs. Stringent “know your customer” rules oblige providers 
of financial services in Switzerland to identify their clients and ascertain the 
origin of their assets. To comply with these rules, financial intermediaries are 
required to identify the beneficial owner of assets. When dealing with PEPs, 
Switzerland’s legislation also stipulates, in conformity with internationally 
recognized standards, special clarification requirements (enhanced due dili-
gence) and requires that business relations with PEPs be considered as involv-
ing increased risks.
Obligation to Report
All financial intermediaries operating in Switzerland are subject to a legal 
reporting obligation if they become aware, or have reasonable grounds to 
suspect, that the assets involved in a given business relationship are, or may 
be, associated with money laundering or terrorism financing, originate from 
criminal activities, or are connected with a criminal organization. In such 
cases, financial intermediaries are required to block assets immediately and to 
notify the Swiss financial intelligence unit, the Money Laundering Reporting 
Office Switzerland (MROS), without delay. If there is reason to believe that 
this may be a case of corruption, MROS will alert the criminal prosecution au-
thorities, who will conduct a preliminary inquiry into the origin of the assets. 
If suspicions persist, the competent authorities will initiate criminal proceed-
ings for money laundering. 
International Mutual Legal Assistance
Under international standards, the unlawful acquisition of the assets in ques-
tion must be proven in judicial proceedings before they can be returned. Inter-
national MLA in criminal matters is a central instrument in this examination.
The Swiss Federal Act on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters entered into effect on January 1, 1983. It empowers Switzerland to 
grant legal assistance to countries with which it has not concluded a bilateral 
agreement. Swiss authorities take care, wherever possible, to apply the provi-
sions of the law with the flexibility needed to respond to the specific circum-
stances of individual asset recovery cases and to develop creative approaches 
to resolving them. This approach makes it possible to actively support states 
that have encountered difficulties in their recovery efforts. This support may 
be necessary when the state in question is unable to provide all the evidence 
required or to comply with the formalities necessary in the context of MLA. 
In such cases, Switzerland can help the state complete the request for interna-
tional MLA and might even pay for the translation of such a request so that 
it can be submitted to the competent Swiss authorities in one of the national 
languages, as required by the act. In some cases, Switzerland has exception-
ally paid lawyers’ fees to enable requesting states to benefit from counseling, 
thus increasing their chances of recovering embezzled funds. 
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In parallel with the establishment of international MLA where there are 
sufficient suspicions to justify it, Swiss authorities will instigate criminal in-
vestigations into money laundering, organized crime, or similar offenses. The 
primary channel for any restitution of assets nonetheless remains the interna-
tional MLA process, in combination with the associated criminal proceedings 
in the state of origin, because it is there that the evidence can generally be 
found that will determine whether the assets were acquired as the result of a 
criminal act. If the unlawful origin of the assets is evident, Switzerland may 
under certain conditions return the assets without any legally enforceable 
forfeiture order from the state concerned, as in the Abacha case, mentioned 
above.
Restitution
Switzerland has made it a priority to return unlawfully acquired PEP assets 
rapidly and in full to their country of origin. As soon as it is established that 
assets located and frozen in Switzerland originate from a criminal act, authori-
ties will determine which form of restitution best takes into account the cir-
cumstances of the individual case. Experience over 25 years shows that there 
is no one-size-fits-all solution. Hence, Switzerland finds an ad hoc solution 
to ensure that the assets in question will indeed benefit the population of the 
country of origin. Furthermore, restitution can be a delicate matter if corrup-
tion is endemic in the country of origin of the assets. In such cases, finding 
a way to ensure that the assets in question will not simply be recycled into 
criminal activities is crucial. Possible approaches in such cases include setting 
up an independent monitoring mechanism, returning assets via an interna-
tional organization that runs projects and programs in the country of origin, 
or cooperation with NGOs.
In the Sharing Act (the Federal Act Pertaining to the Sharing of Confis-
cated Assets), Switzerland has a legal foundation on which it can enter into 
international asset-sharing agreements in cases of organized crime and money 
laundering. The act provides for the waiver of any share of assets forfeited in 
Switzerland so that the entire amount is repaid to the country of origin. It is a 
standing policy of Switzerland to return in their entirety to the state concerned 
any confiscated illicit assets of PEPs originating from bribery or misappropria-
tion of funds, without insisting on asset sharing.
Lessons Learned from the Mobutu and Duvalier Cases 
The Federal Act on the Restitution of Assets of Politically Exposed Persons 
Obtained by Unlawful Means (Restitution of Illicit Assets Act, or RIAA) is 
a significant enhancement to Switzerland’s legal arsenal in the field of asset 
recovery.2 The RIAA, in force since 2011, contains legal provisions tailored 
2  See http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/c196_1.html; for more information, see also http://
www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/finec/intcr/poexp/faqria.html. 
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specifically to cases in which the state structures in the country of origin are so 
weak that the restitution of kleptocrat funds via international MLA channels 
faces insurmountable barriers. The drafting of the act was prompted basically 
by Switzerland’s experiences in the cases of Mobutu (the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, DRC) and Duvalier (Haiti).
In the first case, the Swiss government made use of its emergency powers 
anchored in the Swiss Federal Constitution to freeze any Mobutu assets locat-
ed in Switzerland immediately after the fall of the dictator in 1997.3 In doing 
so, the Federal Council intended to make it possible for the new government, 
headed by Laurent Kabila, to submit a request for international MLA within 
the necessary time frame. Unfortunately, due to the inactivity of the Congo-
lese authorities, who failed to supply the information required and to initiate 
proceedings against Mobutu, the first international MLA procedure had to be 
stopped in 2003. The Federal Council, confronted with the imminent risk that 
the frozen assets would become available again to the members of the Mobutu 
family, felt it was necessary to act. Indeed, in view of Mobutu’s universally 
acknowledged kleptocracy, the return of this money to the Mobutu family 
was as unacceptable to Switzerland as it was to the DRC. The Federal Council 
mandated the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs to make contact 
with the Congolese authorities in an effort to find a solution that would al-
low restitution of the assets. This collaboration made it possible, after several 
years of negotiations, to obtain the agreement of the DRC authorities to al-
low a Geneva lawyer, paid for by the Swiss Confederation, to begin criminal 
proceedings in an effort to recover these assets. A lawsuit filed in Switzerland 
against the Mobutu family on behalf of the DRC alleging the establishment 
of a criminal organization was not pursued by the Swiss Attorney General’s 
Office. It decided not to commence investigations because the statute of limi-
tations on the alleged acts had already expired. Unfortunately, the Congolese 
government instructed its lawyer not to contest the decision of the Attorney 
General’s Office and, in doing so, destroyed all hope that the frozen assets 
would be returned to the Congolese people. Hence, the procedure was termi-
nated, and Switzerland had no other choice but to unfreeze the Mobutu assets 
after twelve years of relentless efforts to avoid exactly that.
Switzerland regards such an outcome as extremely unsatisfactory. It is all 
the more objectionable that a despot continues to profit from the result of his 
poor governance even after he has been overthrown—it is precisely his years 
or decades of dictatorship that weakened state structures to the point that ren-
ders the new authorities incapable of successfully conducting MLA proceed-
ings with a partner state. The result is that assets that are frozen in foreign fi-
nancial centers, such as Switzerland, are ultimately unfrozen and placed back 
in the hands of the overthrown dictator. 
3  See discussion in the section of this chapter entitled “The Arab Spring and Its Implications 
for Asset Recovery.”
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It seemed that the Duvalier case would have a similar outcome. Begin-
ning in 1986, the Duvalier case went through a period involving MLA. Fol-
lowing the difficulties of Haiti to sufficiently substantiate their MLA request, 
this procedure was terminated in 2002. Again, the Federal Council decided 
to intervene, given the manifestly illicit nature of the assets in question. After 
an asset freeze was ordered on the basis of Swiss constitutional powers, ne-
gotiations for a settlement were conducted with the government of Haiti, and 
with the Duvalier family, but without results until 2007. President René Préval 
indicated his desire to combat the impunity of the Duvalier family and to take 
possession of the assets with the help of another MLA procedure, which made 
its way to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. In early 2010, the court ruled that 
restitution in accordance with current Swiss law was no longer possible due to 
the statute of limitations. At the same time, however, the court confirmed that 
the assets were of illicit origin. While regretting the need to apply the statute 
of limitations, the court expressed its view that the conditions imposed by 
the Federal Act on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters “seem 
too strict for this type of affair.” In making this observation, the court invited 
Swiss lawmakers to take into consideration the nature of fragile states and to 
try to increase their chances of benefiting from the restitution of assets.
Fortunately the authorities—prompted by experience gained in the Mobutu 
case—had already embarked on the corresponding legislative work. In an ef-
fort to safeguard the Duvalier assets, the government decided to freeze them 
while awaiting completion of the parliamentary procedure. Work on new draft 
legislation was driven forward with the highest priority. The Federal Act on 
the Restitution of Assets of Politically Exposed Persons Obtained by Unlawful 
Means (Restitution of Illicit Assets Act, RIAA) entered into force in February 
2011, just one year after the Supreme Court’s ruling. It makes Switzerland 
the first nation in the world to have a law enabling the state to overcome the 
difficulties involved when dealing with another state that is no longer able 
to meet the requirements of an MLA procedure due to the collapse of all or a 
substantial part of its judicial apparatus or judicial dysfunction. The RIAA’s 
innovative approach attracted worldwide attention. Stuart Levey, the former 
undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence at the US Department 
of the Treasury, described the RIAA as “arguably the world’s toughest law for 
repatriating the ill-gotten gains of corrupt politicians.”4
The RIAA came into existence as a result of the difficulties encountered by 
the Swiss authorities in returning assets frozen in Switzerland to such states 
following the failure of the international MLA process to produce a satisfac-
tory result. The aim of the act is to prevent such situations from recurring and 
to resolve cases of assets that have been frozen on the orders of the Federal 
Council’s constitutional powers. The RIAA is a subsidiary solution to the Fed-
eral Act on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. In contrast 
4  See Stuart Levey, Fighting Corruption after the Arab Spring, Foreign Affairs (online edition, 
June 16, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67895/stuart-levey/corruption 
-and-the-arab-spring.
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to criminal law, the RIAA makes the distinction between the conduct of PEPs 
and the unlawful origin of their assets. In this way, it provides for a different 
approach to the criminal prosecution of the PEP concerned and enables the 
forfeiture of assets that clearly have been obtained by unlawful means with-
out the need for a criminal conviction against the PEP in question.
There are three stages to the repatriation of misappropriated assets under 
the terms of the RIAA:
•	 	To prevent an outflow of suspicious assets, the Federal Council may, un-
der the conditions outlined in the RIAA, take the first step of ordering that 
assets be frozen to secure them.
•	 	This is followed by the forfeiture of the assets in proceedings under ad-
ministrative law. Here, the state appears as plaintiff against the holder of 
the disputed assets.
•	 	Once a forfeiture ruling has attained legal effect, the assets are repatriated 
to their state of origin in a transparent process.
A major innovation of the RIAA is the reversal of the burden of proof in re-
spect to the unlawful origin of frozen PEP assets. With the Mobutu and Duva-
lier cases in mind, the law provides for a reversal of the burden of proof with 
regard to the assets’ illicit origin. In other words, forfeiture is justified under 
the RIAA if the current owner of these assets is unable to prove that the assets 
are, in all probability, of lawful origin. This concept rests on the assumption 
that if a notoriously corrupt PEP or associates hold powers of disposal over an 
amount of assets that are out of proportion to the PEP’s official salary, these 
assets are, in all probability, unlawful in origin.
The RIAA stipulates that the unlawful origin of assets may be presumed 
if both of the following two conditions are met:
•	 	The wealth of the person who has powers of disposal over the assets has 
been subject to an extraordinary increase during the PEP’s period of of-
fice. This provision is intended to cover two cases: one in which PEPs 
hold powers of disposal, and one in which the person who holds powers 
of disposal is not the same person who exercised a public office but is 
one of their associates. An “extraordinary increase” means that there is a 
significant discrepancy between the income derived from the public office 
and that generated by the assets concerned that cannot be explained by 
normal empirical patterns and the country’s overall situation. A similar 
provision exists in the UN Convention against Corruption, which talks of 
a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot 
reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income. Concrete evi-
dence, to be introduced by the Swiss authorities as plaintiff, must prove 
that the concerned assets have increased extraordinarily over the relevant 
period. This would be true, for example, of a minister who became a mil-
lionaire while in office, despite not previously having had any wealth. 
Another example is a person associated with a PEP whose construction or 
service company generated very high profits from public contracts in con-
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nection with the office in question. The extraordinary increase condition 
does not, however, apply to assets that have grown as a result of skilled 
portfolio management on the part of the bank with which the assets are 
lodged.
•	 	There is a notoriously high level of corruption of the state or PEP in ques-
tion during the PEP’s period of office. Whether or not the level of cor-
ruption is “notoriously high” is determined in a status analysis based 
on reports from organizations, such as the World Bank or Transparency 
International, that conduct research work and analyses on corruption is-
sues. Typical cases include those of Suharto, Mobutu, and Duvalier. Dur-
ing their periods in office, the level of corruption was recognized as high 
in respect to the persons themselves and the country as a whole. Criminal 
acts that are not necessarily classified as corruption under Swiss law but 
that constitute the improper conduct of a public official in other respects 
(for example, misappropriation of funds, embezzlement, or another un-
lawful use of funds) must also be taken into account in this evaluation.
The persons concerned can invalidate the presumption of unlawful origin 
of the assets by presenting a convincing case for their lawful enrichment. In 
other words, the presumption ceases to apply if it can be demonstrated that, 
in all probability, the assets were acquired by lawful means, specifically by 
presenting suitable evidence and explaining suspicious transactions.
The Swiss authorities are confident that the innovative approach of the 
RIAA is a significant enhancement to the legal framework for asset recovery. 
The first case of application of the RIAA is pending: the planned forfeiture or-
der for the Duvalier assets. The corresponding legal action was brought before 
the competent Federal Administrative Court by the Swiss authorities in April 
2011, just two months after the RIAA went into effect.
The Arab Spring and Its Implications for Asset Recovery
General Remarks
The upheavals in the Arab world in 2011 brought the discussion on the freez-
ing and recovery of illicit assets attributed to PEPs to the forefront.5 In view 
of the historic dimension of the events taking place, the Swiss government 
decided to act very swiftly. Only a few days after the overthrow of presidents 
Zine el Abidine Ben Ali (Tunisia) and Hosni Mubarak (Egypt), the Federal 
Council invoked its emergency constitutional powers to make Switzerland 
the first country in the world to freeze all the assets held with its financial in-
termediaries by Ben Ali, Mubarak, and their associates. The Federal Council’s 
aims were twofold. First, it wished to avoid the movement of any unlawfully 
acquired assets to other financial centers, thereby evading justice—at least in 
5  For more information, see http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/finec/intcr 
/poexp/sperr.html. 
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the short term. Second, its swift action sent a clear signal to the states of origin 
that Switzerland was willing to accept requests for international MLA so that 
misappropriated assets could be returned in full as quickly as possible. There 
were soon signs that this signal had been understood. Just a few weeks after 
the freeze was imposed, Switzerland received the first requests for MLA from 
Tunisia and Egypt. A further unilateral freeze on the assets of Muammar Gad-
dafi (Libya) and his associates was replaced by a regime of sanctions following 
the adoption of the corresponding UN sanctions in March 2011. In parallel 
with the efforts moving through international MLA channels, the Swiss crimi-
nal prosecution authorities began their own investigations into associates of 
Ben Ali and Mubarak on suspicion of money laundering and membership in 
a criminal organization.
The legal foundation for the preventive freezing of assets is given by a 
specific provision in the federal constitution. Article 184, paragraph 3, reads, 
“Where safeguarding the interests of the country so require, the Federal Coun-
cil may issue ordinances and rulings. Ordinances must be of limited dura-
tion.” The Swiss government has made use of this option in several excep-
tional cases, starting with the Marcos funds in 1986, to freeze assets. This tactic 
is a Swiss specialty: no other country practices such “constitutional freezing.” 
Three months after the freezes with regard to Tunisia and Egypt were ordered, 
the government conducted an initial review of its action and decided to create 
a legal basis for the freezing of PEP assets for the purpose of securing them. 
This resolution represents a clear commitment to maintaining the practice de-
veloped over more than 25 years, that is, that Switzerland is willing to freeze 
assets as a preventive step in extraordinary cases to prevent their flight else-
where and to create the best possible conditions for successful international 
MLA proceedings for the state of origin. The planned legal basis is intended to 
set out the conditions for a freeze in greater detail and to determine the basic 
parameters for its implementation. As a next step following the RIAA, it will 
complete the Swiss legal framework on asset recovery.
The successful restitution of unlawfully acquired assets via international 
MLA channels is a complex undertaking that demands political will, persis-
tence, and creativity. Switzerland knows from experience that a close partner-
ship between the requesting and the requested states is a key factor. Indeed, as 
the term “mutual” implies, MLA procedures cannot be successfully achieved 
by the requesting or the requested state alone. Furthermore, effective imple-
mentation of existing norms can sometimes be challenging. MLA proceed-
ings are by nature rather static. Hence, in order to successfully address asset 
recovery, one of the main questions is how best to make dynamic use of the 
legal framework. This means, for example, that requests for MLA that do not 
satisfy all the formal requirements are not simply returned without comment 
or even ignored by the requested state. It is preferable in such situations ac-
tively to seek dialogue with the authorities of the requesting state to resolve 
possible problems such as those that might arise in connection with expert-
level meetings. It can also be helpful for the requested state to make an expert 
in MLA and asset-tracing issues available to the authorities of the requesting 
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state to provide targeted support and address any outstanding questions. To 
date, Switzerland’s experience with this approach—which was applied to the 
requests for international MLA from Tunisia and Egypt—has been positive. To 
take the Tunisian example, the local prosecutorial authorities are professional 
and competent, but they have handled few corruption cases in Tunisia, for ob-
vious reasons. However, thanks to Switzerland’s providing an expert in MLA 
and asset tracing, by the end of 2011 the Tunisian authorities were able to sub-
mit several formally complete requests for MLA to Switzerland. These were 
passed directly on to the Swiss judicial authorities for a substantive review.
Possibilities for Future Action
Complex asset recovery proceedings generally involve several jurisdictions. 
To resolve the issues that this causes, a close partnership between the request-
ing and the requested state is required, as is intensive communication be-
tween the various states to which requests for international MLA have been 
addressed when it is suspected that unlawfully acquired assets are being held 
within their financial sectors. Therefore, since 2001, the Lausanne Seminars 
have provided a forum in which experts from requesting and requested states, 
as well as those from international organizations (including the World Bank) 
are able, at Switzerland’s invitation, to discuss the practical problems of asset 
recovery.
One year after the beginning of the Arab Spring, the purpose of the sixth 
edition of the seminar, held in January 2012, was to take stock of progress 
made and to identify challenges with a view to examining possibilities for fu-
ture action. Centered on the experiences of requesting and requested states in 
the wake of the events in North Africa, representatives from Egypt, Libya, and 
Tunisia voiced their observations and concerns, followed by remarks from re-
questing states and third actors, such as the World Bank, the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the European Commission, and the International 
Centre for Asset Recovery, and an in-depth discussion. While acknowledging 
the existence and possible added value of domestic criminal investigations con-
ducted in requested states, participants agreed that international cooperation 
through MLA is the prime vehicle for achieving the recovery of such assets. 
They identified the following key actions for accelerating pending procedures:
•	 	Build and deepen effective MLA partnerships based on dialogue and trust 
between requesting and requested states through the following actions:
•  Strengthen trust and mutual understanding by developing personal 
contacts between the competent authorities and persons in charge in 
requesting and requested states.
•  Increase dialogue through institutionalized communication channels, 
for example, regular meetings between experts from both sides, to 
address issues directly and to ensure consistent follow-up to pending 
procedures.
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•  Ensure continuity with the competent authorities and persons in 
charge by avoiding “wandering files.”
•  Improve the quality of communication; for example, no MLA request 
remains unanswered. If not all formal requirements are met or other 
problems exist from the point of view of the requested state, the re-
questing state is rapidly informed.
•  Deepen the partnership between requesting and requested states 
through the joint determination of possible fields for technical coop-
eration, for example, by dispatching MLA experts from the requested 
state.
•	 	Improve coordination mechanisms, at both international and domestic 
levels, with a view to making relevant information more rapidly and ef-
fectively available through the following actions:
•  Improve coordination at the domestic level by, for example, creating 
focal points and/or task forces in charge of pending asset recovery cas-
es, with clearly attributed responsibilities for each task force member.
•  Use existing international practitioners’ networks more consistently, 
for example, in the framework of Interpol, Eurojust, Egmont, and the 
like, to increase the flow of information.
•  Create, if needed, new, tailor-made networks and communication 
platforms or international task forces to share information more ef-
fectively.
•  Explore ways to increase cooperation with financial intelligence units 
(FIUs) with a view to exploiting more effectively the information and 
intelligence available in FIU networks.
•  Collect facts on the ongoing measures of financial centers to sup-
port requesting states; for example, develop a matrix of assets frozen, 
seized, and finally repatriated by (and for) each state in question.
•	 	Customize the approach that best fits a specific case, with particular at-
tention to creativity and complementarity, through the following actions:
•  Combine the available instruments, such as MLA proceedings, do-
mestic criminal proceedings (for example, for money laundering or 
for participation in a criminal organization), and civil forfeiture.
•  Within the existing legal framework, make use of one’s own MLA 
requests to substantiate partner states’ MLA requests by providing 
relevant information.
•  Increase cooperation with third actors such as the World Bank/
StAR, UNODC, and nongovernmental service providers such as the 
International Centre for Asset Recovery, bearing in mind the impor-
tant role they can play in capacity building, as well as with “match- 
makers” to bridge information gaps.
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•  Explore the possibility of establishing international standard prac-
tices in MLA proceedings and asset recovery as a blueprint for action 
in current and upcoming cases (typical sequencing, main legal chal-
lenges to be addressed, and the like).
•  Actively search for innovative and creative solutions, bearing in mind 
that in asset recovery, there are no one-size-fits-all solutions.
Participants concluded their discussions by expressing the wish for a 
follow-up to take stock of progress and to keep the momentum developed at 
the seminar. 
Conclusions
Experience has shown that asset recovery cases raise complex legal issues 
across several jurisdictions. Resolving these issues demands close and un-
wavering partnerships between the states involved, including the states of 
origin, as well as a considerable degree of tenacity and perseverance. The dy-
namic application of the existing legal framework can go a long way toward 
simplifying efforts via international mutual assistance channels and speeding 
up restitution. In most cases, innovation and creativity play a decisive role in 
asset recovery. By its very definition, however, innovation is a process. Each 
case that is resolved offers new insights that allow the authorities concerned 
to review their procedures, amend them as necessary, and develop new ap-
proaches for the future.
Switzerland has a fundamental interest in ensuring that its financial sector 
is not used as a hiding place for assets of unlawful origin. Since the Marcos 
case in 1986, Switzerland has gathered a great deal of experience in the field 
of asset recovery and has refined its national legal framework accordingly. 
Regular contact with the competent authorities of partner states has been an 
important part of this development. Switzerland plans to continue this dia-
logue through knowledge and experience sharing and will maintain its com-
mitment in this area.
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International Asset Sharing
A Multipurpose Tool for Development
Karyn Kenny
The ability of governments across the globe to work effectively together to 
identify, seize, and forfeit illicit gains and combat the money laundering and 
the corruption that stem from these illicit gains is a critical component of in-
ternational development. “Taking the profit out of crime” is an important 
goal within the international asset forfeiture (AF) and anti-money-laundering 
(AML) community. The need to strengthen AF/AML cooperation on a glob-
al level is even more important. As the US Attorney General pointed out in 
March 2012, “[i]n an era where crime is not limited by physical boundaries, 
our international partnerships are more critical than ever in the work of bring-
ing criminals to justice.”1 One such tool for development that strengthens in-
ternational cooperation, builds domestic capacity, and combats transnational 
economic crime is international asset-sharing programs (IASPs). IASPs are 
agreements that permit the sharing country to recognize case-related assis-
tance received from other countries during a domestically prosecuted forfei-
ture and/or money-laundering case. 
This chapter outlines the components of an IASP and examines IASPs as a 
mechanism to aid economic and legal development. The chapter first examines 
the topic of international asset sharing from the perspective of an international 
organization, specifically, the United Nations (UN). The analysis then turns 
to a discussion of countries participating in asset-sharing agreements, such 
as The Bahamas and Canada. Then it explores the US Department of Justice’s 
(DOJ) IASP program in detail, focusing first on the US legislative framework 
regarding forfeiture and the DOJ’s management model for forfeited property 
and funds and then on the manner in which DOJ international sharing agree-
ments are structured. The chapter concludes with an overview of the benefits 
of implementing a transparent and accountable IASP. 
Interwoven throughout the discussion are the developmental benefits that 
can be realized by implementing an IASP. Tangible benefits include building 
international cooperation among justice and financial agencies (for example, 
  Any opinions expressed in the chapter are the author’s own and do not, in any way, reflect 
the official position or views of the US DOJ. The author would like to thank Hassane Cissé, 
Thomas Dougherty, Agustin Flah, Jenifer Preston, Matthew Moorhead, Milena Sanchez de 
Boado, and Linda Samuel for their support.
1  Remarks by the Attorney General of the United States Eric J. Holder, Jr. (Mar. 26, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/25953 (accessed Mar. 28, 2012). Mark Rock-
well, U. S., Mexico to Split Millions in Seized Assets to Cripple Drug Gangs, Government Security 
News (Mar. 27, 2012). 
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financial intelligence units and prosecution and law enforcement agencies), 
building capacity in domestic AF/AML sectors, and taking money out of the 
pockets of criminals. 
UN Support for Asset Sharing 
Support for international asset sharing can be found in a number of UN con-
ventions, including the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances of 19882 (commonly referred to as the Vienna 
Convention), the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime3 
(commonly referred to as the Palermo Convention), and the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.4
Pursuant to UN Resolution 2004/24,
the Economic and Social Council, determined to strengthen interna-
tional cooperation in the confiscation and disposal of the proceeds of 
crime covered by the Organized Crime Convention and the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances of 1988, and recognizing that a model bilateral 
agreement on sharing confiscated proceeds of crime could facili-
tate greater international cooperation in that matter, requested the  
Secretary-General to convene an open-ended intergovernmental ex-
pert group to prepare such a draft model bilateral agreement. The 
group met from 26 to 28 January 2005.5 
As a result of these meetings, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime suc-
cessfully developed a model agreement on international asset sharing. The 
UN Crime Commission endorsed this agreement in May 2005, and the UN 
General Assembly endorsed it in December 2005. The model provides a use-
ful framework for countries needing an asset-sharing agreement to facilitate 
international forfeiture cooperation. 
2  Article 5(a) provides that “proceeds or property confiscated by a Party . . . shall be disposed 
of by that Party according to its domestic law and administrative procedures.” Article 5(b)
(ii) encourages the sharing of such confiscated assets with other parties “on a regular or case-
by-case basis” in accordance with domestic law or any applicable bilateral or multilateral 
agreements.” Available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf (accessed 
Mar. 3, 2012).
3  Article 14 calls for forfeited assets to be disposed of pursuant to domestic law, but “if so 
requested” the country should “give priority consideration to returning the confiscated pro-
ceeds of crime or property to the requesting State Party so that it can give compensation to 
the victims of the crime or return such proceeds of crime or property to their legitimate own-
ers.” See http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC (accessed Mar. 3, 2012). 
4  This convention recommends, but does not mandate, sharing. See http://www.un.org/law 
/cod/finterr.htm (accessed Mar. 3, 2012).
5  See Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Bangkok 
6 (Apr. 2005). See also http://www.un.org/events/11thcongress/docs/programme.pdf 
(accessed Mar. 12, 2012).
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In addition to the UN conventions, recommendation 38 of the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF)6 advocates international asset sharing. Specifically, 
this recommendation states that
[t]here should be authority to take expeditious action in response to 
requests by foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate 
property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or predicate 
offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the com-
mission of these offences, or property of corresponding value. There 
should also be arrangements for co-ordinating seizure and confis-
cation proceedings, which may include the sharing of confiscated 
assets.7
In addition to UN support for international asset-sharing agreements, 
many nations, recognizing the benefits of such agreements, have established 
their own IASPs. The US Attorney General states, “It is the policy of the Unit-
ed States to encourage international asset sharing and to recognize all foreign 
assistance that facilitates US forfeitures so far as consistent with US law.”8 This 
chapter examines in detail the components of one such IASP —that of the DOJ.9 
Bermuda and Canada—International Asset-Sharing Agreements 
Bermuda and Canada are two countries that have entered into formal asset-
sharing agreements. In March 2009, officials from the Bahamian and Canadian 
governments signed an asset-sharing agreement that reinforced their shared 
commitment to confiscate the proceeds of drug trafficking and money laun-
dering, among other criminal acts. Prior to the agreement, The Bahamas and 
Canada had relied primarily on the 1990 Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters Treaty to exchange information and confiscate illegal assets. 
A mutual legal assistance treaty
facilitates the gathering of evidence and intelligence in the inves-
tigation and prosecution of criminal offences. It also enhances the 
capabilities in the confiscation of the proceeds of crime. Mutual legal 
assistance treaties are concluded between two countries for the pur-
6  “The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 
by the Ministers of its Member jurisdictions. The objectives of the FATF are to set standards 
and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for 
combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity 
of the international financial system. The FATF is therefore a ‘policy-making body’ which 
works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regu-
latory reforms in these areas.” See http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ (accessed 
Mar. 10, 2012).
7  See http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/40%20Recommendations.pdf, at 13 
(accessed Mar. 24, 2012). 
8  US Attorneys Manual, Chapter 9-116.000, Equitable Sharing and Federal Adoption, 9-116.400, In-
ternational Sharing of Forfeited Assets (2011). 
9  The US Department of Treasury maintains its own IASP for cases handled by the agencies 
that fall within the Treasury’s domain, such as the Internal Revenue Service. 
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pose of gathering and exchanging information in an effort to enforce 
criminal laws and confiscate the ill-gotten gains of criminal activity.10
Then, in 2000, “[p]ursuant to the 1988 United Nations Convention against the 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the Government 
of The Bahamas implemented the Proceeds of Crime Act 2000 (Act), where 
Sections 52 and 53 provide[d] for the establishment and administration of the 
Confiscated Assets Fund.”11 Following the passage of the act, the government 
of the Bahamas expressed a desire to formalize their existing cooperation ef-
forts with the government of Canada. In 2001, both countries participated in 
negotiations that resulted in an agreement to enter into a formal asset-sharing 
agreement. In 2009, officials representing the governments signed an asset-
sharing agreement. With this agreement, Bahamian and Canadian officials 
were able to strengthen their mutual cooperation efforts in combating interna-
tional money-laundering offenders while facilitating bilateral confiscation of 
illicitly obtained assets.
Asset Forfeiture Framework—US Federal Statutes
The fundamental building block for any IASP is a strong and comprehensive 
legal framework. The statutory authority that enables the DOJ to enter into 
international asset-sharing agreements is found in Statute 18 US Code (USC) 
Section 981(i), Statute 21 USC Section 882(e)(1)(E), and Statute 31 USC Sec-
tion 9703(h)(2).12 Statute 18 USC Section 981(i) sets forth the conditions under 
10  See  http://www.thebahamasweekly.com/publish/bis-news updates/Bahamas_and_Canada 
_Sign_Asset_ Sharing_Agreement 5788.shtml (accessed Jul. 19, 2012).
11  Id. 
12  Statute 18 USC Section 981—Civil Forfeiture, Section (i), reads, in part: “(1) Whenever prop-
erty is civilly or criminally forfeited under this chapter, the Attorney General or the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, as the case may be, may transfer the forfeited personal property or 
the proceeds of the sale of any forfeited personal or real property to any foreign country 
which participated directly or indirectly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property, if such a 
transfer (A) has been agreed to by the Secretary of State; (B) is authorized in an international 
agreement between the United States and the foreign country; and (C) is made to a country 
which, if applicable, has been certified under Section 481(h) [4] of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961. A decision by the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant 
to this paragraph shall not be subject to review. The foreign country shall, in the event of a 
transfer of property or proceeds of sale of property under this subsection, bear all expenses 
incurred by the United States in the seizure, maintenance, inventory, storage, forfeiture, and 
disposition of the property, and all transfer costs. The payment of all such expenses, and the 
transfer of assets pursuant to this paragraph, shall be upon such terms and conditions as the 
Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury may, in his discretion, set. (2) The provi-
sions of this section shall not be construed as limiting or superseding any other authority of 
the United States to provide assistance to a foreign country in obtaining property related to 
a crime committed in the foreign country, including property which is sought as evidence of 
a crime committed in the foreign country. (3) A certified order or judgment of forfeiture by a 
court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country concerning property which is the subject 
of forfeiture under this section and was determined by such court to be the type of property 
described in subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, and any certified recordings or transcripts 
of testimony taken in a foreign judicial proceeding concerning such order or judgment of 
forfeiture, shall be admissible in evidence in a proceeding brought pursuant to this section. 
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which the US Attorney General may transfer personal property, or the pro-
ceeds from the sale of any personal or real property, that has been civilly or 
criminally forfeited to a foreign country. The critical component of this statute 
is that it grants the attorney general discretionary authority regarding sharing 
agreements. 
Forfeiture Statutes
Forfeiture is the taking, by the government, of property derived from a crime, 
involved in a crime, or that facilitates a crime, without compensating the 
owner. Many countries have enacted forfeiture laws in both their civil and 
their criminal codes. In the US federal system, there are two types of forfei-
ture: administrative and judicial. Judicial forfeiture, which requires a pros-
ecutor to start a case in court, is further subdivided into criminal and civil 
forfeiture. Each of these types of forfeiture is briefly discussed below. 
Administrative Forfeiture
Administrative forfeiture is a nonjudicial matter handled by a law enforce-
ment agency; the majority of all forfeitures are administrative. In this process, 
the seizing agency declares the property forfeited without a judicial proceed-
ing; this status is reserved for uncontested cases. An administrative forfeiture 
typically begins with a law enforcement agent making a seizure based on 
probable cause.13 Each step of the administrative forfeiture process includes 
procedural and constitutional protections for owners.
Following the initial seizure, the law enforcement agency commences the 
administrative forfeiture process by sending a notice to the party informing it 
of its right to file a claim for the return of the seized property within a certain 
period of time. After the period of time has lapsed, and if no claim is filed, the 
property may be declared forfeited by the federal agency. However, if a claim 
is filed, the case is referred to a prosecutor for judicial forfeiture, a process in 
which the party may challenge the forfeiture. 
Pursuant to US federal law, the seizing or adopting14 law enforcement 
agency may proceed to administratively forfeit a defined category of items. 
For example, the following may be forfeited: monetary instruments, such as 
cash, checks, stocks, and bonds; or conveyances, such as vehicles, vessels, 
Such certified order or judgment of forfeiture.”
13  “[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts 
available to the officer would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,’ Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 [45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543] (1925), that certain items may 
be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any 
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” United States v. Dunn, 
946 F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 950 (1991).
14  Under US federal law, a state or local law enforcement agency may request that a federal 
agency “adopt” a seizure if certain conditions are met, including if the underlying act sup-
porting the seizure was a violation of US federal law. 
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and/or aircraft that have been used to commit or facilitate a crime. In regard 
to other property, such as bank accounts and jewelry, only items valued at 
US$500,000 or less may be seized. Although most property can be forfeited 
administratively, an important exception is real property.15 
Judicial Forfeiture
Judicial forfeiture “is the process by which property is declared forfeited to 
the United States by a court. This status is required for any property other 
than monetary instruments and hauling conveyances if the value of the other 
property exceeds US$500,000; a valid, timely claim has been filed in an admin-
istrative forfeiture; or if the property is real estate.”16
Once a property claim enters into a judicial forfeiture procedure, it will 
proceed as either a criminal or a civil case, depending on the circumstances 
regarding the seizure. 
Criminal Forfeiture
Because it is in personam, that is, forfeiture against the person, only property 
that the defendant in a criminal case has an interest in, and that does not be-
long to a third party, can be forfeited in a criminal case. In criminal forfeitures, 
the forfeiture allegation is contained within the criminal indictment.17 If the 
defendant is convicted, the jury or court hears additional evidence and/or 
argument on the forfeiture matter. If applicable, the court may also hold a 
post-trial ancillary hearing to address any third-party interests.
Civil Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture, also referred to as non-conviction-based forfeiture, is a civil 
action in-rem, that is, against the property itself, and forfeiture is limited to 
specific property involved in the crime.18 In this type of forfeiture action, the 
government must prove that the property, not the person, was derived from, or 
was used to, commit a crime. In a civil judicial forfeiture case, the case moves 
through a civil discovery process, with motions practice and trial stages. 
In terms of burden of proof, the government bears the initial burden 
of establishing the forfeitability of the property by a preponderance of the 
15  US Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Guide to Equitable Sharing for State and Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies (Apr. 2010). 
16  Id.
17  Criminal indictment is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as a formal written state-
ment framed by a prosecuting authority and found by a jury (as a grand jury) charging a 
person with an offense.
18  In The Recovery of “Criminal” Assets in New Zealand, Ireland and England, 41 Victoria U. of Wel-
lington L. Rev. 26 (2010), Liz Campbell observes that “[i]n the same way that a civil action 
for misappropriation of property seeks to restore the injured party to the position he was in 
prior to the commission of the tort, it is arguable that civil forfeiture also seeks to return the 
state of affairs to that before the alleged criminal offence.” 
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evidence,19 and the innocent owner defense may be asserted. If forfeitability 
is proved and the innocent owner defense fails, the court will order judgment 
for the government.
Countries that have incorporated forfeiture laws into their legal frame-
work often have a version of the types of forfeiture discussed above. Re-
gardless of the approach, the key is a strong legal framework to support the 
government’s ability to seize and forfeit property in accordance with constitu-
tional and due process rights. In the United States, pursuant to Statute 28 USC 
Section 1355(b)(2), regardless of where the assets are physically located, the 
government may bring a civil forfeiture action before a federal court. How-
ever, a “US court’s jurisdiction over international property is a legal fiction 
without the cooperation of the foreign country where the property is located. 
If the foreign country does not agree to enforce a US district court’s civil forfei-
ture order, the US government would be unable to seize the property.”20 
In addition to a strong statutory-based framework, an effective IASP re-
quires the establishment of an agency or office that is tasked with an oversight 
role regarding the maintenance and accountability of seized and forfeited 
property and any resulting funds. In the US federal system, these responsibili-
ties fall under the DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Program. 
The DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Program 
The need to efficiently preserve, manage, and (if the forfeiture process is final-
ized) dispose of forfeited assets is an important component of any success-
ful IASP21 and requires the presence of an agency or a specialized division. 
Such an agency can work to ensure that seized assets are properly maintained, 
which guarantees that their value is retained during the pendency of the sei-
zure process—an important responsibility—regardless of whether the assets 
are returned to the original owner or ultimately forfeited to the government. 
In the United States, this function is carried out for the DOJ by the US 
Marshals Service.22 The US Marshals Service “has primary responsibility 
for holding and maintaining real and tangible personal property seized by 
19  “A preponderance of evidence is described as just enough evidence to make it more likely 
than not that the fact the claimant seeks to prove is true . . . the definition serves as a helpful 
guide to judges and juries in determining whether a claimant has carried his or her burden 
of proof.” See http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com.
20  Jorene Soto, Show Me the Money Part II, 13 –14 Oregon Review of Intl. L. 141, 152 (2011), 
quoting, in part, “See, US v. Meza, 856 F. Supp. 759 (E.D.N.Y/ 1994, aff’d, 63 F.3d 148 (2nd. 
Cir. 1995).” 
21  Agencies participating in the Asset Forfeiture Program must also ensure that data in the 
property and financial management systems of the program are updated in a timely manner.
22  “The [US] Attorney General is authorized to use the Assets Forfeiture Fund to pay any nec-
essary expenses associated with forfeiture operations such as property seizure, detention, 
management, forfeiture, and disposal. The Fund may also be used to finance certain general 
investigative expenses. These authorized uses are enumerated in 28 USC. Section 524(c).”
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participating agencies for disposition. Seized property can be either returned 
to the owner or forfeited to the Government. Forfeited property is subsequent-
ly sold, placed into official use, destroyed, or transferred to another agency.”23 
Moreover, funds that are forfeited to the government must also be managed in 
a transparent, accountable, and efficient manner. 
In cases where the seizing agency participates in the DOJ’s IASP, the re-
sponsibility for oversight of the funds and program management falls under 
the power of the DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Program: 
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 established the De-
partment of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund to receive the proceeds 
of forfeiture and to pay the costs associated with such forfeitures, in-
cluding the costs of managing and disposing of property, satisfying 
valid liens, mortgages, and other innocent owner claims, and costs 
associated with accomplishing the legal forfeiture of the property.24 
The Asset Forfeiture Program operates at the federal level and manages 
the individual DOJ components that are “charged with lawfully, effectively, 
and efficiently supporting law enforcement authorities in the application of 
specified forfeiture statutes.”25 The program was designed to support law en-
forcement initiatives across the United States and around the globe to “re-
move the tools of crime from criminal organizations, deprive wrongdoers of 
the proceeds of their crimes, recover property that may be used to compensate 
victims, and deter crime.”26 
The DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Program comprises two financial funds.27 
Funds involving seized and forfeited property are managed in the United 
States by the Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF), which works in conjunction with 
the Seized Asset Deposit Fund (SADF) to create a single financial reporting 
entity for the DOJ. These funds include the “specified funds, property seized 
for forfeiture, and the transactions and program activities of the DOJ forfeiture 
program components and other participating agencies.”28 
23  See Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund Annual Financial Statements Fiscal Year 
2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/a1212.pdf (accessed Mar. 21, 
2012). 
24  Statute 28 USC Section 524(c). See http://www.justice.gov/jmd/afp/02fundreport/02_2 
.html (accessed Feb. 18, 2012).
25  See Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund Annual Financial Statements Fiscal 
Year 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/a1212.pdf (accessed 
Mar. 2, 2012).
26  US DOJ, Criminal Division, Guide to Equitable Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies (Apr. 2010). 
27  See Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund Annual Financial Statements Fiscal 
Year 2011, at 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/a1212.pdf (accessed 
Apr. 1, 2012).
28 Id.
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The Asset Forfeiture Program invests cash balances from both the AFF and 
the SADF in government securities. “All amounts earned from the investment 
of AFF and SADF balances are deposited into the AFF. The interest earned 
on the AFF balances is the property of the United States Government.”29 The 
AFF and SADF accounts are maintained at the US Federal Reserve Bank in 
New York.
In accord with statutory requirements, the AFF managers must file an an-
nual report with the US Congress detailing areas such as the total net deposits 
to the fund and the total expenses paid from the fund by category of expense, 
including equitable-sharing payments. The statute also sets forth the limita-
tions governing use of the AFF, and the statutory authority is further con-
trolled by policy guidelines.30
In total assets, the AFF
(which present as of a specific time the amounts of future economic 
benefits owned or managed by the AFF/SADF), increased in FY 2011 
. . . 71.7 percent . . . [s]pecifically, in FY 2011, ten major fraud cases re-
sulted in extraordinary forfeiture income of $733.6 million compared 
to the nine FY 2010 fraud cases that resulted in extraordinary forfei-
ture income of $630.3 million. The term extraordinary is considered 
nonrecurring forfeiture income greater than $25 million.31 
The management and disbursement of forfeited funds must be carried out 
in a transparent manner. This transparency is necessary not only to preserve 
the viability of the IASP itself but also to ensure public and global trust in 
international asset sharing as an effective and accountable tool for reaching 
development goals.
The DOJ’s International Sharing Program
The DOJ’s international sharing program32 is “guided by standing interna-
tional sharing agreements or [by] the subject of a future case-specific forfeiture 
sharing arrangement to be negotiated by AFMLS [Asset Forfeiture and Money 
Laundering Section of the US Department of Justice] and approved by the 
29  See Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund Annual Financial Statements Fiscal 
Year 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/a1212.pdf (accessed 
Mar. 21, 2012).
30  See Attorney General’s Guidelines on Seized and Forfeited Property (Jul. 1990). 
31  See Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund Annual Financial Statements Fiscal 
Year 2011, at 5, available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/a1212.pdf (accessed 
Mar. 21, 2012).
32  Although not the focus of this chapter, the DOJ also maintains a domestic equitable-sharing 
program, which as of 2009, had “shared over $4.5 billion in forfeited assets with more than 
8,000 state and local law enforcement agencies.” See US Department of Justice, Criminal 
Division, Guide to Equitable Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (Apr. 2010).
The World Bank Legal Review274
Department of State.”33 When entering into sharing agreements, the DOJ and 
the recipient country must agree that the funds will be used to strengthen im-
portant development goals, such as building capacity in the recipient’s AF/
AML sector. The preference is for shared funds to be used to support AF/AML 
reform and development; however, with some exceptions, shared funds can 
be used to support a wide variety of domestic development needs. Regard-
less of the ultimate manner in which the funds are spent, each case-specific 
forfeiture-sharing arrangement is negotiated in a manner designed to ensure 
that it meets the needs of the recipient country. 
Between 1992 and 2011, the DOJ, through its international asset-sharing 
program, shared more than US$234,949,197 with more than 39 countries. 
Case-Specific Sharing Agreements
Countries can enter into case-specific sharing agreements (CSSAs). A CSSA is 
used when forfeited funds are shared as a result of a specific case.34 Typically, a 
CSSA is an official written agreement, entered into between two or more coun-
tries after a series of negotiations. The CSSA sets forth the percentage of total 
seized proceeds to be shared, memorializes the mutual understanding of how 
those proceeds will be used by the recipient country (preferably to enhance 
its AF/AML regimes), and addresses accountability and transparency issues 
regarding expenditures. 
The DOJ’s AFMLS negotiates the terms of the CSSA, with the US Depart-
ment of Treasury’s concurrence and the US Department of State’s authoriza-
tion. Through this process, the DOJ, often viewed as a domestically focused 
agency, can exercise a degree of assistance in the international development 
process. 
The Process for Requesting a CSSA 
An assisting country may request a CSSA for DOJ sharing in the following 
ways:
•  A request pursuant to a treaty between the United States and the assisting 
c ountry
• A request made within the diplomatic arena 
•  The submission of an official, signed letter by a country’s appropriate rep-
resentative addressed to the US law enforcement agency that the country 
assisted in the investigation 
33  US Attorneys Manual, Chapter 9-116.000, Equitable Sharing and Federal Adoption, 9-116.400, 
International Sharing of Forfeited Assets (2011).
34  In addition to CSSAs, related tools for international asset-sharing agreements are global 
asset-sharing agreements, which serve the same function as CSSAs, but the terms of which 
apply to all sharing between two countries, and agreements not limited to a single case 
agreement (as is a CSSA). 
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The Reviewing Process
Once the initial request has been received, the appropriate agency in the DOJ 
will begin the first in a series of reviews to determine if an international as-
set-sharing agreement is an appropriate action. The review process normally 
includes the prosecution office(s) and law enforcement agency (or agencies) 
that received the foreign assistance and additional divisions within the DOJ. 
During the review process, the following factors are considered:
•	 	Whether the foreign country directly or indirectly participated in the sei-
zure or the forfeiture of property
•	 	Whether the transfer is authorized in an international agreement (that is, a 
mutual legal assistance treaty or an asset-sharing agreement) between the 
United States and the recipient country
•	 	Whether the underlying forfeiture has been finalized 
•	 	Whether the country has been certified under section 481(h) of the US 
Foreign Assistance Act35 
The decision regarding whether to enter into negotiations for a CSSA is 
not reviewable.36 However, if the above factors have all been satisfied, the pro-
cess continues, with additional factors reviewed: 
•	 	Whether the country provided the information that led to the seizure(s) of 
property that was ultimately forfeited
•	 	Whether the country provided unique and indispensable assistance dur-
ing the investigation and prosecution of the case by the DOJ
•	 	Whether the country initially identified the assets for seizure
•	 	Whether the country seized one or more assets that were forfeited in non-
federal proceedings during the same investigation
•	 	Whether the country could have pursued forfeiture under domestic law 
but instead joined forces with the United States to conduct a more effec-
tive investigation or prosecution37
Because individual factors may vary, the review process attempts to take 
into account the totality of circumstances regarding the underlying case, in-
cluding recognizing any unique challenges that were present in the investiga-
tion and prosecution. 
35  Chapter 8, section 481(h) of the Foreign Assistance Act, known as the Certification Law, 
serves as a link between foreign aid and positive drug-control performance. See http://
www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf (accessed Apr. 3, 2012).
36  The DOJ also shares forfeited proceeds domestically, among US federal, state, and local 
agencies. As with the global CSSA approach, domestically and pursuant to the Equitable 
Sharing Program conditions, the percentage of shared funds is based on participation and 
assistance in the underlying case. 
37  US DOJ, Criminal Division, Guide to Equitable Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies (Apr. 2010). 
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How Is the Percentage of Shared Funds Determined?
If the DOJ determines that the case is appropriate for international sharing, 
the next stage is the determination of what percentage of the total amount of 
forfeited funds will be shared with the assisting country. This determination 
is at the discretion of the DOJ and typically reflects the degree of assistance 
provided by the foreign country, which falls into one of three categories: es-
sential assistance (EA), major assistance (MA), and facilitating assistance (FA). 
Essential Assistance
The highest level of sharing funds is EA. Cases falling into this category may 
enter into CSSAs in which 50 to 100 percent of the total forfeited funds can be 
shared. In deciding what cases fall in the EA category, the DOJ examines fac-
tors such as whether the case involved victims or if the assisting country was 
the victim. 
In addition, the DOJ considers additional factors such as whether the as-
sisting country waived its own forfeiture actions and provided all necessary 
evidence to US authorities and whether the country initiated defending litiga-
tion or agreed to repatriate funds without an account signatory letter. In es-
sence, the greater the amount of bilateral cooperation in a case, the greater the 
percentage of funds shared. 
Major Assistance
In cases deemed to be MA, sharing percentages typically involve 40 to 50 per-
cent of the total forfeited amount. In determining whether a case falls into 
the MA category, the DOJ considers several factors, such as whether the as-
sisting country enforced a final forfeiture order from a US court or assisted 
in repatriating the assets to the United States. Other factors include whether 
the assisting country aided the US case by freezing or lifting a freeze over as-
sets, whether the assisting country repatriated defendants via an extradition 
request, or whether their law enforcement agents were put at physical risk by 
assisting in the case. Equally important is whether the assisting country ex-
pended substantial prosecutorial and law enforcement resources on the case. 
A recent example of MA sharing is the March 2012 signing of a letter of intent 
between the United States and the government of Mexico to share 70 percent, 
approximately US$6 million. According to a DOJ press release:
On March 26, 2012, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and Mexican 
Attorney General Marisela Morales Ibáñez signed a letter of intent 
for the United States to share approximately $6 million in forfeited 
funds with the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of 
Mexico (PGR) to support Mexican efforts to combat the financial in-
frastructure of organized criminal groups and to enhance bilateral 
cooperation between the two countries in forfeiture matters.
     The letter of intent and anticipated fund sharing recognized the 
PGR’s valuable cooperation in the investigation and resolution of 
the US government’s case against the Sigue Corporation for viola-
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tions of the Bank Secrecy Act. In January 2008, Sigue entered into a 
deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of Justice on 
charges of failing to maintain an effective anti-money laundering 
program. As a result, Sigue forfeited $15 million to the United States 
and agreed to commit an additional $9.7 million to improving its 
anti-money laundering program.38
Facilitating Assistance
In FA cases, up to 40 percent of the total forfeited funds may be shared. Cases 
are categorized as FA when the assisting country provided critical informa-
tion regarding an investigative lead, assisted the United States by obtaining 
and sharing extensive bank documentation, provided other financial records, 
and/or assisted in ensuring that foreign banks repatriated assets. Once the 
decision regarding the percentage to be shared has been determined, the pro-
cess continues to the negotiation stage. 
Negotiation of CSSA Terms
No other US government officer or agency may bind the DOJ to terms of a 
CSSA, which are negotiated by the AFMLS of the DOJ. For the assisting coun-
try, negotiations are typically handled by the corresponding attorney gener-
al, minister of justice, or minster of foreign affairs or a representative. The 
negotiation process includes a series of meetings to discuss how the shared 
funds will be targeted and addresses mechanisms to ensure accountability 
and transparency regarding the shared funds. These decisions are arrived at 
via a process of mutual agreement, and discretion is granted to the assisting 
country depending on individual circumstances.
In discussing areas in which shared funds may be targeted, the domestic 
AF/AML sector will receive particular attention. The preference is for shared 
funds to target AF/AML issues; examples include
•	 	Support for establishing an AF/AML division with the recipient country’s 
prosecution office
•	 	Funding of joint investigations, programs to identify emerging trends in 
domestic and regional economic crime sectors, and to strengthen the over-
all anti-money-laundering mission of the assisting country 
•  Funding to explore ways to strengthen financial data mining and analysis 
capacity and to improve the tracking of suspicious bank transactions 
•	 	Funding initiatives to increase bilateral asset forfeiture cases
Typically, the target areas are written into the terms of the CSSA. Although 
there are some notable exceptions in which shared funds should not be target-
ed (such as paying for salaries for prosecutors), the process allows for a great 
deal of flexibility in determining how funds should be expended. 
38 US Department of Justice press release (March 26, 2012).
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IASPs as a Tool for Development
Development has been defined as “the process which facilitates for every hu-
man and all persons the enjoyment of economic, social, cultural and political 
development.”39 This definition includes the critical need to ensure that citi-
zens around the globe have both access to and faith in a functioning and trans-
parent justice sector. The primary question posed here is exactly how does the 
adoption and implementation of an IASP contribute to international develop-
ment? The answer lies in the ability of the IASP to, if properly implemented, 
act as a mechanism to support domestic capacity building in a number of dif-
ferent areas, including the AF/AML sector, to foster international cooperation, 
and to provide a means to combat transnational crime.
In Resolution 2004/29, the United Nations recognized that
the laundering of the proceeds of crime ha[s] spread internationally 
and ha[s] become a worldwide threat to the stability and security of 
financial and commercial systems [and] urged Member States that 
had not yet done so to strengthen their capacity to prevent, control, 
investigate and suppress serious crimes related to money-laundering, 
including money-laundering related to the financing of terrorism.40 
An IASP can adapt and respond to the specific needs of both the recipient 
and the sharing country in various ways. 
First, an IASP can address development needs often encountered in frag-
ile or weak states. The ability to target shared funds to specific areas of need 
can assist fragile states transitioning from postconflict to stable societies. For 
example, a transparent IASP can assist in the design and implementation of 
development projects in fragile states by using the shared funds to target key 
economic and justice sector reforms. It can also effectively address identified 
constraints that businesses and officials in weak states cite as limitations to 
growth, such as weak banking and court sectors.41 In these cases, shared mon-
ies can provide funding for the establishment of a strong financial intelligence 
unit, an anticorruption office, or prosecutor and judicial training academies. 
Second, an effective IASP can provide fragile states with the opportunity 
to establish or strengthen their AF/AML sectors while also developing key 
partnerships that enable future capacity-building programs. 
Third, IASPs can be an effective tool in addressing unique challenges in 
justice sector growth—such as the absorption challenges that new member 
39  Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development (adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 41/128 of Dec. 4, 1986), as quoted in A. H. Qureshi & A. R. Ziegler, International 
Economic Law 494 (2nd ed., Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell 2007). See also http://labspace.open 
.ac.uk/course/view.php?name=PUB_46_1.2 (accessed Feb. 26, 2012). 
40  See 11th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Bangkok, 
13 (Apr. 2005) (A/CONF.203/1). See also http://www.un.org/events/11thcongress/docs 
/programme.pdf (accessed Mar. 12, 2012). 
41  See http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1426232 (accessed Jul. 18, 2012).
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states of the European Union must confront. For example, shared funds can be 
focused on assisting new member states in their efforts to address economic, 
institutional, and justice sector absorption challenges, such as the need to im-
prove fiscal management practices and to strengthen anticorruption capaci-
ties. In these areas, an IASP can act as a mechanism to assist new member 
states in overcoming obstacles while continuing to foster key partnerships 
and encourage innovative planning initiatives. 
Fourth, IASPs can serve overall global development goals by strengthen-
ing international cooperation efforts among countries, regardless of the eco-
nomic or legal differences that may separate them. By serving as a mechanism 
that encourages countries to work together, IASPs create global partnerships 
to prevent, control, investigate, and suppress transnational economic crime.
Finally, an accountable and transparent IASP demonstrates, at a very pub-
lic and visible level, the ability of governments to work globally to take profits 
away from criminals and redirect them back to the very agencies and offices 
tasked with combating economic crimes. In a related manner, the successful 
completion of a bilateral CSSA represents an opportunity to share, domesti-
cally and internationally, the message that international cooperation in fight-
ing economic crime not only occurs but, more important, succeeds. 
Conclusion
The ever-increasing globalization of transnational criminal groups not only 
endangers global economic systems but also undermines rule of law and good 
governance practices. Encouraged by the United Nations and domestic gov-
ernments alike, asset sharing at an international level is an effective and pow-
erful tool for development. It can assist in disrupting and dismantling trans-
national criminal organizations while strengthening international cooperation 
on AF/AML issues.42 The ability of countries to cooperate on a bilateral scale 
and enter into mutually beneficial asset-sharing agreements serves a number 
of goals, including “taking the profit out of crime.”
42  DOJ equitable sharing applies only to sharing of assets that were seized by the DOJ and 
that were “forfeited judicially or administratively to the United States by the United States 
Attorney’s Offices or Forfeiture Program Participants.” The participants include the Asset 
Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division (AFMLS); Organized Crime 
Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF); Asset Forfeiture Management Staff, Justice Man-
agement Division (AFMS); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); 
Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State (DS); Executive Office for United States 
Attorneys (EOUSA); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA); United States Marshals Service 
(USMS); and United States Postal Service (USPS). See US DOJ, Criminal Division, Guide to 
Equitable Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (Apr. 2010). 

Toward a New Law and Development
New State Activism in Brazil and the Challenge 
for Legal Institutions
DaviD M. Trubek, Diogo r. CouTinho,  
anD Mario g. SChapiro
At the intersection of law, economics, and the practices of states and devel-
opment agencies, the field of law and development undergoes continuous 
realignment.1 As economic policies, legal theories, and institutional practices 
change, the salient issues in law and development change as well.2 The 21st 
century has ushered in a new era. Development theories are being challenged 
and new practices are emerging. Law and development scholars need to un-
derstand the new trends and explore their implications for legal studies and 
practice.
In the past couple of decades, development policy and practice have shift-
ed in many regions, but nowhere more clearly than in Latin America. After 
a long period when neoliberal policies prevailed and the state’s role in the 
economy was curtailed, many countries in the region have begun to explore 
new forms of state activism. Brazil has been a leader in the formation of new 
development policies and in the creation of a new development discourse. 
Starting with the election of Lula da Silva in 2002 and gaining momentum 
during Lula’s second term in 2006, Brazil has instituted new forms of indus-
trial and social policy, experienced a surge in growth, and seen a reduction in 
economic inequality. 
This trend has led scholars to begin to talk about a “new developmen-
talism” and speculate about the emergence of a new kind of developmental 
state in which the government plays an active role in mobilizing resources, 
stimulating investment, and promoting innovation but does not command or 
1  This article draws on David M. Trubek, Diogo R. Coutinho, and Mario G. Schapiro, New State 
Activism in Brazil and the Challenge for Law, in Law and the New Developmental State: The Bra-
zilian Experience in Latin American Context (David M. Trubek et al. ed., Cambridge U. Press, 
forthcoming) (hereinafter, Trubek et. al). An earlier version of the article was discussed at 
the 2012 IGLP Workshop at Harvard Law School and the Conference on Global Governance: 
Critical Legal Perspectives at the European University Institute (July, 2012). The authors are 
grateful to Peter Houtzager, Willy Forbath, Alvaro Santos, David Kennedy, Duncan Ken-
nedy, Helena Alviar, Jeremy Perelman, Lucie White, Mushtaq Kahn, Shunko Rojas, and Yves 
Dezalay for comments and suggestions. The authors also received useful comments from 
Professor Wang Chenguang of the Tsinghua University School of Law. 
2  For a discussion of the history of law and development, see David M. Trubek and Alvaro San-
tos, The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge U. Press 2006). 
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control the economy. In this approach, the state employs an open-economy 
industrial policy to restructure production and increase international compe-
tiveness while simultaneously using an active social policy to eliminate pov-
erty, reduce inequality, and stimulate domestic demand. Unlike the old para-
digm, in this new model, such a state seeks to benefit from participation in 
the global economy while avoiding the dangers of free trade fundamentalism, 
and it tries to stimulate, not replace, the private sector.3
This chapter explores shifts in government policy in Brazil since 2000, 
showing how these changes are influencing developments in the law. After a 
limited experience with neoliberalism, the country has embraced new forms 
of state engagement in the economy and social relations. Because these chang-
es are recent and have not yet been fully consolidated, the resulting constella-
tion can be viewed as new state activism (NSA),4 a term that suggests neither a 
return to the past nor a clearly consolidated alternative “model.” The chapter 
covers the emergence of NSA; identifies its salient features, noting how it dif-
fers from prior forms of state intervention; explores some of the forces that 
have shaped this new form of state action; and provides a preliminary assess-
ment of the significance and challenge of these developments for the law. 
Introduction: From the “Long 1990s” (1988–2004) to NSA
The evolution of NSA in Brazil was preceded by a series of policy changes 
that dismantled some of the institutions of the old developmental state and 
embraced some aspects of the Washington Consensus. Like several other 
developing Latin American countries, Brazil had a classic developmentalist 
phase in the twentieth century: from 1930 until the end of the 1980s, economic 
policies consisted of state-led initiatives to promote import substitution indus-
trialization, and growth through state-owned enterprises, economic planning, 
price control, regulatory and administrative authorities in key sectors, and the 
use of tax and financial incentives. 
3  For a discussion of new developmentalism and the idea of a new development state, see 
David M. Trubek, Law, State and the New Developmentalism: An Introduction, in Trubek et. al, 
supra note 1.
4  See Glauco Arbix & Scott B. Martin, Beyond Developmentalism and Market Fundamental-
ism in Brazil: Inclusionary State Activism without Statism, paper presented at the workshop 
on “States, Development, and Global Governance,” Global Legal Studies Center and the 
Center for World Affairs and the Global Economy (WAGE), University of Wisconsin, 2010, 
available at http://www.law.wisc.edu/gls/documents/paper_arbix.pdf  (accessed Jul. 15, 
2012); and Renato Boschi, Estado Desenvolvimentista no Brasil: Continuidades e incertidumbres 
(2010), 2 Ponto de Vista, available at http://neic.iesp.uerj.br/pontodevista/pdf/Ponto_de_
Vista_01fev2010.pdf  (accessed Oct. 10, 2010). For an account of “new developmentalism” in 
Brazil, see Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, From Old to New Developmentalism in Latin America, in 
Textos para Discussão–Escola de Economia de São Paulo 193 (2009). See also Eli Diniz, É possível 
um Novo Modelo de Estado Desenvolvimentista no Brasil? 2 IPEA – Boletim de Análise Político- 
Instiutional 17 (2012).
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Between 1988 and 2004, known as the “long 1990s,” Brazil partially dis-
mantled these structures and policies and shifted to more market-oriented ap-
proaches. In 1988, after 24 years of military dictatorship and in a context of a 
threat of hyperinflation,5 Brazil passed a new constitution that has influenced 
and shaped policy ever since. The 1988 constitution is a social democratic doc-
ument that created a vibrant democratic polity and includes civil, political, 
and social rights and a number of policy goals such as building a free, just, and 
socially integrated society; fostering national development; acquiring tech-
nological autonomy; eradicating poverty and marginalization; and reducing 
economic and social inequalities. Many of the constitution’s provisions have 
had a direct effect on government policy and budgetary allocations. 
President Collor de Mello was elected in 1989, immediately after the new 
constitution came into force. Stressing the need for “modernization,” Col-
lor de Mello rapidly liberalized the economy using drastic tariff reductions, 
privatization, and flawed attempts to control inflation. Under Itamar Franco, 
who replaced Collor de Mello after he was impeached, a stabilization plan 
(the Plano Real) was successfully adopted and inflation was controlled.6 New 
legislation on social assistance and welfare for the poor was also passed.
Franco’s minister of finance, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (known as 
FHC), became the next president in 1994. During Cardoso’s eight years in of-
fice, Brazil continued to move away from the dirigiste policies of the develop-
mentalist period, embracing many of the neoliberal prescriptions favored by 
the Washington Consensus.7 In the Cardoso period, state owned-enterprises 
were privatized, direct subsidies for certain industries were scaled back, areas 
of the economy were deregulated, import barriers were reduced, competition 
was fostered and enforced, intellectual property rights were tightened, bilat-
eral investment treaties protecting foreign investors were signed, and fiscal 
responsibility was enhanced. Also, the currency (the real) was constantly kept 
overvalued as monetary stability was pursued and attained.8
Under Cardoso, the bureaucracy was partially modernized, regulatory 
agencies were created, public-private partnerships were designed, and new 
5  In January 1990, inflation in Brazil reached 56 percent per month, raising to 73 percent in 
February and peaking at 84 percent in March; see Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira and Yoshiaki 
Nakano, Hiperinflação e estabilização no Brasil: O Primeiro Plano Collor, Revista de Economia 
Política 4 (1991). During the same period, economic inequality reached its worse level since 
it had been measured (the Gini coefficient peaked at 0.647, according to the Brazilian Office 
of Statistics).
6  “Despite that, a period of strong deterioration of the Balance of Payments began, which led 
the current-account deficit to achieve 4.0% of the GDP in 1998.” Antonio Barros de Castro, 
From Semi-Stagnation to Growth in a Sino-Centric Market, 28 Brazilian J. of Pol. Eco. 3–27 (2008). 
7  Cardoso has always rejected the neoliberal label and claimed that his goal simply was to 
modernize the economy. 
8  “[T]he goal of price stability has remained sacrosanct and the instruments for achieving this 
goal have been in line with the latest international fashions: central bank independence and 
inflation targeting.” Cornel Ban, Brazil’s Liberal Neo-Developmentalism: New Paradigm or Edited 
Orthodoxy? Rev. Intl. of Pol. Eco. (forthcoming). 
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social policies were adopted. To carry out privatization and encourage foreign 
investment, Congress made several changes in the constitution. But although 
the country adopted some ideas from the Washington Consensus, it did not 
wholeheartedly embrace neoliberalism. Privatizations were limited; Banco do 
Brasil, BNDES (the Brazilian Development Bank), and Petrobrás, three major 
state-owned enterprises, remained under government control. None of the 
bilateral investment treaties signed in the 1990s was ratified. 
Institutional and Political Background: The New Democratic  
Constitution of 1988 and the Cardoso Administration
Political parties and social movements had been repressed during military 
rule (1964–85). When the constitution-making process started in the late 1980s, 
an eruption of social-political demands had to be accommodated. Not surpris-
ingly, the resulting constitution was nicknamed “the citizen’s constitution.” 
Not only did it create democratic institutions, it also included an extensive 
charter of civil-political and social rights and reframed public-private rela-
tionships. The constitution incorporates provisions guaranteeing the rule of 
law, protecting individual rights, and guarding against arbitrary state action. 
It also created positive—and justiciable—rights that could impose policy ob-
ligations. The 1988 constitution includes rights to health, education, housing, 
social protection, and pensions. These guarantees have shaped a new and 
complex welfare system, including a massive universal public health system 
and a system of universal pensions. The new system in turn has had a ma-
jor impact on the role of the state and on patterns of government spending.9 
Instead of cutting back on social spending as many countries did during the 
1990s, Brazil increased the percentage of GDP devoted to social protection 
during that period.10
Besides facilitating political mobilization and participation, instituting so-
cial rights and shaping social policies, the new constitution facilitated modern-
ization of the state apparatus and reframed public-private relationships with 
consequences for the business environment. The 1988 constitution initiated a 
slow process of professionalizing state administration. Until the 1930s, public 
employees were hired through the “spoils system” of political appointments. 
A partial reform under Getulio Vargas had instituted meritocratic selection for 
some key agencies such as BNDES and the Foreign Ministry, but left most gov-
ernment jobs subject to political appointment.11 The 1988 constitution carried 
9  See Jorge Abrahão de Castro & José Celso Cardoso Jr., Políticas Sociais no Brasil: Gasto Social 
do Governo Federal de 1988 a 2002, in Questão Social e Políticas Sociais no Brasil Contemporâneo 
(Luciana Jacoud et. al. ed., IPEA 2005). 
10  See Kleber Pacheco de Castro & José Roberto Afonso, Gasto Social no Brasil Pós 1988: Uma 
Análise sob a Ótica da Descentralização Fiscal, 1 Revista de Política, Planejamento e Gestão da 
Saúde 34–56 (2009).
11  The first initiative to reform the public sector to create a more professional public staff was un-
der taken by President Getulio Vargas (1930–45), whose government created the Department 
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the reform further, requiring that all public employees be selected through 
meritocratic processes and capping state salaries. 
The constitution significantly affected relations between the state and 
business. It required competitive bidding for all state purchases and made the 
process more transparent. The special federal prosecutors (Ministério Público) 
were authorized to combat corruption and enforce laws protecting consumers 
and the environment. The constitution also protected individuals and busi-
nesses against regulatory takings and expropriation without compensation.
Although the new constitution embraced social-democratic values and 
norms and some developmentalist ideas, during the 1990s, Brazil flirted with 
neoliberal policies. In 1994, President Itamar Franco and Minister of Finance 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso launched the Plano Real, a macroeconomic sta-
bilization effort that eventually managed to control inflation in Brazil.12 One 
of Cardoso’s first acts as president was to get Congress to remove some provi-
sions in the 1988 constitution that enshrined “old developmentalist” policies 
such as state monopolies and restrictions on foreign investment.13
Under Cardoso, Brazil experienced a strong devaluation of the real as a 
result of a harsh international crisis (particularly in Mexico, Russia, and Asia). 
The government raised the interest rate to a very high level, which severely 
hindered growth. At the same time, the Cardoso government managed to 
embed Brazil in the world economy through trade liberalization. In 2000, it 
ensured fiscal austerity by passing a fiscal responsibility act, and it sought to 
modernize public administration by adopting tenets of a “new public admin-
istration” that allowed outsourcing of certain functions to the private sector.14
Under Cardoso, Brazil accelerated privatizations initiated by Collor and 
Itamar Franco:15 in 1997, Vale do Rio Doce, a major state-owned mining and 
steelmaking company, and Sistema Telebrás, the public-owned telecommu-
nication conglomerate, were sold. In the same year, several electricity and 
gas distribution companies, as well as some state-level banks, were trans-
ferred to private owners. During his eight years as president, Cardoso raised 
of Public Service Management (DASP), a preliminary attempt at establishing a public career 
path in Brazil. 
12  In 1999, Brazil officially adopted an inflation target system (the target in 2012 is 4.5 percent 
per year). 
13  João Paulo M. Peixoto, The Brazilian States since Vargas, in The Brazilian State: Debate and Agenda 
(Mauricio Font & Laura Randall ed., Lexington Books, 2011). 
14  The strategy segregated core activities that should be performed by politicians and senior 
officials, including conducting support activities that may be outsourced, separating policy 
formulation from policy execution, and granting more autonomy and accountability to ser-
vices performed by the state, which would take the form of either “executive agencies” or 
of “social organizations” that are a special type of nonprofit. See Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, 
The 1995 Public Management Reform in Brazil: Reflections of a Reformer, in Reinventing Leviathan: 
The Politics of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries (Ben Ross Schneider & Blanca 
Heredia, ed., North-South Center Press, 2003). 
15  Franco privatized CNS, an important steel company, in 1995.
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approximately US$79 billion through privatization. However, like Petrobrás, 
the Brazilian state oil and gas company, the three large federal banks—Banco 
do Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal, and BNDES—were not privatized. In-
deed, BNDES played an important role in facilitating privatization by offering 
credit to both domestic and international buyers. Table 1 lists the state-owned 
enterprises that were privatized in the 1990s.
Table 1. State-Owned Enterprises Privatized
USIMINAS 24.10.1991 CSN 02.04.1993
USIMEC 24.10.1991 FEM 02.04.1993
CELMA 01.11.1991 ULTRAFÉRTIL 24.06.1993
MAFERSA 11.11.1991 COSIPA 20.08.1993
COSINOR 14.11.1991 AÇOMINAS 10.09.1993
COSINOR DIST. 14.11.1991 EAC 07.12.1994
SNBP 14.01.1992 EAI 07.12.1994
AFP 14.02.1992 PQU 25.01.1994
PETROFLEX 10.04.1992 CARAÍBA 28.07.1994
COPESUL 15.05.1992 EMBRAER 07.12.1994
Can 15.07.1992 NEIVA 07.12.1994
ALCANORTE 15.07.1992 ESCELSA 11.07.1995
CST 23.07.1992 LIGHT 21.05.1996
FOSFÉRTIL 12.08.1992 VALE 06.05.1997
GOIASFÉRTIL 08.10.1992 MERIDIONAL 04.12.1997
ACESITA 23.10.1992 TELEBRÁS 29.07.1998
ENERGÉTICA 23.10.1992 GERASUL 15.09.1998
FASA 23.10.1992 DATAMEC 23.06.1999
Source: Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão (Brazil) 
Brazil adapted the US model of regulatory agencies to supervise and en-
force post-privatization rules and to introduce competition in natural monop-
olies. As a result, electrical distribution, fixed telecommunication networks, 
and transportation (railways, highways, waterways) were subject to a new 
legal and institutional framework that substantively changed the patterns of 
administrative law. New licensing and concession agreements were signed. 
For a list of areas subjected to regulation see table 2.
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Table 2. Activity Regulated
Activity Regulated Commission Foundation Law
Competition CADE 1994 8.884/94
Electric power ANEEL 1996 9.427/96
Oil & Gas ANP 1997 9.478/97
Telecommunication ANATEL 1997 9.472/97
Health Surveillance ANVISA 1999 9.782/99
Health Insurance ANS 2000 9.961/00
Water ANA 2000 9.984/00
Water Transport ANTAQ 2001 10.233/01
Land Transport ANTT 2001 10.233/01
Aviation ANAC 2005 11.182/05
The Cardoso administration rejected the idea of industrial policy, long a 
mainstay of Brazil’s developmental state. Finance Minister Pedro Malan said 
that “the best industrial policy you can have is not to have one.” BNDES, 
which for decades had provided financing to targeted sectors and supported 
many state-owned enterprises, shifted to support of privatization. Rather than 
trying to support priority sectors, the government focused on increasing the 
efficiency of government services and reforming credit markets. For example, 
starting with Cardoso and continuing into Lula’s first term, the Central Bank 
sought to reduce the cost of credit. Among the microeconomic measures un-
dertaken were improvements in bankruptcy procedures and debt collection.16
The Cardoso administration’s opposition to industrial policy did not de-
ter it from stimulating selected sectors in order to promote competiveness and 
innovation. Thus, in 1999, 16 new sectorial funds were charged with fostering 
innovation in strategic areas such as oil and gas, telecommunications, biotech-
nology, and agribusiness. The Cardoso period also saw important changes in 
social policy. Traditionally, the Brazilian welfare state has been regressive, cli-
entelistic, and opaque. Between 1994 and 2002, the federal government took 
a number of measures aimed at transforming this system, including add-
ing poverty-alleviation programs aimed at specific populations; introduc-
ing noncontributory social protection programs; decentralizing social policy 
implementation; and tackling some of the regressive features of the pension 
 
16  According to Fabiani, during the 1999–2006 period, the law behind the government’s micro-
economic agenda was seen as an instrument to protect creditors and ultimately to promote 
economic efficiency. See Emerson Ribeiro Fabiani, Direito e Crédito Bancário no Brasil (Saraiva, 
FGV, 2011). 
The World Bank Legal Review288
scheme.17 The Cardoso government initiated the use of conditional cash trans-
fers; for example, the Bolsa Escola program, implemented 2001, aimed to in-
crease access to education, reduce poverty in the short term by transferring 
cash to impoverished households, reduce child labor, and serve as a social 
protection network.18
Another important development in this period was LOAS (the Social As-
sistance Act). Enacted under Itamar Franco and implemented by Cardoso, 
LOAS seeks to guarantee “minimum social standards.” The noncontributory 
multilevel federal, state, and local program is designed to protect households, 
mothers, children, adolescents, and the elderly; to assist underprivileged chil-
dren and adolescents; to promote labor market integration; and to train and 
rehabilitate persons with disabilities and promote their integration into com-
munity life.19
NSA Emerges 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was elected president in 2002. For two four-year 
terms, his government preserved some Cardoso policies such as inflation 
control and openness to foreign investment while changing others by adopt-
ing state-activist initiatives, including an active industrial policy and a mas-
sive poverty-fighting program. Dilma Roussef, elected president in 2010, has 
maintained Lula’s priorities but expanded state activism in key areas.20
Lula’s inauguration instigated a decade of experimentation. Develop-
mentalist institutions have been reinvented, neoliberal policies were modi-
fied, new institutions were created, and a new form of state activism is emerg-
ing. Changes have occurred gradually.21 Some of Cardoso’s policies, such as 
17  Almeida explains that during Cardoso’s first term, some changes in universal social polices 
confronted the regressive feature of the Brazilian pension system (a constitutional amend-
ment changed the minimum age and the period of contribution for retirement), although the 
problematic topic of public servants’ pensions—a major source of inequality in the coun-
try—remained untouched. See Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, A Política Social no Go-
verno Lula, 70 Novos Estudos - CEBRAP 70 7–17 (2004). 
18  Inspired by successful experiences at the local level, the federal Bolsa Escola program 
reached more than 5 million families. Other conditional cash transfer programs widened the 
scope of protection and helped build a multilevel public-private network of providers. 
19  The federal government is assigned the task of coordinating and promoting LOAS and pro-
viding technical advice and financial incentives to states, cities, and welfare entities and 
organizations. States must transfer certain funds to municipalities, provide them with tech-
nical support, and stimulate the collective rendering of social services. Municipalities must, 
among other things, execute social assistance and poverty-fighting policies, which includes 
the possibility of establishing partnerships with civil society organizations. 
20  See Alfredo Saad Filho, Neo-Developmentalism and the Challenges of Economic Policy-Making 
under Dilma Rousseff, 38 Critical Sociology (2012), available at http://crs.sagepub.com/con-
tent/early/2012/07/03/0896920512441635.abstract?rss=1 (accessed Oct. 5, 2012).
21  To win the election, Lula stated that debt agreements would be honored. Talking about the 
gradual manner through which changes would take place, Lula said in his “Letter to Bra-
zilians” in 2002: “the premise of this transition will naturally be the respect to contracts 
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macroeconomic stabilization, have been preserved, and some of his social 
policy innovations have been improved and substantially expanded. Institu-
tions like BNDES that survived from the period of state developmentalism 
have been reinvigorated and redirected. Other developmentalist institutions, 
such as industrial policy, that were rejected during the neoliberal period have 
been revived, albeit in different form. Finally, new institutions have been 
added to increase coordination between the public and private sectors.22
Macroeconomic Continuity
Scarred by decades of high and damaging inflation, Brazil adopted policies 
in the 1990s to preserve monetary stability. The Plano Real used various mea-
sures to control public spending and regulate the money supply. This has kept 
the inflation rate low (by Brazilian standards) for more than 15 years and en-
shrined monetary stability as a cornerstone of economic policy. During the 
first Lula administration, emphasis was placed on instituting, developing, 
and strengthening political and economic credibility using fiscally responsible 
macroeconomic policy, a floating exchange rate, and inflation targeting. In gen-
eral terms, the Dilma administration has continued these policies. However, 
this emphasis has come at a price: the main tools of macroeconomic policy 
are restrictions on government spending and a relatively high interest rate, 
putting a brake on public investment and increasing the cost of credit, thus 
possibly hampering growth. To offset these effects, Lula introduced several 
growth-inducing microeconomic policies, including a new form of industrial 
policy and social policies that helped spur domestic growth while relieving 
poverty and reducing economic inequality.
Industrial Policy
In 2004, after a decade in which Brazil had explicitly rejected industrial 
policy,23 the government introduced measures designed to foster selected in-
dustries. Lula’s first try at industrial policy was limited and focused primarily 
on innovation. At the time, there was strong opposition to industrial policy in 
policy making circles and academic opinion. It was thought that governments 
were not able to strategically identify targets and that trying to do so would 
divert resources from horizontal structural measures such as tax reform and 
infrastructure investment that would benefit the entire economy. 
However, some people were prepared to accept a limited role for govern-
ment in overcoming market failures and reducing the coordination and sys-
temic problems that hampered innovation; the Cardoso administration had 
taken modest steps in this direction. Lula’s first foray into industrial policy 
and obligations enforceable in the country.” Available at http://www2.fpa.org.br/carta-ao-
povo-brasileiro-por-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva. 
22  A notable example is the Public-Private Partnership Federal Act of 2004.
23  For a history of the rejection of industrial policy see Wilson Suzigan & A. V. Villela, Industrial 
Policy in Brazil (Editora da Unicamp 1997). 
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—called PITCE—stressed a combination of general measures to improve 
the business environment24 and financial support in four sectors in which 
one could argue innovation was essential: semiconductors, software, capital 
goods, and medicines. 
PITCE included substantial legislative activity, including the Innova-
tion Law (designed to facilitate partnerships and synergy among universi-
ties, companies, and research institutes) and the Foundation Law (which fa-
cilitated government support for university research).25 At the same time, the 
government started building institutions designed to improve coordination 
within government and between government and the private sector. These in-
cluded the Council of Economic and Social Development (CDES), designed to 
help foster inclusive growth; the National Council of Industrial Development 
(CNDI), a public-private body charged with defining directives for industrial 
development; and the Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI), 
which coordinates implementation of industrial policy by bringing together 
government, industry, labor, and universities. Arbix and Martin describe 
ABDI as a “networked institution, formally under the Ministry of Develop-
ment, Industry, and Trade. ABDI has played an important role in seeking to 
develop an industrial policy and helps identify and guides investment deci-
sions in technological research, innovation and industrial development.”26
In 2008, during Lula’s second term, the government launched the Pro-
gram for Productive Development (PDP).27 PDP replaced PITCE and was 
much more ambitious and complex. It included both horizontal measures 
designed to increase the overall efficiency of the economy and vertical pro-
grams for targeted sectors. Reflecting the scope and complexity of the Brazil-
ian economy, PDP covered a wide range of industries. The program set goals, 
established a complex governance regime, and placed special emphasis on 
collaboration between the public and the private sectors. It called for industry-
specific competiveness councils instituted by Cardoso and expanded under 
Lula. PDP relied on policy instruments such as financing, tax, public procure-
ment, public-private alliances, coordination and consultation, and regulation.
Horizontal measures in PDP included improvements in infrastructure and 
education, increased investments in science, reductions in interest rates for 
investment, tax relief, and improvements in the legal environment, including 
24  These include legal measures to improve incentives for innovation and to facilitate better 
relations between universities and business, as well as tax relief.
25  The Innovation Law allowed the government to invest directly in private companies as a mi-
nority shareholder in order to create new products and processes, and provides for sharing 
of any resulting intellectual property. The Foundation Law facilitated support from FINEP 
and the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development for university-based 
research-support foundations.
26  Arbix & Martin, supra note 4. 
27  The discussion in this section draws heavily on Luciano Coutinho et al., “Industrial Policy and 
Economic Transformation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Latin American Political Economy, 134–188 
(Javier Santiso & Jeff Dayton-Johnson ed., Oxford U. Press, 2012). 
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modernizing the rules governing foreign trade. Vertical measures, which dealt 
with specific industries, were designed to meet three basic challenges. For each, 
there were different governance mechanisms and a different mix of policies 
and measures. Measures that might be employed included subsidized credit 
from BNDES and other public financial sources, tax incentives, technical as-
sistance, advantages in public procurement rules, favorable trade policy, and 
supportive regulation.
The first challenge identified by PDP was to consolidate and expand lead-
ership in sectors in which Brazil was deemed to have a competitive edge. The 
goal was to support Brazilian firms that could be world leaders or heavy-
weights in their industry. Sectors included aviation, mining, steel, cellulose, 
oil and gas/petrochemical, bioethanol, and meat. The second challenge was to 
foster and occasionally induce mergers and alliances (sometimes with BNDES 
holding a minority stake) to build up industries that had competitive potential 
but were not yet at the global frontier. These included capital goods, the auto-
motive complex, wood and furniture, pharmaceutical, meatpacking, personal 
hygiene, perfumery and cosmetics, construction, various service industries, 
coastal and marine industry, leather, footwear and artifacts, the agro-industri-
al system, and plastics. The third challenge was to strengthen high-tech “van-
guard” sectors that had both growth potential and whose growth could im-
prove the technological capacity of the entire economy. These strategic areas 
included health, biotechnology, defense, nuclear energy, nanotechnology, and 
information and communication technology. 
The governance of PDP was complex. A system of public management 
brings representatives of appropriate ministries and agencies together for 
each of the major tasks and links them to the private sector through a variety 
of coordination devices. Observers of PDP point to the importance of public-
private coordination at every level, from setting overall priorities to working 
out packages of effective measures for each sector. 
PDP was overtaken by the global financial crisis before it got off the 
ground. But even if there had been no recession, a program like this, which en-
visions major structural changes, must be considered in a long-term context. 
Although the government can point to some real achievements, critics have 
questioned whether the plan truly shifted resources from traditional sectors 
to high-tech industries or if did enough for small and medium industry, which 
often is a major source of innovation.28
In 2011, the new administration, led by Dilma Rouseff, introduced an 
updated version of PDP called Brasil Maior (Greater Brazil) with the motto 
28  According to information available from the BNDES, in 2008, out of the 179 beneficiary 
companies, 12 were listed in Bovespa (a Brazilian stock exchange). In 2009, out of the 156 
beneficiary companies, 25 were listed in Bovespa. Available at http://www.bndes.gov.br 
/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/BNDES_Transparente/Consulta_as_operacoes 
_do_BNDES (accessed May 1, 2010).
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“innovate to compete; compete to grow.”29 This plan continued many of the 
same objectives and policies of PDP. But reflecting rising concerns about “dein-
dustrialization,” the plan emphasizes efforts to protect domestic industries hit 
hard by global competition, an overvalued currency, and low-cost imports. 
Taxes on manufacturing have been reduced, attention is paid to antidump-
ing measures, and substantial preferences for local producers in government 
procurement have been introduced. At the same time, funding from BNDES 
and FINEP, the Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos, were increased and efforts 
were made to channel more funding to innovative firms and sectors. 
ABDI identifies three major strategic areas for development and explains 
how Brasil Maior addresses each area. To increase investment and spur inno-
vation, Brasil Maior offers tax relief, increased financing for investment and 
innovation, and further improvements in the legal framework. To promote ex-
ports and protect domestic industry from unfair trade, the plan offers tax re-
lief, export financing and guarantees, trade promotion, and enhanced defense 
thorough antidumping and other trade remedies. To protect hard-hit domestic 
firms, the plan includes exemptions from payroll tax for selected industries and 
a 25 percent margin of preference for local firms in government procurement. 
An important part of the Brasil Maior plan is the system of public-private 
coordination that builds on structures created for PDP: the National Industrial 
Development Council (CNDI), sectorial executive committees, and sectorial 
competiveness councils. CNDI is a peak institution that includes ministers, 
the president of BNDES, and 18 representatives of industry, labor, and the 
public. Its role is to set strategic guidelines. The Brasil Maior plan identifies 
20 priority sectors: petroleum, gas and marine construction, chemicals, health, 
renewable energy, furniture, automotive, mining, civil construction, defense, 
aviation and aerospace, agro-industry, capital goods, metallurgy, logistics ser-
vices, electronics, personal hygiene, fragrances and cosmetics (HPPC), servic-
es, retail, shoes, textiles, candy and jewelry, cellulose and paper. There is an ex-
ecutive committee and a competiveness council for each sector. The executive 
committee consists of government officials charged with developing an action 
plan for the sector. These representatives meet with the sectorial competive-
ness councils to refine the action plans and explore implementation issues. 
Social Policy
In addition to reviving industrial policy, the governments of Lula and Dilma 
have expanded Brazil’s social protection system and antipoverty programs. 
The result is a significant decline in the poverty rate, a reduction in inequality, 
substantial growth of the middle class, and stimulus for the domestic mar-
ket. Between 2001 and 2008, incomes of the wealthy grew at a moderate pace, 
while the income of the poor increased substantively. Approximately 28 mil-
lion people moved out of poverty and a “new” middle class has emerged— 
between 2003 and 2011 approximately 10.5 million Brazilians became part of 
29  Available at http://www.brasilmaior.mdic.gov.br/.
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the middle class, which now includes 55 percent of the population.30 The Bra-
zilian social pyramid is now diamond shaped, with more citizens classified as 
middle class than as poor.
The distributive gains achieved in Brazil during the past decade are the 
result of a combination of economic and institutional reforms. These reforms 
include the reintroduction of previous efforts such as inflation control and 
changes in labor markets that include unemployment reduction and increases 
in the minimum wage, pensions, and social security improvements, as well 
as a new generation of social assistance policies, especially the Bolsa Família 
program (BFP), created in 2003 as a result of a consolidation of previously 
existing initiatives.31 Health and education spending as a share of GDP has 
grown considerably in recent years, magnifying the impacts of institutional 
reforms instituted in the late 1990s. In another recent development, in 2011, 
the Brazilian Unified Social Assistance System (SUAS) was institutionalized 
and formalized by a federal statute. 
In June 2011, President Dilma Rousseff launched the Brasil Sem Miséria 
program,32 designed to rescue 16.2 million people from extreme poverty, 59 
percent of whom live in the northeast region. Brasil Sem Miséria has been 
presented as a combination of complementary rural and urban sectorial ac-
tions—in the areas of income transfer, labor market integration, access to 
public services, education, health, social assistance, water, and sewage—and 
involves the creation of new initiatives and the reconceptualization of exist-
ing ones. This program aims to find and register extremely poor families and 
integrate them into different programs. Brasil Sem Miséria is also supposed to 
help those who graduate from BFP enter the labor market.33
The changes in social policy seem to be working: poverty has been cut 
drastically and income inequality has been reduced. Although Brazil still is one 
of the most economically unequal countries in the world,34 the decline in pov-
erty and the reduction of inequality in Brazil in recent years have been remark-
able. Thanks to a wide range of policies—including universal, targeted, and 
decentralized programs—the Brazilian welfare state is becoming stronger.35
30  See Marcelo Nery, A Nova Classe Média – o lado brilhante da base da pirâmide 29 (Saraiva 2011). 
31  Since its inception, BFP has reached more than 12 million families as beneficiaries. If one as-
sumes that each family has four people on average, the total figure for individuals who have 
benefited from BFP reaches 48 million people, or approximately 25 percent of the Brazilian 
population. Half of its budget has been spent in the northeast part of Brazil, where millions 
of very poor families live. Considering its gigantic scale, the targeting of BFP (defined as the 
share of total benefits received by specific groups of the population) has been considered ex-
emplary, outperforming other social assistance programs in both Brazil and internationally.
32  Translation: “Brazil without Indigence.” 
33  Brasil Sem Miséria also changed the number of children and adolescents who can obtain the 
BFP benefit—as of 2012, up to five (it used to be three).
34  The Brazilian Gini coefficient in 1960 was 0.5367; it was 0.6091 in 1990; and in 2010, it was still 
very high (0.5304). See Nery, supra note 30 at 27. 
35  As put by Arbix & Martin, supra note 4: “while Brazil’s ‘welfare state’ still has segmented 
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Brazil’s NSA: Something New under the Sun?
The emerging profile of state activism differs from state action in both the 
developmentalist period and the neoliberal phase of the 1990s. In the devel-
opmentalist period, from the 1930s to the 1980s, the Brazilian government not 
only set priorities for industrialization in a top-down fashion, it also was a 
primary actor in industry. The state bureaucracy set goals; state-owned enter-
prises played a central role in many sectors, including steel, mining, aircraft, 
automobiles, and banking; and the state development bank provided funding 
for areas deemed priority by government planners. Emphasis was on “catch-
ing up” by building domestic industries. The new industries used imported 
technology and paid little or no attention to innovation.36 The state created tar-
iffs and multiple exchange rates to control imports. Social policy was not fo-
cused on redistribution or poverty reduction; social protection programs were 
elitist, designed to keep the industrial working class and the small middle 
class happy and managed in a clientelistic fashion.37
The 1990s saw a partial reversal of the developmentalist model with 
privatization, liberalization, dismantling of the instruments of industrial pol-
icy, and tentative steps toward poverty alleviation. But when it took office, 
the Lula government decided the state needed to resume a more active role in 
industrial development and to take more aggressive steps to relieve poverty 
and reduce inequality.
The Lula administration recognized that markets were necessary but not 
sufficient for inclusive growth. The state could do more to promote growth 
with equity, and it started to act more selectively and aggressively in the econ-
omy. This shift away from neoliberalism was as notable for what it did not do 
as for what it did. When Brazil began to develop new forms of state activism, 
it did not renationalize former state-owned enterprises, impose price controls, 
create a top-down development plan, discourage foreign investment, default 
on international obligations, engage in deficit spending, or close its markets 
to foreign goods. Rather, it sought to maintain and benefit from openness 
by ensuring the competiveness of the domestic industry. Efforts focused on 
qualities, benefiting the better organized and remunerated in the formal and public sectors 
disproportionately, this segmentation is now much less acute than it has been for decades, 
and perhaps since the creation of the country’s first social benefits many decades ago. In 2010 
inequality in Brazil reached its lowest level since measurement started in 1960.”  
36  During the import substitution period, Brazil copied technology from developed countries. 
This was often manifested in the form of factories owned by foreign companies that located 
R&D and innovation outside Brazil with no obligations to transfer technology. That meant 
that Brazilian industry had a very low level of capacity for innovation. See Ignácio José Go-
dinho Delgado, “Desenvolvimento, empresariado e política industrial no Brasil,” in Estado, Empre-
sariado e Desenvolvimento no Brasil: Novas Teorias, Novas Trajetórias, 115–141 (M. A. Leopoldi, 
W. P. Mancuso, & W. Iglecias ed., Editora de Cultura, 2010). 
37  Arbix & Martin, supra note 4 observe that “over the course of several decades, the statist 
model shifted resources from consumption to investment, limiting real wages and social 
spending and directing social spending in clientelistic fashion toward more organized seg-
ments of society with an eye toward political stability and control.” 
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constructing new forms of industrial policy that emphasized innovation and 
partnership with industry. At the same time, an emphasis was placed on social 
policy and redistribution and the combination of social policy with industrial 
growth strategies.
The Rise and Shape of NSA
What explains NSA and why did it take the shape that it did in Brazil? What 
impelled the Lula government to reintroduce industrial policy? Why did it 
choose to emphasize innovation, engage with the private sector, and structure 
the program in a more bottom-up fashion? Why did NSA link industrial and 
social policy and refocus social policy toward poverty alleviation and reduc-
tion of inequality?
No one would claim that Brazil’s new form of state activism was planned 
from the start or that a clear or completely stable model has emerged. No mas-
ter plan ever emanated from a government think tank or planning ministry. 
These policies evolved in a piecemeal fashion and are still changing. The Bra-
zilian government has been feeling the stones as it crosses the river—recalling 
Deng Xaoping’s phrase—not following an existing blueprint. However, look-
ing back over a decade of experimentation and policy evolution, one can see 
several factors that explain the decision to resume an active role for the state 
as well as the forces that affected the form this role would take. This section 
considers three of these factors: political opportunity, structural impediments 
to growth, and international and domestic constraints. Taken together, they 
exemplify the profile of what Arbix and Martin call “new state activism with-
out dominance.”
A Political Moment
When Lula was elected in 2002, growth had slowed and unemployment was 
very high. The effects of globalization and liberalization were being felt, and 
Brazilian companies were losing ground. It is not hard to understand why 
a government led by the Brazilian Workers Party (PT), predisposed to state 
activism, would want to increase the role of the state in the economy. But the 
PT was not alone—this view was shared by at least part of the wider business 
community. Business in general and many industrialists in particular wanted 
a more activist state and more voice in government policy.38
Although the PT was ideologically committed to state activism, the busi-
ness community looked to the state as a force that could reignite growth. Dis-
satisfied by the effects of liberalization in the 1990s, powerful industrial groups 
(including the Federation of Industries of São Paulo, or FIESP) involved them-
selves in the electoral process in 2002 with the objective of “opening space for 
38  Shunko Rojas suggests that changes in the leadership of the Federation of Industries in São 
Paulo led to FIESP support for an expanded state role well before the 2002 election. Private 
communication with the authors, Aug., 2012. 
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developmentalist ideas.”39 Industry had played an important role in the old 
development state, so at least some industrialists were comfortable with an 
increased role for the state as long as they had a voice in state policy. 
Although Lula’s first administration took cautious steps toward state ac-
tivism, interest in a stronger role for the state grew during Lula’s second term 
(2006–10). In this period, NSA gained appeal, importance, and political sup-
port from industrialists, unions, intellectuals, and academics. Brazilian econo-
mist Antonio Barros de Castro suggests that the Brazilian elite realized that 
it needed to “deal with China.”40 He notes that trade liberalization and the 
rise of China led much of Latin America to abandon industry and refocus on 
natural resources. Due to the large size and central importance of its industrial 
sector, Brazil could not and did not want to take this route. Despite the mod-
ernization of Brazil’s industry that had made it globally competitive in some 
fields, once China came on the scene, Brazil was no longer as competitive. At 
the same time, Chinese demand for natural resources drove up the value of 
the real, thus further handicapping Brazilian industry by increasing the cost 
of exports and lowering the cost of imported manufactured goods. The situa-
tion worsened, leading to a slowdown in 2005 and a public outcry about the 
economic situation that generated calls for more action by the state.
The turning point came around 2006. As a result of a political scandal, 
Antonio Palocci, Lula’s finance minister, was replaced by Guido Mantega, a 
heterodox economist and academic closely linked to Lula. Palocci was also 
closely linked to the PT, had maintained an orthodox approach to economic 
policy, and was closer to the financial sector than to industry. His replacement 
opened a window of opportunity for the industrialists represented by insti-
tutions such as the National Industry Confederation (CNI), FIESP, and the 
Economic Institute for Industrial Development (IEDI), a business think thank, 
to push for policies that would allow them to recover and protect industrial 
chains dismantled during the 1990s, foster international competitiveness, and 
channel more state funds into infrastructure investments. Business support 
for neoliberalism, never so robust, declined, and its acceptance of state activ-
ism increased. Jackson De Toni suggests that “Brazilian industrialists partly 
conceded in their unconditional defense of a minimalist agenda for the state in 
exchange for a political economy that would maintain the inherited stability 
and defend them against external competition, but would also revive public 
investments in infrastructure.”41
39  They “correctly understood Lula’s election as a mandate for a pro-growth strategy,” says 
James Martin Cypher. Brazil’s Development Strategy: Maintaining the Industrial Base, Side Step-
ping the Staples Trap? paper presented at at the 2012 Congress of the Latin American Studies 
Association, San Francisco, California, 8, 2012.
40  See de Castro, supra note 6. 
41  Jackson de Toni, Estado e empresários na política industrial brasileira recente: Processos de coopera-
ção e mudança institucional, paper presented at IPEA CODE (2011), available at http://www.
ipea.gov.br/code/chamada2011/pdf/area10/area10-artigo2.pdf (accessed Jul. 21, 2012).
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In this context, continues De Toni, the Lula government created some new 
“arenas” for public-private coordination (including councils such as CDES, 
CNDI, and the so-called competitiveness fora) and new agencies (such as 
ABDI) in an attempt to ensure legitimacy while controlling the increasing de-
mands of industrial entrepreneurs. At the same time it launched the Growth 
Acceleration Program (PAC) in 2007. PAC was designed to restart investment 
using the strength of public companies like Petrobrás to lead the process.
Another factor that helped cement political support for state activism was 
the global financial crisis. The pervasive and worldwide failure of markets, 
which were deeply affected by financial disorganization, epitomized the crisis 
of deregulated capitalism and legitimized the adoption of alternative policies. 
This gave more support for the expansion of industrial policy and the grow-
ing role of BNDES. The government adopted a rhetoric that stressed that the 
crisis was an opportunity for Brazil to gain comparative advantages, requiring 
proactive state action.
When the financial crisis broke out in 2008, the Brazilian economy was 
seriously challenged by the lack of credit. Like many institutions in the United 
States and Europe, Brazilian financial institutions halted the supply of credit. 
This led to more pressure by the industrial coalition for action by the Brazil-
ian state. As a result, BNDES was heavily capitalized so that it could play a 
countercyclical role in the economy. BNDES sharply raised its disbursements, 
thus galvanizing a national industrial sector already suffering from reduced 
competitiveness and an unfavorable exchange rate and now also buffeted by 
credit stringency. In general, because of the worldwide crisis, the Brazilian 
government was able to become more active in shaping the trajectory of eco-
nomic development.
Structural Elements
What problems did policy makers face and respond to as they shaped NSA? 
Three structural features were important: 
•	 	Major market failures that impeded economic activity, including a low 
level of investment in infrastructure and a lack of innovation
•	 	Long-standing Brazilian social concerns
•	 	The international embeddedness of the Brazilian economy and its need to 
spur competitiveness
Market Failures: Innovation, Infrastructure, Financial Sector,  
and Competitiveness
Major domestic market failures forced policy makers to face the low level of 
innovation in Brazilian industry. By the early 2000s, they had recognized that 
Brazilian industry had slowed down and believed that markets alone could 
not restart the growth process and that state intervention was called for. The 
national economy had had its last impetus of vitality in the 1970s, during the 
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apogee of “old” development state policies. In that decade, Brazil underwent 
a second industrial revolution, acquiring a diversified industrial base. But the 
economy started to stagnate due to external and internal factors, and begin-
ning in the early 1980s, the economy endured a long period of stagnation, in 
which growth slowed and Brazil fell behind the rapidly growing Asian tigers. 
One external factor was changing global capitalist accumulation patterns 
and the consolidation of a knowledge-based economy,42 which made indus-
trial innovation essential for economic competitiveness. The internal reasons 
included Brazil’s failure to reshape the political economy and the legal- 
institutional structure that underpinned the old developmentalism based on 
an alliance among the state, foreign capital, and national capital.43 The state 
provided infrastructure, organized key sectors of the economy through state-
owned enterprises, generated savings that could be used for new investment, 
and created regulations and incentives to protect and promote the private sec-
tor. Foreign capital helped develop local industry using technology that had 
been created and perfected in advanced markets; sometimes this included 
bringing in equipment that had become obsolete at home.44 One effect of this 
arrangement was that the Brazilian economy was largely insulated from in-
ternational competition. This, in turn, reduced the pressure for national inno-
vation and the development of new technology: Brazil was limited to buying 
externally-generated technology. This helped slow the pace of development. 
Suzigan and Villela conclude: 
It was necessary to change not only to correct these problems, but 
also because there was [an awareness] that the country had reached 
the zenith of a historical development process (which many errone-
ously described simply as import substitution). Once an ample and 
diversified industrial basis [had been built], it was necessary to make 
it efficient and competitive. It was also necessary to incorporate  
sectors and industries representing new technologies, particularly 
informatics and telecommunications, and to develop innovation 
ability, a crucial element in competition.45
During this time, Asian countries, noticeably South Korea and Taiwan, 
were on a brisk developmental pace, giving rise to a new round of growth 
based on knowledge, innovation, and reduction of poverty and inequality. 
Brazil and its Latin American counterparts lost vitality. One indicator is the 
42  See Michael J. Piore & Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity 
(Basic Books, 1984); and David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the 
Origins of Cultural Change (Wiley-Blackwell, 1991). 
43  Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton U. Press, 
1995). 
44  See Lincoln Gordon & Englebert L. Grommers, United States Manufacturing Investment in 
Brazil: The Impact of Brazilian Government Policies 1946–1960 (Division of Research, Graduate 
School of Business Administration, Harvard U., 1962). 
45 Suzigan & Villela, supra note 23. 
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relative success in patenting: Asians far surpassed Latin Americans in patents 
issued in the United States.
Brazilian policy makers took steps to increase the rate of innovation in in-
dustrial activity. Modest efforts to stimulate innovation began as early as 1999, 
but with the reintroduction of industrial policy in 2004, substantial resources 
were devoted to improving the overall climate for innovation; supporting re-
structuring in targeted industries; and fostering the development of new areas 
of specialization considered relevant and potentially able to consolidate key 
industrial chains.
Another structural barrier to growth was the low level of investment in 
infrastructure. The private sector was unwilling to invest in needed infra-
structure expansion, and the state had not compensated for this deficiency. 
Although Brazil has one of the highest tax burdens in the world, public sector 
investment was relatively low, even by Latin American standards.46
The private financial sector played a large role in the structural economic 
failure in Brazil. Although it had grown in size and importance, the private 
sector still funded industrial expansion in only limited amounts. State banks, 
which date to the developmental period, filled the gap. When the Lula gov-
ernment decided to implement a broader industrial policy, it looked to the 
state banks, especially to BNDES, to prove the capital and expertise needed 
for growth, innovation, and competiveness and to buffer the effects of the fi-
nancial crises.47 Unlike other developing countries, Brazil did not dismantle 
its development bank in the 1990s, so that institution was available when the 
government decided to intervene more actively in the economy. Today, the 
state bank is the main source of long-term financing in Brazil and a key actor 
in the conception and implementation of industrial policy.
The fourth structural problem that affected the emergence of state activ-
ism is the side effect of the Plano Real. Undeniably, the Plano Real achieved 
its goal of ending runaway inflation. Since 1994, when the plan was im-
plemented, inflation has been kept in check at around 5 percent per year. 
The problem, however, is that this plan is anchored in the interplay of two 
46  José Roberto Rodrigues Afonso, Erika Amorim Araújo, & Geraldo Biasoto Júnior, Fiscal Space 
and Public Sector Investments in Infrastructure: A Brazilian Case-Study, 1141 Textos Para Dis-
cussão IPEA (2005). Commenting on the infrastructure deficit in Brazil, Daniel Perrotti notes: 
“Although several factors were involved (such as high macroeconomic volatility, the lack 
of comprehensive policies and regulatory and financing issues), the effects of these physi-
cal constraints are obvious and seriously threaten future development.” See The Economic 
Infrastructure Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean, 293 FAL Bulletin (2011), available at 
http://www.cepal.org/usi/noticias/bolfall/6/42926/FAL-293-WEB-ENG-2.pdf (accessed 
Jul., 20, 2012). 
47  BNDES and the other major state banks have access to public (pension and treasury) funds, 
so their cost of capital is well below that of the private sector. BNDES also makes profits and 
raises funds in the capital market, besides offering substantial expertise; the bank has been 
financing the Brazilian industrial sector for 50 years and has developed detailed knowledge 
of many important sectors and close ties to industry that add to its advantages over the pri-
vate sector.
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macroeconomic variables: interest rate and exchange rate. Whereas the in-
terest rate is the main control against inflation, the exchange rate is directly 
influenced by the interest rate: if the interest rate is high, it attracts foreign 
investment, which results in an appreciation of the exchange rate. This has 
two direct consequences. First, the regulation of inflation by management 
of the interest rate creates side effects in the financial markets, inasmuch as 
appreciation of the value of the currency encourages investors—including 
foreign investors—to buy government bonds. This means that less money is 
available for the private sector. Second, the resulting appreciation of the ex-
change rate affects domestic industry because it makes imports cheaper and 
exports less competitive. This situation put pressure on policy makers: in-
dustry pressed for solutions that would lower the cost of finance and guard 
against deindustrialization. Industrial policy seemed like a way to handle 
both concerns.
Social Concerns
Social concerns shaped the development of NSA in Brazil, in particular four 
issues: poverty, social inequality, unemployment; and the tendency of wages 
to lag behind productivity.
In 1981, 31 percent of the Brazilian population was living on less than 
US$2 per day. Other social indicators were negative: child mortality was high, 
life expectancy at birth was only 63 years, illiteracy was widespread, and 
many people had no regular access to sanitation and potable water.48 Econom-
ic inequality was extreme. Brazil has been profoundly unequal and unjust for 
a long time: in 1990, the Gini coefficient was 0.6091. The degree of inequality 
is further aggravated when considering race and gender. Unemployment was 
also high: the rate of unemployment reached 10 percent in the early 1990s, and 
from the 1980s to 2000, unemployment was a crucial political issue.49 Educa-
tion was also a problem: the education system did not produce the number of 
skilled people needed by a growing and competitive economy. Industrial poli-
cies designed to spur technological upgrading were hampered by the lack of 
adequate human resources; people did not have the skills needed in a chang-
ing labor market. The government recognized the need for job creation and 
skills upgrading in connection with social and welfare initiatives. 
Wage lag is another social issue in Brazil. Because of the large rural popula-
tion in most Latin American countries including Brazil, a huge pool of under- 
employed workers depresses wage levels.50 As a result, domestic demand 
does not grow as fast as domestic production, thus hindering growth of the 
48  Data in this section is taken from Mauricio Font & Laura Randall, The Brazilian State: Debate 
and Agenda (Lexington Books, 2011). 
49  Id. Some observers put the effective rate as high as 20 percent.
50  This is what W. Arthur Lewis called development with “unlimited supplies of labor.” 
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domestic market. Economists stress the need for government action to offset 
this with an income policy that will bring wages up to optimal levels.51
International Embeddedness and the Need to Spur Competitiveness
A third structural feature affecting the emergence of NSA was Lula’s decision 
to liberalize the economy and maintain openness. Although export promo-
tion had been a development target since the 1960s, domestic industrialization 
dominated the governmental agenda until the 1990s. This situation changed 
with globalization and liberalization. In the 1990s, Brazil opened itself to in-
ternational competition and began to actively pursue export markets, forcing 
the state to pay more attention to competitiveness.
When Lula’s government took office, one of its first moves was to em-
phasize the need for state action to encourage the solutions needed to main-
tain competitiveness. This decision, brought about by the commitment to 
open economy policies, explains both the revival of industrial policy and 
the government emphasis on innovation. From PITCE through Brasil Maior, 
policies have focused on boosting the international competitiveness of Bra-
zilian companies, including BNDES’s support for the internationalization of 
Brazil’s most competitive industries and various mechanisms to subsidize 
exports. Although the government has recognized the importance of com-
petiveness and that maintaining openness to foreign goods is necessary to 
preserve competiveness, it has also taken measures to provide protection for 
domestic industries.
Structural Elements: Conditioning Factors
The stage was set for the government, led by the Brazilian Workers Party, to 
increase the role of the state in the economy. But why did Brazil’s role as a 
development state take the shape that it did? Why did Brazil opt for an in-
novation-focused and collaborative public-private form of industrial policy 
rather than, say, renationalization as did Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia? Why was Brazil supportive of foreign investment in most sectors? 
This section discusses factors that influenced the choices Brazil has made in its 
search to help the economy regain dynamism and promote inclusive growth. 
Among these factors, four are especially important: 
•	 	Constitutional considerations
•	 	The strength and scope of the private sector
•	 	International economic law and policy
•	 	Global financial markets
51  Bresser-Pereira, supra note 4 at 193.
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Constitutional Considerations
The 1988 constitution influenced the choice of strategies and measures by mak-
ing direct state control of industry both more expensive and less important 
than in the past. The new constitution protected property rights and regula-
tory commitments, thus making renationalization of privatized industries an 
expensive proposition. It reduced the possibilities for corruption and for pri-
vate capture of state power, thus increasing the government’s capacity to steer 
the private sector and provide control and accountability mechanisms for the 
public sector. This made state ownership seem less necessary. Finally, by creat-
ing an open and democratic political structure, the constitution enhanced the 
power and participation of civil society, including industry, vis-à-vis the state.
The Private Sector
The size, complexity, and sophistication of the private sector in Brazil influ-
enced the path of collaborative innovation-oriented industrial policy. The Bra-
zilian economy includes many well-developed sectors and a growing capital 
market. Many firms are either at the global competitive frontier or close to it. 
Others have incipient capabilities. Many sectors accept the need for restructur-
ing and continuous improvement. Many firms have the kind of deep knowl-
edge essential for effective innovation even though they may not be able fully 
to utilize this knowledge without public incentives and support. 
It must have seemed much easier to create incentives for these firms to 
innovate and provide support for new private start-ups than to try to replace 
them with state-owned enterprises. At the same time, the size and scope of 
the private sector meant that once democracy was restored, the private sec-
tor gained an important voice in public affairs. The private sector was eager 
to support an expanded role for the state as long as this support was offered 
in collaboration with industry and was appropriate to resume growth. Thus, 
Cypher notes:
given the many endemic macroeconomic problems that had made 
the 1990s a period of slow growth in spite of the restructuring of 
industry, powerful industrial groups (including the Federation of 
Industries of São Paulo) involved themselves in the electoral process 
in 2002 with the objective of “opening space for developmentalist 
ideas” (Delgado 2010: 125) . . . the business federations—the organi-
zations representing the interests of Brazil’s vast and diversified in-
dustrial base—correctly understood Lula’s election as a mandate for 
a pro-growth strategy and as an indication that a structural change 
would occur opening-up channels of direct intermediation between 
the industrial sector and the new administration. . . . In short, there 
was a consensus between the PT and important fractions of indus-
trial capital to reverse “the loss of the centrality of the State as an 
agent of accumulation.”52
52  See supra note 39. 
Toward a New Law and Development 303
International Economic Law and Policy
World Trade Organization (WTO) law places restrictions on policies like ex-
port subsidies and weak enforcement of intellectual property that had been 
used by the East Asian states, so Brazil had to work around these restraints or 
find ways to defend them. The Lula administration did a little of both by de-
fending some heterodox policies and modifying others.53 Because it never rati-
fied the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) signed in the 1990s, Brazil did not 
encounter similar restrictions in international investment law. Nonetheless, 
because the government recognized that foreign investment was important 
for its innovation strategy and sought to encourage its own firms to invest in 
foreign markets, it followed many of the principles of the investment regime. 
Similarly, while Brazil’s export surpluses and growing reserves have made it 
less dependent on international financial institutions, Brazil has been influ-
enced by the World Bank and other international financial institutions that 
promote market solutions but accept industrial policy as long as it respects 
comparative advantage and focuses on innovation. 
Global Financial Markets
The Lula government decided to rely on foreign investment to help it reach 
and maintain international competiveness. It realized that classic protection-
ism would threaten the availability of such investment, while an innovation-
oriented and collaborative industrial policy offering selected benefits and in-
centives to both foreign and domestic firms would be acceptable to investors. 
Other Influences on the Emergence of NSA
Several other factors help explain the profile of Brazil’s NSA, including the in-
creased professionalism of the state apparatus and bureaucracy, which made 
it possible to carry out industrial policy, and the rise of alternative economic 
theories that legitimized state activism. The macroinstitutional arrangement 
provided by the 1988 constitution contributed to upgrading state capacity and 
played an important role in NSA. In the past few decades, the Brazilian state 
has enhanced internal coordination, increased public-private collaboration, 
and learned how to better define policy mandates. Thus, NSA is partly the re-
sult of institutional learning, through which the Brazilian state progressively 
acquired greater administrative capacity and the expertise needed to imple-
ment complex and ambitious development policies.
Until recently, the vast majority of public employees was appointed po-
litically, weakening the public service ethos necessary to build a professional 
bureaucracy staffed by people with technical expertise who can administer 
53  See Alvaro Santos, Carving out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade 
Organization: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico; and Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, Devel-
opmental Responses to the International Trade Legal Game: Cases of Intellectual Property and Export 
Credit Law Reforms in Brazil, in Trubek et al., supra note 1.
The World Bank Legal Review304
policies rationally and efficiently. There were some islands of excellence in 
public administration: some key institutions of developmental coordina-
tion, such as BNDES, Petrobrás, Embraer, Embrapa, IPEA, and the Central 
Bank, were professionalized. But these cases were in stark contrast to the rest 
of public administration, which compromised state capability. This lack of 
professionalism changed with the 1988 constitution, which mandated the re-
cruitment of public employees through public and official exams (concursos 
públicos). As a result, there has been a substantial increase in the percentage of 
public employees selected meritocratically.
The constitution also regulates the ceiling of earnings, determining that 
the maximum wage should be no higher than that one received by members 
of the Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal). This rule was designed to 
limit public expense and curb discretionary distortions in the level of salaries. 
Although both meritocratic recruitment and wage policy face problems of en-
forcement, they represent an improvement in terms of governmental quality. 
When the Lula administration began to expand the state’s role, it could count 
on a more professional workforce in government.
Other measures helped enhance state capacity, making it easier to carry 
out the direction called for by NSA. The constitutional framework estab-
lished in 1988 gave rise to policy initiatives designed to “implement rights” 
and “modernize” the state. New ministries were created, several others were 
reorganized, subministerial entities were added, and councils and commit-
tees were formed to increase participation by business and labor. In addition, 
BNDES has played an increasingly important role in industrial policy. 
Changes in the world of ideas also facilitated NSA. With the turn to a 
more robust role for the state in the economy, and its particular profile in Bra-
zil, there have been corresponding changes on the intellectual scene. Inter-
nationally, more attention is paid to the positive role industrial policy might 
play, and the World Bank has endorsed certain types of industrial policy.54 
Similar developments are occurring within Brazil as Brazilian economists seek 
to explain and guide the evolving new configuration. Brazil has also attracted 
the attention of theorists around the world who hope to create a new political 
economy of development.55
The academic focus has resulted in analytical tools and offers intellectual 
justifications that can help sustain policy experimentation. Some observers 
have labeled the emerging set of ideas “new developmentalism.” James Cypher 
describes this approach:
On the one hand, New Developmentalism [rejects] prevailing ideas 
of neoclassical economics regarding a passive reliance on an export-
54  Justin Yifu Lin, New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development (World 
Bank, 2012), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTVIETNAM/Resources/
Jtin.pdf. 
55  For a detailed discussion of Brazil and new developmentalism, see David M. Trubek, Law, 
State, and the New Developmentalism: An Introduction, in Trubek et al., supra note 1. 
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led, resource-based economy [and agrees with]. . . . the original de-
velopmentalist economists such as Rosenstein-Rodan, Hirschman, 
and Nurkse, and their emphasis on the centrality of a developmen-
talist state. . . . On the other hand, New Developmentalism stresses 
a “growth with equity” approach along with an emphasis on indus-
trial policy, highlighting public, growth-supporting, infrastructure 
spending, and a “neoschumpeterian” emphasis on building a na-
tional innovation system through deep public-private cooperative 
programs that will drive investment expenditures toward produc-
tivity-enhancing science and technology applications throughout 
the national industrial base of the economy.56
In Brazil, after the relative theoretical hegemony of liberal ideas associ-
ated with the Washington Consensus in the 1990s, a burgeoning literature 
has lent support for NSA. This can be seen in two different fields: economics 
(both macroeconomics and microeconomics) and political science. In econom-
ics, an important contribution has been research on the exchange rate and its 
effect on industrialization. According to the argument developed by Bresser- 
Pereira, there has been appreciation of the value of the real, leading to a 
“Dutch disease” effect that promotes deindustrialization.57 Due to the floods 
of dollars that have been reaching the Brazilian economy, the currency has be-
come overvalued, with a negative effect on national industry. By showing that 
free market policies can lead to these negative effects, Bresser-Pereira and his 
colleagues created a rationale for an aggressive industrial policy. This criticism 
was accompanied by microeconomic studies that challenge the market-orient-
ed model. These studies include sectorial and market analyses and document 
specific and pervasive market failures that require active industrial policies.58
In addition, microeconomists and political scientists have been providing 
inputs to social policy. Studies have demonstrated how economic inequality 
itself is a problem, detaching this problem from poverty. This sort of consid-
eration has given impulse to the formulation of two different sets of social 
measures: poverty alleviation measures and instruments intended to reduce 
economic inequality more generally.
56  Cypher, supra note 39, comments that “As yet, New Developmentalism has not been rigor-
ously defined. Some find that trial and error rather than the adoption of a coherent ‘model’ 
such as ‘new-developmentalism’ better describes the current conjuncture,” citing Arbix & 
Martin, supra note 4. 
57  The “Dutch disease” refers to the effect of a commodities boom on industry. Increased de-
mand for commodities leads to appreciation of the currency, which makes industrial exports 
less competitive. This occurred in the Netherlands with the discovery of natural gas. See 
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, The Dutch Disease and Its Neutralization: A Ricardian Approach, 28 
Brazilian J. of Pol. Eco. 47 –71 (2008). 
58  Two issues have been highlighted: failures in the market for innovation and gaps in the 
industrial chain. Studies conducted by Arbix & Pacheco and the Institute for Economic Ap-
plied Research show the need for innovation policies, while Erber, Cassiolato, & Kupfer 
highlight gaps in supply chains that require government action. 
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Challenge for Law
What does the emergence of NSA mean for law, and vice versa? As the role 
of the state in the economy and social protection changes, there will be corre-
sponding changes in law. And it seems possible that law will shape and chan-
nel the path for policy innovation, as well as providing room for adaptation. 
This section outlines some general considerations about NSA’s challenges 
for law. 
Although it is easy to say that law and NSA must in some way be mutu-
ally constitutive, it is another matter to say how NSA affects law and vice 
versa. Part of the problem derives from the complexity of the situation, and 
part from the paucity of empirical studies. Although abstract models of po-
litical economy such as neoliberalism and new developmentalism suggest 
clear delineations, in the real world, policies are a mix of the old and the new, 
layered on top of one another, and sometimes contradictory. This complex-
ity and contradiction at the policy level carries over into the legal domain: 
key legal variables are difficult to define and causalities involving changes 
in the law and in policy outcomes are blurred. As a result, studies on rela-
tionships between the law and development policy present methodological 
challenges. 
This section focuses on methods for understanding these relationships, 
outlines some functionalities that NSA seems to demand, and provides a few 
examples of how law has responded to these functional needs. 
New Roles, New Frameworks of Analysis, New Functionalities
NSA will generate pressures for new laws and new roles for law. Much will 
be straightforward: statutes will change, procedures will be altered. This has 
been occurring in Brazil for years. Laws created ABDI, MDS, Cadastro Unico, 
and other institutions that are central to Brazil’s NSA. Laws aiming at specific 
goals such as innovation and competiveness are also important. Although 
recognizing the importance of these legal changes, this section focuses on 
“new functionalities”—roles for law that have not been as important (or did 
not exist in Brazil) in the past and take on new importance with the emer-
gence of NSA.
Three sources were used to identify new functionalities and legal respons-
es: research done by the project on Law and the New Developmental State 
(LANDS), of which this study is a part;59 other research on law and develop-
59  LANDS, the Project on Law and the New Developmental State, is coordinated by the Global 
Legal Studies Center at the University of Wisconsin, Madison with assistance from CEBRAP 
(the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning), and Los Andes University. Funding for 
LANDS was provided by the University of Wisconsin School of Law, the University of Wis-
consin’s Center for World Affairs and the Global Economy (WAGE), and the Ford Foundation.
Toward a New Law and Development 307
ment polices conducted in Brazil;60 and “reverse engineering.”61 Reverse engi-
neering means starting with policies and programs, describing the functions 
associated with them, and seeing if law has contributed, or could contribute, 
to those functions.
For NSA to be successful and new development policies to work, the 
government must maintain flexibility, orchestrate the relations among public 
actors and between them and the private sector, create conditions that will 
maximize synergy between actors, and preserve legitimacy. These functional 
needs point to new roles for law: if one isolates the role law can play in these 
new functionalities, one can identify four roles the legal system could play in 
NSA in Brazil: safeguard flexibility, stimulate orchestration, frame synergy, 
and ensure legitimacy.
Safeguard flexibility means to use legal norms to allow room for experimen-
tation, to promote innovation, and to facilitate feedback from experiments to 
policy. NSA demands legal regimes that permit learning by doing and that 
encourage path correction. Different from import substitution and neoliberal-
ism, NSA requires the assurance of some degree of flexibility and learning to 
implement initiatives that in most cases do not resemble preexisting recipes 
or strategies; this is one reason why NSA employs “new governance” tools.62
Stimulate orchestration means to use law to structure state activities for ef-
fective industrial and social policy. This means facilitating coordination and 
articulation within the state—both horizontally (that is, between entities that 
belong to the same bureaucratic state level) and vertically (that is, between 
entities that are subject to hierarchies or belong to different state levels). 
60  Diogo R. Coutinho & Paulo T. L. Mattos, “Law and the New Developmental State: Brazil Pilot 
Project,” paper presented at the workshop “Law and the New Developmental State: Lat-
in America and Beyond,” Global Legal Studies Center—Center for World Affairs and the 
Global Economy (WAGE), University of Wisconsin, Madison (2008); Fabiani, supra note 16; 
Roberto Pires, Promoting Sustainable Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and Compliance 
Outcomes in Brazil, 147 Intl. Lab. Rev. 199–229 (2008); Mariana Mota Prado & Ana Carolina 
da Matta Chasin, How Innovative Was the Poupatempo Experience in Brazil? Institutional Bypass 
as a New Form of Institutional Change, 1 Brazilian Pol. Sci. Rev. (2011); Mario Gomes Schapiro, 
Development Bank, Law and Innovation Financing in a New Brazilian Economy, 1045 L. & Dev. 
Rev.; Gregory C. Shaffer, Michelle Ratton Sanchez, & Barbara Rosenberg, The Trials of Win-
ning at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil’s Success, 41 Cornell Intl. J. 2 (2008). 
61  The idea of reverse engineering appears in David Kennedy, The Rule of Law, Political Choices, 
and Development Common Sense, in The New Law and Development—A Critical Appraisal (David 
Trubek & Alvaro Santos ed., Cambridge U. Press 2006), in the context of a discussion of the 
postwar consensus (1945–70). Kennedy reckons that although there was a clear demand for 
instrumental law during this period, the legal theory was implicit. In order to reveal it, he 
proposes, “We need to reverse engineer the legal theory of mainstream development profes-
sionals from their economic and political projects, and from the attitudes toward law they 
manifested in managing developing policies within national administration. A great deal 
of law was required to translate the leading economic theories of development economic 
policy.”  
62  For a thorough account of new governance and its legal functions and tools, see Orly Lobel, 
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 
89 Minn. L. Rev. (2004).
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Orchestration can consist of norms and procedures that assign institutional 
tasks and foster cooperative (rather than competitive) governance regimes, 
including rules that encourage government to work with the private sector. 
Also, it can mean supporting policy networks that share tasks and interact in 
a complementary way to implement policies; this can include defining pol-
icy hubs. Finally, orchestration can mean using norms that harmonize new 
policies with preexisting ones to ensure coherence. Norms and processes 
playing these roles are crucial in NSA because it relies on the integration of 
different fields. 
Frame synergy involves using the law to frame public-private partnerships 
and ensure that they are more effective than purely public or private solu-
tions. Such modalities include collaborative governance regimes that create 
incentives for public-private cooperation (through incentive alignment and/
or the use of private contracts by public entities), risk sharing,63 and hybrid 
instances in which public and private players regularly meet to interact and 
exchange opinions on regulatory and contractual instruments that bring pri-
vate expertise and public financial capacity together.
Ensure legitimacy means to keep government transparent and ensure ad-
equate participation. NSA requires a regime in which it is easy for new ideas to 
percolate upward and be widely shared. This makes older authoritarian mod-
els obsolete and increases the importance of democracy. Legal regimes must 
ensure accountability, transparency, and participation in development policies, 
which requires norms for disclosure, frameworks for participation, methods to 
hold policy makers accountable for results, and ways to avoid industry capture 
of government at the same time public-private dialogue is fostered. 
Developments in industrial and social policy illustrate how Brazil is deal-
ing with these new needs and functionalities.
Flexibility and Synergy in Industrial Policy
The industrial policy promoted by NSA in Brazil is as much process as policy. 
It is part of a joint public-private discovery process, a collaboration through 
which partners experiment with different trajectories to identify products and 
processes that are optimal for individual firms and sectors as a whole. Ef-
forts to encourage innovation through a full-scale partnership with the private 
sector move the state into new territory. For example, instead of traditional 
arms-length lending with well-defined goals set in advance, internationaliza-
tion strategies for Brazilian companies and innovation financing call for sub-
stantial flexibility, risk sharing, and alliances—this requires legal innovation. 
One area in which this is occurring is BNDES’s program to foster inno-
vation that replaced its traditional form of fixed obligation loan agreements 
with a variety of flexible devices that support collaboration and experimen-
tation. The tools developed for this purpose represent a break in BNDES’s 
63  Coutinho & Mattos, supra note 60. 
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legal pattern: the bank relies on flexible legal structures that, formally or in-
formally, support a financial relationship that permits changes of trajectory 
and adaptation of plans. These legal tools include partnerships with techno-
logical institutes and grants to promote the development of new products; 
relational loan contracts that include nonbinding performance criteria, staged 
disbursements, and constant BNDES monitoring through shared governance 
mechanisms; equity investments coupled with shared governance established 
through shareholder agreements that give BNDES a seat on the board and 
that subject certain corporate decisions to its approval; and arrangements by 
which BNDES participates on the investment committee of venture capital 
funds that it assists.64
Other new legal mechanisms connected with industrial policy include 
risk sharing with the private sector, soft law, and special public-private part-
nerships. Risk-sharing agreements are designed to encourage private inves-
tors to increase investments in technological research and innovation, expand 
industry capacity and exports, and acquire assets abroad in order to exploit 
comparative advantage in sectors where Brazil is a global leader. Soft law has 
also been used to induce investment. For example, governmental letters of 
intent communicate public investment strategies and serve as signals for the 
private sector, inducing private investment decisions. Other tools that create 
incentives for private companies to innovate include public-private partner-
ship contracts, cooperation agreements between government and research 
centers, and flexible private law contracts (credit contracts, shareholder and 
investors agreements) between government and corporations.
Orchestration and Decentralization in Social Policy
Brazil has sought to strengthen its welfare state through cooperation among 
the several levels of government in the federation. It also brings together dif-
ferent types of social policies to deal with major problems. This requires a 
continuous orchestration of different levels and types of policies (universal 
and targeted, federal and local, contributive and noncontributive). Thus, the 
government has found new uses for old administrative law tools and created 
new instruments. This strategy can be seen in BFP, which uses a registry for 
all social programs (Cadastro Único) and a decentralized management index 
(IGD) to coordinate the work of several ministries, local administrators, and 
other public actors and to encourage policy innovation. BFP uses conditionali-
ties—obligations of recipients for child education and health—that it enforces 
through revisable regulatory rules such as ordinances. It employs the Cadas-
tro Único to gather data and reduce asymmetric information with the purpose 
of expanding education and health coverage. It also adopted a carrot-based 
64  Mario Schapiro, Rediscovering the Developmental Path? Development Bank, Law and Innovation 
Financing in the Brazilian Economy, in Trubek et al., supra note 1. Although the bank’s inno-
vation funding clearly represents a new form of state activism and new approaches to law, 
Schapiro emphasizes that the program represents a tiny portion of the bank’s total portfolio, 
and it is unclear whether this segment of the program will expand in the future.
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federal arrangement through the use of financial incentives such as IGD to get 
municipalities to gather data on very poor families. 
In addition, IGD aims to encourage Brazilian cities to deliver effective 
performance, employing funds to reward those who provide dependable and 
quality information, maintaining updated data in the Cadastro Único, and 
providing information on the effect of the health and education conditionali-
ties. BFP uses contractual arrangements with cities to ensure that they set up 
local agencies of social control and participation. These agencies receive IGD 
funding to support the BFP management and develop activities with recipi-
ent households, including managing conditionalities and benefits, monitoring 
recipient households, registering new households, updating and reviewing 
data, implementing complementary programs for basic adult literacy, provid-
ing occupational training, creating jobs and income, stimulating regional de-
velopment, and strengthening BFP’s social control. 
This system has led to a more collaborative (rather than imposed) and flex-
ible (rather than based on rigid rules and sanctions) relationship between the 
federal and local levels.65 Such an articulation fosters decentralization (with 
federal guidance, steering, and expertise) and is the result of a broader picture 
in which, although universal programs remain central, “targeting within uni-
versalism” has been fostering development outcomes. 
Experimentation and Synergy in Labor Law 
In a study of new approaches to the enforcement of labor laws in Brazil, Rober-
to Pires shows that labor inspectors using flexible and reflexive experimental-
ist governance approaches had more success than their peers who employed 
more traditional management tools.66 The study compares two different styles 
of enforcement: one, drawn from the theories of the new public management 
stresses, specific targets and quotas67; the other, which draws more on the ex-
perimentalist governance literature, stresses public-private cooperation, dia-
logue, exploration of options for compliance, careful analysis of the causes of 
violations, and revision of goals and standards as mutual learning progresses. 
Pires shows that through a system of hybrid governance that employs exper-
imentalist methods while keeping sanctions in the background, health and 
safety inspectors in Pernambuco are able to significantly reduce the incidence 
of industrial accidents. 
The key to this success, Pires suggests, is creating institutions that allow 
interaction among government, business, and labor; encourage the search for 
65  Diogo R. Coutinho, Decentralization and Coordination in Social Law and Policy: The Bolsa Familia 
Program, in Trubek et al., supra note 1. 
66  Roberto Pires, Promoting Sustainable Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and Compliance 
Outcomes in Brazil 147(2–3) Intl. Lab. Rev. 199–229 (Jun./Sep. 2008).
67  New public management refers to the idea, and consequent policy prescriptions, that market- 
oriented management of the public sector will lead to greater cost efficiency for govern-
ments. It gained its momentum during the 1990s.
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ways companies could revise their business plans to comply with the law and 
still prosper; and facilitate experimentation with new technologies that might 
reduce risks of accidents at low cost. He notes that because of the success of 
these methods, the experimentalist model has been scaled up to the federal 
level. Although Pires does not relate his study and the growth of experimen-
talism in governance directly to the new political economy of development or 
how the Brazilian government is redefining its role in that development, the 
affinity between the development literature and changes in public administra-
tion seems clear. 
Building Legal Capacity for Development: Trade Law
In addition to adapting law to deal with functionalities demanded by NSA, 
Brazil has built the legal capacity needed to shield the new industrial and so-
cial policies from restrictions that might be imposed by international law and 
policy. Built into NSA are policies that challenge some orthodox prescriptions 
backed by international economic law, including restraints on export subsi-
dies and stricter protection of intellectual property. The clearest example of 
this kind of legal response is in the field of trade law.68
When it initially joined the WTO in 1995, Brazil accepted the full package 
of WTO agreements without first determining to what extent they might clash 
with domestic policies and priorities. But as neoliberal enthusiasm waned, 
successive administrations protected domestic policy space by challenging 
restrictive interpretations of global trade rules. This growing willingness to 
challenge WTO-based restrictions is a result of changes in development policy 
and in the way trade policy is formulated in Brazil. As the state began to play 
a more robust role in the promotion of economic growth and social protec-
tion, trade policy making became more closely integrated with overall devel-
opment policy, and Brazil invested in the legal and related skills needed for 
success in trade disputes. At the same time, the arena for discussion of trade 
policy expanded as more government agencies began to participate and the 
private sector and a flourishing civil society movement entered the debate. As 
a result, Brazil has been able to use trade law as a shield for policy innovation. 
In the case of intellectual property, Brazil was able to carve out space 
within the regime for the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) that allowed it to negotiate better prices for antiviral 
drugs. Although initially it seemed that TRIPS would preclude this kind of ac-
tion, a number of changes in law, politics, and government organization at the 
domestic level, as well as action in the international arena, strengthened the 
Brazilian government’s capacity to shape domestic health policy in the face 
of international constraints. The judiciary entered the arena to enforce a 
 
68  See Alvaro Santos, Carving out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade 
Organization: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico; and Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, Devel-
opmental Responses to the International Trade Legal Game: Cases of Intellectual Property and Export 
Credit Law Reforms in Brazil, in Trubek et al., supra note 1.  
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constitutional right to health, administrative changes were made that 
opened trade policy discussions to a range of interests, and the legislature 
was mobilized. 
Specific legal changes at the domestic level included reforms of the legal 
system in order to eliminate TRIPS-plus provisions; authorization for use of 
flexibilities such as compulsory licenses; the approval of new mechanisms im-
plicitly authorized by the international system that favor access to technology; 
and the creation of new government institutions that could serve as counter-
vailing powers to industry interests in the patent approval process. Brazil and 
other developing countries carried on a campaign at the international level 
that led the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to 
take a more supportive stance toward the use of policy in this field. 
Brazil has been able to legally protect domestic trade policy from WTO 
restrictions. As part of its new industrial policy, Brazil sought to build Embraer 
into a national champion and facilitate efforts to develop market share in the 
global regional jet market. Government financing is an essential part of any 
deal for aircraft manufacturers, and Embraer had been hampered by the high 
cost of finance available to Brazilian companies. The government decided to 
provide a subsidy to the institutions that provided finance for Embraer sales. 
Canada’s Bombardier challenged this practice as a violation of the WTO sub-
sidies code. After a long and drawn out litigation, Brazil was forced to make 
changes in its subsidies. But through a partially successful campaign that drew 
on the growing capacity of government and industry working together in the 
trade law field, Brazil was able to preserve part of the subsidy program and 
shift the issue of aircraft financing terms into the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). By moving the issue to the OECD, 
Brazil gained a voice in the main forum affecting global rules for aircraft fi-
nance. This meant it has a say in the terms affecting its competitors and thus 
more bargaining leverage in the continuing dispute with Bombardier.
Conclusion: Assessing the Brazilian Experience  
in Development Policy and Law
The Brazilian foray into NSA is a work in progress. Policies are altered as 
domestic and international conditions change. Industrial policy seems to be 
working and is helping the country both weather the storms from the global 
financial crisis and resume economic dynamism. World markets have accept-
ed this trend, and foreign investment has soared. Significant gains have been 
made in poverty alleviation and the reduction of economic inequality. 
Yet questions remain. Is a coherent model of a new development state 
emerging, and is Brazil’s new state activism likely to become consolidated? 
Does the government have the capacity to manage and implement the ambi-
tious set of processes and policies that have been put in place? Can Brazilian 
institutions develop and sustain the new roles demanded by NSA? Finally, is 
the Brazilian experience unique to that country, or can it be replicated? 
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A New Development State?
Although the current situation in Brazil is described here as NSA, a discussion 
of a “new Brazil model” in the sense of a coherent and stable configuration of 
state, law, and political economy would be premature. Brazil is experimenting 
with a variety of new policies and procedures. Many of them have yet to stand 
the test of time. But the trends show continuous movement toward a set of 
policies that could cohere into a sustainable model. A new form of industrial 
policy stressing state assistance for innovation and competitiveness in the pri-
vate and public sectors is in place and has been combined with a robust social 
policy. The commitment to NSA has lasted for more than a decade, through 
two presidential elections. President Dilma Rousseff has deepened the gov-
ernment’s commitment to the new industrial and social policies.
Does Brazil Have the Capacity to Manage and Implement  
the New Policies?
NSA places great demands on the state, which must be able to assist the private 
sector without stifling it. It must make choices among sectors, industries, and 
firms in the public interest. Complicated decisions involving massive sums 
of money require both technical expertise and distance from special interests. 
Through a series of reforms, the Brazilian state bureaucracy is more profes-
sional today than it was in the past. But this is not true everywhere, and in 
many areas inefficiency, bureaucratic rigidity, or both, persist. Finally, the risk 
of corruption and capture is always present. Some measures have been taken 
to limit corruption; although new anticorruption laws and agencies have been 
created, corruption remains a problem in Brazil as elsewhere. 
Can the Brazilian Legal System Meet the Needs of NSA?
Brazilian law can contribute to the operation of the new policies and proce-
dures under NSA. In at least a few cases and a few areas, new legal tools are 
being created and old ones are being put to new use. The legal system has the 
capacity for innovation that new developmentalism demands. But it is not 
clear that this is happening—or will happen—in all the areas where change is 
needed. The cases that have been studied suggest it is possible, but they are 
too limited to warrant a conclusion. For that to happen, many rigidities and 
obstacles in the Brazil legal system must be overcome. 
Is the Brazilian Experience Unique, or Can It Be Replicated?
There is no question that other nations can learn from the Brazilian experi-
ence in development policy. The approach to industrial policy that assists the 
private sector and fosters structural changes needed for competiveness can 
be followed in other countries. The potential for using a state development 
bank as an engine of innovation and growth also provides lessons that can be 
replicated. Brazil’s successful merger of industrial policy and social policy is 
worth further study. The same can be said for the Brazilian experience in law 
and development. To the extent that countries adopt aspects of NSA, they will 
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need to adapt their legal system to new functionalities and can learn from the 
way Brazil has developed legal institutions that address these needs.
That does not mean, however, that the Brazilian experience has resulted 
in a template that can be followed by everyone, everywhere. The account pre-
sented in this chapter has stressed the contextual features that explain Brazil’s 
turn to NSA, such as a large, well-developed industrial sector, advanced re-
search centers, a huge domestic market, a democratic constitution, a profes-
sionalized bureaucracy in key agencies, a long history of state involvement in 
the economy, and some transformative capacity in legal institutions. Because 
the development of NSA in Brazil is based on these contextual features, NSA 
in the Brazilian form will not be easily replicated in countries that lack any or 
all of these features.
The Role of the Public Ministry  
in the Defense of the Environment
Hydrogeographical Regions and Attitudes  
for Coping with Socioenvironmental Conflicts
Luciano Badini and Luciano aLvarenga
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988, the first constitutional text since the fall of 
the Brazilian military dictatorship, devotes significant attention to the idea of 
democracy. The constitution entrusts the Public Ministry, a permanent institu-
tion that is crucial to the jurisdictional function of the state, with the defense of 
the legal order, the democratic regime, and so-called metaindividual interests 
and rights—rights belonging to society as a whole. The protection of the en-
vironment, claimed as a common possession for use by the people and recog-
nized as essential to a healthy quality of life for current and future generations 
(Article 225), is a metaindividual right.
The defense of rights fits into the larger scope of implementing the essen-
tial principles of the Federative Republic of Brazil. As Marcelo Goulart reflects:
The strategic goal of the Public Ministry is to defend the project of 
participative, economic and social democracy outlined in the 1988 
Constitution through achievement of crucial objectives for the Re-
public, synthesized in Article 3, from Section I to IV (construction of 
a free, fair and solidary society in which cultural and socio-economic 
development should be directed towards the eradication of poverty 
and marginalization, thus reducing social and regional inequalities 
and promoting the welfare of all).
In order for the Public Ministry to fulfill this task, the Brazilian Constitu-
tion gives it legitimacy to adopt measures of civil and criminal liability against 
the violators of environmental rules.1
  The authors would like to thank Mr. Matt Moorhead, the editors of this volume, Dr. Nigel 
Quinney, Gustavo Abreu, and Alessandra de Souza Santos, who collaborated on the techni-
cal revision and translation of this text.
1  M. Goulart, Princípios institucionais do Ministério Público: A necessária revisão conceitual da 
unidade institucional e da independência funcional MPMG Jurídico, 14 Belo Horizonte 13 (Oct./
Dec. 2008).
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The expansion of the power of the Public Ministry and other public agen-
cies to protect the environment is vital in a country undergoing intense eco-
nomic development. The use of law as a means of environmental protection 
is a way to compensate for the negative impacts of the increasing demand 
for natural resources. In this sense, the constitution of 1988 established “state 
activism” in regard to ecological matters in Brazil.2 
According to the 1988 constitution, the Public Ministry’s functions are to 
promote, on an exclusive basis, public criminal action and to institute civil in-
vestigations and public civil actions for the protection of the environment and 
other metaindividual interests. As the legitimate defender of these interests, 
the Public Ministry plays the role of “society’s attorney” even against the state 
itself, because, in the Brazilian legal system, the Public Ministry is assured of 
operational independence. Thus, the Public Ministry is a public institution, 
attached to the state, but, as constitutional defender of society’s interests, it 
is independent from the state. This feature guards against any forms of viola-
tion of metaindividual rights, including violations committed by agents of the 
state. Goulart notes that the operational independence of the Public Ministry 
“is a social guarantee because it was created to give people security of having 
a political agent which, while acting for the defense of social interests, can 
work independently, immune to the pressures of power.”3
This chapter looks at the ways in which the Public Ministry, and espe-
cially the Public Ministry of the State of Minas Gerais, has used innovative 
legal mechanisms to address and resolve environmental and social conflicts. 
The chapter focuses in particular on a successful initiative to reorganize the 
ministry’s environmental work so that it corresponds to natural, rather than 
administrative, boundaries.
The Problem-Solving Public Ministry:  
The Extrajudicial Activities of the Public Ministry
The Public Ministry has the power to resolve environmental conflicts without 
demanding the intervention of the judiciary. This power is exercised via two 
instruments: 
•	 	A recommendation, through which the Public Ministry sends the state 
guidelines to improve the provision of a service of public interest
•	 	A “conduct adjustment,” a type of out-of-court settlement through which 
a person or company that has put at risk or has caused damage to the 
public interest (for example, environmental quality) assumes obligations 
2  This chapter is based on a draft of a chapter from a forthcoming book tentatively titled Law, 
State, and Development: New State Activism in Brazil in Comparative Perspective and edited by 
David Trubek, Helena Alviar, Diogo Coutinho, and Alvaro Santos.
3  Goulart, supra note 1, at 12.
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to cease the illegal activity, to conform conduct to legislation, and to repair 
damage done 
The out-of-court settlement, known as a term of conduct adjustment 
(TCA), has helped remove red tape from the processes of environmental con-
flict resolution, which are frequently complex, thereby avoiding court dis-
putes that could drag on for years. The Public Ministry thus plays a problem-
solving role: it offers quick responses consistent with the socioenvironmental 
demands of the society.
The Drainage Basin as a Territorial Unit for Analysis,  
Planning, and Action
An analysis of socioenvironmental processes and planning strategies cannot 
be isolated from the context of the natural systems in which they occur. In 
this context, the drainage basin is suitable for an investigation that aims to 
integrate physical, biotic, social, cultural, and economic aspects, providing an 
understanding of the ways in which different environmental aspects—such 
as vegetation cover, geology, and agricultural production systems—interact.4 
Drainage basins are multilevel systems that encompass political, economic, 
and cultural practices and as such are an important environmental and social 
area for analysis and planning. As Francisco Barbosa, João Antônio de Paula, 
and Roberto Monte-Mor comment:
[A] “basin” has considerable merit as a physical and economic unit 
for analysis. Actions or policies external to the “basins” (pricing 
policies, for example) can have important effects within a system 
defined in them, and an economic analysis, even incorporating the 
issue of welfare, can capture only a part of the relevant interactions 
within the system. Appropriate management requires, therefore, 
that the basins be considered as “multilevel” systems that include 
water, soil, and sociopolitical components, internal and external. 
Thus, a typical “basin” would consist in the overlap of natural and 
social systems. The natural system would be defined on aquatic and 
terrestrial (fauna, flora, water resources, and minerals) bases. The 
social system would determine how these bases are used. Govern-
ment policies as an extension of social and institutional organization 
influence local patterns of using natural resources.5
4  R. G. M. Botelho, Planejamento ambiental em microbacia hidrográfica, in Erosão e conservação dos 
solos: Conceitos, temas e aplicações 269–300 (A. J. T. Guerra, A. S. Silva, & R. G. M. Botelho ed., 
Bertrand Brasil 1999); and F. V. F. Castro, L. J. Alvarenga, & A. P. A. Magalhães Jr., A Política 
Nacional de Recursos Hídricos e a gestão de conflitos em uma nova territorialidade, 1(1) Geografias, 
Belo Horizonte 37–50 (2005).
5  F. A. R. Barbosa, J. A. Paula, & R. L. M. Monte-Mor, A bacia hidrográfica como unidade de análise 
e realidade de integração disciplina, in Biodiversidade, população e economia: Uma região de Mata 
Atlântica 258 ( J. A. Paula coord., UFMG/Cedeplar/ECMXC/PADCT/CIAMB 1997).
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Brazilian law recognizes the drainage basin as the territorial unit for envi-
ronmental planning, management, and analysis. Law 8,171/1991, which con-
cerns agricultural policy in Brazil, states, “The drainage basins constitute the 
basic units for planning [for] the use, conservation, and recovery of natural 
resources” (Article 20). Law 9,433/1997, known as the Water Law because it 
established the National Policy of Water Resources, also focuses on the drain-
age basin as the territorial unit (Article 1, Section V).
Although the Water Law presents several innovations, such as the adop-
tion of socioenvironmental parameters, its application, like the application of 
environmental laws in general, has been marked by conflicts. Some of them 
derive from the coexistence of territorial units corresponding to the adminis-
trative units of Brazil’s federation (union, member states, municipalities, and 
Federal District) with the natural divisions of drainage basins and ecosystems 
that they encompass. In other words, the geographic areas covered by the ad-
ministrative units do not correspond to the geographic area of drainage ba-
sins. As Jorge Thierry Calasans et al. point out:
[B]ecause the implementation of water resources management by 
basin does not coincide with the political-administrative division of 
the country, it creates a potential conflict between the entities that 
are part of SINGREH [National System of Hydric Resources Man-
agement]. The so-called water resources management agencies must 
now give up their administrative autonomy over the management of 
water resources in the state’s territory to share their autonomy with 
the new deliberative body represented by the Basin Committees.6
Similar conflicts have been identified regarding the environmental protec-
tion provided by the Public Ministry. The Public Ministry is organized, like 
the judiciary, by counties, which creates several obstacles to prosecutors’ work 
to protect environmental and water resources. These obstacles are identified 
by Antônio Herman Benjamin and include 
•	 	“County likeness,” the concept that environmental and water resources 
can be safeguarded using the geographic and legal organization into 
counties, despite the fact that this method of organization is incompatible 
with the natural division of the natural systems.
•	 	“Spontaneism,” which prevents proactive and prospective action by the 
Public Ministry, whose work is reactive and retrospective. Thus, ministe-
rial intervention is “always hostage to the degradation which has already 
occurred or is just about to occur, subjugating the institution to the fait 
accompli dictatorship.”
•	 	“Lack of specific techniques for the correct interpretation of environ-
mental issues,” which substantially restricts activities by the prosecution 
offices in defense of the environment. Lacking technical and scientific 
6  J. T. Calasans et al., A Política Nacional de Recursos Hídricos: Uma avaliação crítica, in Congresso 
Internacional de Direito Ambiental 7°, Anais 585–602 (Imprensa Oficial 2003).
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resources, the prosecution offices have problems identifying and measur-
ing complex environmental problems.
•	 	“Generalism,” which hinders the expertise of prosecutors with regard to 
knowledge of environmental law, “hampering the implementation of en-
vironmental legislation and providing an inadequate service to our cus-
tomers, the community, and the future generations.”
•	 	“Isolationism,” which precludes the “efficient use of the institution’s ener-
gies, leading to a shortsighted implementation, if not devoid of any real 
practical results, because it lacks the overall vision,” that is, the view on 
the drainage basin to be protected as a whole.7
Benjamin is convinced that “environmental problems recognize neither 
the historic strength of the criterion of administration of the jurisdictional 
rules that guide the division of the state into counties, nor the political frag-
mentation of the territory.”8 Proposals for the territorial reorganization of the 
Public Ministry in the interest of environmental protection are gaining ac-
ceptance. The idea that ministerial action should have drainage basins as a 
basis—that action should be taken not on the basis of political units (coun-
ties) but on the basis of hydrogeographical regions (drainage basins)—would 
foster, in geographical and socioenvironmental terms, a more comprehensive 
view of ecological problems and their socioeconomic and cultural constraints 
and implications. It would also encourage the development of ecologically ef-
fective solutions that are socially appropriate.
The Public Ministry of Minas Gerais State (MPMG) pioneered the imple-
mentation of a drainage basin approach. In 2001, with the support of the 
federal government, MPMG created the Prosecution Office of the Rio Sao 
Francisco Drainage Basin and started planning and enforcing actions to pro-
tect natural and water resources associated with Rio Sao Francisco, consid-
ering the drainage basin as a whole. Before that, MPMG actions occurred 
in a fragmented way throughout the several counties (administrative geo-
graphical divisions, as opposed to natural ones) in the state. The Prosecution 
Office of Rio Sao Francisco is subdivided into five regions devoted to the 
preservation and restoration of natural and water resources from the drain-
age basin. In 2009, this working model was extended to all other basins and 
sub-basins within the territory of Minas Gerais state, effectively coordinat-
ing regional prosecution offices in their work to defend the environment. 
This reorganization of MPMG received social and institutional recognition 
in Brazil when it was awarded the Innovare Prize in 2010 in the Public Min-
istry Award category. 
7  A. H. Benjamin, Um novo modelo para o Ministério Público na proteção do meio ambiente, 10 Re-
vista de Direito Ambiental 7–13 (Apr./Jun. 1998). The quoted material is from page 11.
8  Id., 10.
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Conflict Resolution and the Promotion of Environmental Quality
Using the drainage basins of Minas Gerais as its basis and applying a problem- 
solving approach, the reorganized MPMG has been effective in resolving 
environmental conflicts in the state, as evidenced by a number of programs.
Between November 2008 and November 2011, prosecutors considered a 
total of 13,906 cases but submitted only 4,795 of them—that is, just 34 percent 
—to the courts. Conflict resolution through the formalization of out-of-court 
settlements, employing TCA, was used in 66 percent of cases (9,111 proce-
dures). MPMG was involved in the defense of protected areas (53 percent of 
TCAs), the repair of environmental damage (22 percent), pollution control 
(8 percent), the protection of wildlife (3 percent), and the control of irregular 
mining (2 percent).
MPMG thus expanded its conflict-resolution role by implementing a set of 
extrajudicial techniques geared specifically toward the negotiation of environ-
mental conflicts involving the protection of metaindividual and unavailable 
rights. In parallel, it instituted environmental damage valuation as a refer-
ence for the evaluation of “ecological compensation”—in other words, for an 
evaluation of procedures aimed at the improvement of environmental well-
being according to the provisions of the Brazilian Constitution (Article 225, 
paragraph 1, Sections I, II, and VII) and the National Environmental Policy 
(Federal Law 6,938/1981, Article 2, Sections I, II, IV, VIII, and IX, and Article 
4, Section VI).
It is difficult to translate into monetary terms the damage that environ-
mental degradation can cause. Such degradation has multiple, cumulative, 
and synergistic impacts. Many valuation methods exist, but none can cope 
with the diversity and variety of the damage caused. The inability to predict 
the value of compensation for environmental degradation hinders the adop-
tion of agreements.
For this reason, ecological compensation has become the most appropri-
ate way to solve many socioenvironmental conflicts, especially in regard to 
the need to restore the damaged area. Ecological compensation also helps the 
company responsible for the damage to determine how to conduct its future 
activities so that it abides by the law, in the sense that by being held respon-
sible for ecological damage, the company will be reeducated in environmen-
tally friendly ideals. 
Serra da Moeda
An example of the success of this approach can be seen in the Serra da Moeda 
(Mountain of Money) case. As a result of the decisions made in this case, a 
mining company whose activities could have caused serious damage to the 
environment stopped extracting ore in areas relevant to biological diversity 
conservation. These areas were turned into “conservation units”—that is, 
areas given special protection by environmental legislation. 
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In the Serra da Moeda, a mining company sought to carry out activities 
in an area believed to have high environmental value. The ensuing debate 
revolved around the question of how one can reconcile environmental preser-
vation with the generation of jobs and income, considering the socioeconomic 
development of the region, in accordance with Federal Law 6,938/1981, Ar-
ticle 4, Section I.
MPMG defined the area that would be crucial to environmental preserva-
tion. No mining activities—indeed, no human activities that cause environ-
mental damage—would henceforth be allowed in this area. Following careful 
studies, the company identified other areas in which it wanted to mine and 
presented an initial schedule for the extraction of ore. Subsequently, the com-
pany submitted to a regular environmental licensing process, carried out by 
Minas Gerais State, obtaining an authorization for mining in the areas defined 
as exploitable in the agreement signed by the Public Ministry.
Oasis
The Oasis project is another example of MPMG’s role as a protector of the 
environment. This project was implemented through an agreement signed in 
2011 by the Public Ministry and a mining company from the town of Bru-
madinho. In the course of a civil investigation, MPMG found evidence of en-
vironmental damage and quantified the environmental compensation. The 
compensation consisted of payments to 75 small producers around the min-
ing venture whose farms included Permanent Preservation Areas (PPAs)—
for example, river banks and hilltops—and Legal Reserve Areas—portions of 
property deemed necessary for the sustainable use of natural resources, biodi-
versity conservation, shelter, the protection of native flora and fauna, and the 
preservation of the quality, amount, and circulation of water resources in the 
environment.
In partnership with the Foundation O Boticario, MPMG developed a 
methodology to specify the monthly amount to be paid to each farmer, as 
well as an efficient system of inspection that demonstrated whether benefi-
ciaries were afforded adequate funds to maintain the Legal Reserve and the 
PPAs. The partnership between MPMG and the foundation is innovative: this 
is one of the first projects in this state based on payment for environmental 
services (PES). It also contributes to social and environmental justice because 
it remunerates farmers who contribute to the implementation of environmen-
tal legislation.
Belo Horizonte
A third example of MPMG’s expanded role involves the protection of the 
quality of life in the urban environment. In 2011, entrepreneurs from the real 
estate market in the southern section of the Minas Gerais capital, Belo Ho-
rizonte, signed a breakthrough agreement with MPMG. The civil building 
sector has a number of negative consequences with regard to the quality of 
urban environment, especially for urban mobility, and it increases demand 
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for public services. Again, environmental compensation was the solution: 
20 entrepreneurs committed themselves to a road construction project in the 
neighborhood, considered a priority by the associations of local residents. 
The agreement with MPMG was made with input from Minas Gerais State 
and the consent of the city of Belo Horizonte, representing the local commu-
nity. Thus, there was a widespread effort to improve the quality of life in the 
urban environment.
Conclusion
The Public Ministry, notably in Minas Gerais State, has distinguished itself as 
an institutional defender of Brazil’s environment. It enhances the effectiveness 
of the state’s response to various types of socioenvironmental conflicts in two 
major ways: it prioritizes conflict-resolution work—that is, work that does not 
require the intervention of the courts; and it recognizes the need to reconfigure 
the territorial organization of institutions so that they are consistent with the 
organizational pattern of the natural systems. The Public Ministry has thus 
been able to expand access to justice and to implement the laws that protect 
natural and water resources in Brazil.
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OHADA Nears the Twenty-Year Mark
An Assessment
Renaud BeauchaRd
On October 17, 1993, in Port Louis, Mauritius, 14 African heads of state signed 
a treaty creating the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in 
Africa, or Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires 
(OHADA). The treaty came into force on September 18, 1995, and its signato-
ries now number 17 member states.1 Designed to modernize and harmonize 
business laws with the ultimate goal of increasing domestic and foreign trade 
and investment, OHADA constitutes a unique experiment involving the legal 
integration of states participating in different economic, trade, and monetary 
unions.2 Almost two decades after the Port Louis treaty was signed, this chap-
ter evaluates the initiative.3
That task is not made easier by the fact that little empirical evidence sug-
gests that OHADA has had a beneficial effect on the economies of the member 
states, all of which are lower-tier countries crippled by structural problems 
and most of which have experienced numerous calamities since the creation 
of OHADA, including humanitarian crises, military coups, and the collapse of 
democratic governments.4 The main issues analyzed here are whether any cor-
relation can be identified between the good and bad fortunes of the OHADA 
member states and OHADA itself and whether OHADA can provide a work-
able basis for attracting investment in its member states.
OHADA was first conceived of during a meeting of finance ministers of 
the members of the Communauté Financière Africaine5 held in Ouagadou-
1  In order of ratification, the OHADA member states are Guinea-Bissau ( Jan. 15, 1994), Senegal 
( Jun. 14, 1994), Central African Republic ( Jan. 13, 1995), Mali (Feb. 7, 1995), the Comoros 
(Feb. 20, 1995), Burkina Faso (Mar. 6, 1995), Benin (Mar. 8, 1995), Niger ( Jun. 5, 1995), Côte 
d’Ivoire (Sep. 29, 1995), Cameroon (Oct. 20, 1995), Togo (Oct. 27, 1995), Chad (Apr. 13, 1996), 
the Republic of Congo (May 28, 1997), Gabon (Feb. 2, 1998), Equatorial Guinea (Apr. 16, 1999), 
Guinea (May 5, 2000), and Democratic Republic of Congo ( July13, 2012). See http://www 
.ohada.org/etats-parties.html.
2  The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and the Monetary and Economic Community of Central 
Africa (CEMAC).
3  Parts of this chapter draw significantly on  R. Beauchard & J. Kodo, Can OHADA Increase 
Legal Certainty in Africa, Justice and Development Working Paper No. 17/2011 (World Bank 
2011), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/17 
-2011CanOHADAIncrease.pdf?resourceurlname=17-2011CanOHADAIncrease.pdf.
4  Including the events in Guinea-Bissau and Mali unfolding at the time of writing.
5  The Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc is the name of two currencies used in 
Africa that are guaranteed by the French treasury: the West African CFA franc (XOF) and 
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gou, Burkina Faso, in April 1991. This group of experts, led by Justice Keba 
Mbaye from Senegal,6 was appointed to conduct a feasibility study on a form 
of legal collaboration designed to promote economic integration and attract 
investments.7
Integration could be attempted via several methods. It could take the 
shape of a common frame of reference or a model law, which the states could 
then use as a point of reference, without any obligation.8 Another, more con-
straining, approach would be to establish objectives to be pursued and let the 
states determine how to implement them.9 A still deeper form of integration 
could be attained through unification, that is, by replacing preexisting national 
laws with uniform laws.10 Unification would substitute new legislation for 
current domestic laws in relevant areas of business.
In the end, OHADA framers chose the path of unification,11 although the 
treaty expressed this goal by using the all-encompassing—though perhaps 
more ambiguous—word “harmonization.” As part of the process, a new set of 
unified laws was created that preempted all conflicting domestic provisions. 
The treaty was opened to all African states, whether or not they were mem-
bers of the African Union. 
A fully fledged international organization, OHADA has an institutional 
framework that consists of the Council of Ministers (Conseil des Ministres), 
the Permanent Secretariat (Secrétariat Permanent), the Common Court of 
Justice and Arbitration (Cour Commune de Justice et d’Arbitrage, or CCJA), 
and the Regional Training Center for Legal Officers (Ecole Régionale Supéri-
eure de la Magistrature, or ERSUMA). The treaty revisions signed in Québec 
on October 17, 2008, completed the institutional framework with a fifth 
the Central African CFA franc (XAF). Although theoretically separate, the currencies are ef-
fectively interchangeable.
6  Keba Mbaye died in 2007 after having occupied the offices of chief justice of the Senegalese 
Supreme Court, chief justice of the Senegalese Constitutional Council, and vice president of 
the International Court of Justice.
7  Martin Kirsch, Historique de l’OHADA, Revue Penant 129 (1998); Barry Walsh, In Search of 
Success: Case Studies in Justice Sector Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 44 (World Bank 2010).
8  For example, US model codes or the Association Capitant and Société de Législation Com-
parée’s Draft Common Frame of Reference on European Contract Law.
9  For example, European Commission (EC) directives.
10  Comp. EU regulations are the most direct form of EU law—as soon as they are passed, 
they have binding legal force throughout every member state, on a par with national laws. 
National governments do not have to take action themselves to implement EU regulations; 
see http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/what_regulation_en.htm. For more details, 
see J. A. Yakubu, Community Laws in International Business Transactions, in Unified Business 
Law for Africa: Common Law Perspectives on OHADA 4 (Claire Moore-Dickerson ed., GMB 
Publishing 2009). Although harmonization is mentioned in the treaty, OHADA in fact uni-
fies business law, but the (French) word “harmonisation” was used instead of “unification” 
consciously and for political reasons.
11  See Keba Mbaye, L’histoire et les objectifs de l’OHADA, 205 Les Petites Affiches 6 (2004).
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component, the Conference of Heads of State and Government. The revised 
treaty came into force on March 21, 2010.
The main accomplishment of OHADA has been the production of a series 
of standardized pieces of legislation on business law, known as uniform acts, 
which are directly applicable in the member states and preempt any relevant 
domestic legislation. Thus far, nine uniform acts are in force.12 With most 
uniform acts in force for more than a decade, it is legitimate to ask whether 
OHADA has produced the desired effects identified in the Port Louis treaty’s 
preamble, which proclaims the aim of “making progress toward African uni-
ty and creating a climate of trust in the economic systems of the contracting 
States with a view to creating a new center of development in Africa.”
Who Are OHADA’s Constituents and What Can OHADA Bring Them?
A preliminary matter in assessing OHADA is to identify its constituents. Al-
though this should be an easy task, in fact, the political elites in OHADA coun-
tries tend to think of OHADA constituents as judges, lawyers, notaries, and 
bailiffs, all of whom like to participate in donor-funded seminars on more or 
less theoretical subjects. But while these are indeed essential actors, OHADA 
constituents must be more broadly defined.
Geographically, the best place to locate OHADA constituents is in the 
many marketplaces that characterize Africa. For the purpose of this chapter, 
the Dantokpa market in Cotonou (Benin), one of the largest marketplaces in 
West Africa, is the focus. A fascinating place, it is a complex, multilayered, 
pyramidal structure. The base consists of minor transactions in local goods, 
usually perishable and cheap. The next level is fabrics, jewelry, and arts and 
crafts, more expensive and often transported from far away. At the very top of 
the pyramid is the active money market. 
What is most important in places like Dantokpa is not what appears at 
first sight. It is the credit, rather than the commodities. The Dantokpa market 
is where accounts are settled, where debts meet and cancel each other out. 
The complex structure operates almost entirely outside the realm of formal 
law and ignores OHADA. Therefore, when considering OHADA, one should 
think about the small merchants at the Dantokpa market as OHADA’s con-
stituents. 
What precise innovations can OHADA bring its constituents to empower 
them and promote their welfare? OHADA offers the business community of 
the OHADA member states some essential “institutions” (in the neo-institu-
tionalist sense of the “humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
12  The uniform acts cover general commercial law, companies, secured transactions, bank-
ruptcy, arbitration, simplified debt collection and enforcement measures, accounting, 
carriage of goods by road, and cooperative companies.
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economic and social interactions”)13 that can transform uncertainty, which is 
characterized by imprecise knowledge, into risk, which relates to events that 
can be assessed with some degree of certainty and can therefore be hedged 
against.14 It can provide universal mechanisms that ensure that its constitu-
ents are not liable for 100 percent of their losses. It can give its constituents 
institutions such as pledges without dispossession, which allow them to use 
their stock as collateral for a loan. It can help the moneylending observed in 
places like the Dantokpa market ascend to the next level, that of commercial 
moneylending.
The drafters of OHADA had small merchants in mind when they defined 
OHADA’s ambitious policy goals. But somewhere along the way, OHADA’s 
lofty objectives came into conflict with the entrenched economic logic of 
autocracy and rentseeking15 at play in the member states, which typically sup-
port contract or property rights enforcement only for regime insiders.
Legal Certainty: The Fundamental Standard
Achievement of the OHADA policy goals should be the ultimate measure of 
OHADA’s success. The Port Louis treaty aims at “making progress toward 
African unity and creating a climate of trust in the economic systems of the 
contracting States with a view to creating a new center of development in Af-
rica.” The important word here is “trust,” which French anthropologist Marcel 
Mauss describes as “the very foundation of all collective action.”
The economies of the OHADA member states are mostly informal and 
broken into a mosaic of local markets; trust is precisely the engine that could 
help achieve the aim of OHADA to transform member economies from ones 
based on a material life focused on survival to an economic life focused on ex-
change. This goal can be achieved only through larger-scale, more integrated 
markets, which require two pillars of trust: property protection and contract 
enforcement. 
More fundamentally, trust points to and underlines another central 
concept articulated in the Port Louis treaty: legal certainty. Because legal 
certainty connotes more than a simple evaluation of a law’s formulation but 
encompasses the issues of enforcement and observance, this chapter evalu-
ates OHADA against the critically important objective of legal certainty. 
The standard of legal certainty must be clearly defined, however, which 
is not necessarily an easy task. Taking into account that a definition must be 
13  See Douglass North, Institutions, 5 J. of Econ. Persp. 97 (1991).
14  See H. Root, Capital and Collusion: The Political Logic of Global Economic Development 4–6 (Prince- 
ton 2006).
15  Rentseeking is a culture in which the principal route to wealth is not creating wealth but 
taking possession of or benefiting from wealth created by others. Financial Time Lexicon, 
available at http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=rent_seeking.
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comprehensive but not too far-reaching, this chapter first uses an operational 
a contrario definition of what legal certainty is not. And there is no better ex-
ample of what legal certainty is not than the situation found in the member 
states in pre-OHADA days. At that time, outdated business laws existed on 
the books, but without implementing regulation and often in contradiction to 
existing or prior nonabrogated norms. Having no equivalent of specialized 
commercial courts and with negligible business litigation, business law was 
largely an abstraction in those countries. What is more, judges had no codes 
and little if no access to legal reports or periodicals, and they often ignored 
the issue of which laws applied to which economic activity.16 Without effec-
tive risk management, legal innovations, such as limited liability companies 
or secured transactions, which are so essential to the successful advance of 
industrial revolutions, were doomed to remain at the margin of economic de-
velopment. This situation was among the ills OHADA hoped to redress. 
Is it possible to propose a formulation of the legal certainty standard 
relative to OHADA’s ambitions? Keep in mind that OHADA unifies busi-
ness laws, the main objective of which is the protection of modern property 
rights17 and contract enforcement—and here is a useful limit to the definition 
of legal certainty that also limits the scope of the investigation. The protection 
of property rights and contract enforcement requires, in the words of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, that “people . . . know under what circumstances and how 
far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than 
themselves[,]” which meant “the incidence of the public force through the 
instrumentality of the courts.”18 That knowledge presupposes “that all law be 
sufficiently precise to allow the person—if need be, with appropriate advice—
to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, what a given 
action may entail.” 
This means that with respect to harmonized business laws: 
•	 	laws and decisions must be public and publicly available;
•	 	laws and decisions must be definite and clear in their applicability;
•	 	decisions of courts must be enforced and, to the greatest extent possible, 
reasoned, so as to provide relevant information on the compliance of con-
duct with law; and
•	 	persons or officials associated with the application and enforcement of 
those laws must be easily identifiable and properly trained and equipped 
to accomplish their duty.
16  See, e.g., the dismal description made by Xavier Forneris, Harmonizing Commercial Law in 
Africa, 46 Juris Périodique 77, 81 (2001), available at http://www.ohada.com/doctrine 
/titre/199/Harmonising-commercial-law-in-Africa-the-OHADA.html.
17  Francis Fukuyama’s definition of modern property rights is used here, understood as “rights 
held by individuals, who are free to buy and sell their property without restrictions imposed 
by kin groups, religious authorities, or the state.” Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political 
Order 248 (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux 2011).
18  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
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Assessment of OHADA in Regard to Legal Certainty
The goal here is to assess OHADA’s innovations and claim of empowering 
member states’ populations against the standard of legal certainty, as artic-
ulated above. To promote legal certainty, OHADA is based on two pillars: 
the norms it produces and the institutions designed to produce and apply 
those norms. OHADA has largely been successful in terms of the production 
of norms. There are undeniable achievements, mostly concerned with the 
innovations contained in the formulation of OHADA law and centered on 
the supranational level, which are detailed here. However, OHADA has en-
countered serious challenges regarding the application and the reception of 
the uniform acts. OHADA has an Achilles’ heel: the way it is implemented at 
the state level. Only if the focus is on effective implementation can OHADA 
deliver results; this, however, does not seem to be the case.
Achievements
In a remarkably short period of time, OHADA has created a new suprana-
tional organization—no small feat. The principal achievement of OHADA is 
that it has largely fulfilled its aim in the production of uniform law. Thus far, 
OHADA has delivered nine uniform acts that form an innovative, comprehen-
sive, definite, and coherent framework focused primarily on the microlevel, 
the level of the productive unit. For example:
•	 	The General Commercial Law Act provides the fundamental rules of 
business activity: merchant status, commercial leases, commercial sale of 
goods, agency, businesses and movables registry (Registre du Commerce 
et du Crédit Mobilier, or RCCM), and microbusiness.
•	 	The Companies Act provides for various limited liability structures that 
protect business operators. 
•	 	The Secured Transactions Act provides for various securities protecting 
creditors against the risk of defaults of their debtors and sets the condi-
tions for the development of commercial lending.
•	 	The Accountancy Act provides for uniform accounting standards based 
on the true and fair view standard. 
•	 	The Simplified Debt Collection Procedures and Enforcement Measures 
provides operators with modern legal remedies, such as seizures and 
garnishments, that are available to unpaid judgment creditors to compel 
judgment debtors to pay up, if need be with the assistance of the police.
The OHADA drafters opted for a uniform law rather than a harmonized 
one. OHADA is not a model code, which the member states are free to adapt. 
It is a uniform set of legislation that must be applied with consistency in the 
member states. On one hand, this uniformity makes implementation less 
dependent on the governments of the member states, although that is largely 
theoretical. On the other hand, the policy choice of a uniform law makes it ap-
pear more distant from its ultimate constituents and more difficult to reform 
to respond to local circumstances.
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But uniformity means nothing without coherence. In this respect, the co-
herence of OHADA law rests primarily on Article 10 of the treaty, which pro-
vides that the uniform acts preempt all domestic statutes for the subject matter 
they cover, whether enacted before or after the acts’ entry into force. And there 
cannot be coherence without uniformity of interpretation. Thus, to guarantee 
uniformity of interpretation, the OHADA framers created the court of justice, 
the CCJA. 
Some examples of innovations that, if properly applied, could have an 
important impact on OHADA’s constituents, include the following:   
•	 	The entreprenant status: the General Commercial Law Act, revised in 
2010, introduced a status of entreprenant, inspired by the auto-entrepreneur 
status in France, which is credited with leading more than 300,000 persons 
to register an activity in less than a year after its introduction in 2009.
•	 	The Registre du Commerce et du Crédit Mobilier (RCCM): the General 
Commercial Law Act created a three-tiered registry of businesses and 
movables, the RCCM. This registry, by recording businesses and movable 
securities, is an important and essential innovation designed to ensure 
protection for creditors. As such, it is a key institution to favor the devel-
opment of moneylending.
•	 	Pledges without dispossession on tangible assets: the Secured Transac-
tions Act, revised in 2010, instituted pledges without dispossession on 
tangible assets. Provided it becomes a practical reality, this is a welcome 
innovation designed to use stock or any other means of production as col-
lateral without depriving the grantor of the use of the pledged asset. 
A Few Design Flaws
Even though the formal law created by OHADA was well conceived, it is 
not flawless. For example, why did the drafters consider a bankruptcy act to 
be a priority in countries with no significant commercial moneylending? As 
one author put it, “bankruptcy is the unwanted handmaiden of commercial 
debt.”19 Without significant commercial lending, there is no practical use for 
a bankruptcy act. This act should have been implemented farther down the 
road.
The choice of arbitration as the sole alternative dispute resolution method 
was introduced in OHADA to the detriment of mediation, which would cor-
respond better with the traditional method of conflict resolution known as pa-
labre.20 Arbitration is a hard sell in OHADA countries. Perceived as expensive, 
the payment of fees up front is often dissuasive, except for very sophisticated 
businesses. Mediation and conciliation, which, compared with adjudication, 
19  See Wade Channell, Lessons Not Learned about Legal Reforms, in Promoting the Rule of Law 
Abroad, in Search of Knowledge 141 (Thomas Carothers ed., Carnegie 2006).
20  See J.-G. Bidima, La palabre, une juridiction de la parole (Michalon 1997).
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are costless alternatives and centered on consensus building, would be easier 
to sell.
Finally, only two uniform acts (the General Commercial Law Act and the 
Commonly Owned Businesses Act), and one only very partially, acknowledge 
the existence of an informal sector, which accounts for 60 to 85 percent of the 
GDP of the member states.21 
But these challenges are easy to address in comparison to implementation 
challenges.
Implementation Challenges
Diligent application of the existing uniform acts should be the priority of 
OHADA policy makers. Except for employment law—and not everybody 
agrees on that—the OHADA institutions should stop legislating activity and 
dedicate attention to the enforcement of the existing uniform acts. 
The legislation of risks generates conflicts with norms produced by other 
regional organizations. Thus, the more legislation there is, the more oppor-
tunities there are for conflicts with other regulatory ensembles, because all 
OHADA member states are also members of monetary unions, such as the 
Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), and trade and 
customs unions, such as the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). These groups produce regulations, especially in the banking sec-
tor. Only once markets become more concentrated should OHADA legislate 
further.
Regarding proper implementation, OHADA faces various challenges, 
beginning with the institutional challenges of OHADA itself. OHADA must 
transform itself into an integrated judicial space in which final judgments on 
subject matters covered by OHADA are given full faith and credit. Finally, 
and this is certainly the most difficult challenge, OHADA can succeed only if 
member states demonstrate the requisite level of political will and dedication 
to implement OHADA laws.
Institutional Challenges
At the regional level, OHADA institutions are well established. However, they 
still face budgetary constraints. For example, the total budget of OHADA in 
2012 was roughly US$8.3 million, which seems low, especially considering 
that OHADA must organize an annual conference of heads of states.22 More 
important, there seem to be structural problems (not least the use of bud-
21  See Prosper Backiny-Yetna, Secteur informel, Fiscalité et équité, l’exemple du Cameroun, 104 Sta-
téco (2009); Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud, & Constance Torelli, La mesure de 
l’emploi et du secteur informel: Leçons des enquêtes 1-2-3 en Afrique, 104 Statéco (2009).
22  See Minutes of the Council of Ministers (Dec. 15 & 16, 2011), available at http://www.ohada 
.org/actualite-cm/en/cmfj/actualite/3610-compte-rendu-de-la-reunion-du-conseil-des 
-ministres-de-lohada-des-15-et-16-decembre-2011-a-bissau.html.
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get) that indicate that simply injecting money won’t do the trick. Among all 
OHADA institutions, the one that seems to be suffering the most is the CCJA, 
which has backlogs despite a rather modest caseload.23
One structural problem can be traced to the treaty itself, which provides 
that all matters of interpretation of an OHADA provision as a matter of law 
can be deferred only to the CCJA, which cannot refuse to hear the case if it 
deems that the matter does not raise any matter of uniform interpretation at 
the regional level. Although this tenet may appear sound in theory, it has led to 
difficulties in administrative manageability and has made backlogs unavoid-
able. Although this provision does remove the final interpretation of OHADA 
law from the national judiciaries, which are often accused of cooptation by 
political forces and extractive interests and of solving conflicts of interpreta-
tion of OHADA provisions even before states review the matters, it also risks 
causing jurisdictional conflict with domestic supreme courts and hampers the 
CCJA’s manageability, a critical problem given the scarcity of resources in the 
member states. 
To make matters worse, the Rules of Procedure (Réglement de Procédure) 
contain no provision for filtering appeals such as those existing before the US 
Supreme Court, which grants plenary review to an average of only 1 percent 
of the cases on its docket, or for fast-track proceedings such as those insti-
tuted before the French Cour de Cassation in 2001.24 Such proceedings would 
give the CCJA the ability to refuse to hear a case by a nonreasoned decision 
if it deemed that the appeal, which is limited to a matter of legal interpreta-
tion, does not raise interpretative issues requiring a CCJA decision. Instead, 
Article 26 of the Rules of Procedure requires that as soon as an appeal is lodged, 
the CCJA chief justice must appoint a judge to follow up the case management 
and report to the court. This is the same procedure used by the French Cour 
de Cassation before the institution of the fast-track option in 2001, a reform 
motivated by the buildup of large backlogs.
No Integrated Judicial Space 
There is no real judicial space in OHADA, that is to say, a space where final 
and enforceable decisions of the national judiciary on OHADA matters receive 
full faith and credit in OHADA member states applying the same law based 
on a simple recognition and enforcement procedure. Although the treaty pro-
vides that CCJA judgments are directly enforceable in the territory of mem-
ber states under the same conditions as domestic judgments (Article 20 of 
the Rules of Procedure), it does not contain any jurisdictional provision for 
transnational matters, nor does it regulate how final domestic judgments that 
apply uniform law can be applied in other member states.
23  It is difficult to understand how a court with nine judges can have backlogs with a docket of 
a few hundred cases, as compared, for example, with the US Supreme Court, which has the 
same number of judges and an annual docket of 10,000 cases but little backlog.
24  Known as procedure de non admission du pourvoi.
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Because of this shortcoming, issues of jurisdiction, recognition, and en-
forcement within the OHADA judicial space tend to follow national rules, 
which suffer from the same problems as the laws OHADA replaced: they are 
frequently outdated, unavailable, unenforced, and/or nonexistent.
Challenges at the State Level
Perhaps the most prominent example of OHADA’s enforcement weakness is 
the Business and Movable Securities Registry (RCCM). The RCCM operates at 
three levels: local, national, and regional. A creation of the general commercial 
law that entered into force in 1998, the RCCM is largely a virtual registry. Most 
discussions have been centered on computerization, viewed as the remedy of 
all ills. Computerization suffers from its own problems, not least the lack of 
coordination among actors involved in the process, but the issue has much 
deeper roots than that. First, the initial filings are made at the local level, then 
at the national level, and finally at the regional level and little progress can be 
attained if the focus goes the other way around, that is, from the regional to 
the local. Second, and this is the more important problem, a registry of collat-
eral cannot be feasible without a proper vital records registry, which none of 
the member states has managed to create. 
Another implementation issue is the articulation of the uniform acts and 
domestic laws the OHADA acts are intended to replace. In domestic circum-
stances, new text replacing another indicates that the provisions of older in-
struments are repealed. That is called express abrogation.
Express abrogation is difficult with a supranational law, such as OHADA 
laws; article 10 of the treaty provides that the uniform acts are “directly ap-
plicable and mandatory . . . against any contrary provision in domestic law.” 
Thus, OHADA is an example of tacit abrogation.
To make OHADA work, the member states should have inventoried all 
texts repealed by OHADA and enacted express abrogation statutes. Yet, not 
a single country has done that. At best, a proper inventory was made, but no 
statute has been enacted to repeal preempted instruments. At worst, nothing 
has been done. In most cases, hefty fees have been paid to consultants to make 
insufficient inventories. As a result, OHADA provisions coexist with tacitly 
repealed domestic rules, not a tenable situation regarding legal certainty.
These are just some of the implementation challenges that call for the in-
tervention of the governments of the member states. But these are nothing in 
comparison to the challenges caused by the necessity to ensure that OHADA 
becomes a concrete reality for its constituents. In this respect, a reconsidera-
tion of the Dantokpa market is in order. The constituents of OHADA are not 
the judiciary and the various legal professions (attorneys, bailiffs, notaries, 
and the like) of OHADA member states, but rather the business community, 
comprising mostly informal actors.
To reach their true constituents and be effective, OHADA’s laws must 
be implemented and applied by a myriad of intermediary players, including 
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accountants, moneylenders, court registries, chambers of commerce, business 
registration units, microfinance institutions, banks, insurance companies, ar-
bitration and mediation chambers, and all sorts of government officials in-
volved in activities connected with the constitution of capital and the protec-
tion of property for business. But OHADA remains largely an abstraction for 
those actors.
To guarantee the integration of OHADA into domestic legal systems, a first 
and logical step would have been to carry out an inventory of all agents affect-
ed by OHADA and to ensure that these actors are familiar with OHADA and 
comply with it. To provide one example: the websites of most business regis-
tration centers say nothing about the status of entreprenant or microbusiness. 
In the OHADA member states, the status of entreprenant exists only virtually.
Similarly, formalization cannot take hold without the cooperation of tra-
ditional leaders in rural communities. Nothing was done to familiarize tradi-
tional authorities with the advantages of mechanisms such as those promoted 
by OHADA to transform uncertainty into risk management.
Conclusion
OHADA has come a long way since the 1993 Treaty of Port Louis. Few ob-
servers would have expected that a group of states whose track record on 
coordination was decidedly wanting would be able to achieve the goal of stan-
dardizing business laws. The framers of OHADA and international donors as-
sumed that the appropriate social and political institutions required for the ex-
periment to succeed already existed. In retrospect, it was overly optimistic to 
assume that a set of uniform business laws would be self-enforcing and gener-
ate trust toward and among countries in which rent seeking is so entrenched 
and whose judiciaries are crippled by backlogs, corruption, lack of planning, 
and limited accountability. Twenty years after the Port Louis treaty, it is time 
to reintroduce those exogenous parameters into the debate on OHADA.
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Legal Innovation for Development
The OHADA Experience
Marc Frilet
In the years following the independence of the French African colonies, inter-
national investors and the African business community faced many difficul-
ties in ascertaining the applicable principles of company law in the region.1 At 
that time, company law was based on the French Company Act of 1867, which 
ceased to be in force in France in 1966. Interpretation of the law by local courts 
was often hazardous, and few reliable precedents existed. This uncertainty 
was the source of numerous disputes that triggered often unpredictable deci-
sions by local courts, which in turn caused yet more uncertainty and discour-
aged international investment in these countries. 
This volatile situation presented an opportunity for French law firms to 
develop a practice in Africa providing “authoritative interpretations” of com-
pany law. These interpretations were often based on documentation that was 
not available in Africa. The firms’ comparatively easy access to French case 
law gave them lucrative opportunities in Africa.2 
It took years to figure out how to overcome this problem. In 1963, Profes-
sor René David, a leading scholar in comparative law, organized a confer-
ence with the ministries of justice of the former French African colonies to 
assess the need to harmonize the legal system in the interest of economic de-
velopment. This meeting set the stage for the emergence of the Economic and 
Custom Union of West Africa in 1964 and the Economic Community of West 
African States in 1972. Subsequent enlargement of the scope of these organi-
zations included their extension into the insurance sector during the African 
conference on insurance markets in 1972. 
The African and Mauritius Office for Law Research and Studies (Bureau 
Africain et Mauritien de Recherches et d’Etudes Législatives, BAMREL) was 
created in 1975. The purpose of BAMREL was to help signatory states develop 
their legislation in a harmonized manner. Although BAMREL was not imple-
mented due to a lack of funding,3 its conception represents the true beginning 
of the harmonization of business law in the region. 
1  The OHADA region comprises 17 states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African 
Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Equa- 
torial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
2  See also Georges Meissonnier & Jean-Claude Gautron, Analyse de la législation africaine en 
matière de droit des sociétés, 3 RJPIC 331 (1976).
3  See Alhousseini Mouloul, Comprendre l’organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des 
Affaires, 2nd ed., Working Paper 17 (2008).
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The desire of the business community (both in Africa and farther afield) 
to develop a secure legal system for economic transactions was increasingly 
expressed, particularly by private operators and the French Council for Inves-
tors in Africa (CIAN). In April 1991, during the conference of Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso), which included all the ministries of finance of the franc zone, 
the decision to progress toward the harmonization of African francophone 
countries was made. The ministries of finance gave a mandate to a high-level 
panel of seven members, made up of eminent jurists and specialists in busi-
ness law, to propose an action plan. The panel was chaired by Keba Mbaye, a 
Senegalese judge and a former vice-chair of the International Court of Justice.
In October 1992, in a meeting of the heads of state in Libreville (Gabon), the 
report of the panel was presented and endorsed by President Abdou Diouf.4 
The next step was to appoint a directoire, made up of three members, to coordi-
nate and prepare a treaty creating the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en 
Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA, also known as the Organization for 
the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa). The directoire was chaired by 
Mbaye and included Martin Kirsch, honorary counselor of the French Cour de 
Cassation, and Michel Gentot, chair of the dispute department of the French 
Conseil d’Etat. 
After preparation of the draft treaty and several meetings with experts, 
judges, and specialists, 14 states5 signed the treaty in Port Louis (Mau-
ritius) on October 17, 1993;6 the treaty was revised in Quebec (Canada) on 
October 17, 2008.7 
Many of the exchanges were organized under the leadership of Keba 
Mbaye, especially during the conference in Abidjan in 1993, where techniques 
for preparing to harmonize business law were presented and tested (inter alia, 
through the organization of national committees in each country). 
A key objective of OHADA, as reported by Seydou Bâ, former chair of the 
Senegalese Court de Cassation and former president of the OHADA regional 
supreme court (the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration, or CCJA), is
to progressively unify the legal framework in the area of business 
law and to organize a set of legal procedures promoting harmonized 
and sustainable development in all the Member States. Harmoniza-
4  The final communiqué is as follows: The heads of states “approved the project of harmoni-
zation of business law elaborated by the Ministries of Finance of the Franc Zone, decided 
its immediate implementation, and requested to the Ministries of Finance and Justice of 
all interested States to treat this matter as a priority.” Henri Tchantchou, La supranationalité 
judiciare dans le cadre de I’OHADA: Etude à la luminère du système des communautés européennes 
22 (L’Harmattan 2009).
5  The 14 signatory states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, 
Chad, the Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, the Republic of 
Congo, Senegal, and Togo. 
6  See http://www.ohada.com/traite.html. 
7  See http://www.ohada.com/traite-revise.html.
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tion of business law is a real trigger of growth and should facilitate 
the implementation of the rule of law.8 
Legal integration is intended to mirror progress in economic integration at 
the regional level between Central African and Western African states. To this 
end, the OHADA member states designed a set of Uniform Acts on business 
law matters.9 The nine OHADA Uniform Acts cover three broad areas: 
•	 	Commercial relationships and related transactions (general commercial 
law, security law, transport of goods by roads)
•	 	Establishment and operation of commercial entities (company law and 
economic interested groups, accounting law)
•	 	Settlement of disputes and regulation of commercial default (arbitration, 
bankruptcy law, recovery procedures)
Additional acts are in the pipeline for contract law and labor law. 
The acts are currently under review on the basis of a reform program or-
ganized by the World Bank Group’s multidonor Investment Climate Advisory 
Service (FIAS). The overall project objective is to improve the quality and ef-
fectiveness of the legal and institutional framework created by OHADA and 
therefore help the 17 member countries increase their attractiveness for do-
mestic and foreign private investment.10
OHADA is a major legal innovation, unique in the modern world. There 
is much to be learned by assessing it. This chapter looks at its impact from a 
private sector perspective. 
The Positive Features of OHADA
Several OHADA Uniform Acts replaced old business regulations in partici-
pating countries. This move has generally been welcomed by international 
and local businesses that wish to develop their operations in a secure frame-
work and with good governance. The best features of OHADA include the 
following:
8  Seydou Bâ, speech, in Fourth International Conference on Law and Economy: La convergence du 
droit 48–50 (Ordre des avocats de Paris, Edition Lamy Nov. 2005). 
9  The Uniform Acts relate to general commercial law, commercial companies and economic 
interest groups, securities, recovery procedures and measures of execution, proceedings for 
wiping out debts, arbitration, undertakings’ accounting systems in the signatory states to 
OHADA, carriage of goods by road, and cooperative credit banks. 
10  The reform’s program has three components: 1, institutional strengthening of the OHADA 
Secretariat and project implementation support: to strengthen the institutional capacity of 
the Permanent Secretariat; 2, institutional strengthening of the Joint Court of Justice and 
Arbitration (CCJA) and the regional superior magistrate school (ERSUMA); 3, improving 
corporate financial reporting: to improve and strengthen corporate financial reporting, 
accounting standards, professional standards and practices, regional professional qualifica-
tions, and so on. 
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•	 	 The process of drafting, developing, and promulgating the Uniform Acts 
is efficient by all modern standards. 
•	 	 Problems often found in other countries or regions for drafting and adopt-
ing new pieces of legislation are minimized in the OHADA countries.
•	 	 The problem of striking an appropriate balance between general prin-
ciples and concepts and specific language is satisfactorily resolved. The 
Uniform Acts are worded in plain language that is easy to understand, 
with a minimum of cross-references and definitions. Credit must be given 
in this respect to the innovative method for the initial drafting of the Uni-
form Act, which was to invite international law firms to participate. 
•	 	The Uniform Acts are limited to key areas of business laws and as such are 
not particularly politically sensitive. For instance, the Uniform Acts do not 
cover areas that are often considered sovereign privileges, such as mining, 
taxation, and criminal penalties. 
The Uniform Acts are conducive to good governance and economic devel-
opment. In this respect, some were designed to educate the users (members of 
the business community, especially the local business community). This is par-
ticularly relevant for the OHADA company law system. As noted by Professor 
Guyon, the OHADA company law system—as is the case in many civil law 
countries—is more institutional than contractual in character.11 He reminded 
his audience that a role of law is to protect third parties, and the Uniform Act 
Relating to Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups does just 
that. In his view, OHADA company law could become more contractual in the 
future as the economy and the capacity of the players develop. 
Article 2 of the Uniform Act Relating to Commercial Companies and Eco-
nomic Interest Groups states: “The provisions of this Uniform Act are manda-
tory, except in cases where the Act explicitly authorizes a sole partner or the 
partners of a company to substitute contractual provisions between them for 
those of this Uniform Act or to supplement the provisions of this Uniform Act 
with their own provisions.”12 
11  IBA Conference on OHADA, Yaoundé (Cameroon), December 1999.
12  Some international experts and scholars who view this act more from a common law per-
spective may consider it too rigid and not conducive to the facilitation of business activities. 
If this is true for some sophisticated players, it is not the case for most of the African busi-
nesses that need strong guidance and strict boundaries to develop their businesses with legal 
certainty before reaching the stage of sophisticated techniques. This is an important point to 
take into account in a “doing business exercise” sponsored by the World Bank. For instance, 
the obligation to have articles of association drafted or recorded with a public notary has 
raised debate. For most of the new players in the OHADA region, this obligation is perceived 
as an element of facilitation of business and governance, and in particular legal certainty for 
third parties. For some others, it may be considered an unnecessary hurdle limiting the pos-
sibility of easily creating a company. 
  Another debate has been raised concerning the benefits or pitfalls of having a minimum 
paid-up capital as provided for in the OHADA Uniform Acts. In the OHADA region, this 
provision is perceived less as a constraint to creating business than as a facilitation of sus- 
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Some Uniform Acts induce the informal sector of the economy to develop 
activities in the formal sector by providing for the following:
•	 	Registration of commerce and movable credit (RCCM)
•	 	Disclosure of corporate documentation
•	 	Accounting: The Uniform Act on accounting is generally recognized as a 
compromise in this respect, taking into account the real situation in the 
region13
•	 	Progressive access to lines of credit through mortgages and pledges 
•	 	Simplified forms of company structure, including mandatory provisions 
for their organization and operation
The response of the business community in Africa to OHADA has gener-
ally been positive.14 The international legal community also has responded 
positively. An American Bar Association panel made a thorough evaluation 
of the Uniform Acts and in 1999 proposed useful guidance in various areas.15
The Implementation Challenges of OHADA
As with any new legal system, understanding of and compliance with the new 
regime can be a challenge, especially in Africa because of the overall low level 
of income, the poor state of the judiciary, the size of the informal sector, and 
deficiencies in governance. This section discusses some key implementation 
challenges of OHADA for the business community and for investors.
The interpretation and enforcement of the Uniform Acts by the region’s 
judiciaries is and will remain a significant problem. At the highest level, the 
CCJA renders authoritative judgments concerning the interpretation of the 
Uniform Acts16 and has an impressive track record. However, many decisions 
concern procedure and jurisdiction, and relatively few concern the substance 
tainable business activities, because there is no sophisticated banking system and traditional 
security is difficult to organize and implement. 
13  Professor Pérochon, famous for his manual assisting small businesses and owner-managers, 
was the author of this act. He was a practitioner of both the French system of accounting 
rules and international accounting standards.
14  The IFEJI/UBIFRANCE survey was conducted in 2003 with the support of the local business 
community, Conférence Permanente des Chambres Consulaires Africaines et Francophones 
(CPCCAF), and the Syndicat des Entrepreneurs Français à l’International (SEFI). The answers 
to the 30 survey questions are a useful reference for appraising issues faced by the business 
community and proposed actions. 
15  A team of US lawyers and judges had reviewed each Uniform Act (four to eight experts for 
each Uniform Act) . Other reviews were prepared by members of the section of International 
Law and Practice of the American Bar Association (ABA) and the International Judicial Rela-
tions Committee of the United States Judicial Conference under the leadership of William 
Hannay (OHADA project chair and chairman of the section of International Law and Prac-
tice of the ABA), together with two rapporteurs. 
16  Paul Gerard Pougoué & Sylvain Sorel Kuate Tameghe, Les grandes décisions de la cour com-
mune de justice et d’arbitrage de l’OHADA (L’harmattan 2010). 
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of the law. The CCJA also provides advice to national governments and judi-
ciaries that is authoritative but limited.
The greatest challenges facing the CCJA are its location, resources, and 
relationship with national judiciaries. Because of its location in Abidjan and its 
limited resources, the CCJA cannot perform its functions in an optimum man-
ner. The problem of distance is a major issue for most of the OHADA states, 
and one that is negatively seen by practitioners in various countries and the 
international community. The superior courts in member states have resisted 
acknowledging that the CCJA possesses ultimate jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
many judges have only limited knowledge of OHADA.
OHADA also includes a comprehensive and unique system of arbitration. 
Yet, the CCJA also has the authority to conduct arbitration and to rule on ad-
ministrative issues. However, because this function is not well understood by 
the private sector and is underused, the number of authoritative awards is 
limited. 
The OHADA arbitration rules are modern and in accord with interna-
tional standards, but they need to be implemented by administrative services 
provided by the secretary of the arbitration court. So far, the track record of 
implementation is limited. Promoting the arbitration system has proved to be 
a challenge. The system requires improvement in several aspects.17
Another challenge relates to the enforcement of the Uniform Acts in terms 
of criminal sanctions. Without appropriate criminal sanctions, compliance 
with legislative provisions is haphazard. The OHADA approach to criminal 
penalties is interesting in this respect. Article 5, paragraph 2, of the treaty pro-
vides that “[t]he Uniform Acts may include provisions to give rise to criminal 
liabilities.” Article 10 provides that “Uniform Acts are directly applicable and 
overriding in the Contracting States notwithstanding any conflict they may 
give rise to in respect of previous or subsequent enactment of municipal laws.”
Because the Uniform Acts are directly enforceable in each member state, 
criminal offenses should also directly be sanctioned in each member state. 
However, Article 5, paragraph 3, provides that “Contracting States commit 
themselves to enforce sentences of offences.” Thus, the sanction for criminal 
offenses is in fact determined by each state. This situation entails enforcement 
problems and discrimination, because the member states are not harmonizing 
penalties. This conundrum occurs not only with prison sentences and fines 
but also with surety provisions and other procedures for enforcement.18 
17  Improvements could include, for instance, the introduction of more prescriptive procedural 
rules and guidelines governing the appointment and performance of the arbitrators, clarifi-
cation of foreseeable costs depending on various procedural aspects and organization of the 
proceedings, and decentralization of the arbitration’s administration. 
18  Aude-Marie Cartron & Boris Martor, Eclairage sur la révision du Traité de l’OHADA, 36 Cahier 
du Droit de l’Entreprise no. 1 ( Jan.–Feb. 2010).
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This situation is compounded by the fact that it is not always easy to iden-
tify in the Uniform Acts the definition and scope of a criminal offense. Some 
of the acts, such as the Uniform Act on Recovery Procedures and Measures of 
Execution, are particularly complex in this regard.19
Legal or Regulatory Areas Not Regulated
Many key areas of interest to investors are not covered by the OHADA Uni-
form Acts, including
•	 	Taxation and issues of tax certainty and conditions of implementation
•	 	Parafiscality20 
•	 	Customs and related tariffs
•	 	 Exchange control and currency fluctuation issues 
•	 	Private contract law content and interpretation21
•	 	Public contract law content and interpretation
•	 	Permitting risks (risks deriving from governmental or bureaucracy atti-
tude for clearances, nonobjection, approval, and other permits)
•	 	 Land availability and land use risks, including the expropriation process 
and related issues
•	 	Environmental impact studies and related permits 
•	 	Administrative or judicial review of adverse bureaucratic decisions
•	 	Public-private partnership issues
•	 	Employment law risks
19  Michel Mahouve, Le système pénal OHADA ou l’uniformisation à mi chemin, Recueil Penant 
87–94 ( Jan.–Mar. 2004).
20  Parafiscality is recognized as a major risk for the business community and investors. It is 
broadly defined as the fees, royalties, local and sundry taxes, and levies not directly listed 
and not defined in tax code or legislation, mostly payable at the local level or with line min-
istry organizations, for supporting particular activities or services of such administration 
and/or public bodies. In most states, parafiscality charges are numerous and in constant 
development. 
21  Several drafts of Uniform Acts are in circulation, but little progress has been made on an 
avant-projet of Uniform Acts since February 2008. One reason is that this avant-projet is too 
close to the UNIDROIT principles. Various meetings have been held on the subject since 
September 2012, including exchanges between the French Institute of International legal Ex-
perts (IFEJI) and the African professors Issah-Saygeh, Pougoué, and Sawadogo on Septem-
ber 2008 (as part of the activities of the international working group set forth by IFEJI with 
the support of the World Bank and various stakeholders in March 2005: “Legal reform in 
developing countries—evaluation of the OHADA model”). A comparative analysis has been 
made on the drafting process and through benchmarking with the European Union effort 
to assess the benefits of a common European contract law. In Europe, this uniform contract 
law is progressively taking shape after the publication of a common frame of reference for 
its harmonization and a tentative draft of an optional legal instrument for international sales 
published in 2011. 
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At this point, large international investment projects can realize only 
limited benefits of OHADA because OHADA does not regulate most major 
risks.22 Yet these kinds of projects are essential for development in areas such 
as infrastructure, public utilities, and mining.
Business Community Expectations 
The business community expects that OHADA will contribute to the legal 
formalization of day-to-day activities, including relationships with states, 
ministries, public entities, subsovereign entities, and the like. This business 
community is represented at different levels, particularly with the chambers 
of commerce.23 
French investors, who are very active in francophone Africa, have devel-
oped a French business community in Africa, represented by the Conseil Fran-
çais des Investisseurs en Afrique (CIAN) and the Mouvement des Entreprises 
de France (MEDEF). Members of these organizations are in close contact with 
African and international lawyers.24 
In the eyes of the international business community, better and more effi-
cient implementation of the existing Uniform Acts is needed. Three tasks need 
particular attention:
•	 	Reinforce the program run by the ERSUMA school in Benin (see below) to 
train the judiciary. 
•	 	Design a user-friendly system that encompasses the issues of a particu-
lar region and the capacity of the players and then promote arbitration 
through this system. This means, inter alia, doing the following:
•	 	 Guarantee the appointment of an arbitration tribunal that is indepen-
dent, professional, and efficient.
•	 	 Guarantee simple and well-understood proceedings in line with local 
traditions for dispute resolutions.
•	 	Guarantee a fair and enforceable award within a reasonable time.
22  In areas that necessitate major up-front investments and with a very long recovery capacity 
(often over several decades), it is interesting to analyze the risk matrix developed by the 
industry leaders and that led to a due diligence ending at limiting the risks at a reasonable 
level to finance the project. For instance, in large mining projects, the risk matrix identifies 
10 to 20 key chapters in which several key issues are generally identified. Some chapters can 
be well appraised in appropriate regulations, procedures, and reasonable perspectives of 
good implementation. Examples are expropriation, land use, compensation, resettlement, 
environmental permits and environmental and social management plans, and sovereign in-
terference. 
23  Several chambers have developed an integrated system of exchanges and created entities 
such as the Conférence Permanente des Chambres Consulaires Africaines et Francophones 
(CPCCAF).
24  In particular, the French Institute of International Legal Experts (IFEJI), created by the Paris 
Bar, and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs select French practitioners (on average, 120 
practitioners) with day-to-day expertise in international business law matters. 
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•	 	Guarantee an arbitration administration center that is efficient, re-
sponsive, fair, and cheap.
•	 	Allow the possibility of evaluating in advance costs and duration of 
proceedings. 
•	 	Promote the development of uniform “implementing regulations,” guide-
lines, and procedures for the Uniform Acts.
	In considering additional Uniform Acts, two actions may do most to help foster 
international investments in Africa:
•	 	Design an institutional framework that will facilitate long-term public-
private relationships in the core public service sector with appropriate 
guarantees for the stakeholders and a limited impact on state budgets and 
development aid.
•	 	Design principles of public contract law and procedures that facilitate 
transactions involving the public sector. These should include improve-
ment in the procurement of public contracts of all kinds and the provision 
of reasonable guarantees of fair implementation of the various types of 
contracts between the private and the public sectors, together with effi-
cient procedures in areas such as mining contracts, urban development, 
forestry, lease of public land, and agriculture projects.
Capacity Building and Empowerment Issues
The international community has been actively building capacity in the 
OHADA region. For example, the ERSUMA school in Porto-Novo (Benin), 
which conducts training for the judiciary,25 provides support to OHADA in-
stitutions such as the OHADA national committees. Yet, it is clear that much 
remains to be done in terms of capacity building and empowerment in regard 
to OHADA.
The OHADA model has been assessed with a view to further improving 
the lawmaking process and the legal certainty for the business community. Sev-
eral international working groups with that focus were established in the mid-
2000s, particularly in the wake of two conferences organized by the Paris Bar 
inviting African experts and practitioners, as well as World Bank specialists, in 
Washington (2004) and in Paris (2005).26 These exchanges led to the creation of a 
joint working group on legal reforms in developing countries, which has as its 
objectives the evaluation of OHADA and the dissemination of lessons learnt. 
The World Bank Group is playing an important role in funding programs 
to evaluate the content and implementation of the Uniform Acts through 
the World Bank Group’s multidonor Investment Climate Advisory Service 
25  See http://web.ohada.org/ersuma.html. 
26  The World Bank was represented by Robert Danino, senior vice president and general coun-
sel of the World Bank, and Michael Klein, chief economist of the IFC (World Bank).
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(FIAS). This effort has resulted in a useful revision and improvement of some 
Uniform Acts (relating to securities and general commercial law), and other 
acts are in the pipeline (relating to competition law, banking law, intellectual 
property law, civil societies law, and evidence).27 The international donor com-
munity is also supporting the OHADA institutions. 
More work is needed to build capacity in OHADA institutions and to imple- 
ment provisions on the ground. Specific areas that require attention include 
•	 	The efficient implementation of the Trade and Personal Property Credit 
Register, an instrument for securing transactions and developing the 
economy
•	 	The organization and selection of the judiciary 
•	 	The organization of efficient and user-friendly arbitration centers
•	 	The process of designing and implementing in various states regulations 
that further develop and adapt the OHADA Uniform Acts at various lev-
els, including the clear abrogation of national regulations that conflict 
with the Uniform Acts 
Josette Nguebou, professor of law at the University of Yaoundé (Camer-
oon), explored the sensitive relationships between the Uniform Acts and the 
national laws of the member states. She found that “although national law 
not conflicting with the Acts remained applicable, nothing prevents the Mem-
ber States from maintaining and expending regulations which could narrow 
down its scope or even prevent its effective implementation.”28
Capacity building and empowerment should also be oriented toward 
•	 	Fostering exchanges between scholars and practitioners on the implemen-
tation of the Uniform Acts and authoritative case law.
•	 	Training the legal profession in the international business law system.
•	 	Training senior civil servants to engage with the international business 
community in order to permit them to be on an equal footing with expe-
rienced international players when negotiating, implementing, and moni-
toring their relationships. This would apply, for example, to projects in the 
oil and gas sector, the mining sector, the infrastructure sector, the utility 
sector, the agricultural sector, and the forestry sector. 
•	 	Enabling more extensive exchanges between the local administrations 
and the administrations of other countries and regions. 
•	 	Implementing more proactive programs in e-learning. Well-prepared pro-
grams of e-learning, including appropriate documentation transmitted in 
27  See the harmonization agenda adopted by the Council of Ministers of the OHADA region 
during the Bangui meeting of March 2001. 
28  See OHADA Treaty, Les actes uniformes commentés et annotés, Juriscope 249 (1999). On this 
matter, see also Marc Frilet, Implementing the Rule of Law in Sub-Sarahan Africa: Appraisal of the 
OHADA after a Decade, 8(3) Bus. L. Intl., 254–67 (Nov. 2007).
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advance by electronic means and used as background material for work-
shops or specialized classes, can be effective at building capacity. The 
programs should be monitored by teachers or facilitators who have been 
trained to teach in an e-learning manner, including, when appropriate, 
direct online contact with authoritative scholars in other countries.29
•	 	Fostering new relationships between the public and private sectors to ease 
the transfer of investment. This was identified as a top priority by multi-
laterals and by the G20 Business Summit in Cannes (also referred to as the 
B20 of Cannes) in November 2011. Infrastructure development is seen as 
essential to achieving the Millennium Development Goals, and to that end 
the business community has been urged to develop a framework for better 
projects.30 Proposals have been made to design a new act on PPP; in June 
2011, the council of ministers of OHADA decided to explore that option. 
Perfecting a system of equitable public contract law based on concepts 
and case law should be a priority, especially because some OHADA countries 
have started to experience the benefits of equitable public contract law for 
both the private sector and the public sector in landmark and long-term public 
infrastructure and utility projects. 
Conclusions
OHADA has many positive features, and lessons learned from its implemen-
tation can be instructional for organizations considering business activities 
not only in that region but also in other regions of the world.
Improved understanding of the Uniform Acts will help strengthen the in-
vestment climate and make it easier to do business in the region. Particular 
attention should be given to a clearer definition of criminal offenses (including 
the nature and scope of the criminal penalties). One solution might be to pro-
mulgate a Uniform Act on this matter.31 
29  E-learning conducted by faculties of law deserves to be taken into account; see, for instance, 
development of e-learning under the auspices of the International Bar Association (IBA). 
30  See G20/B20, Final Report of the Business Summit in Cannes, 8 (Nov. 2011). In relation to pub-
lic-private partnerships, the G20 report (p. A-71) says, “without appropriate institutional 
and legal framework, most of the public-private partnership (PPP) projects proposed for 
developing countries have a high likelihood of failure.” An international working group 
made of international lawyers with expertise in concession and other PPPs worldwide and 
representatives of the construction industry has been working on the matter with various 
agencies for a few years. This group, after reviewing many projects with governments and 
local authorities, identified 30 issues that need to be addressed in an inclusive manner for the 
success of long-term concessions and other PPP projects. The publication of a handbook on 
the conditions of success of concessions and other PPPs, together with an evaluation matrix 
for concession on other PPP projects, individually or at an institutional, regulatory, or con-
tractual level, is expected in 2012. See CICA website, http://www.cicanet.com/.
31  See Achille Ngwanza, OHADA, Entre adolescence et âge adulte, une crise existentielle, Rapport 
général de l’université d’été de cercle horizon, club OHADA d’Orléans ( Jul. 1–3 2008).
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The greater problem is that regulatory sectors essential for the economic 
development of Africa, which are not well controlled by national laws or re-
gional organizations, are not yet regulated by Uniform Acts. Looking ahead, it 
is important to consider new Uniform Acts in key areas where a good regula-
tory framework already exists. It is also essential to launch an innovative pro-
cess of capacity building and empowerment in the various directions outlined 
above, such as developing exchanges between scholars and practitioners, and 
training members of the legal profession and senior civil servants. Greater 
participation of legal practitioners experienced in providing advice in Africa 
may be the key to this process.32
Laurent Esso, minister of justice of Cameroon and president of OHADA, 
reported on the collateral benefit of OHADA in terms of legal innovation. In 
his view, OHADA is a conduit for convergence between civil law and common 
law in business law matters. He believes that Cameroon could be a laboratory 
for facilitating the implementation and interpretation of the OHADA Uniform 
Acts due to its unique civil law/common law regimes.33 Professor Barthélemy 
Mercadal, a specialist in international business law, followed this path by pro-
moting convergence in the interpretation of legal concepts worldwide (inter 
alia, between the civil law and the common law worlds) based on the same or 
similar legal provisions and using the OHADA Uniform Acts as a background. 
Mercadal’s extraordinary effort, which led to a publication of Code IDEF annoté 
de l’OHADA,34 will contribute to encouraging business players at both the na-
tional and the international levels to use the Uniform Acts on a regular basis.35 
OHADA is an advanced and inclusive example of legal innovation for 
development. As such, the OHADA Uniform Acts are an excellent ground on 
which to test the benefits of an emerging field focusing on the optimization of 
legal frameworks and products. Although the contribution of OHADA to this 
field is already significant, much more can be done to apply lessons for further 
legal innovation.36
32  Business community and legal practitioners active in this area include UNIDA, CIAN, 
MEDEF, IFEJI, and IBA, which have conducted several conferences. 
33  Uniform Commercial Law Infrastructure and Project Finance in Africa, 215 Intl. Bus. L. (May 2000).
34  http://www.institut-idef.org/-Code-OHADA-annote-.html.
35  See also Marc Frilet, Le raisonnement juridique du monde anglo-saxon: Quelques considérations 
élémentaires et quelques recettes pour éviter les malentendus contractuels, in La revue des entreprises 
(MEDEF Jan. 2000). 
36  For information on this emerging field, known as l’art de la légistique, see Carine Gilberg, 
L’art de la légistique, Gazette de Palais 8–10 ( Jan. 6–7, 2010); Alexander Flückiger & Christine 
Guy-Ecabert, Guider les parlements et les gouvernements pour mieux légiférer—le rôle des guides de 
légistique (Schulthess 2008); Guide pour l’élaboration des textes législatifs et réglementaire, avail-
able at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/Guide_legistique_2/accueil_guide_leg.htm; 
Catherine Bergeal, Savoir rédiger un texte normatif (Berger-Levrault 2004); Marc Frilet, Le code 
civil, une source d’inspiration inégalée pour améliorer la sécurité juridique en matière internationale, 
87 Revue de l’Avocat Conseil d’Entreprise (Dec. 2003). 
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